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 ABSTRACT  
 
The thesis is about the criminal organisation of people smuggling and human 
trafficking from Libya to Italy.  In order to concentrate on the nature of the 
criminality, the separate but closely related crimes of people smuggling, and 
human trafficking are conflated into the portmanteau criminal concept of the 
‘human trade’.  It argues that the nature of the criminality involved in this human 
trade between Libya and Italy has significantly changed over the last decade.  
Previously, scholars regarded criminal networks engaged in this trade as fluid 
and unstructured.  This work demonstrates from a close examination of the 
criminal networks that they are now, for the most part, specialised, scattered, 
unrestrained and structured.   
 
The research uses a qualitative approach to investigate the trade based on 
unique access to the judicial proceedings of cases investigated by the Italian 
criminal justice system and tried in Italian tribunals.  Statement analysis of these 
proceedings, alongside semi-structured interviews conducted in Sicily and Rome 
offer novel and original insights into the way criminal networks involved in this 
trade have evolved.   
 
The thesis examines significant aspects of the trade, namely the actors involved, 
their roles and degree of specialisation and their ‘way of operating’ or modus 
operandi which has become increasingly unrestrained in its use of violence and 
coercion, hostage taking and ransom demands, whilst analysis of the structure of 
the networks finds that they are scattered and more structured than networks 
operating five years previously.  In other words, the thesis demonstrates that 
these criminal networks have, over the past ten years, become better organised, 
more violent, sophisticated and complex as reflected in the models developed in 
this research. These models are recommended to enhance the understanding, 
and likewise enable an effective management of the phenomenon. 
 
The longevity, prosperity and sustained appeal of these criminal networks is 
attributed to their ability to adapt to new circumstances arising from state policies.  
It is therefore concluded that the Libya to Italy irregular migration across the 
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Mediterranean once driven by fluid unstructured networks is ipso facto, now 
steered by specialised yet scattered networks that are unrestrained in their 
modus operandi.  
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Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Reports indicate that the criminal organisation of the ‘human trade’ from Libya to 
Italy, a trade that is estimated to have transported 11,749 irregular migrants in 
2007 which, at the time constituted a national emergency and triggered a political 
crisis rose by 2014 to 42,000 persons. The number increased rapidly to 170,000 
in 2015 and 181,000 in 2016, then fell to, the still substantial, 119,000 in 2017 
(Médecins sans Frontier 2013; BBC News 2015; Sherwood, Smith, Davies, and 
Grant 2014; Médecins sans Frontier 2017; International Organisation for 
Migration, IOM 2017; Squires 2015).  Many of these migrants were recorded as 
unmarried and arrive from Eritrea, Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Guinea and Niger. 
Many die en route and, of those who survive, the UN estimates that 80% of the 
women end up being trafficked into prostitution (a sample demographic data is 
presented in the chapter 3 of this work).  This human tragedy attracted my 
attention since many women and girls trafficked from Libya to Italy, in fact come 
from my own country, Nigeria.  
 
The research examines the nature of the criminality behind this human trade.  It 
argues that over the last decade this criminality has changed from being 
organised by fluid and unstructured networks, to being organised by structured 
networks that are increasingly specialised, scattered, unrestrained and 
structured.  
 
Research has shown that the majority of these persons, who decide to move or 
flee, often undertake the movement with the aid of criminal agents (Europol-
Interpol Report 2016).  This is because they mostly do not possess the required 
authorization which will grant them access to legal migration channels 
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012).  These include border-related 
bureaucracies and control systems which they may not be able to deal with.   
Secondly, migrants may resolve to employ the services of criminal agents or 
gangs as a result of the geographical distance, as well as the complexity of the 
trip which they do not have the capacity to manage.  In these circumstances, the 
illegal and risky alternative way is perceived as the only viable option for migrants 
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searching for the ‘safest’ means of escape from the perils of war in war-torn 
regions and also better economic alternatives.  
 
To what degree has the Arab Spring of 2011, encouraged irregular migration by 
sea to Europe?  While some have agreed with the claim that the Arab Spring has 
been a catalyst for the increase in the volume of migration across the 
Mediterranean, which in addition has boosted the business of criminal gangs, a 
number of scholars such as De Haas (2014) and Paoletti (2014) have strongly 
opposed the submission.  Their view is that the Arab Spring has only amplified 
the ‘logic of criminalization’ that has long marked immigration debate in Italy and 
elsewhere’ (Paoletti 2014).  The Arab Spring is critically examined in chapter 3 
as is its impact on the role of Libya in the criminality involved in transporting 
migrants across the central Mediterranean. 
 
The issue of the actual nature of criminality involved in the practice has also 
become a topic of debate.  Although Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi (2013) explain 
that the ‘Arab Spring’ might have contributed to the geopolitical changes which in 
turn led to the emergence of new migration flows created by diverse regional 
crises, the active involvement of organised crime groups have also played a 
significant role in the whole migration process which this study refers to as the 
‘human-trade’.  
 
Prior to the political, economic and social shocks of the Arab Spring, a tentative 
analysis emerged in the literature that sought to map the criminality involved in 
this maritime human trade through the activities of loose, fluid networks which 
never crystallised.  It is the scope of organised criminal networks’ involvement in 
the trafficking and smuggling of migrants that is yet to be determined in 
ethnographic and migratory studies.  While, myriad of studies have focused on 
the continuum of organised crime versus a criminal network continuum in the light 
of terrorism, national and international security among others, the influence of 
criminal networks in the human trade has been somewhat neglected.  
 
Though there have been previous studies on the human trade – people 
smuggling and trafficking – they have failed to fully address events such as the 
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Lampedusa boat tragedies and other humanitarian cases in the Mediterranean 
exposing a gap in the approach.  A better analysis of these recent events will 
hopefully expose the underbelly of the various criminal networks involved. 
 
Other debates in the migration discourse concern the use of terms such as ‘illegal’ 
or ‘irregular’ migrants and the manner of labelling used for migrants which has 
made the question of identification an issue.  The literature argues that irregular 
migrants, trafficked victims, refugees and asylum seekers have been conflated, 
hence not properly managed (Batsyukova 2012; Phillips (2014).  Again, the 
question of ‘who’ the actors are in this phenomenon, their links and roles, 
particularly with reference to the routes and period examined in this work, 
remained unclear.  One of these debates as regards the actors is the involvement 
of the European states and their complicity in irregular migration crimes. A good 
number of them have argued that the manner in which the EU policies and the 
restrictive immigration measures have been managed and applied respectively 
have resulted in the violation of human rights of the migrants as well as the 
consequential humanitarian crisis that characterised the last decade. (Nigram, 
1965, Hollis 2012 & 2016, Achilli 2016, Research and Evidence Facility (REF) 
2017, and Molenaar and van Damme   2017, Adler 2018, Welander 2018, 
Guiraudon 2018, and Estevens 2018).  There is also the question of the 
relationships existing between the different roles involved in the business and the 
structure of the organisations; whether they are centralized and hierarchical in 
nature or in the form of networks of self-governing actors linked by short-term 
agreements which are periodically renewed.  This investigation is not intended to 
provide solutions on how to stop people smuggling or trafficking in persons, but 
it does seek to examine the extent to which transnational criminal organisations 
– regardless of their structure and formation - are involved in the smuggling of 
migrants from Libya to Italy in particular.  And it interrogates what role these 
Transnational Criminal Organisations (TCOs) play in this process; who are the 
actors and how are they involved or linked? 
 
Additionally, gender issues permeate the issue of irregular migration. The 
research identifies five key areas where gender is relevant to the phenomenon of 
irregular migration: (a) females are under-represented in the smuggling networks; 
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(b) gender influences the reasons for migration and who migrates; (c) gender 
influences the networks subscribed to and their accesses to resources; (d) gender 
influences the treatment experienced throughout the migration process; and (e) 
gender also influences how migration is perceived by outsiders. These five 
elements are reflected in this work. 
 
Through evaluating these debates and gathering new data this study seeks to 
determine the nature of criminality in the irregular migration of persons by sea, 
from Libya to Italy.  The study begins by contextualising the phenomenon of 
irregular maritime migration from Libya to Italy through a review of literature 
focused on organised crime, migration studies and networks.  It seeks to establish 
the distinction between people smuggling and human trafficking, given that in the 
debate the two phenomena are often conflated in such a way that it has led to 
confusion about how the victims and the offenders of irregular migration are 
managed.  A careful distinction between the two will aid in identifying the category 
of migrants who travelled before 2007 from those who form the majority in the 
current sea border crossing from North Libya to Italy.  Some have argued that 
migrants who are refugees and asylum seekers should not be classified as 
criminals, since they are doing no more than using irregular migration as a means 
of escaping conflict (Liempt 2011; Phillips 2014).  
 
This study then proceeds to analyse the scholarly debates on models and 
paradigms of organised crime, examining their applicability in divergent 
categories of organised crime particularly human trafficking and people 
smuggling from Libya to Italy.  The analysis is undertaken with the aid of unique 
access to irregular migration cases from the courts of Palermo and Agrigento in 
Italy, reviewed on a case-study basis and juxtaposed with evidence and data from 
interview transcripts.  The analysis of organised crime covers the actors, the 
modus operandi used by these actors and the structure of the networks involved. 
It finds that contemporary networks have specialised parts that they are 
unrestrained in their use of violence to achieve their ends, and that are scattered.  
 
Having outlined the debates on and definitions of the core migration concepts, 
the thesis proceeds with a combination of abductive and deductive approaches 
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to critically assess the connection between the political-economic dynamics of 
Libya and the evolution of the flows of irregular migration across the 
Mediterranean.  This further enables the evaluation of the impact of socio-political 
crises and other push factors that feed the migrants’ need to enter Europe and 
the resultant increase in the volume of detections on the Mediterranean from 
2007-2017. 
 
This study also analyses the changes in the organisational structure and modus 
operandi employed by the human smugglers involved in the Libya to Italy irregular 
maritime migration.   The consequences of these changes is evidenced in media 
reports of shipwrecks and mounting death tolls among the migrants venturing 
across the Mediterranean.  The aim is to revise and reconstruct model(s) of the 
means and methods of this form of irregular migration.  This work reveals models 
that will bring to light the nature and role of criminal group/organisations involved 





• To investigate the nature and reality of irregular migration by sea from 
Libya to Italy  
 
• To critically analyse the role of the dramatis personae [actors] and their 
modus operandi as organised criminal groups in the Libya to Italy human 
trade. 
 
• To critically evaluate the causal links between changes in irregular 




• Within the scope and context of this research, what is organised crime? 
 
• Who are the actors, how is it structured and organised and what is the 
modus operandi? 
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• What are the strategies – old and new – as, identified by the research 
findings? 
 
• How do the research findings compare with previous models of organised 
crime in relation to people smuggling and human trafficking? 
 
 
Scope of study 
 
Although irregular migration is an increasingly global phenomenon, this research 
will be limited to people smuggling and trafficking on the routes from Libya to Italy.  
The investigation will focus on the Libya to Italy route.  The selection of Libya-
Italy route is based on the scale of the recent and current maritime humanitarian 
crisis and the volume of interception on the Libya-Italy route (GIATOC, 2014).   
The study will use the neologism ‘human trade’ throughout the thesis to refer to 
the separate, but closely connected, concepts of ‘people smuggling’ and ‘human 
trafficking’.  The distinction between people smuggling where the victim is 
ostensibly the state into which the migrants are smuggled, and human trafficking 
where the victim is the exploited trafficked individual, is recognised and accepted.  
However, it is equally argued that there is a debate over the validity of the existing 
legal criteria that distinguish between the smuggling and trafficking (Bhabha & 
Zard 2006) and a growing recognition that smuggling can very often transmute 
into trafficking.  That is, an apparent business arrangement to transport an 
irregular migrant can readily become an exploitative relationship.  So as to 
concentrate on determining the nature of criminality in the movement of migrants 
from Libya to Italy, rather than becoming distracted by the, often contested, 
distinction between smuggling and trafficking, the study will employ the 
portmanteau term ‘human trade, as a deliberate conflation of these two concepts.   
 
Summary of the chapter structure 
 
This study is broken into chapters as follows:  
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Chapter 1 introduces the main over-arching aim and the subsidiary objectives.  It 
delineates the scope of the study, notably the type(s) of criminality being 
investigated and sets the geographical limits to the study.  Finally, it outlines the 
chapter structure for the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the scholarly literature outlining the debates about 
organised crime as a phenomenon and the nature of [transnational] organised 
criminal networks.  These scholarly debates are placed in the context of the 
increased volume of irregular migration from Libya to Italy and the changing 
nature and character of the transnational organised criminal networks involved in 
this human trade.  
 
Chapter 3 begins by more closely exploring the inter-connectivity of the distinct 
but closely connected criminal activities of people smuggling and human 
trafficking, justifying the approach of this study to conflate these related crimes 
into a portmanteau [criminal] activity: the ‘human trade’.  The chapter concludes 
by delineating the specific routes used to move irregular migrants from Africa to 
Europe, and most particularly through the central route from Libya to Italy.  
  
Chapter 4 explains and justifies the chosen methodologies for the study.  In 
particular, it explores the use of judicial proceedings as a key methodology for 
the study, critically assessing the benefits and potential drawbacks to using this 
powerful, but under-employed methodology in social scientific research.  The use 
of the ‘scientific content and analysis’ and Statement analysis techniques as tools 
to analyse the proceedings are also explored.  Finally, the chapter explains and 
substantiates the use of semi-structured interviews conducted in the field in Sicily 
and Rome to balance and cross-check the evidence and data extracted from the 
judicial proceedings.  
 
Chapter 5 is the first chapter based primarily on the evidence and data gathered 
from primary research.  As with the subsequent two analysis chapters it uses 
evidence and data from one particular investigation conducted by the Italian 
criminal justice authorities against those criminals involved in the human trade.  It 
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focuses on the thesis’ contention that the actors involved in the human trade from 
about 2011 onwards have become much more specialised in their roles than was 
previously the case.  Using data mined from the proceedings and evidence and 
data gathered from semi-structured interviews, the chapter produces a typology 
of the near-contemporary role categories of the criminal actors, investigating how 
this evolution has changed the nature of criminality in the human trade between 
Libya to Italy.  
 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the evolution of the criminals’ ‘way of operating’ or 
modus operandi in the human trade from Libya to Italy.  Again, it concentrates, 
although not exclusively, on a particular investigation that turns on new or 
changing means and methods employed by the criminals, and criminal networks, 
involved in the trade.  In particular, the chapter defends the thesis finding that the 
ways in which the criminals and networks operate lack restraint whether in terms 
of the monies extorted or the violence and coercion used against the migrants.   
 
Chapter 7 analyses the ways in which the human trade has evolved from the 
2000s when the number of irregular migrants crossing the central Mediterranean 
could be measured in the tens of thousands to the current situation when the 
numbers are in the hundreds of thousands with a concomitant increase in the 
numbers drowning whilst making the crossing.  It focuses on a case that 
highlights changes to the way in which the criminal networks are structured 
arguing that previous findings from the scholarly literature that these networks 
might be characterised as ‘fluid’ and ‘unstructured’ need to be revised to 
recognise a more ‘scattered’ and ‘structured’ approach to their organisation. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes all the arguments and presents the study’s contribution to 
knowledge, strong suggestions, recommendations and areas possible of future 
researches.  
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Chapter 2 ORGANISED CRIME AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
 
Organised crime has been labelled transnational organised crime (TOC) by the 
UN and identified as a serious threat that undermines a country’s institutions and 
norms.  Findlay (2000) argues that TOC is a feature of transnational globalised 
societies.  Pivotal to globalisation is the movement of people across borders and 
the role of TOC as a facilitator of the human trade is contested in the scholarly 
literature.  The purpose of this chapter is to explore models of organised crime 
with reference to the human trade.  It first critically examines initial models that 
perceive criminal networks as fluid and unstructured networks.  It then offers an 
alternative analysis in terms of networks that are specialised (as regards their 
actors), unrestrained (as regards their behaviour) and scattered (as regards their 
nature).  
 
The academic literature details several structured networks that exist globally. 
However, based on general assumptions, stereotypes and American action/crime 
films, such as Mario Puzo’s The Godfather (1969), whenever mention is made of 
a structured criminal group, the Mafia always comes to mind (Arsovska, 2014).  
According to Arsovska, ‘The Godfather’ and ‘Scarface’ movies contributed a lot 
towards painting the Mafia as a criminal organisation especially when organised 
criminal networks is being discussed. Using the Mafia as a model, this work will 
examine if a network so structured can fit into the concept of a transnational 
organised criminal network.  This is aimed at providing an understanding of the 
role of criminal networks in the organised crime of human trade, providing 
answers to the investigation on the nature of criminality in the human trade 
particularly from Libya to Italy.  
 
The analysis in this chapter will begin with an encapsulation of the concept of 
transnational organised crime and the definitions that are prevalent.  It will further 
analyse the debates and the paradigms of the phenomenon, highlighting the 
predominant models presented by scholars in the field. Subsequent sections of 
this chapter will present a critical analysis of transnational criminal 
groups/network which will endeavour to answer questions bordering on the 
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involvement of parties in transnational organised criminal groups.  The analysis 
in this chapter will conclude with a summary of major disagreements and 
agreements on transnational organised criminal networks and their link with 
people smuggling and trafficking. The terms ‘organised crime, transnational 
organised criminal groups or networks, organised criminal groups, smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in persons will be used frequently in this work and as 
such will be represented by OC, TOCG/N, OCG, SM and TIP respectively. 
 
 
The Theoretical Framework of Organised Crime and Transnational Criminal 
Networks 
 
This section explores the different perceptions, concepts and definitions of 
organised crime. Organised crime (OC) has been described by UNODC as a 
phenomenon that ‘threatens peace and human security, violates human rights 
and undermines economic, social, cultural, political and civil development of 
societies around the world’ (UNODC 2014). This view is supported by Williams 
(1994) who claims that perpetrators of OC such as transnational criminal 
networks (TCNs) not only undermine civil society, but also create chaos and 
exploit the uncertainties created by domestic and international development, 
flourishing in weak states with weak governance structures. Wright (2006) further 
argues that the phenomenon has become one of the key public policy battles of 
the 21st century. Galeoti (2008) considers OC an essentially modern 
phenomenon, despite its long history. 
 
At present, there is no generally accepted definition of the phenomenon, rather it 
is generally understood as the coordination of various aspects of an activity such 
that it creates a particular structure commonly identified by its categories and 
features (Adamoli et al 1998).  On the other hand, Allum and Siebte (2004) point 
out that organised crime in its contemporary form is often both invisible and 
pervasive.  Van Dijck (2007) does not believe in the need for a harmonised 
definition of organised crime. He rather considers it as ‘a threat image’ which is 
being brandished in the absence of a more decisive way of addressing the 
phenomenon and its aftermath. Several scholars have presented different 
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definitions (Adamoli et al 1998), but strikingly, Arsovska (2014:1) points out that 
the term organised crime does not mean that the crime in question is necessarily 
organised.  She further maintains that although certain crimes require a degree 
of organisation, they still cannot be referred to as organised crime.  Hence the 
need to differentiate the various types of crime (Arsovska 2014).  Following 
Arsovska’s argument, Hauck and Peterke (2016) explore the term ‘organised 
criminality’, emphasising that a number of crimes that are not listed as organised 
crimes nonetheless fall into that category such as  burglary, vandalism  car theft 
etc. being that defining OC broadly or narrowly influences what is to be covered 
or left out.  Bullock (2009) identifies these sort of crimes as crimes which the 
public perceive as high-impact crimes – associated with high levels of harm – 
judging by the extent it impacted mainly the physical and emotional wellbeing of 
a victim rather than  how organised it was.  The argument of Hauck and Peterke 
(2016) here points to the fact that a mere listing of crimes provides no information 
about what category of crime is identified, and the possibility that organised crime 
may refer to criminal organisation (e.g. drug cartels, triads, Mafia, etc.). However, 
the facts of modern criminal law permits that individuals are punished not for what 
they are but for what they do, and with the use of indicator activities1; OC is 
identifiable as a clandestine criminality when investigated (Hauck and Peterke 
2016,Andrews et al :125). Bearing in mind these complexities in understanding 
the actual category of crimes to be classified as ‘organised’, and following the 
analysis of Hauck and Peterke (2016), it is possible to contest the opinion of 
Arsovska (2014) that a structured organisation of a crime automatically classifies 
such crime as an organised crime.  This is because the main motive of OC which 
is profit appears to be often misplaced in analysis of organised crime by scholars 
(Madsen 2016).  
 
Further on the debate, Dobovsek (1996) argues that ‘…different definitions of 
organised crime throughout Europe as well as in the world, the differences in 
judicial systems, the differences in the police registration methods of organised 
 
1 Monitoring that detects the action/activities of organised crime groups either by Frequent Item set Mining or Real-time Situation 
assessment, powered by Formal Concept analysis (a mathematisation of concept and concept hierarchies represented by a table 
(Andrews et al :125). This implies that no matter how much elusive OC group may make their activities so as not to be detected. 
These strategies will pick up frequent/repeated actions that would expose their activities.  
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crime and the differences in registration of criminal offences and of police 
activities’ (p.324), make it difficult to accurately define organised crime.  The 
definition for organised crime often differs from country to country (INTERPOL 
2014).  Wright (2006) to this end, contends that some scholars adopt an 
emotional or romantic approach to defining organised crime.  Likewise, Albanese 
et al (2003) refers to factors such as geographical location, economic 
circumstances, history, politics and government, as well as culture, beliefs and 
traditions of a country as influencing different definitions of the term.  This equally 
contributes to the complexities in identifying an all-encompassing definition of the 
phenomenon.  
 
Arsovska’s explores the historical etymology of the term organised crime. A report 
made by a US Federal Commission set up by President Herbert Hoover in 1929 
described organised crime as a business, listing crimes of legitimate businesses 
and commercialised fraud and all forms of racketeering, naming it ‘organised 
crime’ (2014).  A second attempt at defining organised crime is to be found in the 
United States Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968) 
 
…unlawful activities of members of a highly organized, disciplined 
association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, 
including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, 
narcotics, labour racketeering, and other unlawful activities of 
members of such associations (Public Law 90-351, cited  in 
Arsovska 2014).  
 
This definition has been criticised for directing the focus from the offenders of 
organised crime to the crime itself.  Arsovska also charts the involvement of the 
UN in defining organised crime beginning in the mid-1970s (2014).  This journey 
produced the first Draft Framework against Organised Crime in early 1997 
following the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime 
which foresaw the possible expansion of the phenomenon and first referred to 
Transnational Organised Crime.  The related definition states that organised 
crime  
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…means group activities of three or more persons, with 
hierarchical links or personal relationships that enable their 
leaders to earn profits or to control territories or markets, internal 
or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation, or corruption, in 
both furthering criminal activity and infiltrating the legitimate 
economy, in particular by the following means: illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub-positions, and money-
laundering; traffic in persons; counterfeiting currency; illicit traffic 
in or the theft of cultural objects; the theft of nuclear material; 
terrorist acts; illicit traffic in arms and explosive materials or 
devices; illicit traffic in or the theft of motor vehicles; and the 
corruption of public officials (quoted in Arsovska 2014). 
 
This attempt at a definition by the UN rests on a legally binding instrument of 
December 2000 which finally came into force in 2003 known as the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNCTOC).  This 
definition may have implied that the offenders of organised criminal activities (of 
which human trade is a part) could be categorised merely under hierarchical or 
personal groups which enable profits earning for their leaders.  However this 
research presents networks that are not structured in this way.  The evidence of 
the research demonstrates a shift into specialised, unrestrained and scattered 
networks that do not operate solely for the profit gain of an overall head.  Even 
so, UNCTOC defines ‘organised criminal group’ and ‘serious crime’, rather than 
organised crime (UNTOC Article 2, a, and b).  According to Arsovska (2014), 
there exist presently over 200 scholarly and institutional definitions of organised 
crime as a phenomenon, but still no universally accepted definition.  
 
Two definitions by British commentators deserve mention. Mills et al (2013) 
refers to two UK government definitions 
 
Organised crime involves individuals, normally working with 
others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime 
on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, 
control and coordination, and benefits those involved. The 
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motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. Some types of 
organised crime, such as organised child sexual exploitation, 
have other motivations (UK HM, cited in Mills et al 2013:15) 
 
The National Crime Agency (NCA) states that ‘organised crime can be defined as 
serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on 
a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain’ (NCA 
2014).   
 
A crime is referred to as transnational, if it is  a crime ‘not confined to a single 
nation or state, but including, extending over, or operating within more than one’ 
(Encarta 2012).  Lampe (2011) refers to a ‘…crime that somehow transcends 
international borders’ (quoted in Lampe 2011:3).  For Lampe this can include the 
cross-border movement of people in the form of human trafficking and smuggling, 
goods in the form of drugs, stolen vehicles, pirated textiles, and information in the 
form of child pornography and embargoed information (Lampe 2011).  As noted 
by Đorđević (2009), the term transnational emphasises the international element 
of the crime, as well as actors involved in the crime.  The term TOC was first used 
in 1975 during the Fifth Congress of the United Nations for the Prevention of Crime 
and Treatment of Offenders (Đorđević 2009). Although UNTOC is acknowledged 
to have provided the definition of a transnational organised group, the US National 
Security Council (NSC) provides a more detailed definition of the term;  
 
Transnational organised crime refer to self-perpetuating associations 
of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining 
power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part 
by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of 
corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities 
through a transnational organisational structure and the exploitation 
of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms (NSC 
2011, cited in Bergeron 2013:6). 
 
Madsen (2009:1) argues that it is important that transnational crime is tackled at 
the international level, since its illicit trafficking activities mirror licit global trading 
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mechanisms and structures.  This tallies with Findlay’s (2000) contention that 
commercial crime benefits from the transnational movement of goods, services 
and finance that, as in the case of licit trade, cannot be controlled or regulated by 
domestic legislation or sanctions.  Madsen further contends that the terminologies 
alluding to the transnational such as ‘transnational crime’, ‘transnational organised 
crime’, ‘international organised crime’ and ‘multinational crime’ often clearly 
overlap (Madsen 2009:8). 
 
In defining TOC, several scholars have approached the term from the perspective 
of international and national security, terrorism, economics, war and crisis as well 
as cultural diversity.  Đorđević (2009) places the threat posed by TOC in four key 
state sectors: the economy, politics, internal security and foreign policy.  Bergeron 
(2013) widens the relationship between states and TOC arguing that it is possible 
for the goals of states and TOC to intersect. This claim is informed by the fact that 
both states and TOC rely on planning, process, management and leadership to 
achieve their goals.  One example given by Bergeron is the Camorra, a Neapolitan 
criminal organisation that will be analysed later in the thesis.  The Camorra seeks 
to control territory in a similar manner to the state (Bergeron 2013).  Likewise, 
Bergeron contends that the complexity of TOC can be compared with the 
complexity of providing international security such as the NATO interventions in 
Bosnia and Afghanistan (Bergeron 2013:7). TOC acts on the fault line between 
state authority and the rule of law, thriving where states and the international 
community are weak (Bergeron 2013:8).  Williams (1994) agrees, maintaining that 
TCOs are a threat to national and international security.  He also identifies the 
resilience of TOC to law enforcement citing the capacity of drug traffickers to refine 
their modus operandi in response to international policing operations.  In addition, 
Madsen (2009:64) argues that there are multiple points of similarity between TOC 
and international terrorism contending that those involved are ‘birds of a feather’ 
employing mutual methodologies to achieve their ends with terrorists engaging in 
TOC including abductions, armed robbery, and drug trafficking to fund their 
operations, whilst organised criminal groups use terror tactics to assert control 
over their victims (Madsen 2009:64) 
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Vlassis (2002) on the other hand, challenges the generally assumed notion of 
threats posed to national and international security and further argues that the 
threat is in fact the aftermath of activities of individuals and organisations as 
regards corruption in state institutions, undermining of the rule of law, 
contravening legal and social norms and the violation of national borders to 
mention but a few.  To this end, there is evidence that the impact of TOC has a 
serious and toxic impact in places where organised crime takes root, such as in 
Italy or parts of Africa.2   Valassi’s (2002) analysis is complemented by Williams’ 
(1994) study on the impact of changing international conditions on the rise of 
illegal activities which maintains that these activities have been made easier as a 
result of an increase in the number of porous borders.  Hansen and 
Papademetriou (2013) assert that the effort of controlling borders has yielded 
unintended and contrary consequences such as people smuggling and trafficking, 
drug trafficking, illegal migration among other criminal activities.  
 
Bergeron (2013), refers to a definition of TOC offered by the US NSC by which 
he emphasises the organisational elements which is drawn to light by the term 
‘transnational organisational structure’, thereby introducing the notion of 
networks.  Although criminal networks have been traced back to the 1920s, the 
advancement in transportation and telecommunication particularly in the 1990s 
became the impelling cause which, to a reasonable extent, has influenced the 
nature and structure of traditional OCGs (Hill 2003, Đorđević 2009, Albaneese 
2011, Arsovska 2014).  To this end, Grabosky (2013) examines OC in terms of 
its link with the internet, lamenting the inability of the proffered definitions of OC 
to precisely reflect the category in which cyber-crime falls.  He considers that 
although some forms of cybercrime could be regarded as a nuisance, they cannot 
be categorised as threats to national/international security. 
 
With the view that the major objective of OC is maximising economic gain, 
responding to a particular demand and the pursuit of profit by these organised 
criminal organisations which makes them no different from commercial 
organisations as shown by the divergent views presented hitherto (Schloenhardt 
 
2 See accounts of the horrifying slavery happening in Libya as an example of the result of the activities of organised 
groups and criminal networks (McKernam 2017; BBC 2018).  
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1999), the next section will analyse the models of organised crime used in 
classifying the concept. 
 
 
Transnational Organised Criminal Groups 
 
There exist multiple paradigms regarding transnational organised crime groups.  
Arsovska (2014) draws on Albanese’s (1994) use of behavioural theory (1994) in 
her overview of the models attached to TOCGs including ‘the hierarchical/alien 
conspiracy model’, the ‘patron–client model’, and the ‘enterprise model’. In terms 
of the hierarchical model, Arsovska (2014) uses the example of the Cosa Nostra, 
a Sicilian organised crime organisation. This model, otherwise referred to as the 
‘bureaucratic model’, ‘national conspiracy’ or ‘corporate/organisational model’, 
comprises  
 
...bosses of individual families, capo regimes, which are 
lieutenants, and soldiers. Territory and criminal enterprises were 
divided among families of men of Italian descent. Hence, this 
model came to be characterized as a governmental-like structure, 
where illegal activities are conducted with the approval of 
superiors (Cressey 1969 cited in Arsovska 2014).  
 
 
           
Figure 2-1 A crime family structure (adapted from National Crime syndicate (n.d) 
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The figure above depicts how a traditional mafia family is structured based on 
Arsovska’s (2014) hierarchical model.  
 
 
The hierarchical/alien conspiracy model presents organised crime as 
imported from outside the territory where the criminal group is based, operating 
a formal hierarchical structure, which was the dominating assumption of the 
academic discipline of sociology and of business in the 1960s coinciding with 
major government hearings on organised crime such as the Kefauver and 
McClellan Committees (Arsovska 2014).  This description of the hierarchical 
model, agrees with Cressey’s (1969 cited in Arsovska 2014:4) research 
conducted in the late 1960s that the system of organised crime in the US was 
made up of an alliance of 24 tightly knit criminal Mafia families which were 
hierarchically structured and included a distinct criminal organization.  Arsovska 
(2014) characterises this paradigm as a ‘governmental-like’ structure, under an 
extensive division of labour in which illegal activities are undertaken with the 
authorisation of superiors (Cressey 1969 cited in Arsovska 2014:4). It is alleged 
to be a powerful syndicate that is nurtured by the demand for illegal goods and 
services (Cressey 1969).  
 
 
Cressey’s (1969) reliance on the Italian families’ link to organised crime was 
challenged by later research that found a multiplicity of criminal groups operating 
including Cuban, Colombian, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Mexican, 
Russian, Canadian, Irish, and Jamaican gangs. Conversely, Finckenauer (2007), 
dissatisfied with the explanatory power of the alien conspiracy model, argues that 
organised crime had existed in America long before Sicilian/Italian immigration. 
He bases this argument on historical studies of the existence of organised crime 
in communities including white protestant, Jewish, and Irish. Finckenauer (2007) 
disagrees with the view that OC is an explicitly Italian phenomenon, as well as 
arguing that the Mafia’s modus operandi in the US differs markedly from that of 
Mafia organisations in Sicily/Italy (Finekenauer (2007). Edwards (2004) accuses 
the UNCTOC of encouraging the notion of OC being an external threat from 
ethnically defined pathological groups. Finckenauer (2007) concludes that this 
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model fails to encourage research and investigation, categorising it as a close 
minded ideology instead of a theory.  
 
Based on the various definitions, an illustration of a hierarchical bureaucratic 
model produced by the author is presented below to enhance and aid the 
understanding of the analysis in this section. Despite the debate of hierarchical 
models being merely an exception, or unnecessary by some scholars 
(Finckenauer 2005:65, Morselli 2009, Pearson and Hobbs 2001) hierarchical 
models have been observed to exist in  network and hybrid criminal organisations 
and the co-existence of hierarchies and networks are equally possible as argued 
by William (2001).  The hierarchical bureaucratic model exemplifies the 
organisational structure of OCG despite its fluidity or flexibility. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. An illustration of a hierarchical bureaucratic model of organised criminal organisation 
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Bound by a code of conduct, it is a defined hierarchy comprising of a single 
leader, with various levels of subordinates (Subordinates level 1and S2), with 
division of labour (S3 and S4 as the case may be).   
 
The second paradigm, the ‘patron-client’ model, originating in the 1970s, was 
based on the exchange relationship between ‘those with power and those who 
need access to power’ (Arsovska 2014:5).  According to Le’s (2012:125) analysis 
of Abadinsky’s (2007) definition of the patron-client (Patrimonial) model, it is ‘…a 
network model that focuses on the relationships between families, friends and 
patrons’. The model is characterised by its traditional strong emphasis on 
relationships based on trust and emotional ties in which members are recruited 
based on their relationship as family relatives or friends (Le 2012). Bound like 
members initiated into a brotherhood, penalties were used to instil discipline in 
the majority of kin-like relations (Le 2012).  This paradigm was a product of 
studies in the field of Anthropology which did not accept the concept of the 
formality of the institutional approach but rather emphasised the patron-client 
relationship. Arsovska draws from the debate of other scholars’ such as Albini 
(1971), Ianni and Reusslanni (1972) to demonstrate the diversity of scholarly 
interpretation showing the opposing opinions of scholars at this time. Although 
the contention of this paradigm was that OCGs were, in essence, friendships 
based on cultural, ethnic and economic ties, and consisted of networks of patrons 
and clients instead of rational hierarchies, Le (2012) proposes that the model 
combines elements of both standard hierarchies and a criminal network.    
 
The perspective of this analysis is shown below as presented by Klaus von 
Lampe (2003) referred to as Cressey’s model. It comprises the government, 
society, illegal markets and organised crime that undermine the morals of the 
community.  
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Figure 2-3 Cressey’s model as presented by Klaus von Lampe (2003) 
 
Being mono-ethnic in nature, members were recruited solely from family and 
friends, placing emphasis on relationships, trust and emotional ties such as is 
the case in the Sicilian Mafia. (Albadinsky 2007)  
 
Arsovska (2014) considers these models as behavioural models which can 
influence the analysis of organised crime such as Albanese et al (2003) 
description of the ‘ethnicity trap’.  Albanese et al (2003) argue that although the 
roots of organised crime groups lie in economic, social and political causes, 
‘these groups are defined in ethnic and national terms’ (Albanese et al 2003:7).  
Hence it is a fallacy to analyse organised crime based on biographical attributes 
which cannot give precise explanation of a person or a group’s behaviour.  To 
further emphasize this position, Albanese et al (2003) advance different 
organised crime activities and particular places where these crimes thrive and 
are not, or may not, be perceived as organised crime, for instance Namibia and 
money laundering.  Finckenauer (2007) strongly disagrees with the use of 
ethnicity in defining organised crime arguing that organised criminal behaviour is 
not caused by ethnicity, rather the reason for their susceptibility to this type of 
criminality is attributable to the difficult socio-economic circumstances in which 
ethnic migrants find themselves.  He adds that though some groups such as 
some prison gangs possess ethnic identification, ethnicity theory cannot explain 
the emergence of non-ethnic groups in organised crime adding that not all, or 
even most, members of these ethnic groups join criminal organisations. Hence 
this theory does not represent an inclusive theory of organised crime.  Following 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
24 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
the evolution of OCGs in the context of the argument of this study, there has 
been a shift from traditional inclinations of OCGs and TCNs to what seems more 
like multiples of core groups or clustered hierarchies building a formidable 
network (See chapter 7- where evolved criminal networks are analysed). 
 
The ‘illegal enterprise model’ is a contemporary paradigm on which most 
current international and state definitions of organised crime are based 
(Arsovska 2014).  This paradigm is focused on the business of organised crime 
arguing that criminal behaviours are triggered by economics; in this case, 
economic activities that are illegal (Liddick 1999). Consequently the theories 
used in analysing legal business organizations may equally be applied in 
analysing criminal enterprise organisations.  Finckenauer (2007) claims that the 
theory explains the ‘what and why’ of criminal endeavours.  The theory proposes 
that ‘illicit entrepreneur exist because the legitimate marketplace leaves potential 
customers for goods and services unserved or unsatisfied’ (Smith, 1980 cited in 
Finckenauer 2007).  He adds that this theory is realistic since it employs the 
propositions of economic law of supply and demand, for example the demand for 
illegal drugs and the effect legalising drugs could have on the illegal markets. In 
Liddick’s (1999) opinion, the unit for analysis for this model is not the individuals 
or the OCG, but rather the illegal market place.  However, the illegal enterprise 
model is used by a number of researchers to analyse TCO/N.  Kleeamans (2012) 
analyses the illegal enterprise models as a case of offenders being considered 
as regular profit oriented entrepreneurs/companies who operate under the same 
law of demand and supply as legal institutions.  It is probable that even bans and 
restrictions will not lead to their extinction but rather increase demand for their 
services. This is because, theorists believe, that because legal boundaries are 
bound to change meaning, the marketplace will under the weight of demand, 
exceed the brink of legitimacy, with entrepreneurs aiming to meet the demand 
no matter the means (Liddick 1999). This implies that difficulty in distinguishing 
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In addition to the models discussed above, Finckenauer (2007) introduces the 
concept of ‘strain’ theory and the impact of ‘cultural conflict’.  Cultural conflict 
which has been observed to be most common after migration, is discussed here 
to be a reason for the involvement of members of some migrant groups in OC as 
a result of issues such as clash of cultural values/tradition/behaviours and 
unemployment of the migrants. These migrants form neighbourhood street 
gangs which in turn become brooding grounds for criminal organisations 
(Finckenauer (2007).  A number of scholars such as Agnew (1985), Giddens and 
Sutton (2017)  have used the strain theory – first developed by Merton in the 
1940’s – in elucidating the effect of certain strains and stresses on individuals in 
a society which in turn results to their act of perpetuating crime.  Finckenauer 
(2007) explains that these strains are caused by frustration and anger felt about 
their inability to attain social status.  Therefore, these strains serve as an impetus 
for the involvement in criminal activities and the metamorphosis of criminal 
organisations. Schloenhardt (1999) also adds the ‘network model’ theory, 
arguing that the relationship  between the core members of the criminal group 
are organised horizontal, particularly those involved in complex and dynamic 
illegal markets such as the sex industry, and trafficking prohibited goods which 
involves multiple competitors.  It is important to note that the evolution of the 
traditional models into flexible criminal networks, functions as a result of the 
social environments of the OCGs. Le (2012:126), opines that the ability of 
networks to respond to changes in their environments supposedly makes them 
“lighter on their feet”. The next section critically examines what makes networks 
in view of transnational criminal networks in the Libya to Italy human trade. 
 
 
Transnational organised criminal networks 
 
 This section is particularly focused towards understanding what constitutes a 
TOCN and their   involvement in the human trade. While diverse perceptions of 
the workings of the criminal groups in the Libya to Italy human trade abound, it is 
important to consider the intricacies and the different forms of network and how 
they translate to being transnational and the applicability of the models discussed 
in the previous section.   
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Galeoti (2009) considers it natural for criminals to organise, as well as work 
towards developing their relationship with the upper-world.  However, certain 
characteristics make networks ideal for organising criminal activities. Williams 
(2001) identifies these specific characteristics drawing comparisons with social 
networks and business theory.  For Williams, networks are a ‘series of nodes that 
are connected ...can be individual, organisations, firms, or even computers so 
long as they are connected in significant ways’ (Williams 2001:66). The concept 
of criminal networks has gradually gained popularity as scholars realise the 
complexity of crime in present times. The size, shape, membership, level of 
cohesion and purpose of a network are crucial in classifying a network. 
Essentially, networks are indispensable supplements to markets which make 
them efficient, reduce transaction costs as well as provide opportunities for 
parties interested in buying and selling (Williams 2001:65). Wright (2006) 
describes the transformation from ‘gang-related underworlds of the pre- and post-
second World War periods to a more fragmented and diverse panorama of 
criminal groups at the beginning of the 21 century’ (2006: xvii).  Le (2012) drawing 
from the network topology created by William (2010), explains in line with  
network leadership variations that networks could either be (a) directed – core 
group organisers who are the steering mechanism of the network; (b) mesh – 
member performing task as standard criminal networks; (c) transactional – which 
can be part of a directed network but functions with the aid of a broker or 
middleman;  or (d) flux – opportunist OCGs that operate as ad-hoc networks 
without a conventional structure (Le 2012:127). Evidence and data collected for 
this research indicates aspects of all these network types in the Libya to Italy 
human trade (see chapter 7.  As the focus of this study is on the nature of 
transnational criminal networks, it is important that themes such as the 
characteristics and dimension of criminal networks be understood.  
 
In his analysis of networks, Williams (2001), states that ‘networks are not an 
exclusive organisational form and often exist within more than traditional 
hierarchical structures, cutting through divisions based on specialisation or 
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rank…it is possible to have networks in which hierarchical organisations are key 
participants’ (Williams 2001:65). In his detailed analysis, he submits that networks 
have characteristics that brand them ‘indefinable’ which he identifies as 
‘…pervasiveness …capacity to coexist both within and outside the hierarchies, 
…ability to make markets more efficient by facilitating directed flows of 
information and commodities (Williams 2001:65).  In addition to the identification 
of the characteristics, he further discusses networks as differing in rationales such 
as social networks and business networks. Campana (2016) on the other hand, 
suggests that the concept of networks could also be used in describing the recent 
mode of operation employed by criminal groups, as well as terrorists. To this end, 
it is possible to suggest that networks vary in dimension and cannot be said to be 
clear-cut. This to a large extent, suggests an explanation for the flexibility of 
networks.  Social networks are recognised as flexible and dynamic based on how 
ties are often formed, strengthened or broken. Therefore, in analysing social 
networks certain issues are important: 
  
[the] prominence of particular individuals in the network, the 
concept of centrality [which refers to] the individual …with the most-
or most important-ties; the notion of closeness and distance based 
on communication paths among actors in the network; the notion 
of cohesive subgroups;…the extent to which the relationships and 
transactions within it are regulated by explicit or tacit rules; and the 
number and diversity of actors within the network (Williams 
2001:67).  
 
Williams (2001) claims that some sociologists are of the opinion that network-
based organisations are able to perform better than traditionally structured 
hierarchical organisations, particularly in their adaptability to change. The 
concept of networks and their advantages to organisations are also being 
identified by practitioners. The EUROPOL report of 2016 revealed that a 
significant proportion of over 40,000 suspects that were investigated by the 
Europol were identified to belong to a criminal network (EUROPOL 2016). These 
groups and networks reflect homogenous features, vary in size and consist of 
assorted specialists, carrying out diverse roles (EUROPOL 2016).  It is therefore 
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possible to agree that the success of migrant smuggling in recent times affirms 
the claims of Williams (2001) as regards the characteristics of networks.  
 
Although ‘centrality’ in a network has been identified as a criterion to prove 
importance, influence and control, Morselli (2009) contests centrality as regards 
criminal network discourse, arguing that the applicability of the concept as 
regards crime remains contestable.  This stand by Morselli (2009), contradicts 
Williams’ (2001) analysis of criminal networks.  Although Williams acknowledges 
that the role of network peripheries remain invaluable in enhancing the success 
of most criminal networks, he further argues that the core member has the 
responsibility of providing steering for the network, a relationship which enhances 
trust and cohesion. Campana (2016) on the other hand points out that degree of 
centrality matters; it could be either high or low which in turn affects their roles in 
the network.  Campana however agrees that it works differently with different 
networks, supporting Morselli’s earlier argument.  
 
On the other hand, business networks emerged as a response to ‘limitations and 
rigidities and inefficiencies associated with strict hierarchical structures, the need 
to exploit globalization through partnerships and strategic alliances, and a desire 
to emulate the Japanese success with the Keiretsu’ (Williams 2001:68).  This use 
of the concept hypothesises the development of networks as virtual corporations 
which enable both the understanding of criminal networks and other types of 
enterprise networks (Williams 2001).  In addition, Burt argues that a network’s 
access to information which their counterparts are not privy to gives them a 
unique edge over other competitor entrepreneurs (Burt 1992 cited in Williams 
2001:68).   
 
Technological networks enhance the operation of larger and more dispersed 
social networks and also critically aid the growth of certain social network 
categories (Williams 2001). Williams (2001) holds that globalisation and the 
growth of technology has contributed immensely to easy access to 
communication which has become cheaper and easier, enabling the massive 
expansion of networks.  This view is supported by Koslowski (2011) who writes 
that increasing international migration and expanding transnational crime have a 
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common accelerator in globalization having their connections intensified by the 
process of globalization.  He adds that globalisation has reduced the cost of 
communication and transportation thereby facilitating the expansion of the 
operation of local criminal organisations (see McMullin 2009).  Although 
Koslowski’s (2011) argument comes from his evaluation of the impact of 
economic globalisation processes on international migration and transnational 
crime, it provides insight to the irrepressible growth of transnational criminal 
groups.  Findlay (2000) supports this argument on the impact of globalisation by 
reiterating that globalisation is responsible for new and favourable circumstances 
that perpetuate crime in particular, advances in information technology. 
 
In identifying OC groups, Galeoti (2009) employs certain characteristics such as 
being profit-oriented, made of multiple members, enjoying close interaction 
(communicated by means of tattoo, oaths and distinctive argot), hierarchical 
structure or even egalitarian nature, carrying out crimes and relentless in their 
activities rather than purely opportunistic (see also McMullin 2009).  These 
characteristics are present in other types of networks. Although McMullin (2009) 
analyses the nature of OCGs from the point of view of conflict, his views are 
valuable.  He identifies the important points for consideration as the motivation of 
profit or the greed thesis, structure which varies, globalisation which has aided 
communication and transportation, violence which is a tactic that varies according 
to different OCGs, and the unit of analysis whether they are a group/individual or 
organised as a market activity or corporate entity (McMullin 2009).  Regarding 
criminal networks, Williams (2001) argues that networks provide criminals with 
attractive and irresistible advantages such as the ability to operate clandestinely 
and by so doing evading law enforcement.  The second point is that networks do 
not run conspicuous centres and are mostly deficient of physical infrastructures 
which will not invite the interest of law enforcement. This does not however 
obliterate the fact that the networks in the Libya to Italy human trade do not own 
structures that enhance their strategies which are extensively analysed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  The trans-nationality of most networks enables them to take 
advantage of inadequacies in national laws and regulations and also provide 
opportunities for both easy dismissals, which may not be possible in rigid or 
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formal organisations, as well as flexibility (Williams 2001; see also Adamoli et al 
1998).  
 
Additionally, there are indications that women are under-represented in the 
smuggling networks3.  This could be analysed as a case of feminine capacity 
versus masculine dominance. This is because it is generally assumed that the 
people smuggling, and trafficking networks are solely run by men (possibly 
powered by the statistics such as the statistics of the members of the smuggling 
network reported in the FERMO PM GLAUCO case) excluding the probable 
involvement of women.  Research by Siegel and De Blank (2010) highlights the 
feminisation of the trade in terms of the actual involvement of females in the 
business of human smuggling and not the perspective of CARITAS International, 
UN Thirty-Ninth session in 2006 which refers to the statistics of female migrants 
migrating as economic providers or bread winners; or the gender segregation 
regarding migrants jobs as argued by O’Neil et al (2016).  Evidence and data 
showed that this was prominent with the Nigerian smuggling and trafficking 
cartels where the trust the females had in their fellow females was exploited. In 
more serious cases, these women even enslaved the female counterparts to 
ensure their loyalty to them (CARITAS (nd); De Blank 2010).    
 
 
What makes a network transnational? It is arguable that the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) which was adopted 
by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, and entered into 
force on 29th September, 2003, provides a definition of a transnational criminal 
group especially defining the concept of transnationalism. Scholars such as David 
(2012) and Arsovska (2014) agree that this definition to a reasonable extent 
addresses the issue in context.  It defines transnational organized criminal group 
as  
 
…a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one 
 
3 Nigerian networks are an exception; women are at the helm in relation to human trafficking for the sex trade in Europe 
– see this thesis and CARITAS (nd) and De Blank 2010).   
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or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with 
this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
or other material benefit; 
(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence 
punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty; 
(c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly 
formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does 
not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity 
of its membership or a developed structure; …’ (UNCTOC 2000 
Article 2: a,b,c), 
 
The Article of this convention further delineates when a crime could be said to be 
transnational. It states 
 
...an offence is transnational in nature if: 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, 
planning, direction or control takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group 
that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State 
(UNCTOC 2000, Article 3:2: a, b, c, d). 
 
Following this convention, it can be said that a crime, criminal network or group 
becomes transnational when it transcends national borders and involves parties 
from other states.  This goes to highlight the main argument of study regarding 
the nature of the networks involved in the human trade from Libya to Italy, namely 
that they are more specialised, unrestrained and scattered, as against the 
previous perceptions of them as fluid and unstructured. At present, the 
acceptable definition of transnational OCGs/network attested to by most scholars 
remains UNTOC, the main international instrument in the fight against TOC.  
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Williams (2001) noting that networks are not the only form of organised criminal 
activity, supports the view that the traditional hierarchical model which has been 
associated with the Mafia families in the US remains relevant. He argues that ‘it 
is possible to have a network of hierarchies, hybrid organisational forms with 
some hierarchical components and a significant network dimension’ (Williams 
2001:69).  Williams (2001) further identifies the different dimensions of crime 
networks.  In his opinion, a network could be a  
 
a) directed network – created and directed by core organisers, for specific 
purpose;  
b) …it can range from small, limited associations at the local level to 
transnational supplier networks that move a variety of goods, either licit or 
illicit – or even both – across national borders;  
c) can be highly structured and enduring in nature or …loose, fluid or 
amorphous in character with members coming and going according to 
particular needs, opportunities and demands;  
d) [And finally] can be focused very narrowly on a single purpose or on the 
supply of a single product, or they can supply a broader range of illegal 
products or engage in more diverse criminal activities (Williams 
2001:69&70). 
 
Williams (1994:321) holds a similar understanding of the features of TCO/N such 
as their size and scale and further gives examples such as the Colombian cartels 
whose strong focus is drug trafficking and the Chinese triads/Japanese yakuza 
whose criminal activities include extortion, credit card fraud, prostitution and also 
drug trafficking.  Williams concludes that networks have limited exposure to risks 
based on the limited fixed assets they possess enabling them to adapt and exploit 
the path of least resistance (Williams 2001:74).  
 
Jackson (2007) argues that there must exist a set of basic conditions for OCGs 
to start operations including a combination of social confusion, economic chaos, 
and political disturbance.  In circumstances such as this, the political process is 
weak and is unable to properly protect itself or even the citizenry from illicit 
activities while the OCGs on the other hand, move to fill the gaps created by the 
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state’s inadequacies (Jackson 2007).  OCGs gradually take over the economy, 
meeting demand for goods and services and consequently will go to any length 
to maintain their control.  This view is supported by Williams (1994) who in 
analysing the emergence of TCO, writes that the development of transnational 
organisation enabled by core changes in global politics and economics has 
opened the door for TCO to also develop.  He cites globalisation which in his 
analysis has enhanced the rate of transnational activity involving money, people, 
physical and non-physical goods as well as creating a single global market for 
both licit and illicit goods and services.  
 
In analysing people smuggling/trafficking, Adamoli et al (1998) are of the opinion 
that the involvement of OCGs has increasingly linked migration with crime.  This 
involvement of OCGs they argue is changing the nature of migration, introducing 
a link between trafficking, exploitation and induced criminality often/usually 
managed by the same criminal organisation.  The explanation for this analysis is 
that smuggled/trafficked migrants move within the same criminal circles as 
OCGs, often recruited and transported by OCGs, their transportation enabled by 
the falsification of documents and their contravention of border laws organised by 
OCGs, and exploited in the destination countries by other OCGs. This may be 
the reason for which  Adamoli et al (1998) pointed out that majority of the crimes 
committed in countries in the late 1990s were said to be perpetuated by illegal 
migrants. 
 
Schloenhardt uses the business model of migrant trafficking to illustrate the 
diversity of the trade including the role of amateur traffickers who provide a single 
service for the migrant in the form of transport across a border.  Others involved 
include small groups of organised criminals who specialise in escorting 
immigrants from one country to another and internal trafficking networks that 
specialise in conducting the whole process of trafficking.  Kleemans and Van de 
Bunt (2008) add that jobs associated with mobility and logistics provide a 
breeding ground for both smuggling activities and camouflage. Coluccello and 
Massey’s (2007) study on the nature of criminality involved in people smuggling 
and trafficking with regards to the Libya to Lampedusa sea route argues that the 
trade is a product of transnational criminal organisations.  According to their 
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study, the trade operated in three phases: mobilisation and recruitment, their 
transportation and insertion into the destination country. Coluccello and Massey 
(2007) employ the mixed method of research, drawing facts and resources from 
judicial proceedings of cases concerning human trade- related operations 
conducted by the Italian State Police in Calabria.  Their work further presents a 
delineation of the division of labour/organisation of the trade using the Moroccan 
network.  This network shows that designated persons are responsible for the 
lodging of smuggled persons prior to embarkation.  These smuggled persons 
have been transported from their different countries of origin to the point of 
embarkation.  The different points of embarkation include Libya, Algeria and 
Morocco depending on the source countries (Haas 2006). A Nigerian source 
reports that this initial transportation/movement even involved long treks from 
Mali to Libya by Nigerian illegal migrants (Awoyinfa 2012). Coluccello and 
Massey also follow the involvement of organised crime in Italy, tracing the 
involvement of the Moroccan networks in the movement of escaped detainees 
from the Sant’Anna detention centre and their subsequent transportation and 
insertion into northern Italian cities (Coluccello and Massey 22007:88). Others 
were involved in the collection of ransom and transportation money, facilitating 
escapes from detention centres, and supplying forged documents.  
 
Coluccello and Massey’s (2007) findings are at odds with a later analysis by 
EUROPOL (2013) which includes people smuggling/trafficking in the list of 
criminal activities undertaken by the Mafia. Some scholarly analyses of the Mafia 
have portrayed them as being based on the dynamics of family ties, political 
power and respect of territory (Bechi and Turvani 1993; Paoli 2004:22; see also 
Finckenauer 2007:18).  Although emphasis has been placed on the hierarchical 
structure of the Mafia and it’s previously believed criminal priority of collecting 
protection money (Gambetta 1993), Williams (2001) cites the possibility of 
networks in which key participants are hierarchical organisations. As such the 
Mafia may not be absolved of involvement in the human trade. Chapter 7 will 
explore this in more detail.  
 
The word ‘Mafia’ is often used as a generic term for OCGs. Arsovska suggests 
that this might be a result of the ubiquity of the ‘Mafia’ in popular culture including 
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films and television serials (Arsovska 2014). Seindal (1998) argues that early 
efforts to provide actual definition for the Mafia focused on the socio-cultural 
background of the Mafia, defining it as ‘a culturally or socially determined 
behaviour pattern or as a cultural adaptation to the demands of the surrounding 
world’ (Seindal 1998:11).  Seindal (1998:11) adds that subsequent efforts 
emphasise the criminal element and defined the Mafia as a ‘close-nit criminal 
association or secret organisation seeking to overturn the state and itself take 
power’, while the revelation of their close contact with politicians portrayed them 
as a tool in the hands of nameless political patrons. Finckenauer (2007) 
endeavours to explain how the Mafia became linked to Italy in the 1800s after the 
large-scale immigration of Italians to America and the forming of highly structured 
secret criminal organisations. He claims, however, that the theories of organised 
crime that emerged in the US are often loose theories based on popular myths 
surrounding the American Mafia (Fickenauer 2007).  
 
Seindal’s (1998) work provides a detailed description of the existence, 
recruitment and structure of the Mafia. He characterises the culture of the 
American Mafia as a synthesis of Sicilian values and norms displayed in extreme, 
distorted forms which emphasise solidarity, and the rule of absolute silence sworn 
at admission to the Mafia known as Omertà.  The Mafia is a formal organisation 
with structures, rules and rituals consisting of clans linked to a territory which 
builds its influence on control of the given territory and its economy (Seindal 
1998).  
 
Gambetta (1993) identifies the Mafia as an industry that is specialised in 
producing, promoting and selling private protection which originated in Sicily over 
150 years ago. Italian Mafia type organisations include the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, 
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, Neopolitan Camorra, and Apulian Sacra Corona 
(EUROPOL 2013).  Morselli et al’s (2010) research explains the expansion of the 
Mafia from its historic origins and its existence across a variety of settings such 
as geographical locations, criminal markets and legitimate industries.  They argue 
that this movement is orchestrated by certain push and pull factors ranging from 
availability of criminal markets, ethnically based criminal groups, legitimising the 
group, to mass demand criminal markets and criminogenic settings in legitimate 
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settings stemming from lax security/enforcement/high impunity (Morselli et al 
2010).  This description, though summarised, constructs the Mafia as a secret, 
illegal organisation, hence the different perceptions and assumptions according 
to events and diverse encounters with the Mafia makes it inaccessible and 
challenging to study or even accurately define.  
 
The nature of criminality in human trafficking and people smuggling has not been 
heavily researched, one of the main motivations for this study.  Given the Mafia’s 
roots in Italy, it is often assumed in the popular media and amongst the general 
public that the Mafia, in its broadest sense, is liable to be involved in the human 
trade.  Schweizer et al (2003) emphasise the scope of people smuggling, citing 
a close interaction between criminal organisations, smugglers and corrupt 
government officials. Williams (2001) categorises people smuggling as the most 
lucrative of the variety of enterprises in which criminal networks are involved. 
Writing in 2007, Coluccello and Massey, concurring with Pastore (2006) argued 
that ‘the criminal networks involved [in the human trade from Libya to Italy] are 
not ‘mafia-like’ traditional hierarchical groupings, but rather loose networks’ 
(2007, pg. 86).  However, this research adopts a working hypothesis that TOCNs 
have now become intrinsically involved in the human trade.  Following Williams 
(2001) concept of the possibility of criminal networks coming together without 
threatening their discrete raisons d’etre, particularly when it is beneficial and 
convenient, it is difficult to totally exclude the Mafia from people smuggling 
activities in the Italian territories.  This will be explored in subsequent chapters  
 
A useful comparator with the role of Italian Mafia in the human trade across the 
Mediterranean is the role of Chinese TOCNs in the human trade.  The data from 
Chin’s (2011) survey shows the well organised nature of the Chinese people-
trafficking group: a transnational criminal enterprise active in China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Thailand and the US.  He employs a multiple research methodology 
which includes surveys and interviews with informants.  One of his interviewees 
explains the characteristics of the Chinese smuggling network which includes big 
heads/recruiters, little heads/recruiters, transporters, corrupt government officials 
involved in bribery, guides that move the immigrants from one transit point to 
another, enforcers, illegal immigrants recruited as workers  on the smuggling 
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ship, support personnel and debt collectors (Chin 2011:118-119).  Data collected 
in New York, showed that the leaders and the members of the smuggling network 
have a close working relationship while specialising in either sea or air smuggling. 
Chin (2011) claims that according to law enforcement and immigration officers in 
the US, as well as court testimonies by one of the smugglers, Chinese triads, 
tongs, and street gangs are involved in the trade. Similarly, judicial proceedings 
from the ‘ticket to ride’ case analysed by Massey and Coluccello (2010) reflect 
the involvement of criminal networks in the smuggling of migrants from Iraq to 
Italy’s eastern sea borders and onward to Italy and other European destinations. 
Although the involvement of Chinese criminal networks have been reported, Paoli 
(2010) maintains that the cultural codes and norms of the Mafia prohibit their 
exploitation of prostitution for instance, and has denied them  access to the  most 




The overarching argument of this thesis is that the criminal networks engaged in 
the human trade are more specialised, scattered, unrestrained and structured 
than previously understood. This chapter has sought to place this contention in 
context by exploring the scholarly debates surrounding the over-arching concept 
of ‘organised crime’ and the related notions of criminal networks and transnational 
criminal networks.  
 
Drawing on a rich scholarly literature in the field of organised crime, the chapter 
concludes that the facilitation of irregular migration from Libya to Italy is both a 
criminal enterprise, certainly when it comes to the maritime phase of the journey, 
and organised. That criminal networks evolve and take advantage of new 
technologies, especially in communication, was recognised by Williams (2001) 
almost two decades ago.  This adaptation to take advantage of new means and 
methods underpins the thesis’ main argument.  The chapter presents as baseline 
models a number of studies that find that the criminal networks involved in the 
human trade before 2010 could be characterised as fluid and unstructured.  
Further, and perhaps against intuition, there is little evidence that Italian 
hierarchical Mafia organisations did not seem to be involved in the trade at that 
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time: ‘evidence compiled on the trade, documented in the judicial proceedings 
indicate that the criminal networks involved are not ‘mafia-like’ traditional 
hierarchical groupings, but rather loose networks’ (Coluccello and Massey 2007).  
Both these findings will be tested in subsequent chapters using the new evidence 
and data gathered, and novel methodologies employed, for this study.  
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Chapter 3  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND PEOPLE 
SMUGGLING FROM LIBYA TO ITALY 
 
 
The human trade is driven by the mixed motivations of the irregular migrants. 
There is the quest for a better life and wider opportunities and migration as a 
means of escape from natural disasters, extreme poverty, political and religious 
intolerance and war.  Legal means of migration from the developing to the 
developed world are limited (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012).  Hence, the 
majority of migration from the developing to the developed world is irregular and, 
very often, steered by linked, but informal, transnational organised criminal 
networks.  Insufficient legal channels of migration, border-related bureaucracies 
and geographical disposition combine to drive would-be migrants into the hands 
of organised criminal networks in order to achieve their goals.  For many Africans, 
this perilous alternative has become a surer means of entry into Europe.  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that the criminal networks engaged in the 
human trade between Libya and Italy have become more specialised, scattered, 
unrestrained and structured.  The rationale for adopting this position will be laid 
out in subsequent analytical chapters that draw on the evidence, data and 
argumentation gathered from analysis of the judicial proceeding and from the 
semi-structured interviews.  This chapter, however, will place the concept of the 
‘human trade’, and how the human trade operates from Libya to Italy, in context. 
The first section explores the definition of the two phenomena that in this study 
have been conflated to the ‘human trade’: people smuggling and human 
trafficking.  The second section will dissect the human trade from Libya to Italy, 
examining the smuggling process, the actors, the modus operandi, and the 
migratory trajectories.  The third section will evaluate the factors that enable the 
human trade to contextualise the nature of criminality of the human trade. Finally, 
the chapter will set out the way in which the choice of land and sea routes 
influences the nature of criminality in the human trade from Libya to Italy.  
 
 
Understanding smuggling and trafficking 
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A commonly accepted definition of people smuggling is that provided by the 
United Nations in the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air, which came into force on the 28 of January, 2004.  This protocol is one 
of the three protocols that supplement the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime which came into force on the 29 of September, 
2003 (UNODC 2013). Pursuant to this Protocol, smuggling means ‘…the 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is 
not a national or a permanent resident’ (Article 3 UNODC 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
The primary aims of this Protocol which advanced the first globally accepted 
definition of smuggling are; preventing and combating the smuggling of migrants, 
the protection of migrants’ rights and promoting cooperation among state parties 
(UNODC 2013). Furthermore, the Protocol criminalises the practice of people 
smuggling.  However, in contrast to criminal prosecution on grounds of illegal 
entry, the protocol provides that the migrant is not subject to any cruel, degrading 
or inhuman treatment such as torture but rather more attention should be given 
to the enabling cause of vulnerability to smuggling (Bhabha 2007; Article 5 of the 
Smuggling Protocol 2000).   Kyle and Koslowski (2011:4) simply define people 
smuggling as ‘…an individual’s crossing of a state’s international border without 
that state’s authorisation and with the assistance of paid smugglers’.  People 
smuggling is, however, frequently confused with human trafficking and the 
distinction between the two is blurred as they share similar features (Batsyukova 
2012, Doomernik 2013).  A number of attempts have been made by scholars to 
distinguish between the two phenomena.  Kyle and Koslowski (2011) argue that 
human trafficking is a subset of people smuggling which in turn, is part of a 
broader phenomenon of irregular or unauthorised migration. Though Kyle and 
Koslowski (2011) have attempted to simplify the definition provided by the 
Protocol, this study aligns its argument with Batsyukova (2012), and Doomernik 
(2013) regarding the complex nature of modern people smuggling.  This explains 
the decision by this study to conflate smuggling and trafficking and refer to the 
human trade.   In fact, based on credible reports, both smuggled migrants and 
trafficked migrants undergo very similar experiences during their journeys 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015, U.S Department of State 2017).  Therefore, despite 
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the differentiation in theory highlighted by the UNODC (2017), identification of 
either trafficked or smuggled migrants remains a highly complex task.  
 
Regarding human trafficking, Siegel and De Bank (2010:437) summarise 
trafficking in persons as ‘…the exploitation of people under the threat or use of 
force or another form of control’, while the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, known as the 
Palermo Protocol, provides a more detailed definition stating that trafficking 
means; 
 
…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat of use of force or other forms 
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the help of a person having 
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs (Palermo Protocol, 2002, 
Article 3). 
 
Batsyukova (2012) argues that, in reality, the conflation of people smuggling, and 
human trafficking persists and results in the inappropriate management of 
trafficked victims as smuggled migrants.  This conflation is analysed by 
Batsyukova (2012) as a ‘conceptual confusion’ which produces incorrect 
interpretations of the two phenomena.  He argues that, to an extent, the UN has 
contributed to this conflation.  The definition provided by the UN might be 
seemingly clear but in reality, Batsyukova (2012) contends that there exists little 
or no distinction between the two; arguably adding to the ambiguity.  He therefore 
employs a comparative table in testing human trafficking and people smuggling 
against some defined criteria which includes ‘the type of crime, characteristics of 
recruited people, push factors, … relationship between recruiter and recruited 
individuals,… profits, use of violence …’ amongst others (Batsyukova 2012:39).  
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This methodical approach provides a clearer distinction between the two 
phenomena as presented in the table below.   
 
Table 3-1. Batsykova’s Comparative Table on Human smuggling and Human trafficking 
(Source: Adapted from Batsykova’s 2012:41-42) 
Criterion  Human trafficking Human smuggling 
Type of crime Human trafficking is a crime 
against the person and the 
state(s). 
 
It can be of transnational 
(involves border crossing) or 
national (internal trafficking) 
nature. 
Crime against public order. 
 






Gender, age, appearance, 
exotic characteristics of the 




Identity of the person does 
not play a role. 
Push factors Poverty, 
unemployment, poor cost of 
production, war, political 
conflicts, discrimination etc. 
Same as for human 
trafficking. 
Illegal entry in 
the country of 
destination 
Entry maybe legal or illegal. Entry of smuggled 
individuals is always illegal 
and break the migration 








Victim is seen as a 
commodity. Victims are 
“bought and sold”. 
Commercial relationship. 
 
Persons are secreted across 
a border in exchange for 
money. 
Control over the 
situation 
Victims have no control over 
the situation. Traffickers 
“own” victims. 
Smuggled persons can 
negotiate the price and 
destination with the 
recruiter. 
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Profit Multiple profits.  
 
Victims can be exploited for 
many years and re-sold many 
times. 
One-time profit. 
Use of violence Violence is used to keep 
control over victims. 
In some cases violence can 





are entitled to upon 
detection 
Asylum, refugee status, 
financial assistance, legal, 
medical, psychological 
support and protection. 




Similarly, Roth (2011) argues that the application and interpretation of criminal 
law provisions on human trafficking differ among states, consequently creating a 
misunderstanding of what constitutes human trafficking.  He argues that, although 
the UN definition of trafficking, has been seen as constituting a consensus 
definition regarding prostitution and other human trafficking crimes, the debate 
continues.  His argument hinges on the distinction between human trafficking and 
people smuggling caused by the complex interpretation of the concepts of 
consent and coercion. Thus, for example, not all prostitution meets the definition 
of human trafficking.  In other words, while some are prostituted against their will, 
some authentically consent to prostitution, albeit often as a means of survival.  
Evaluating Roth’s (2011) and Batsykova’s (2012) approaches to distinguishing 
between trafficking and smuggling, Batsykova’s (2012) comparative tabling 
seems to offer a more convincing way of distinguishing between these crimes. 
The key distinction is that while smuggling is a voluntary act which entails moving 
across international borders using falsified documents and contravening 
immigration laws (Sadiq 2011), trafficking involves the use of force, deception 
and forms of coercion such as abduction.   
 
Despite the clarity of Batsyukova’s (2012) distinction, other studies point out that 
the ‘smuggled’ migrant, at junctures of the smuggling process, is trafficked and 
subject to different forms of exploitation; particularly in the case of indebted 
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migrants (Davidson 2013, Kyle and Koslowski 2011). This Ellis et al, (UNODC 
2010) refer to as an overlap.  Davidson (2013) explains that this occurs 
particularly when the smuggled migrant is unable to meet the cost of the journey 
and arranges to pay on arrival at the destination country.   Most of the cost of the 
journey is borrowed.  This is usually the case with Chinese irregular migration.  
The cost of the journey is often met by a portfolio of loans from divergent sources 
including family and friends (Davidson 2013). Smugglers, however, usually 
demand payment up front. With this understanding, it is debatable that besides 
the debt owed back home, the anticipated job opportunities at their arrival in the 
destination country, by which the migrant/victim hope to be able to pay up their 
debts within months of hard work enslaves the migrants to the smuggler.  At this 
point the category of prostitution identified by Roth (2011) comes to play; be it 
victims procured for sexual exploitation or forced into the act as a matter of 
survival.  In essence, the majority of the migrants are involved in prostitution 
pandered and exploited by their smuggler or trafficker and not by their own will 
but forced into it as a means of survival and paying off accumulated debts (Roth 
2011).  
 
Tamura (2010) argues that those trafficked or smuggled are subject to the will of 
the trafficker or smuggler by no choice of their own. Even though some migrants 
or victims, seeing the proceeds (remittances) of few successful migration 
activities might decide to patronise traffickers or smugglers, it is still argued that 
no one consciously consents to being exploited.  Monzini (2010) illustrates this 
overlap of trafficking and smuggling, citing Nigerian girls ostensibly being 
smuggled who, in the course of being transported, are required to provide sexual 
services to their smugglers.  
 
Gebreegziabher (2013) concurs that human trafficking and people smuggling 
often happen concurrently and that both are primarily profit-making enterprises 
based on the exploitation by one means or another of men, women and children. 
Davidson (2010) believes that the differences between trafficking, smuggling and 
migration are not fundamental, but rather imaginary constructions based on an 
illusory line between freedom and restriction; and a political judgement as to 
which forms of exploitation are deemed appropriate and inappropriate (Davidson 
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2010).   From a human rights perspective, Davidson submits that in developing 
policies towards combating trafficking, the phenomenon needs to be addressed 
from within a  ‘broader migration network’ (Davidson 2010:245). It is this ‘broader 
migration framework’ that this research seeks to address through a holistic 
investigation of the movement of people from Libya to Italy, rather than an artificial 
disjuncture of those being moved into ‘smuggled’ and ‘trafficked’.  
 
 
Smuggling from Libya to Italy  
 
Studies by Sandell (2005), UNODC (2010) and Ellis et al (2011) point to the early 
2000s as the start of medium scale irregular migration from Africa to Southern 
Italy. More recent large scale migration has, however, moved the issue up the 
political agenda of the destination countries and the wider European region. In 
analysing the recent history of migration from Libya to Italy, de Haas (2007) 
establishes a striking increase in  migration from West African countries such as 
Nigeria and Ghana to Europe from the1990s as against limited migration in the 
1980s which consisted of mainly skilled workers and West African students (de 
Haas 2007).  He contends that, initially, these trans-Saharan migrants, migrated 
in search of work in Libya, but soon joined the flow of the Maghrebis in their illegal 
crossing of the Mediterranean by the aid of fishing boats - paretas – to Italy and 
Spain.  This was exacerbated by a shift in Libya’s foreign policy in the 1990s – 
pan-African migration policies pursued by the Libyan government – that 
encouraged mass trans-Saharan migration to Libya.  This pan-African solidarity 
implemented by Al-Qadhafi, which birthed the consolidation of trans-Saharan 
migration routes and networks was as a result of the air and arm embargo 
imposed on Libya  by the United Nations Security council  between 1992 and 
2000 (de Haas 2007, Chulov, and Smith, 2011).  Furthermore, De Haas (2007), 
holds that the increase in trans-Saharan migration and the growing demand for 
migrant labour with enticing earnings and living conditions in Southern Europe 
led to the creation of a network of human smugglers to facilitate this movement. 
 
Other scholars such as Monzini (2007), Koslowski, (2011), Boch and Chimenti, 
(2011) and Cheng (2013) argue that people smuggling and trafficking are 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
46 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
attributable to globalization and push and pull factors such as political crises, 




By 2011, approximately 23,000 people were recorded to have arrived in Italy 
between January and March alone, following the crisis and displacement in North 
Africa.  The age range recorded were males mainly 18 to 45 years of age (WHO 
2012).  By March of the same year, the numbers of migrants had hit 400,000, and 
in 2015, it had risen beyond 181,000.  For the want of specific sex and age 
demographic data in the Africa to Italy human trade this research employs the 
2016 -2017 IOM Flow monitoring Survey Analysis. 
 
  
Table 3-2 Table indicating the number of migrant arrivals by sea in the year 2015 (source: 
IOM 2017) 
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Figure 3-1 Graph indicating the arrivals by month in the year 2015 source: IOM 2017) 
 
 
This report records a summary of the profile of surveyed migrants along the 
central Mediterranean route who would have arrived Italy between 2016 and 2017 
providing a sample of the demographic of the migrants who accessed the central 
Mediterranean route to Italy (IOM 2017).  The focus is on 2016 which has been 
recorded as the deadliest year on this route. A sample from 2016 provides solid 
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Men represent the majority of the sample (87%) while women are 13%. Children between 
14 and 17 years of age (boys and girls) are 24% of all migrants interviewed.   
The average respondent is 22.5 years old. Average age of Gambians (20), Guineans (20) 
and Senegalese (22) is slightly lower than the average age of Nigerians (24) and Eritreans 
(24). Interviewed children are almost exclusively men (91%) and are especially present 
among Gambians (47%) and Guineans (37%), as compared to respondents of other 
nationalities.  
Majority of all interviewees is single (81%). Children reported to be single in almost all 
cases (99%). Females are more often married than men (32% vs 16%). Eritreans, 
Nigerians and Senegalese were more likely to be married, as compared to Guineans and 
Gambians: 29% of Eritreans, 17% of Nigerians and 14% of Senegalese reported being 
married, as compared to 8% of Guineans and 8% of Gambians.   
Before departure, majority of all interviewees is single (81%). Children reported to be 
single in almost all cases (99%). Females are more often married than men (32% vs 
16%). Eritreans, Nigerians and Senegalese were more likely to be married, as compared 
to Guineans and Gambians: 29% of Eritreans, 17% of Nigerians and 14% of Senegalese 
reported being married, as compared to 8% of Guineans and 8% of Gambians.   
46% of the sample was employed, 25% reported to be a student and 28% was 
unemployed at the time of starting the journey. 
Majority of the males (77%) compared to the women (56%), travelled alone and with no 
family member while children (6%) were recorded to travel with family members. 
(IOM 2017 reports) 
3-1 Data on surveyed migrants along the central Mediterranean route who would have 
arrived Italy between 2016 and 2017 
Figure 3-2 Civil Status of adult from 5 major nationalities by sex in percentage 
(Source: IOM 2017 
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Figure 3-3 Educational level of Children and adult by sex from 5 major nationalities, in percentage 
(Source IOM 2017) 
 
The data indicates that the majority of the migrants within that period were males, 
mainly unmarried, unemployed, originating from Eritrea and Nigeria and had 
basic education up to secondary level. Very few had tertiary education. Their 
situation could be attributed to their displacement or their inability to meet their 
responsibilities following conflicts and political and economic decadence of their 
countries. Very few chose to migrate for economic reasons as generally assumed 
which is actually a ‘fallacy appeal to past practice’ The data which is based on 
the 5 major countries from where the migrants surveyed in 2016 to 2017 
originated from,  is shown in the figure below.  
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Figure 3-4 Graph indicating migrant’s reason for leaving home country (Source: IOM 2017)  
 
 
The UNODC has referred to the Mediterranean routes as the deadliest routes, 
with the central Mediterranean route accounting for 91% of overall migrant deaths 
in 2017 (UNODC 2018). Factors that caused these deaths include, vehicle 









4 these were normal occurrences in the transit cities and migrant holding centres 
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 The breadth and complexity of the human trade across the Mediterranean 
obliges the research to concentrate on a single route, the smuggling of migrants 
from Libya to Italy and to concentrate on the involvement of transnational criminal 
networks. 
 
People smuggling and criminal networks 
 
The connection between people smuggling and criminal networks is a contested 
phenomenon.  Albanese et al (2003) cite geographical location, economic 
circumstances, history, political and governmental situations as well as social 
culture, beliefs and traditions as factors that influence what constitutes smuggling 
and organised crime.  What is considered illegal varies from culture to culture and 
country to country.  In discussing assisted migrant experiences, Liempt (2011) 
makes a distinction between the smuggling of Kurdish women from Iraq and the 
Horn of Africa perceived as not criminal, but rather illicit yet socially accepted.  He 
further contends that smugglers in this instance are seen as professionals who 
offer ‘alternatives to legal migration’, as ‘alternative migration experts’ who would 
enable one to migrate without being caught, and not as criminals (Liempt 2011).  
In this context, not only does the perception of what form of migration is illegal 
differ from what the legal instruments on transnational migration hold, but also 
what is safe for the migrants.  According to Liempt’s (2011) study, most of the 
women interviewed from the Horn of Africa strongly maintained that it was safer 
for them to migrate than to stay in the war-torn countries from which they came.  
 
The way in which research interviews are conducted is arguably important when 
it comes to gathering accurate data.  Liempt (2011) uses interview methods that 
encourage openness amongst his respondents using phrases such as 
‘assistance or help’ rather than ‘smuggling or trafficking’, and creating a non-
threatening setting for the interviews.  This is corroborated by Thomsen (2012) 
who considers how evidence and data is incorporated into the knowledge 
production process, given the highly politicised discourse surrounding irregular 
migration.  His own practice includes the use of the explorative study approach, 
for example in his exploration of Polish workers in Denmark. He also utilises 
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biographical interpretative methods to understand the experience of migrants 
who could be termed as ‘difficult to access’ groups.  Phillips (2014) concurs with 
Liempt that refugees and asylum seekers should not be defined as ‘illegal 
migrants’.  Human rights campaigners contest the legal accuracy of conflating the 
terms refugee and migrant.  Citing the categorisation of, for example, Eritrean 
refugees as migrants, Phillips (2004) argues that the media will use the 
intellectually lazy term ‘migrant’ without contextualising the horrendous push 
factors that exist in this authoritarian state impelling the migration.  
 
In an explicit analysis on human trafficking in the context of trafficking from 
Eastern Europe, Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) argue that despite policy 
relevance, academic research on human trafficking - particularly as an economic 
phenomenon - has been scarce. The thrust of their argument is based on simple 
supply and demand considerations (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010).  They further 
argue that human trafficking and migrant exploitation as a market, has been 
largely ignored by the scholarly literature, and practitioner dialogue (Mahmoud 
and Trebesch 2010). Mahmoud and Trebesch’s (2010) analysis indicates that 
some smuggling transmutes to trafficking particularly where migrants who may 
have employed smuggling services, decide to leave voluntarily.  Applying the 
business model of organised crime to the human trade, Schloenhardt (1999) 
argues that the trade responds to a specific demand, and that those involved in 
criminal activities are simply seeking financial gain and enhanced social status.  
 
Sutherland (2013) argues that migrants play a critical and positive role in shaping 
the twenty-first century as engines of poverty reduction in spite of the perceptions 
of migrants as burdens.  Reinforcing the findings of DFID (2007), Michael and 
Stephen (2009:76) and Mallett & Hagen-Zanker (2014), he argues that 
international and internal migration is a means of escaping poverty and conflict, 
as well as a way of adapting to environmental and economic shocks.  Families 
rely on migration to improve their income, health and education, often through 
remittances (Sutherland 2013).  Travis (2014), Hartikainen (2014) and Lusenti 
(2014) argue the need to establish legal migration channels or opportunities as 
an answer to the humanitarian crisis in the central Mediterranean. Lusenti 
contends that restrictive border management measures simply shift the departure 
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points and transit routes and lead to yet more inventive smuggling methods such 
as the use of ships capable of holding up to a thousand migrants.  She argues 
that the dearth of legal migration possibilities is the major driver of the human 
trade.  
 
Boch and Chimenti (2011) explore the expansion of labour migration from 
developing to developed countries contending that ‘the congruence of interests 
of economies, policies and individuals in both ‘receiving’ and ‘sending’ countries’ 
explains the current trend’.  This approach is supported by Beat and Belser 
(2009), Koslowski (2011) and Van Lampe (2011) who emphasise labour 
shortages in developed countries resulting in increased forced labour and on the 
other hand, globalization which has made transportation and communication 
easier in recent years (see also Chindea  and  Ramirez 2014). 
 
Again it is useful to make a brief comparison with Chinese TNOC. Chin (2011), 
writing in the context of people smuggling from China, compares smuggling 
networks to a dragon with tightly linked diverse organic parts. Chin’s (2011) 
research details the organisation of the Chinese smuggling organisation which 
includes arrangers or investors referred to as snakeheads; recruiters known as 
little snakeheads; transporters, and corrupt Chinese officials who accept bribes; 
guides; enforcers; and support personnel.  Chin’s (2011) depiction of Chinese 
smuggling organisation partially complements Arsovska’s (2014) analysis of the 
hierarchical/alien paradigm of organised crime and criminal bodies and, at a wider 
level, William’s (2001) analysis of most criminal networks.  Chin’s (2011) analysis 
reveals the involvement of Chinese triads; tongs and street gangs in the business 
of the smuggling of undocumented Chinese to the US.  However, Monzini (2010) 
argues that change remains a constant feature of smuggling networks, and that 
people smuggling to Italy, may not involve powerful cartels or even organised 
groups such as the Mafia, but can be small-scale organisations. Monzini 
(2010:28) summarises the characteristics of smuggling organizations as 
‘…flexibility, changeable hierarchical structures and relationships and limited 
longevity’ with the ‘boss’ being the only stable figure. She, however, notes that 
Nigerian smuggling organizations differ as they are highly structured, 
coordinating with other networks and out-sourcing part of the transportation 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
54 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
(Monzini 2010). Chindea  and  Ramirez (2014) concur that criminal groups are 
flexible observing that drug cartels can morph into more complex entities such as 
polydrug entities and diversifying beyond drug trafficking to other illicit activities 
such as kidnapping, people smuggling and human trafficking (see also Dill 2011).  
They list Mafia organisations, drug trafficking organisations, prostitution rings and 
street gangs, inter alia, as different forms of organised criminality (Chindea and 
Ramirez 2014). Similarly, Reitano et al (GIATOC 2014)5 suggest that smugglers 
who traditionally have been locals and acted alone in the smuggling of people 
from Libya to Italy have in recent times become part of professional networks as 
their activities have become more sophisticated.  
 
 
The smuggling process and the drivers of irregular migration  
 
Based on research by the OSCE (2010), people smuggling shares similar 
features with human trafficking, and can be referred to as a process. It comprises 
different stages or nodes each organised by different personalities. Reitano et al 
(2014) affirms EUROPOL’s statistics that 80% of irregular migration to Europe is 
facilitated by smugglers and criminal groups contracted to carry out the process. 
Her analysis provides a breakdown of the types of migrant smuggling: 
  
• Ad hoc smuggling services, in which migrant travels on his own but 
employs certain services of smugglers during the journey such as when 
crossing borders; 
• Migrant smuggling through misuse or abuse of documents, where 
migrants can afford the visas and travel documents; 
• Pre-organised stage to stage smuggling, where migrants are escorted 
through the journey by smugglers (Reitano et al 2014:2) 
 
Much scholarly research (Monzini 2010; Ellis et al 2011; OSCE 2010) categorises 
the actors and roles in the human trade as consisting of recruiters who are usually 
the first contact for the migrant, also known as rabatteurs and coxeurs.  Monzini 
 
5 the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime 
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(2010) lists the second category as middle men who are responsible for creating 
contact between the migrant or victim and the organiser of the journey; they are 
known to be in contact with more than one smuggler. According to her analysis, 
the trip is usually organised by the smuggler – which could be either in the country 
of departure or destination country -while the innkeeper makes safe houses 
available at embarkation and departure points.  In the case of smuggling by sea, 
Monzini (2010) and Reitano et al (2014) stress the role of the passeur who pilots 
the boat.  
 
Ellis et al (2011) have developed a detailed typology of those involved in the 
smuggling process. The typology includes migrants; people providing food and 
other requirements; coxeurs/rabtteurs/touts/guide men; intermediaries such as 
chairmen and connection men; burgers, In Tchaga, passeurs, and Jefes (see Ellis 
et al 2011:49).  The typology should also expand to include state officials who 
facilitate passage in return for bribes, but also migrants who work as part of the 
networks to earn money for their own journey. Monzini (2010) observes that in 
most destination or transit countries there are indigenous middlemen 
incorporated into established international networks with the responsibility of 
assembling the clients/migrants in the location.  However, the motivation of these 
indigenous middlemen is seemingly ambiguous according to the literature. Callan 
(2012), investigating people smuggling to Australia from Asia, contends that 
many locals involved in helping to transport migrants do so out of a sense of 
altruism as much as a money-making opportunity. Her interviews with middleman 
suggest that they are not fully aware of the nature of the role they play in 
facilitating the migrant journeys.  Humphris (2013) researching people smuggling 
and trafficking from Eritrea to Sudan and Egypt reports that the local Eritreans 
who act as brokers for the Rashaida ethnic people who act as smugglers are not 
really aware that they are part of a smuggling network, but rather opportunists 
fulfilling money-making tasks as they arise.  
 
The scholarly literature also explores often sizeable and distinct groups involved 
in networks at different junctures and in different roles. Siegel and de Bank (2010) 
investigate the specific role of women in human trafficking (rather than 
smuggling).  These are often former trafficked victims who assume the role of 
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‘madams’, controlling women exploited as prostitutes. Koslowski (2011) 
researches the role of traditional gangsters, not explicitly part of the network 
process, but willing to undertake diverse violent roles such as enforcers or debt 
collectors. Reitano et al (2014) analyse the role of the semi-nomadic Tuareg and 
Tubu in the Sahel, again not professional people smugglers, but with a long-
standing tradition of involvement in the movement of goods across the Sahara.  
 
 
Each region in Africa has its peculiar dynamics in terms of organisation and 
structure of migration.  It is therefore important to briefly highlight some of the 
debates on the reasons for migrating besides the existence of smuggling and 
trafficking networks that encourage migration. These reasons are considered by 
this research as drivers of irregular migration.  
 
From the year 2000, it can be observed that irregular migration which at the time 
was mainly inspired by the search for ‘greener pastures, was recorded to have 
significantly dropped in 2010 and thereafter increased as an aftermath of the 
revolts of the Arab Spring of 2011.  In recent times, it has been observed that the 
unprecedented drive for irregular migration has shifted from the quest for 
alternative economic opportunities to fleeing from wars, political and religious 
crises, and poverty (Reitano, Adal and Shaw, 2014).  A number of factors 
influence the decision to migrate and these decisions, as pointed out by 
Cummings et al (2015), range from personal to political reasons and at the same 
time are subject to change over the course of the migrant’s journey.  Drawing 
from the analysis of Cherti and Grant (2013), Browne (2015), highlighted violence 
and instability, limited opportunities and the culture of migrating as push factors, 
while the influence of the diaspora, media and social technologies and improved 
prospects as pull factors that act as motivations that contribute to the migrant’s 
decisions to migrate.   McAuliffe (2017) however agrees with De Hass 2010 about 
the fact that it is not possible to categorise a number of factors that act to facilitate 
migration.  These factor are referred to as ‘enabling factors’ and they include 
geography and ease of travel, ability to travel through transit countries, travel 
assistance from diaspora population, increased ability to self-fund journeys, 
communication technology and global asylum systems (McAuliffe 2017:2).  There 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
57 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
is a caveat to these factors; there is a possibility of rapid change.  The changing 
characteristics of these factors make the decision making of the migrant complex 
which in turn makes it difficult to categorise the enabling factor or drivers of 
irregular migration in a number of instances.    
 
Equally, gender norms significantly influence the reasons for migration; who and 
where they migrate to. IOM states that gender influences reasons for migration 
and who migrates, networks subscribed to and their accesses to resources both 
in their country of origin and at the destination countries.  Ahmad (2008) working 
with Pakistani migrants concluded that it was easier for Pakistani male migrants 
to migrate while the female migrants would not have access to the resources that 
would enable them to do so even if they desired. As a matter of fact, they had 
little or no choice at all regarding migrating. In such instances, and in such 
statistics, the female gender may not resonate when human trafficking or 
smuggling issues are examined but rather it is a case of masculinity. While both 
males and females migrate in search of economic alternatives that would help 
their families and escape from socio-political crisis, additional factors necessitate 
and shape the movement of females.  This movement could be both voluntary 
and forced. O’Neil et al (2016), identifies the lack of autonomy of the majority of 
female migrants; they are not allowed to make the decision to migrate for fear 
regarding remittances.  In cases where they are finally allowed to, there is huge 
expectation of remittances to the family laid on the female migrant (Jolly 2005).  
Nonetheless, some females, especially adolescents, migrate to escape harmful 
cultural practices such as genital mutilation and early or forced marriage which is 
imposed on them by their families (O’Neil et al 2016; Jolly and Reeves 2005).  
Females in some societies are banned from migrating by their governments with 
the claim of protecting them from the various risks associated with feminine 
migration. Females seem to be the easiest prey of the human traffickers and 
smugglers. This is because of being exploited sexually.  There are no indicators 
that men are sexually exploited as well in international migration (Ahmad 2018).   
Jolly and Reeves (2005) examining voluntary and involuntary migration, identify 
inequalities within and between countries as one factor that can influence gender 
as a cause of immigration; either economic, family unification, accesses to 
desired jobs opportunities and or gender discrimination.  
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In the same context, Dibeh et al (2019) considers a different perspective of drivers 
of migration, focusing on drivers of youth irregular migration in the North African 
region, with regards mostly to youths from disadvantaged backgrounds. The 
motivations of the migrating youths in the MENA region and North Africa were 
categorised into ‘…socio-economic factors, wealth, adaptability, the labour 
market, institutional factors, and the Arab Spring’ (Dibeh et al 2019:234). This 
research significantly contributes to the debate regarding the increased migration 
rates post Arab Spring, with the Arab Spring considered as a catalyst to migration 
dynamics.  Although Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi (2013) explained that the ‘Arab 
Spring’ might have contributed to the geopolitical changes which in turn led to the 
emergence of new migration flows created by diverse regional crises, the active 
involvement of organised crime groups have also played a significant role in the 
whole migration process which this study refers to as the ‘human-trade’.  In 
contributing to this debate of the Arab spring as a catalyst to migration dynamics, 
this will be examined in greater detail in the succeeding part of this thesis.   
 
Doomernik (2013) argues that international migration is highly motivated by social 
considerations, economic opportunities or drivers which include prolonged 
economic underdevelopment and growing competition for scarce resources and 
the search for employment.  Institutionally weak states are also often unsafe and 
autocratically governed.  Doomernik (2013) refers to these drivers of immigration 
as a mix of push and pull factors which are not quickly remedied.  In the same 
vein, Humphris (2013) provides instances of push factors in the Eritrean context 
such as the lack of political freedom, educational opportunities and freedom of 
movement.  
 
In collaboration with the Migration Policy Centre, Fargues and Fandrich (2012), 
argue that the fallout from the Arab Spring provided the impetus for major refugee 
crises in Libya and Syria forcing refugees to flee to Europe.  The statistics in proof 
of this were gathered from first-hand surveys conducted in the spring of 2012, 
competent offices from European member states and policy documents, which 
indicate that about one million fled Libya while about 100,000 fled Syria.  De Haas 
(2012), expand on the role played by the Arab Spring by arguing that migration 
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in its various forms has played a key part in the uprisings that have spread across 
the North African region. He supports his claims with examples such as sea-
border crossings to Lampedusa, returnees to Cairo joining protests in Tahir 
Square, and migrants in Egyptian and Tunisian holding centres (De Haas 2012). 
Fargues and Fandrich (2012: 12) examine challenges that have followed the Arab 
Spring such as ‘unemployment and underemployment, especially of educated 
youth; wage differentials between the North and South; the attractiveness of 
Europe in regards to gaining skills and education; the desire to live within 
European cultures and lifestyles; and [also] for family reunification’.  They argue 
that Arab Spring resulted in the increase in the number of detected illegal 
crossings of EU sea borders, a position corroborated by Morehouse and 
Bloomfield (2011) who further add that border management operations impact on 
irregular migration as indicated by the figure below.  
 
 




At this juncture, it is important to examine the Arab Spring in the light of the 
centrality of Libya and the central Mediterranean route  
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The Arab-Spring-Catalyst Debate  
 
This section presents an overview of the socio-political context of the research 
into irregular migration from Libya to Italy. It is a period characterised by uprisings 
across North Africa often referred to as the ‘Arab Spring'.  First, the section 
recounts the socio-economic hardships that prevailed at the time of this 
research's focus.  Second, it looks at the catalyst of the first uprising in Tunisia 
and the spread of uprisings across North Africa.  Next, it examines the nature of 
those uprisings in terms of scale, demography and regime response. It then 
moves on to consider the possible causes of the uprisings.  Finally, the section 
recounts the impact of those uprisings on migration country by country. 
 
The phrase Arab Spring was first used by an American political scientist, Marc 
Lynch in his foreign policy analysis (Abusharif, 2014). Qadir Mushtaq and Afzal 
Arab (2017) used the term to represent the  Arab uprisings and it was 
subsequently popularized by the Western media in early 2011 when there was 
an uprising by Tunisians against their former leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 
(Manfreda 2011, Salih (n.d).  The backlash of the Tunisian regime only resulted 
in the evolution of what was hitherto a peaceful protester to violent protest 
(QadirMushtaq and AfzalArab 2017).  The success of this uprising emboldened 
similar anti-government protests in many Arab countries leading to a series of 
protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread to other Arab countries 
including Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen in early 2011.  
 
The Socio-Political Context of the North Africa Uprisings 
 
To understand why these protests took place, it is helpful to examine the socio-
economic hardship in the region prior to the uprisings, The World Bank (press 
release of October 21, 2015) argued that these regions faced, prior to the 
uprisings, a severe decline in life satisfaction that was masked by the seemingly 
high growth rates recorded in the regions.  The fact that the polling of the 
population was not readily visible to observers exacerbated the precipitous 
conditions (World Bank 2015).  The general subsidies that the regimes offered 
served as a palliative which did not deter a majority of the middle-class protesters.  
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The World Bank Chief Economist of the Middle East and North Africa Region, 
Shanta Devarajan argued that the social contracts were ’…old social contracts of 
redistribution with a limited voice [which] had stopped working, especially for the 
middle class, prior to 2011…’. The economic indicators did not alert the regimes 
to their impending doom.  The decline in socio-economic conditions is analysed 
by Piciello (2011).  In Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, there were deteriorating labour 
markets which principally affected their educated youths.  This featured high 
debts and inflation which pushed these countries into seeking help from the IMF 
and the World Bank. Although their economies recovered slightly around the 
2000s, they struggled to generate a growing sustainable job-creating labour 
market (Piciello 2011).  This failure of government economic policies particularly 
affected disenfranchised youth, including young graduates and women.  The 
people were therefore not silent about their dissatisfaction with the deterioration 
in their lives and the quality of the public services; emphasizing the need for 
improved economic opportunities, economic and social justice.  The figure below 
indicates the percentage of dissatisfaction with government services prior to the 
uprisings which could serve as an indicator of an important trigger of the 
uprisings.  The graph enumerates affordable housing, roads, public transport, 
and availability of quality of health care, quality of education and effort to increase 
quality of jobs as aspects the citizens were dissatisfied with in 2009 and 2010 
(see figure 3.7).  
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Figure 3-7. Graph indicating aspects the citizens of the Arab regions were dissatisfied with pre Arab 
spring. (Source: quoted in Ianchovichina 2018) 
 
 
The data indicates that availability of high-quality jobs, accessible roads, 
affordable housing and availability of quality health care remained crucial for the 
people.  This dissatisfaction particularly regarding economic occupation in the 
Arab region in 2009 and 2010 is reported in the figure below.  The level of 
dissatisfaction is visible with a striking deterioration in the life evaluation score of 
business owners in Libya and Tunisia between 2009 and 2010.  
 
 
Figure 3-8. Life evolution score regarding occupation in the Arab countries pre Arab spring, 
indicating the degree of dissatisfaction among citizens. (Source: quoted in   Ianchovichina 2018). 
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Though market-oriented reforms were adopted, they proved inefficient in 
addressing the increasing unemployment crisis.  Rather, there arose lay-offs, 
worsening living conditions and an increase in authoritarianism, repression, and 
limiting of basic freedom.  Economic management was not transparent and the 
regimes were coercive and ineffective in the provision of social services.  The 
high level of coercion and exclusion resulted in a push-back by citizens who 
perceived the high levels of deprivation as unacceptable.    
 
Before 2011, public protests were rare in Tunisia and the Arab world in general 
and dissent was usually put down forcefully. Mohammed Bouazizi became a 
martyr and was seen as a symbol of resistance for all the poor, unemployed and 
oppressed youths in not only Tunisia but the wider Arab world. By the spring of 
2011, similar violent protests had led to despotic rulers being ousted in Egypt, 
Yemen, and Libya. In the case of Libya, however, it took the intervention and 
involvement of NATO forces to topple the regime of Muammar Gaddafi and send 
the long-time Prime Minister to his grave.  There were also civil uprisings and 
major protests in Syria, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Oman and 
protests in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Western Sahara, and Lebanon. The uprising in 
Syria developed into a full civil war that remains unresolved till date in spite 
of/despite the involvement of major world powers on both sides of the conflict.  
The campaign against state despotism and rentierism, that is the generation of a 
large proportion of their income from unproductively earned payments, was the 
crux of the uprising in 2011 and 2012 (Gray 2011:1).6 As Hamzawy (2016) puts 
it, this situation of despotism and rentierism enabled systematic crimes and 
human rights violations in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria.  
This is based on the fact that Mohammed Bouazizi’s martyrdom in Tunisia, as 
narrated by Rosiny (2012), indicated that the wares of the young man were 
confiscated and would not be released by the municipal official because he did 
not possess the necessary permits and had no funds to bribe the official.  
 
In a society facing despotic rule and rentierism, tyranny and violence infiltrate 
every arm of the government and the rule of law seems absent.  This is what 
 
6 For a number of Arab countries this is most rampant in the oil and gas export business which was one of the main sources of 
external income. 
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Ghazi Moradi (2017) referred to as forceful domination.  Forceful domination, he 
implies is an essential tool for despotic rule.  In despotic rule, the people are not 
represented because according to Ghazi (2017) there is no intermediary in 
political domination.  Hence despotic rulers are not answerable to the people but 
rather dominate them.  These rulers simply make promises they do not intend to 
keep during their election campaigns resulting in leaders such as Tunisia’s Zine 
el-Abidin Ben Ali holding office for 23 years.  It took the martyrdom of Bouazizi to 
break this complacency. An intermediary for helpless citizens with no funds to 
bribe officials, was missing in that context. Governments lost  their political 
legitimacy, public institutions were not able to  maintain popular trust, and a 
situation where ‘…decision and public policymaking processes became  
increasingly dominated by military, security, and intelligence institutions’ 
(Hamzawy 2016:3 ),  it could be argued that despotic rule was  evident in these 
countries and thrived on the fear it built in the citizens.  People became unable to 
speak up for their right.  This explains why the majority continued in silence, save 
for the likes of Bouazizi who resorted to self-immolation.  
 
The spark and speed by which the wave of protest went through the Arab regions 
(excluding U.A.E and Qatar) indicate the thirst and eagerness to speak up which 
had been suppressed. Al-Azm (2011) argues that despotic rule was the reason 
for the ‘…inevitable vertical disintegration of our societies along religious, 
sectarian, ethnic, regional and tribal lines (Al-Azm 2011:8). Likewise, Hydemann 
(2016) argues that for weak states that cannot or will not fulfil their side of the 
social contract, violent conflicts and collapse are inevitable. 
 
The catalyst of the first uprising & its spread across North Africa 
 
As mentioned above, the social and political upheavals that beset most Arab 
states in the Middle East and North Africa could be best described to have been 
initiated by the self-immolation of 26-year-old Mohammed Bouazizi, a university 
graduate who sold fruits and vegetables without a licence  in Sidi Bouzid because 
he could not find formal employment.  He doused himself in petrol and set himself 
on fire in protest and died days later. His death set off violent protests in major 
cities across Tunisia culminating in President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fleeing the 
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country within a month.  The death of Bouazizi also inspired uprisings in Libya, 
Yemen, Egypt and Syria that came to be seen as a socio-political revolution in 
the Arab world.  The sacrifice of individual martyrs was magnified by social media 
which became a significant driving factor in the process. Benkirane (2012), refers 
to the roles that the social networks and new media played in the revolutions - 
particularly in Egypt and Tunisia – as ‘catalytic’. Social media is identified to have 
played a critical role in the spread of protest across the region, for example, the 
Facebook campaigns in early 2011 which went viral (Stepanova 2011).  New 
media was more relevant to the general population given the control of 
conventional media by the authorities as a means of restricting criticism and 
opposition. Social media was seen, therefore, as the most effective means of 
disseminating information (Khondker, 2011) 
 
 
The nature of the uprisings and regime response. 
 
According to the  ‘Arab barometer’ the protesters in the copycat protests in Egypt 
were mainly young men between  15 to 29 years, as well as middle-aged men 
between  45 to 59, with the majority having tertiary education, and being single, 
affluent, and urban, some with part-time employment, but with very low pay. (Arab 
Barometer, Ianchovichina 2018). The majority of those protesting in Tunisia and 
Libya were students, while the data for Yemen shows that there the protestors 
also included those in full-time employment. The protests campaigned against 
corruption and deterioration in the quality of life and public service (Arab 
Barometer, 2018).  
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Figure 3-9.  Arab Barometer showing the profile of Arab spring protesters in Tunisia (Source: Arab 






Figure 3-10. Arab Barometer showing the profile of Arab spring protesters in Libya (Source: Arab 
Barometer, Ianchovichina 2018:6) 
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Figure 3-11.  Arab Barometer showing the profile of Arab spring protesters in the Arab Republic of 
Egypt (Source: Arab Barometer, Ianchovichina 2018:7) 
 
 
The figures presented above display higher levels of popular engagement in 
Libya than in Tunisia and Egypt, and it is understandable why Libya spiralled into 
a full-blown civil war. While Tunisia experienced some significant change, the 
uprisings did not yield the desired result in other participating countries. While 
self-immolation became more rampant in Tunisia (some 104 persons were 
admitted to the hospital burn unit in 2016) as a way of protests and suicide,, 
activists were also locked up in countries such as Egypt and Syria, while labour 
exploitation and slavery became the order of the day in regions such as Libya 
(Amnesty International 2015; Blaise 2017; Sherlock 2018).  The similarity in the 
profile of the protesters, who were mainly young students and middle-aged 
employed men, captured a sense of being frustrated by the never-ending 
marginalisation, exclusion from public-policy making processes and the neglect 
of the economic and social demands of the citizens. This appeared to cut across 
the Arab/MENA region. The fact, as the graphs above show, that the majority of 
the protesters were either employed or studying or had graduated from university 
study indicates that the protests were not just a movement stirred by the jobless 
and poverty-stricken. They were people who were frustrated at the failure to 
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improve standards of living, exacerbated by these despotic regimes. Yet, post-
Arab Spring conditions show worsened conditions for those involved in the 
uprisings. Examining the region 8 years after the initial event, Gabon (2018) 
considered it an unfinished phenomenon, and ‘a disastrous landscape’. 
Nonetheless, Makdisi (2017) argues that the outcome of the uprisings remains 
highly uncertain with forces pushing for a return to autocracy, as well as forces 
seeking to deepen the infant democracies.  
 
The regime response to the protests was initially violent. However the increased 
killing of protesters by the security forces only resulted in political, local and tribal 
leaders joining the revolution in order to save their families (Lacher 2012). 
Although Tunisian and Egyptian regimes tried to suppress protesters, Egypt had 
protesters killed and detained (Rane and Salem 2012: Amnesty International 
2015:6). The response of the regimes as well as the outside interventions, 
resulted in continued social movement in some regions while in some countries 
such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, long standing rulers were forced from office 
(Rane and Salem 2012)7, although the removal of individual autocrats did not 
erase autocratic tendencies.   
 
In other words, the Arab Spring proved to be an combination of protests against 
despotic sit-tight rulers, hunger, poverty, unemployment, ethnic and minority 
discrimination, lack of political freedom and economic inequalities (Ansani and 
Daniele 2012; QadirMushtaq and Afzal Arab 2017). The rash of violent uprisings 
and attempts by the different states to quell them, resulted in population 
displacements and a mass exodus of citizens from areas of conflict. The 
breakdown of law and order in strife-torn states, the upsurge in the number of 
migrants and the reluctance of most EU member states to accept refugees and 





7 Elseewi points out a long-debated view that ‘…years of a dilapidated educational system, an ineffectual pretence of a 
democratic infrastructure, and the continued valorisation of patriarchal culture had left Egyptians an apolitical, simple-
minded, and ultimately fatalistic mass of apathetic (young) people (Elseewi 2011:1).   
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The importance of the migratory outcome of the Arab Spring as a core driver of 
the increase in smuggling and trafficking is debatable. De Hass (2012) argues 
that migration played a key part in the uprisings. He suggest that the movement 
of people including the sea crossings to Lampedusa; the return of Egyptian 
migrants to Cairo to join protests in Tahir Square; migrants fleeing the crisis in 
Libya and the return of migrants who were previously held in Egyptian and 
Tunisian holding centres should be seen as migration flows as a catalyst of revolt. 
(De Hass 2012; Hussein 2012; Knell 2012; Global Detention Project 2015).  He 
further suggests that  
 
Recent migration events are not simply a side effect of the revolutions [but 
rather] the possible links between declining opportunities for migration 
from North Africa to the EU (due to the economic crisis and intensified 
border controls) and the exclusion and discontent of disenfranchised youth 
on the one hand, and the protests on the streets of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Algeria and Morocco on the other, deserve closer consideration (De Hass 
and Sigona 2012:4).  
 
A premise for this argument could be the striking shift in the number of migrants 
before, during and after the uprisings (UNHCR 2014; Massari 2015; Roman 
2015).  Prior to the Arab Spring approximately 23,000 migrants were recorded to 
have travelled from North Africa to Italy by boat between 1997 and 2010; the 
numbers increased to 63,000 in 2011 and a further 170, 000 in 2014 (McMahon 
and Sigona 2016).  
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Figure 3-12.  Graph indicating the illegal border crossings on the central Mediterranean from 2008 
(pre Arab spring) to 2017 (post Arab spring period) (Frontex 2018) 
 
 
The figure above indicates crossing figures to Italy between 2008 and 2017. 
There are migration spikes in 2011 and 2014 as a result of a mix of factors 
including political turmoil, the economic crisis and opportunistic migrations. The 
declines in 2012 was largely the result of Italy’s controversial agreement with 
Libya on intercepting and returning migrants as well as stiffer migration policies 
within this period (Cummings et al 2015, Connor 2018).  The impact of the 
uprisings in the Arab region records several spontaneous movements; mass 
displacements and trans-border migration of people from Tunisia to neighbouring 
countries, the breakdown of the rule of law in Libya resulting in migrant workers 
fleeing the instability and violence, crossing the borders for Egypt, Tunisia and 
eventually Italy.  The full-blown war in Syria, contributed to more movement of 
persons to Libya en route Europe in search of asylum in 2014 and 2015. The 
figure above indicates the shifts in the movements in the region and the eventual 
surge to the European Union, resulting in 3771 migrant and refugee deaths in 
2015. Although migration for economic betterment and other reasons, as argued 
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by De Hass, may have occurred before the time of the uprisings, it is debatable 
that the triggers the actual uprisings and their aftermath played a significant role 
in increasing migration numbers.    
 
The intervention by NATO which Koser (2012) believes has been overlooked in 
the analysis of the Arab Spring, has also been argued to have aggravated the 
protests in Libya as well as the effect the support received from other media 
protesters.  The intervention had been criticised as having failed to outline its true 
objectives which were to ‘…protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’ as a collective action (UN General 
Assembly 2005). The intervention by NATO could be classified as justified on 
humanitarian grounds. There are those that argue that the intervention was 
intended to remove Gaddafi from power, ignoring for example the cease-fire that 
the Gaddafi regime offered and the heavy aerial bombardment despite the Libyan 
population not being protected. This raises questions as to its objective of 
‘responsibility to help protect populations’ (Terry 2015:164; Green 2018:1).  
 
Hollis (2012; 2016) on the other hand, argues that the nature of EU, in terms of 
its conflicting objective policies, institutional inefficacy, and its diffuse power 
structure notions, unintentionally contributed to the creation of the Arab Spring. 
Hollis's argument points to the EU’s prescribed reforms for North Africa lacking 
in the area of political reforms, and the economic reforms advocated, under the 
umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), only resulted in low 
wages, inflated living cost, corruption and pronounced youth unemployment 
(Hollis 2016).  Clearly, the implication of opening up their systems to democracy 
was not fully understood by the new politicians of the Arab world. Whilst it might 
be assumed that the essence of the EMP was to allow the free flow of capital and 
goods, it has been argued that the partnership was in reality a way for the EU to 
restrict the flow of migrants and labour into the EU (Hollis 2012).  Funds were 
thrown at problems in the region by the Europeans with the aim of creating 
economic investment that would restrict the desire for migration to the EU for 
economic improvement. However it did not solve the problems as the chasm 
between rich and poor had already become unbridgeable. In reality, ‘…the 
common market principles upheld inside the EU were not fully replicated in the 
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Mediterranean Partnership’, thereby failing the shared prosperity concept (Hollis 
2012; 2016: 5). Consequently the shared geopolitical strategic and economic 
space that the plan hoped would address the problems, did not address these 
institutional imbalances.  The EU only exacerbated the already existing issues in 
the regions which triggered the eventual migration drive.  
 
The Arab Spring has been held to be a key reason behind the increase in 
migration flows since 2011, according to Fargus and Frandrich (2012).  In their 
view, the Libyan protests and the NATO intervention that led to the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime was the main driver of migration in the country, leading to more 
instability and the consequent exodus by the main transit migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa based in Libya.  The Libyan route became a means of escape for 
those already in Libya and a potential transit hub for those attracted by the 
instability and absence of effective land and maritime policing. (Jones 2012).  It 
is noteworthy that prior to this time, Libya had played a significant role in 
Mediterranean migration as a result of Ghaddafi’s open-door migration policy 
which welcomed sub-Saharan African workers to Libya in the 2000s (McMahon 
and Sigona 2016).  
 
Impact of the Arab spring on migration  
 
Tunisia 
Unlike other Arab countries, Tunisia recorded two phases of migration.  First there 
was increased labour migration from Tunisia to Italy and Malta (about 25,000 
migrants at the time of the revolution).  This was helped by the dissolution of the 
Tunisian border police following the protests allowing for unhindered border 
crossing. The second phase was due to mass migration into Tunisia from 
neighbouring Libya as a result of the Libyan revolution in 2011; including 15,000 
Tunisians, who between 2011 and 2013, were repatriated from Europe (Natter 
2015; De Bel-Air 2016; Fargues 2017).  This incident resulted in several practical 
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Libya 
As Gadhafi entered end game, he used his supposed ability to control the 
smuggling and trafficking of persons to Europe as a shield against his removal 
from power.  
 
Frattini [Italian Foreign Minister] warned that the fall of Gaddafi’s regime 
could lead to an exodus of Biblical proportions. Likewise, Gaddafi warned 
that if he fell: ‘You will have immigration, thousands of people from Libya 
will invade Europe. There will be no-one to stop them anymore.’ (Fargues 
and Fandrich 2012: 6). 
 
With the breakdown of the rule of law in Libya and widespread armed conflict, 
mass displacements were recorded in Tunisia (Fargues 2017). However, 
following the Arab Spring, Libya itself became the most popular migration hub or 
point of embarkation for maritime migration to Europe (Massari 2015). Libya 
became the country experiencing the greatest migration pressure.  The uprising 
particularly affected migrant workers from Sudan, Syria, Eritrea, Somalia and 
other countries in Africa.  These made up the largest category of migrants into 
Egypt, Tunisia and Italy (Koser 2012; Fargues and Fandrich 2012). The Libyan 
route consequently featured fluxes involving a mix of both ‘conflict-induced’ and 
‘voluntary’ migrants.  
 
Syria 
The protests in Syria resulted in an increase in deaths following airstrikes and 
chemical weapon attacks by the Assad regime (BBC 2019b). Whilst Libya 
attracted migrants as a transit point, Syria, on the other hand, experienced 
emigration on a massive scale to escape the civil war (Lynch et al 2014; Hollis 
2016). Subsequently Syrian migrants chose to be smuggled into Europe because 




Following the protests in Egypt the 29-year reign of Hosni Mubarak forcefully 
came to an end and the Supreme Council of the Armed forces took over the 
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leadership until parliamentary elections in 2012 which resulted in the short-lived 
government of Morsi (BBC 2019a).  Further protests led to the creation of an 
interim government in 2013. Consequently, the country became polarised 
between supporters of the interim government and military and those supporters 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi’s political party.  The aftermath of the uprisings 
in Egypt resulted in two presidents being overthrown, more deaths, interim 
governments and great division in the country. 
 
Egypt experienced an influx of migrants - up to 135,000 Syrians at the time of the 
revolution - as a result of the displacement in Libya and Syria following the 
violence and instability in their countries, and equally served as a transit route for 
Syrian refugees en route to Libya (Fargues 2017).  The category of migration 
flows in the post Arab revolution Egypt was a case of voluntary, forced or deferred 
migrations.  It featured voluntary or temporary returns of Egyptians to participate 
in the revolutions and reconstruction of the country; forced returns of Egyptians 
from Libya following the explosion of irregular migrants, and deferred returns 
based on the fact that a good number of Egyptians preferred to remain or even 
move onwards to western countries due to the catastrophic post-revolution 
situation in Egypt at the time (Pagès-El Karoui, 2015). 
 
 
These records indicate the genesis of the Mediterranean human trade which 
eventually became the humanitarian crisis on the Mediterranean in the last 9 
years, claiming thousands of lives and ruining families; with about 10,000 persons 
declared missing or dead within 2014 to 2016 alone (McMahon and Sigona 
2018).   Also, the economic impact of the revolutions such as the falling of oil 
output in Libya (from previously 1.6 barrels per day to 0.1millon barrels per day), 
or the economic paralysis experienced by Egypt, and the instability in the region, 
in turn, impacted migration negatively, acting as a push factor of  trans-border 
migration (Abdelfattah 2011).  
 
Though the impact of the Arab Spring on migration flows was significant, we must 
not lose sight of other preceding factors that birthed irregular migration – 
economic constraints.  The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
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Crime (GIATOC) (2014) has shown that the central Mediterranean route has the 
highest percentage of illegal border crossings to Europe. Syrians and Eritreans 
constitute the largest number of migrants. Similarly, analysis of illegal border 
crossing routes by Frenzen (FRONTEX 2012) shows the central Mediterranean 
routes as the route with the highest detection rates of illegal migrants, particularly 
during the Arab Spring.  
 
UNODC statistics indicate that the bulk of movement – about 90 percent – uses 
embarkation points along the Libyan coast either from Tripoli, Zuwara or Zuwiyah, 
changing according to the actions of local communities or security situations 
(UNODC 2018). 
 
Figure 3-13.  Mediterranean countries by Getty images (iStock) 
 
Why is Libya the number one migration hub since 2002 and not other closer 
coastal countries, especially for migrants from Syria who have apparent easier 
access to Europe via Turkey? This study suggests that the existence of a thriving 
smuggling market in Libya may have contributed to the pull of migrants via the 
Libya route. A mixed make-up of migrants - both poor, political/religious crisis-
compelled, economic alternative-compelled and trafficked – find the Libya-Italy 
route more viable. Is the breakdown of the rule of law in Libya a principal factor?  
There are also questions about the identity and role of other contributory actors 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material 
has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
76 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
like the European Union, autocratic state rulers and restless youths of the various 
states seeking emancipation.  The role of the contributory actors, be it the ‘looking 
the other way' attitude of local authorities and border protection authorities of the 
sub-Saharan countries from where a majority of these journeys commence (in- 
the- face human trade activities, see chapter 5); or paying no attention to the 
impact of their actions and decisions on the populace as observed of the 
autocratic state rulers; or even the stringent immigration policies of the EU 
countries; in more ways than one enhances the evolution of the human-trade  
networks and markets, particularly along Libya to Italy route.  A critical analysis 
of the actors and their roles in relation to the 3 Cs concept introduced by this work 
is presented in chapter 5 hereafter. 
 
Based on the different views raised as regards reasons for migrating, it is evident 
that these drivers of migration also influence the choices made by the migrants 
as regards the means and mode of migrating.  The next section looks at the 
routes through which these migrants are smuggled. 
 
The smuggling routes 
 
Migration has been a given throughout most of the history of human beings as a 
species. Modern migration trends within the continent of Africa and from Africa to 
other continents have been complex.  De Haas supplies a map demonstrating 
the extreme complexity of this movement of people.  
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Figure 3-14.  Map showing other migration routes from and within Africa (De Haas 2008). 
 
 
This section examines the migration routes from Libya to Italy.  The central 
Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy has become the route with the highest 
proportion of irregular migrants of the three main routes from African to Europe. 
The majority of this trade takes place from towns and beaches along the Libyan 
coast to the island of Lampedusa and the Africa-facing southern coast of Sicily. 
Nonetheless, Reitano et al (2014) observe that recent efforts to limit migration 
such as restrictive immigration policies, have only resulted in a shift in migration 
routes as shown in the figure below, where migration embarkation points also 
emerged in Tunisia (Frenzen 2011). The capacity of those involved in moving 
migrants to rapidly alter their routes, and the ease with which globalisation makes 
this possible means that, without a substantial expansion of legal migration 
mechanisms, irregular migration is likely to persist as De Haas (2008) argues.  
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Figure 3-15.  Map showing sea routes and distances from other non-Libyan points of embarkation 
(Tunisian/Algeria) to Lampedusa and Sicily in the preceding years of the Arab spring and during the 
Arab spring year (Source: FRONTEX 2011). 
 
 
Recent media reports indicate changes in the routes and points of embarkation, 
as well as additional categories of migrants, notably larger numbers of Syrian and 
Afghan migrants travelling, and sometimes drowning, on the Western route from 
Turkey to Greece (see Park (2015), BBC (2015), BBC (2015), Sofia Globe (2016). 
An increase in irregular migration to Spain and Cyprus has also been recorded in 
2017 (IOM DTM 2017).  
 
Documentation and data collected indicate that North Africa has been established 
as the transit region for migrants from Africa to Europe particularly sub-Saharan 
migrants (Kohnert, 2007).  A number of flows are organised through Libya. For 
instance, the number of people emigrating from Nigeria has risen, increasing the 
weight of West Africa in the pool of migrants using the Libya to Europe route. This 
is blamed on a number of factors such as the cost of the travel which appears 
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cheaper than other routes, deeper smuggling networks, the preconceived 
essence of travelling to Europe and most recently, the Boko Haram presence 
(Toaldo 2015:p2).  Kinsley (2015) opines that the number of migrants exploring 
the maritime routes continually increases regardless of the weather conditions 
and the EU current decisions on rescue missions.  Against the belief of European 
governments, the decision to curtail maritime rescue missions has raised serious 
concerns as it has become an unintended pull factor when examined in the light 
of the drownings of February 2015.  Prior to this time, the Mare Nostrum 
Operation had been assessed to have contributed to the increase in the 
Mediterranean flows as affirmed by the British Foreign Office minister Lady 
Anelay (Kinsley 2015). While Farrell (2014) argues that the Mare Nostrum policy 
has only acted as a ‘magnet’ for irregular migrants which he referred to as the 
boat people, Toaldo (2015) points out that though it may be deemed politically 
impractical for EU states to apply an open border approach to all, “closed borders” 
would only act as a catalyst to the business of people smuggling.  
 
It is a fact that migration routes overtime have evolved from an era when the 
migrants were mostly students, diplomats, highly educated individuals and high 
net worth business people from the southern Sahara who travelled by air with  
genuine legal documents (Ellis et al 2011), to the era of stricter visa regimes by 
Spain and Italy. While desperate North African migrants in search of jobs in the 
European Union who are affected by this development considered the straits 
between Spain and Morocco, migrants from West African countries as a result of 
economic crises looked towards North Africa.  At that time and now, migration to 
Spain through the narrowest point of the Mediterranean -Strait of Gibraltar – and 
Canary Islands appear to be the major route.  A spider web of routes sprung up 
over the years with hubs at strategic points  in Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, and 
Niger,  mostly as a reaction to migration policies and trends so much so that in  
2011, three major routes was recorded (Ellis et al 2011): 
 
i. Canary Islands or Spanish mainland 
ii. Central Mediterranean 
iii. Eastern Mediterranean 
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Figure 3-16.  Western, Central and eastern routes (Source: BBC News 2014) 
 
There is a growing literature on the diversity of routes from Africa to Europe. 
However, Shelly (2014) asserts that no matter the number of routes and their 
origins, these routes constantly change and reorganise so as to effectively 
circumvent border authorities, contravening immigration regulations. Migrants 
who use these irregular migration routes are mainly from African countries such 
as Cameroon, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan as well as migrants from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
With the diverse attempts to clamp down on the activities of people smuggling 
organisations and push-back policies implemented, the strategies and tactics of 
the smugglers have continually changed and so has the routes resulting in the 
variation and modification of migration routes (Massari2015).  For example, the 
ISS and Global Initiative research show Moroccan migrants transiting via Libya 
and Algeria, Tunisian migrants - especially young persons - following this lead, 
they speculate the emergence of a route along the eastern Mediterranean. Most 
interesting is the discovery of Bangladeshi migrants being routed through Libya 
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according to a respondent, a representative of Addio-Pizzo, an anti-mafia NGO 
based in Palermo (Interview 26).  This points to the fact that the Libyan point of 
embarkation in most cases, Zuwarah, has over the years and by virtue of intense 
existing smuggling market in the region,  evolved into the most busy and active 
point of embarkation.  In the light of the continuous social and political upheavals 
that exacerbate the egress of persons, it would suffice to say that even FRONTEX 
(2014) acknowledged these complexities associated with the metamorphosis of 
the routes in stating that; 
 
The job is never finished however. The networks of human 
smugglers and traffickers stay abreast of FRONTEX operations; 
as soon as a route is identified and closed down by an EPN or 
FRONTEX sea operation, the facilitators will adjust either the 
route or their modus operandi to stay ahead of the detection net” 
(FRONTEX 2014).  
 
This means that continuous research on the routes as they evolve is necessary 
hence; this research is not exhaustive on the routes employed at every given 
period. It primarily focuses on the routes relating to evidences from research data. 
 
Aligning the research on the routes and their differentiations, findings from the 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case reveal that migrants from regions such as Syria, 
Egypt and Lebanon, among others, move towards locations where the services 
of smugglers could be available.  Scholars such as Massari, De Has, Ellis et al 
and Aziz, Monzini and Pastore have endeavoured to chart the path of migration 
from the diverse locations where most migrants come from in Africa, particularly 
migrants from West Africa, the Sahel and sometimes the horn of Africa. However, 
this research examines another category of migrants i.e. migrants who travel to 
the region of embarkation from locations such as Syria, Lebanon, Damascus and 
Egypt as in the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case. Witness testimonies reveal that 
majority of these migrants sought their own way from their various locations to 
the region of embarkation; some of them by air and some by land.  Some made 
their move prior to making contact with the smuggler, and some driven simply by 
the desire to escape or thrive. 
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Moreover, findings from the FERMO PM MUHIDDIN case indicate a route 
through the Somali desert between Sudan and Libya where the 130 migrants 
whose testimonies are contained in the judicial proceeding, were kidnapped en 
route Tripoli - Libya for their embarkation to Europe.  Statements by PEDROS 
Tesfit (one of the kidnapped migrants) revealed that the migrants were kidnapped 
by about 50 armed militia men believed to be Somalians and some Sudanese 
and forced into some vans and thereafter made to walk for 6 days before being 
transported to a house in the outskirts of Sabha.  In Sabha, they were held and 
tortured until payments were extorted from their families. The migrants were held 
for about 15 days and thereafter transported to Tripoli after payments were 
received.  Charting their paths, it can be deduced that the routes from wherever 
the migrants came first converged in Sabha and thereafter Tripoli and up to the 
shore where the migrants are pooled for embarkation.  This deduction to a large 
extent agrees with the response of settled migrants interviewed in Palermo, who 
recounted how their journeys were organised and the routes they accessed in the 
process which typically corresponds with the locations and routes mentioned in 
the proceedings.  Locations such as Agadez, Bargigad, Sabha and Tripoli noted 
in reports, occur repeatedly in responses, and witness testimonies; in some cases 
with the exception of Ghat.  It is therefore likely that irregular migration towards 
Europe in the recent past has not only featured a significant increase in flows 
from North African shores, but also a resilient attitude on the part of the migrants 
in enhancing their own movement to the possible points of embarkation for the 
irregular maritime journey. 
 
Modes of transportation of migrants  
 
In order not to be discovered, smugglers and migrants alike have sought diverse 
ways to transport or be transported to their destinations.  Aziz, Monzini and 
Pastore (2015) note that along the land routes, the means of transportation are 
not always convenient but rather a necessary means of mobility such as 4x4 Pick-
Ups vehicles, with the migrants organised in batches of 30 people at a time.  The 
migrants are also reportedly conveyed in large trucks which may also be used 
simultaneously in carrying animals, merchandise, characterised with falls from 
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the truck or starvation and thirst resulting in death in some cases. Aziz, Monzini 
and Pastore (2015) add that these journeys are organised by desert people - the 
Tubu and Tuaregs.  Daragahi in 2013, clarified that trucks which were previously 
sent out loaded with subsidised fuel, flour and sugar from Libya returned loaded 
with migrants who were ready to pay exorbitant fees to get them directly into 
Libya, in some cases to search for jobs or for the Mediterranean travels.  The 
organisers of transportation may be accused of inhuman treatment but migrants 
at this stage rather submit to the notion of being treated as no more than mere 
commodities, with the aim of reaching their destination. 
 
A number of transportation means were revealed in the FERMO PALESTINESE 
1 case. Some of the witnesses revealed in their testimonies how they moved from 
city to city and went either by road (in a car) and by air. One of the witnesses AL 
M  M  stated;  
 
… I started from Syria and, passing from Oman and Egypt, 
arrived in Libya in the city of Tripoli, where I stayed for about five 
months, working as a house painter…” 
(Statement of AL M M , Judicial reports, FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1 case) 
 
While B  R  another witness, states, ‘I was asked by him where we were in 
order to send someone with a car to pick us up…” (Statement of B R , 
Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case).  From these statements, it is 
perceived that in some instances, the migrants have been transported by car as 
indicated by the statement of B R   
 
Equally, an interview respondent met in Palermo, recounted how he was 
transported from Sabha to Tripoli covered with blankets to disguise  and make 
him look like goods and not a migrant (Interview 33).  This migrant’s statement 
revealed another means of transportation which in this case was a truck used in 
transporting good across the desert.  The land route through which this migrant 
was transported and other land routes are presented in the map below:  
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Figure 3-17.  Land routes to Libya from East and West Africa (Source: Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organised Crime (2014) 
 
Judicial proceedings also reveal that the migrants were transported from the farm 
house where the smuggled migrants were initially incarcerated to the point of 
embarkation in Libya by means of military trucks and further transported by 
means of smaller boats to the main vessel they were to be smuggled across the 
Mediterranean in (Judicial reports, FERMO PM Scafisca 2013).  Also, indication 
from the FERMO PM Muhidin Judicial report, reveals that Eritrean migrants 
travelling by foot to Libya who were intercepted and kidnapped by 
smuggling/trafficking rings were conveyed by vans from one point of incarceration 
to another as they exploited them (Judicial reports, FERMO PM Muhidin, 2013) .   
 
Conversely, Coluccello and Massey (2007) list some of the charges made as part 
of HARIG including ‘…association with a transnational criminal network of 
articulated cells operating on the Italian side in Crotone and other cities in North 
Africa in Libya and Egypt’ (Coluccello and Massey 2007:85).  They detail criminal 
activities carried out by Egyptian and Sudanese networks in the transportation of 
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migrants by sea from Libya including the recruitment of persons from their 
countries, proposing packages to Libya and with the aid of Italian contacts, 
organising illegal transnational movement of migrants to Italy. Coluccello and 
Massey (2007) concur with Pastore that those involved in the trade work in 
loosely coupled and temporary networks. Their opinion is that according to the 
HARIG proceedings, the network could be classified as loose but sophisticated. 
This study considers a modification to this perspective based on evidence and 
data collected. This is analysed in detail in subsequent chapters.   
 
 
Whilst Coluccello and Massey (2007) recognise the substantial threat to the 
security of the smuggled, Reitano et al’s (2014) recent report argues that the 
current shift in routes poses even more risk to those being transported.  The 
Economist (2014), however, cites economic reliance on the trade as a reason for 
its survival: ‘dismantling the networks of intermediaries, drivers, guides, migrant 
“welcome centres” and clandestine migration consultants would place the 
regional economy of Agadez under significant stress…’ (The Economist 2014). 
The same could be said of the economies of Gao in Mali and Tamanrasset in 
southern Algeria. The information here suggests that since the alternatives for 
the migrants are limited amidst socio-political and geographical factors such as 
conflict in the Central Africa Republic, northern Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Somalia; and desertification in the Sahel, the available trend which is 
irregular migration becomes more appealing, hence the volume of migration via 
the Mediterranean. Consequently, these migrants have no choice over how and 
when they are transported; they only hope that they arrive at a point where they 




The purpose of this chapter has been to provide specific detail about the nature 
and type of criminal activity occurring in the human trade from Libya to Italy and 
to focus on the specifics of the routes and to explore, from the perspective of 
criminality, why the central Mediterranean route has come to dominate this trade.  
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The chapter began by assessing the differences between people smuggling and 
human trafficking in order to justify the approach taken by this study to conflate 
these crimes into a single criminal phenomenon: the human trade. The Palermo 
Protocols are clear in their ambition to distinguish between people smuggling, 
where the victim is the sovereign state into which the irregular migrant is 
smuggled, and human trafficking where the victim is the trafficked migrant who is 
being exploited. This distinction is, perhaps surprisingly, not over-researched. 
There is scholarly debate, however, as to where consent and coercion of would-
be migrants begins and ends (Bhabba & Zard 2006) and the definition of 
exploitation given the levels of violence and coercion perpetrated against the 
migrants (Batsykuva 2012).  
 
Other aspects of irregular migration stretching back from the Libyan ports to the 
land journey from West and East Africa (and sometimes beyond) include the way 
in which the movement of migrants is variously perceived by those involved in the 
transportation process as legal (which it formally is within, for example, ECOWAS 
countries) or morally/culturally justified ‘assisted migration’. The chapter also 
explores the mix of motivations, the push factors that impel irregular migration 
from primarily economic motives to political motives and survival strategies, 
together with those individuals that are unequivocally victims of exploitation. The 
Arab Spring and the aftermath of the phenomenon is examined as one the 
significant push factors within the context of this research.  
 
The study explicitly seeks to determine the nature of criminality in the human 
trade from Libya to Italy. It argues that the networks involved in moving these 
migrants are now, for the most part, specialised, scattered, unrestrained and 
structured.  Whether the migrant is ‘smuggled’ or ‘trafficked’, there is criminality 
involved.  The migrants also remain ‘irregular’, which is not crossing borders 
using the official immigration channels, whether they are being smuggled or 
trafficked.  Seeking to differentiate between the motivations or status of the 
migrant would dilute the over-arching aim of the research. Hence, the study has 
chosen to employ a term that conflates the two crimes of smuggling and 
trafficking alluding to the commodification of these irregular migrants: the human 
trade. 
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The chapter concludes with an overview of the routes taken between Africa and 
Europe, explaining why the central Mediterranean route has become the 
dominant sea route to Europe from Africa.  The way in which criminal networks 
retain the ability to shift routes in response to the counter-smuggling activities of 
the authorities, whether on a macro-level across North Africa, or a micro-level 
within Libya (see Fig. 4), further justifies the study’s decision to emphasise the 
commodification of the irregular migrant. The nature of the activites in the human 
trade from Libya to Italy and the routes accessed indicates an evolved and 
unrestraind humnan trade that has been significantly fueld by several socio-
economic factors which this chapter has explored.   
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Chapter 4  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The methodology adopted for this research was chosen to maximise the insight 
into the nature of the criminal networks engaged in the human trade from Libya 
to Italy.  This chapter explains the epistemology, theoretical perspectives, 
methodology and data gathering methods of the research.  A flow chart of the 
processes which have been applied for this research is presented below. 
 
 
Figure 4-1.  The methodology process used in this research 
 
 
The flow chart demonstrates how the objectives of the research are arrived at 
through the research method and methodological processes employed.  The 
arrows in the flowchart point to the end product of the data collected and analysed 
which is the research objectives.  The data and methods of data analysis served 
as a means to arriving at the research aim and objectives. The flow chart 
therefore points to this end product which is arrived at by triangulating the data 
(judicial proceedings and interviews) with secondary data to answer the research 
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questions. A more detailed presentation of the chosen theoretical perspectives of 
the chosen data gathering method and analysis are further presented in the figure 
below.  
 




Figure 4-2 is based on an approach to the research process formulated by Crotty. 
In the case of this research, a subjectivist stance is adopted whereby ‘meaning 
does not come out of an interplay between subject and object but is imposed on 
the object by the subject’ (Crotty 2003: 9).  This position lends itself to an 
interpretivist theoretical perspective based on critical inquiry.  A varied 
methodology is utilised that prioritises the discourse analysis of data which was 
gathered through interviews obtained through sampling techniques including 
snowballing, as well as document analysis of judicial proceedings of relevant 
cases prosecuted by the Italian criminal justice system. The rationales for these 
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Research philosophy  
 
The research adopts a subjectivist view in its understanding of changing reality.  
The changing dynamics of migration from Libya to Italy has significantly 
influenced the perceptions of it.   For instance, as Paoletti (2014) notes, the Arab 
Spring amplified the logic of criminalization and securitization that has long 
marked immigration debate in Italy and other places.  Whilst amongst European 
politicians, talk of offering help to asylum seekers and refugees turned to stopping 
smugglers of persons as ‘merchants of death’ who seriously need to be stopped.  
It is clear that the issue of irregular migration from Libya to Italy has been 
interpreted by politicians from different standpoints and regarding different 
concerns (Hasse; Deutsche Welle 2013).   Likewise, individual perception varies 
widely among the migrants themselves as to what is criminal or not. For example, 
in Siegel and De Bank’s (2010) study, unauthorised trans-border movement by 
the aid of human smugglers is perceived by the migrant as being ‘assisted’ by the 
smugglers rather than being a victim of a crime that contravenes international 
migration laws: the migrants considered the smugglers as ‘noble’ and not as 
‘criminal’.  To be helped to escape the crisis which could have taken their life was 
welcome help not exploitative crime.   
 
It is evident, therefore, as constructivists argue, that reality is being socially 
constructed (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012).  Hence in this study the 
factors steering the occurrence of phenomena and their analysis are analysed 
through a subjective lens.  The aim is to understand ‘as what’ and ‘how’ the 
phenomena is perceived both in the departure and destination countries.  The 
approach is to understand the difference between social actors in terms of their 
perceptions of the occurrences and circumstances surrounding them.  Thus, for 
example, the research explores the understanding of the terms 'organised crime' 
and 'irregular migration' from both the migrant country perspective and the 
destination country perspective. Indications from interview transcripts and 
existing literature are that the understanding of organised crime varies from 
country to country, cultures and society.  
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In addition, this research takes an abductive approach in its data analysis, that 
is, it has engaged in a process whereby the collected data is used to explore 
irregular migration by identifying specific themes and patterns of behaviours, 
whilst endeavouring to locate a contextual framework.  In this study, the migration 
behaviours identified from the first data collection were further tested through 
successive data collection.  The perceived advantage of the abductive approach 
is that instead of moving from theory to data or vice versa, it ‘…begins with the 
observation of a surprising fact; it then works out a plausible theory of how this 
could have occurred’ (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012:147).  This the study 
has sought to do as regards the structural organisation of the organised criminal 





The design of this research is qualitative, using data collection techniques such 
as interviews and data analysis procedures such as content analysis to generate 
non-numerical data.  Saunders et al. (2012: 163) claim that majority of qualitative 
research uses the abductive approach in which ‘inductive inferences are 
developed and deductive ones are tested iteratively throughout the research’.  
Further they affirm that strategies used in this research, such as case study 
research, grounded theory, and ethnography, are commonly associated with the 
qualitative research design.  The research particularly attempts a combination of 
case study and grounded theory methodological approach in which analysis 
starts in a deductive manner and concludes with an inductive approach involving 
data collection and data analysis. Triangulation is a key strategy which this 
research employs in ‘controlling bias and establishing valid propositions’ as 
stated by Mathison (1988:13). Evidence and data from judicial proceedings 
examined and interviews transcripts are corroborated and further triangulated 
with several secondary sources.  This is used to enhance validity and reliability 
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Case study  
 
A case study refers to ‘…in-depth investigations of a single person, group, event 
or community. Typically, data are gathered from a variety of sources and by using 
several different methods (e.g. observations & interviews). The research may 
also continue for an extended period of time, so processes and developments 
can be studied as they happen (McLeod 2014:1).  Yin (2009) defines case study 
in two parts; first as empirical inquiry which '...investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009:18) and 
secondly, as a technical inquiry relying on multiple sources of evidence. The case 
study of this thesis is human smuggling and trafficking from Libya to Italy through 
the central Mediterranean route. The reason for this choice is that it enhances in-
depth investigation and allows the use of prior developed theoretical prepositions 
as a guide in data collection and analysis (Yin 2009). Consequently, this research 
employs the strategy of interviews and the collection of empirical evidence about 
human smuggling and trafficking. This case study however, concentrated on 
migratory routes from Libya to Italy and the transnational, as well as, local criminal 
organisations in Italy who are involved in the process.  
 
The fieldwork was conducted in Southern Italy - Palermo, Castelvetrano, Trapani 
and Rome. Given the geographical spread of irregular migration from Libya to 
Italy, this research chose to narrow the focus of the study to the human trade 
from Libya to Italy. The selection is based on the route with the highest volume 
of migration and interception in the Mediterranean (GIATOC 2014). Irregular 
arrivals to Europe by sea from Africa were 42,000 persons in 2014, rising to 
170,000 in 2015 and 181,000 in 2016, then falling to 119,000 in 2017 (Médecins 
sans Frontier 2013; BBC News 2015; Sherwood, Smith, Davies, and Grant 2014; 
Médecins sans Frontier 2017; International Organisation for Migration, IOM 2017; 
Squires 2015). According to the IOM, migrants came from Nigeria, Bangladesh, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast and the Gambia (IOM 2017).  
 
The research focus, then, is on organised criminal networks in Italy and their 
involvement with other transnational organised criminal networks in the human 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
93 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
trade from North Africa. The research adopts a grounded theory approach 
whereby data derived from the field are analysed through the research process 
to establish a theory that will best define the nature of criminality in the human 
trade, was used. This approach agrees with Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
argument that existing theories can be elaborated and extended in the course of 
the data gathering process.  
 
The sources of data for this study are two-fold:  
 
• Selected judicial proceedings from the Italian courts. These consist of 
cases involving people smuggling or trafficking in human beings.  
 
• 40 semi-structured interviews. 
 
 
Judicial Proceedings  
 
As face-to-face contact could not be made with the smugglers and trafficking 
victims for ethical reasons, this study turned to the use of judicial proceedings as 
a means of ascertaining the truth about the human trade from Libya to Italy. Visits 
to Libya being precluded for ethical and risk reasons, the judicial proceedings 
were the most viable means by which the researcher could gather data relating 
to happenings at the point of embarkation of the migrants journey. Indication from 
the proceedings enabled a framework for the suppositions in this thesis. 
 
In recent times, several investigations have been carried out by Italy’s border 
police, the Polizia di Frontiera in collaboration with the Central Operations Service 
or Servizio Centrale Operative (The Local 2014).  These investigations resembled 
those instigated in a country-wide operation called OPERATION HARIG in 2007 
(David 2012) following a perceived significant shift from smuggling to exploitation 
(Coluccello and Massey 2007).  Recent cases include the Abdalmen I, H Attosour 
and Muhidin/Ben Salam cases on so called ‘Travel Agencies’ involved in human 
smuggling activities and tortures, rapes, killings and exploitation of migrants 
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(Ferrara 2014). These recent cases and interviews reveal significant changes in 
the nature of the criminal networks from those detailed by previous scholars such 
as Coluccello and Massey (2007). 
 
For this research, relevant judicial proceedings on irregular migration cases were 
looked at with a view to obtaining data not ordinarily accessible to the public. 
Based on investigations which have been conducted even up to 2015, a 
remarkable volume of documents has been produced. Judicial proceedings are, 
of course, confidential documents until they are published or reported. In the case 
of this research, the judicial proceedings used are authorised case files, released 
for the purpose of this research by the Italian criminal justice system. The cases 
were headed by an Italian judge in charge of the Mafia/human smuggling 
/irregular migration cases. There is, of course, the question of whether the ones 
released by the judge represent his own personal bias. This was minimised by 
first interviewing the judge regarding the aspects of the academic debate about 
irregular migration that needed elucidation.  Thus the case files offered by the 
judge are in response to the questions posed by the researcher and the views 
obtained proffered evidence for an academic opinion.  
 
The selected legal case files were chosen to elucidate the major themes identified 
during field interviews.  These themes indicate the different aspects of the 
business of irregular migration in the form of human smuggling and trafficking 
across the Mediterranean.  
 
Chosen for its identification of the ‘actors’ in the trade:  
The FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case;  
 
Chosen for the identification of the modus operandi of the smuggling 
organisations:  
The FERMO PM MUHIDIN and FERMO PM SCAFISCA cases;  
 
Chosen for the identification of the structural organisation of the smuggling 
groups and networks: the FERMO PM GLAUCO 1 and 2 cases.  
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The case files were in the Italian language and the researcher translated them to 
English.  
 
The use of judicial proceedings for migration research is not totally unusual as 
Monzini, et al (2015) may have admitted that their study on the changing 
dynamics of cross-border human smuggling and trafficking of persons in the 
Mediterranean was supported by the impressive documentation from the Glauco 
operations, but the manner in which the findings in this study have been analysed 
is totally different and novel by the virtue of this SA/SCAN technique used. By the 
aid of the SA/SCAN techniques which this study has introduced into the study of 
irregular migration (further explained in later parts of this chapter), the GLAUCO 
files were used in reconstructing the smuggling process from the point of 
recruitment to disembarkation and further smuggling to final destination points.  
The files in the absence of direct contact with the victims and perpetuators the 
activities of the smugglers are examined, tracing along to uncover the assumed, 
unintended and professional actors; identify their visible and hidden modus 
operandi; as well as their structure or organisation.  By the criteria of SCAN the 
testimonies in the OPERATION GLAUCO files were analysed to reveal the 
dynamics of the human trade from Libya to Italy. 
 
The use of judicial proceedings for migration research needs some justification. 
It is often argued that judicial proceedings can be both credible and useful in 
getting to the truth.  Some might however still argue that there is doubt about the 
validity or credibility of witness statements made in the course of a criminal trial 
and the findings of fact made by the judge and the judgment therein.  There is no 
doubt that lawyers and indeed legal systems all over the world place considerable 
emphasis on witness testimonies.  Most criminal and civil trials are determined 
on the basis of witness testimonies.  The reasons for this are not farfetched.  First, 
judicial proceedings are conducted under oath.  This means that witnesses are 
sworn to tell nothing but the truth and risk imprisonment if they are discovered 
telling a lie in their testimonies.  Also, the testimonies of witnesses are often 
subjected to cross-examination by opposition counsel and the judge is able to 
observe the demeanour of a witness and therefore more able to assess the 
veracity or otherwise of their testimony.  It is therefore understood in judicial 
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proceedings that consistent statements of three or more witnesses in court have 
more evidential value than the opinions of a hundred legal experts on a particular 
fact.  
 
Colwell, Hiscock, and Memon (2002), building on the works of Loftus and 
Ketcham, (1991) Cutler and Penrod (1995), and Sporer et al. (1996), assert that 
the criminal justice system expresses a high level of confidence on eyewitness 
testimony (also  Memon et al., 1998).  Colwell, Hiscock, and Memon (2002) stress 
the credibility of witness testimonies as contained in a record of criminal or civil 
trial.  In ascribing probative value to the testimony of a witness, the judge must 
have examined the coherence, consistency, specificity and independence of the 
testimony. Falsehood is eliminated from the testimony through cross examination 
by opposing counsel and observations by the judge.  In other words, judicial 
proceedings have built-in process of filtering statements in order to arrive at truth.  
 
Beyond these evidential arguments, there is also some research to support the 
credibility of judicial proceedings. Novo and Seijo (2010), having evaluated court 
archives of judicial judgements, assess the causal principles in determining the 
credibility of testimonies by judges. According to their analysis, the effect of any 
information in the court room is based on its reliability and validity. Reliability is 
‘... influenced by factors such as: witness credibility, logical consistency of the 
evidence or the probability of the incident or the order of events; whereas validity 
relies on the relevance of a particular fragment of knowledge regarding the issue 
under judgement’ (Novo and Seijo, 2010:93).  Their study concluded that the 
judges observed relied on forensic psychologists’ reports of testimonial credibility. 
Judges also assess the validity of evidences presented based on the fundamental 
motive of the accusation, the consistency of the evidence presented, and the 
elements relating to the criteria of reality all from a legal perspective (Novo and 
Seijo, 2010).  The argument of this thesis takes a similar position, namely that 
consistency in the verbatim witness statements contained in the judicial 
proceedings can be taken as evidence of credibility.  
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Statement analysis was used on the transcripts from selected judicial proceeding.  
Then these were triangulated with interviews with professionals during fieldwork 
in Palermo and Rome.   
 
The researcher agrees with the opinion of Hall and Wright (2008) on the use of 
content analysis in analysing judicial opinions. From their research they conclude 
that the components of content analysis which lies in legal realism; ‘…electing 
cases for study, coding cases to record consistent information about each one, 
establishing the reliability or replicability of the choices made during the coding, 
and analysing data’, contributes uniquely to legal research (Hall and Wright 
2008:66).  In analysing the judicial proceedings for this study, schema analysis 
and some classical content analysis type of coding was done but with a variation, 
owing to time limitation (Ryan and Bernard, 2000). Text analysis was introduced 
after the initial codding to interpret, deduce and confirm the indications from 
interview transcripts.  These interview responses were organised according to 
the significant themes that emanated during the preparation of the semi-
structured face-to-face interviews and after the first batch of interviews were 
conducted.  The responses were collated and organised according to the themes. 
The deductions and concepts presented by the argument in the study is displayed 
by models in form of flow charts and other creatively inspired drawings that 
convey the researcher’s opinion. 
 
Although many studies have made extensive use of content and discourse 
analysis there is no record of a similar work or statement analysis (SA) in studies 
relating to irregular migration.  This is the first study to make use of statement 
analysis in analysing and corroborating interview responses and witness 
testimonies in criminal trials concerning irregular migration.  Given that both 
interviews and judicial proceedings were used in this study, this research 
employed the use of statement analysis in corroborating the assertions, 
perspectives and indications from these data sources.   
 
Statement analysis, which is also called the scientific content analysis (SCAN), 
is a tool used in analysing and determining the veracity in statements either 
written or spoken (for its key elements see Table 4 below). It is an investigative 
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form of discourse analysis which has the capability of revealing concealed or 
missing information (Adams 1996, McClish 2002, and Burke 2013). Statement 
analysis enables reading ‘between the lines’ and examining statement patterns 
to detect deception and ascertain the veracity of the statement.   Its primary 
premise is that people do not lie, people tell the truth; most people want to tell the 
truth, though they may not always reveal everything (Fleming 2016). SCAN is a 
cross-cultural analysis which can be used to detect deception in the statement 
given (Lesce 1990) and works with criteria that are both objective and subjective 
(Nahari, Vrij and Fisher 2011). SCAN was created by a lieutenant in the Israeli 
Police Department, Avinoam Sapir.  While working as a Polygraph Examiner he 
noticed a correlation between polygraph results and various features of written 
statements.  From those observations he developed a technique for determining 
the veracity of a subject’s verbal or written communication (Lesce 1990). Thus by 
taking forensic statements as a data source, this thesis has used SCAN to 
validate the credibility of the contents of the judicial proceedings examined 
(Barksdale 2006, 2013).  
 
Although judicial records do not provide the statement cues of unreliability 
observed during the interviews (e.g. stuttering, high emotions, stalling for time, 
and hesitation - Fleming 2016), other criteria were used following SCAN in 
assessing the credibility and the suitability of the judicial proceedings. It was 
possible to note that the statements in the interrogations recorded in the 
proceedings were not rehearsed in that some of the question were follow up 
questions in reaction to the answers provided by the witnesses and as such could 
be categorised as unbiased given that the respondents were not all interviewed 
at the same time (Vrij 2005). In addition, the research concluded that all the 
statements were credible since no evidence was found in the judicial proceedings 
of any migrant/witness responding with a question or of witnesses using the 
wrong pronouns (e.g. we instead of I) (Nahari, Vrij and Fisher 2011).  Also 
confirming credibility was the evidence of the conviction of the witness and the 
statement balance in terms of - what happened before the incident; what 
happened at the time of the event; and what happened after the event. This could 
be ascertained following the pattern of the narration of the witnesses. These were 
the features by which the judicial proceedings were analysed.   
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SCAN has been challenged in some quarters concerning its ability to distinguish 
between truthful and fabricated accounts, on the grounds of its lack of empirical 
support and scarce research on its accuracy (Bogaard et al 2016). It has also 
been criticised for the absence of a theoretical rationale as compared to the 
Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (RM). However, 
this thesis follows Fleming’s (2016) argument that in statement analysis, the norm 
is first determined then deductions are derived from that norm, which creates the 
difference between truthful statements and fabricated ones.  As the Forensic 
Language Investigators (PVL) point out, SCAN is not a theory but a technique 
used not only for detecting deceptions, but also for “…obtaining information by 
making a series of observations.  It has been proved to be a scientifically based 
method which produces consistent results” (PVL 2017:1).  Additionally, it was 
noted by Bogaard et al (2016) to include two criteria which can enhance the 
possibility of diagnosing the veracity of the forensic statements. This implies that 
SCAN provided more scope for effective investigation of behavioural cues and 
statement analysis.  Lesce (1990) offers additional support for SCAN, claiming 
that it is a versatile method because of its freedom from the constraints of the 
polygraph, which necessitates the attachment of a machine to the subject and 
their consent. With SCAN it is the written or recorded statement that is engaged 
with, not the person. Therefore though a person may master the act of lying as 
inferred by the augment of Bogaard et alet al (2016), the possibility of using the 
SCAN with judicial proceedings and not the person prosecuted or questioned on 
stand, erodes  the question of inaccuracy of judgement (Bond and DePaulo 
2006), making the use of this Credibility assessment tool practicable.  
 
In the evaluation of the truthfulness of the statements recorded in the judicial 
proceedings, the research sought to follow, where possible, the criteria offered 
by Nahari et al (2012) and Bogaard et al (2016). The criteria offered as indications 
of veracity are:  
 
• Denial of allegations which refers to possible statements that connotes 
denials such as ‘…did not...’  
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• Social introductions referring to whether or not ambiguity was reflected in 
the way the persons in the statement were introduced; were their specific 
names used? 
 
• The structure of the statement which in truthful statement, are expected to 
be the 1st 20% describing activities, 2nd 50% describing actual events, the 
next 30% describing what happens thereafter. 
 
• Evidence of the display of emotions, if any is described in the sentences 
of the witnesses. 
 
• Objective and subjective time which refers to the duration of the event 
described versus the amount of time used in describing it. Events that 
lasted for long cannot just be described in mere 5 sentences.  
 
• Use of the first person singular, past tense; and proper use of pronouns. 
Improper use of pronouns indicates a red flag which connotes features of 
deception. 
 
Likewise, the study seeks to follow, where possible, the criteria offered as 
indications of deception. These are: a change in language; spontaneous 
corrections; lack of conviction or memory; out of sequence and extraneous 
matters; missing information. 
 
Against these criteria, the testimonies contained in the judicial proceedings, were 
applied to see if their testimonies (which is used in this study as a primary data 
source) could be categorised as credible enough for a realistic analysis. The 
result of this exercise is presented in the table below.  Also, a sample analysis of 
how this categorisation was applied on an actual statement of D  T  and 
questioning session of Bahta Alay two of the witnesses from the judicial 
Proceedings of FERMO PM Muhidin, is presented thereafter.  
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Table 4-1.  The SCAN criteria for examining the credibility of statement from judicial proceedings examined. 
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SCAN technique Criteria used  Cues extracted from judicial proceeding to validate the rational for credibility of points from judicial proceedings 
examined. 
Criteria that indicate truthfulness:  FERMO Muhidin & FERMO Scafisca  FERMO PALESTINESE FERMO GLAUCO 1 
1 Denial of allegations, No record of allegations being denied  No allegations were denied No allegations were denied 
2 Social introductions The introductions were unambiguous as 
specific names were mentioned   
The introductions were unambiguous as 
specific names were mentioned   
The introductions were unambiguous as 
specific names were mentioned   
3 Structure of the statement the statements could be said to be 
balanced as the 20%/50%/30% ratio of 
credible sentence structure were well 
represented in the statements  
the statements could be said to be 
balanced as the 20%/50%/30% ratio of 
credible sentence structure were well 
represented in the statements 
 Not applicable in this case as he facts 
from other case were used in building the 
facts in this case  
4 Emotions No clear emotions were reported being 
that this is a case of a written statement 
except emotions which were reactions of 
the other unnamed persons at the sight of 
their smuggler (reported in the FERMO 
PM MUHIDIN case) 
No clear emotions were reported being 
that this is a case of a written statement. 
Not applicable in this case except 
assumed from the report of the witnesses. 
5 Objective and subjective time The objective and subjective time could be 
accessed as corresponding from the 
narratives in the statement. Specific times 
and duration of events were well 
indicated.  
The objective and subjective time could be 
accessed as corresponding from the 
narratives in the statement.  Specific times 
and duration of events were well indicated. 
The objective and subjective time could be 
accessed as corresponding from the 
narratives in the statement. 
6 First person singular, past tense Statement complied with the first-person-
singular-past format.  
Statement complied with the first-person-
singular-past format. 
Since the statements were used in 
building the case, they were reported in 
the past  
7 Pronouns There was notably commitment signals by 
the appropriate use of pronouns by the 
statements witness. 
There was notably commitment signals by 
the appropriate use of pronouns by the 
statements witness. 
Drawn together to build a fact, contents of 
the statements indicated that there was 
notably commitment signals by the 
appropriate use of pronouns by the 
statements witness. 
Criteria that indicate deception:     
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
 
103 | P a g e  
The nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy  
 
 
8 Change in language there was notable consistency in the 
terminologies used  
there was notable consistency in the 
terminologies used 
not applicable in the case 
9 Spontaneous corrections not applicable in the case as material was 
type-written from oral statements by 
witness  
not applicable in the case as material was 
type-written from oral statements by 
witness 
not applicable in the case as material was 
type-written from oral statements by 
witness 
10 Lack of conviction or memory Asides one answer in the statement of 
Dawit Tekle (reported in the FERMO PM 
MUHIDIN case), which could be attributed 
to fear of wrongly confirming the identity of 
the smuggler there exist 99% conviction in 
the statements provided. Precise answers 
were provided.   
There exist 99% conviction in the 
statements provided. Precise answers 
were provided.   
Precise answers were provided.   
11 Out of sequence and extraneous Events in chronological order without 
irrelevant information  
Events in chronological order without 
irrelevant information  
Not applicable in this case  
12 Missing information It cannot be ascertained if there be any 
missing information as specific dates and 
times in a chronological manner was 
provided   
It cannot be ascertained if there be any 
missing information as specific dates and 
times in a chronological manner was 
provided. Statement were made with 
reflected mainly the modus operandi that 
was used by the smuggler to instil fear and 
compel obeisance from the migrants.   
Facts from the statement; particular 
statement from the FERMO PM MUHIDIN 
were extracted to build case; hence the 
information in this context were selected to 
build the case.  
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Excerpts from the judicial Proceedings of FERMO PM Muhidin and 
FERMO PM Scafisca  
 
(Judicial reports, FERMO PM Muhidin) 
 
The questioning excerpt here presented below shows that precise answers 
were provided indicating consistency and truthfulness.   
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material has been 
removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material has been 
removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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 (Judicial reports, FERMO PM Scafisca) 
 
The statement of the witnesses in each of the proceeding were carefully and 
independently examined with the intent of identifying these criteria in ascertaining the 
veracity of their claims and its appropriateness within the context of the analysis of 
this research. The self-replicability of these criteria in the statements indicated validity 
and reliability. 
 
The main limitation of SCAN as a tool is the length of time needed to critically go 
through the data sources and examine them against the criteria used. Therefore, 
though all data sources were critically examined and analysed to deduce useful 
evidence and data, only indications from three of the judicial proceedings are 
presented in a table. At the very least, this process has suggested that statement 
analysis in the form of the SCAN can be used in deducing evidence and data for the 
research of irregular migration crimes.   
 
Having applied the SCAN criteria to the judicial proceedings, this research concludes 
that the witness testimonies within them are credible.  The statements also aligned 
with the evidence of the interviewees and subject experts. The plausibility of witness 
claims contained in judicial proceedings is supported by scholarly works such as 
Reitano et al. (2014), Monzini (2004) Flahaux and Hein de Hass (2016), Campana 
(2017) and authentic reports by the IOM, UNODC as well as reputable NGOs such 
as Amnesty International.  
 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material has 
been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Although some scholars such as Massey and Coluccello (2007), Monzini, Aziz and 
Pastore (2015) and Monzini (2004) have used judicial proceedings in their analysis 
of irregular migration issues, this research differs significantly in the way it has 
employed this technique in that statement analysis increased the value of the 
evidence and data extracted and for the first time, the SCAN tool has been used to 
explore criminal networks involved in people smuggling and human trafficking cases.  
 
It should be stressed that all the witnesses involved in these cases cited in the thesis 
are referred to by the pseudonyms given to them in the judicial proceeding and are in 





Besides the selected judicial proceedings from the Italian courts, the other primary 
source of data was 40 semi-structured interviews with those with close knowledge of 
people smuggling or trafficking in human beings.  
 
The use of questionnaires was excluded as there were serious doubts as to the 
reliability of responses to questionnaires, owing to the prevalent fear of the Mafia in 
southern Italy.  It was anticipated, however, that there might be some ‘independent’ 
respondents that wanted their stories to be heard, if only anonymously. Thus 
interviews were restricted to semi-structured face-to-face engagement with frontline 
officers in the units responsible for irregular migration cases in Italy.  Interviews 
therefore were held with the border police, anti-trafficking organisations, scholars and 
researchers in the field, anti-Mafia organisations and non-governmental 
organisations.  Also contacted were people who had been involved in interstate 
border activities, people who have seen these irregular migrants close-up and had 
first-hand information about the issues involved.  
 
As a strategy to find out things that could not be observed directly, the study carried 
out two periods of semi-structured interviews.  The first interviews were carried out in 
2015 in Palermo and, Rome; the second were carried out in April 2016 in Sicily. The 
40 interviews were semi-structured so as to allow the interviewer to probe beyond the 
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answers (May 2001).  This type of interview not only allows the researcher to see 
things from the perspective of the respondents (Crotty 1998), but also gives freedom 
of expression to the respondents whilst allowing the focus of the study to dominate 
the discussion.  For this study, topic guides were used in directing the questions to 
the appropriate person according to their specialty. The interview questions are 
attached in the appendix. The said interviews were developed according to the 
respondents and what was expected from them.  
 
The interviews were recorded by means of a tape recorder or by notes when 
respondents were uncomfortable being recorded.  The respondents were asked 
questions in English and French (the researcher is fluent in both languages). And for 
those who could only understand Italian, the services of an interpreter were 
employed.  The recordings were transcribed and interviews in French were translated 
to English.  
 
Regarding positionality, there was no evidence that a female interviewer impacted 
negatively on the largely male interviewees.  The researcher was able to gain the 
trust of interviewees given that her explicit motivation was academic research. 
Language skill and a capacity to communicate effectively proved valuable at this 
stage. It is important to note that the interviews were conducted at the peak of the 
phenomenon at one of the major landing cities in southern Italy – Palermo in Sicily - 
and in Rome8.  The events were current and all the interviewees were particularly 
engaged with the phenomenon and enthusiastic to be involved in the project.   
 
There are presently no studies that relate the quality of work done as a researcher in 
the data collection process, to the gender of the researcher/interviewer – be it 
negative or positive, productive or non-productive (Fink 2000, Blom, A., & 
Korbmacher 2013, and Brunton-Smith et al. 2016).  In essence, although there may 
be cases where the male respondent may be sensitive and uncomfortable that they 
are being interviewed by a female, it does not apply to the phenomenon being 
investigated.  In this research the focus is not the gender of the interviewer as this 
will not in any way affect the results that will emanate from the exercise.  It could be 
 
8 these are significant locations which have to a reasonable extent, experienced the events of the influx of 
migrants of diverse categories 
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stated that the focus of the interviewees were on the subject being researched and 
not the person, gender-wise, who was making the inquiries.  
 
40 respondents were interviewed in Palermo, Castelvetrano, Gibelina in the Trapani 
Region, and Rome. Samples in qualitative research are usually purposive (Brikci 
2007), because the findings from qualitative studies are targeted at providing clearer 
and in-depth understanding of the views of the respondents (Pope et al. 2000 and 
Thomas 2006).  Respondents were selected for their professional knowledge and 
experience of human trafficking.  A combination of purposive sampling methods was 
selected for carrying out interviews for this study (Patton 1990:182-183).   
 
First, the snowballing technique was chosen as the sampling strategy, so that the 
recruitment of new respondents was done through referrals from earlier respondents 
(Neale, Allen and Coombes 2005).  Its advantage was that it had a clear goal in mind 
of recruiting informed people (Punch 1998) and because the nature of the research 
topic meant that the participants were anticipated to be few and some of the 
population under investigation, hidden and difficult to trace (Browne 2005, May 2001).  
Further, the network of key informants on irregular migration, though small, was 
unfamiliar, so interviewees were very helpful in introductions to that group.  As a 
publication by UNODC rightly points out, access to information on irregular migration 
is usually very difficult since smugglers are always reluctant to grant interviews 
(UNODC 2011).   
 
Though snowballing increased the number of available interviewees, there were 
elements of the sampling process that could be called criterion sampling, in that the 
aim was always to meet the predetermined criterion of specialisation in irregular 
migration and organized crime among the respondents (Patton 1990). The 
information required could not be gathered from randomly selected persons.  
 
While the sampling methods could be criticised as being biased should the 
respondents only suggest other respondents with a similar view as theirs, 
nevertheless no respondents were selected unless they had professional expertise. 
The sample size of 40 respondents was considered sufficient for this study, since 
data saturation already starts with a sample size of 8-10 in in-depth qualitative studies 
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(Marshal 1996).  Data saturation in simple terms refers to when the collected data is 
considered enough to buttress the point of the analysis being carried out (Strauss 
and Corbin 2008, Faulkner and Trotter 2017) 
 
The respondents interviewed in both field visits ranged from officers from the criminal 
justice system, such as Italian English speaking prosecutors of irregular migration 
cases, law enforcement officers in charge of the irregular migration section of the 
Italian police ( known as  the Squadra Mobile or the Flying Squad), to migrant 
mediators, coordinators of migrant reception centres, medical practitioners dealing 
with victims of trafficking torture, anti-Mafia organisation representatives, international 
migrant organisation representatives, academics in the field of irregular migration and 
some independent respondents who could be classed as members of the local 
community that did not wish to be identified.  For ethical reasons, neither migrants 
nor offenders being prosecuted for the crime of smuggling or irregular migration were 
included in the study.   
 
The few members of the local community that were interviewed were only spoken to 
because they voluntarily offered to be interviewed to enable their ideas to be shared 
for general knowledge. Some of these respondents had previously been migrants 
who had experienced being victims of the criminal organisations being examined.  
These individuals revealed the ordeals they suffered in the course of their voyage to 
Europe.  While their contributions might have been exaggerated, in large measure 
their views were corroborated from the professionals of the criminal justice system, 
and by the evidence offered in the judicial proceedings.  In interviewing them, as with 
all other interviews, the entire process was guided by the concept of consent and 
confidentiality (Brikci 2007).  No one was coerced into being interviewed. Rather a 
respondent participation information and a consent form was signed by every 
interviewee before the start of any interview.  Further care was taken to ensure their 
safety through the anonymization of the interviews.  
 
Data collected in these two field trips presented perspectives from respondents from 
different sectors of the society.  In Tables 1 and 2 below are listed the respondents 
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from the first and second data collection trips.  Table 3 below shows the employment 
sectors of the 21 respondents interviewed in the second part of the field study.9 
 
9 A list of all the respondents and their pseudonyms is presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4-2.  The respondents of the first field visit 
 
Italian Criminal justice 










[C. F.] State prosecutor on 
Irregular migration Cases: 
Deputy Judge, Trabia and 
Palermo, Sicily. 
[M.M] Representatives from 
CISS - Cooperazione 
Internazionale Sud Sud, 
Palermo.  
[E.C] Head of the Centro Astalli – Migrant 
reception centre Palermo, Sicily 
Officiers of the Costiere Guardiere 
Catania 
Officer of the Italian Police 
(Italian Flying Squad), 
Palermo, Sicily.  
R. H. Representatives from 
CISS - Cooperazione 
Internazionale Sud Sud, 
Palermo. 
[A.G.] CRESM (Centro di Ricerche 
Economiche e Sociali per il Meridione) 
Gibelina,Trapani region 
[I. k.] Migrant mediator and Interpreter 
at The  Commission (Commisione 
Territoriale per il Riconoscimento della 
Protezione Internazionale) Palermo, 
Sicily 
 [N.]Researcher with Border-
line (e-mail correspondence) 
Coordinator of MNSA – Migrant reception 
centre Castelvetrano, Trapani region 
[M. A.] Vice President of the Consulta 
dele Culture, Palermo, Sicily, Palermo 
  Representative of  an Anti-Mafia 
organisation, Addio-Pizzo, Palermo, Sicily, 
Italy 
Office of the Nigerian Ambassador to 
Rome (phone and e-mail interview) 
  Coordinator of the Casa San Francesco (a 
migrant reception centre and home) Palermo, 
Sicily 
 
  [N. C.]Coordinator Anti-Mafia Centre, Castel-
Vultrano, Trapani, Italy 
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Figure 4-3.  Chart on The category of respondents interviewed on the field. 
 
 
In line with Miles and Huberman, this thesis has sought to break down the qualitative 
data analysis into ‘…data reduction, data display and drawing and verifying 
conclusions’ (1994 quoted in Punch 1998:203). It has used a mix of analytical 
procedures, such as analytic induction, including discourse analysis and documentary 
and textual analysis.  The analytic induction has enabled the development of particular 
  Molti-Volti, Palermo   
  Pellegreno Della 
Terra, Palermo 
  
  IOM, Palermo team.   
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concepts from data such as additional traits of criminal organisation that were deduced 
from examining their watered-down modus operandi or even the refined ones.  The 
interrelationship of the concepts were traced and discourse analysis was used in 
examining language used, while documentary and textual analysis have focused on 
the social production of documents (Punch 1998).  The reason for this choice is that 
analytic induction has aided in actualising the aim of this work in revising and 
reconstructing models which aid the interpretation of the means and methods of 
irregular migration from Libya to Italy.  Discourse analysis has aided the analysis of 
the different perceptions of the phenomena, while documentary analysis has been 
applied in examining the judicial proceedings, investigating the circumstances 
surrounding their existence as well as their contents.  
 
The interviews were conducted with the aid of topic guides developed by the 
researcher as specific themes both from secondary data and the primary data (judicial 
proceedings).  These themes include: actors; modus operandi; structure of the criminal 
organisations; and the changes identified in the trends in criminality. Table 6 below 
shows one of the questions asked of the interviewees and how the answers were 
categorised or coded.  
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Table 4-5.  The first step in coding an interview transcript. In this sample: divergent notions of 




With selected colour codes this table presents varied views of what makes the act of 
smuggling criminal from the respondent’s perspective.  The responses represented in 
the table were colour coded according to the categorisation of the answers which were 
given by the respondents.  For example, when asked what could be considered as 
what makes the act of smuggling criminal, the answers were surprisingly diverse. 
While some of the respondents did not consider it as criminal but only as a 
circumstantial act, some considered it a heinous crime at different levels.  Indications 
from transcripts were corroborated with findings extracted from judicial proceeding on 
the different themes and triangulated with the debates in the secondary sources. 
 
While the purple phrases depict that smuggling may not be considered criminal, the 
orange colour suggests that it is, because the act is driven by criminal organisation.  
The green phrases suggest that other resultant criminal outcomes of the act categorise 
it as criminal; black phrases suggest that the law labels it criminal; and red phrases 
suggest that the illegality in the documentation or any part of the process that aids 
illegality makes the act criminal.  
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This interview excerpt (see Table 6) is a sample of the coding done to extract from the 
interview transcripts the opinion of the professionals interviewed on the subject matter 
of the nature of criminality in the act of smuggling.  It is the procedure applied to the 
rest of the questions posed to the respondents so as to understand their perspective 
on the different aspects of the phenomenon.  These perspectives are corroborated 
with debates in existing literature on smuggling from the migrants view and that of the 
social actors  
 
Finally, another type of data analysed in this study is documentary films such as 
Stefano Mencherini’s ‘Slaves’, which examines new forms of exploitation  and their 
routes with regards to illegally hired migrants in Italy (Mencherini 2013); and an Al 
Jazeera piece,  ‘The Nigerian Connection’ by Von Einsiedel and Pare (2011), reported 
by Juliana Ruhfus. Additionally, data was collected from local Italian newspapers such 
as ‘The Local’. 
 
In total, I believe that the methods adopted by this research offer valuable and, to an 
extent, unique insights into how criminal organisations have carried out human trade 
from Libya to Italy since 2011. 
 
Research Challenges and Limitations 
 
This research faced several challenges.  These included the inability of the researcher 
to reach some precluded regions during field study based on Coventry University’s 
ethics’ requirements. Consequently, information which was meant to be gathered from 
these locations was gleaned instead from UNODC reports, media reports and 
FRONTEX risk assessment quarterlies.  There was also the challenge of reaching 
contacts given that not every responsible agent was ready to entertain interviews.  In 
this case, the researcher had to rely solely on the snowballing technique to reach more 
respondents. Concurrently, given the increase of the humanitarian crisis at the time of 
the field study 2015 and 2016, some officials especially representatives of the UNCHR 
and the criminal justice system were dispersed to the field to attend to the humanitarian 
and criminal issues.  They were therefore not available to be interviewed, thereby 
causing a reduction in the number of expected interviewees.  There was also the 
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problem of language. The author’s inability to speak the Italian language fluently was 
a draw back as some of the respondents needed interpreters for clarity.  In some 
cases, the respondents were bilingual and could speak other languages like French 
which, fortunately the author is fluent in.  The interviews were therefore conducted 
effectively in the English, Italian and French languages. 
 
Time and distance to the diverse locations to be visited posed another challenge and 
this was to a large extent affected by the financial limitations of the researcher.  In 
some cases therefore, phone interviews were conducted and recorded with a tape 
recorder. Also, consent forms were e-mailed to the respondents who had them duly 
signed and returned.  The recorded interviews took a good amount of time to be 
effectively transcribed. However, these challenges notwithstanding, ultimately the 
relevant personnel were seen and interviewed.  Some IOM officials, themselves 
respondents, offered the author IOM’s latest reports which had more useful 
information on the subject of research.  The researcher was also invited to witness 
migrants disembarking at the Palermo ports in 2016 during a field trip.  
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Chapter 5  THE ACTORS  
 
 
This is the first chapter based principally on primary evidence and data collected 
through the two core research methods: the analysis of relevant judicial proceedings 
cross-checked against semi-structured interviews with key expert respondents.  The 
chapter will identify the various actors involved in the human trade between Libya and 
Italy.  The chapter evidences the increasing specialisation of the actors involved in the 
human trade between Libya and Sicily in comparison with previous studies such as 
Coluccello and Massey (2007) and Pastore (2006) that indicated that those involved 
in the fluid and unstructured networks involved in the transport of irregular migrants in 
the 2000s adopted multiple concurrent functions.  Increased specialisation is one 
evolving characteristic of the networks more recently involved in the movement of 
irregular migrants that this research exemplifies as specialised, scattered, 
unrestrained and structured.  
 
Studies by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organised Crime (GIATOC) have argued that assumptions about the 
human trade from Libya to Italy and those involved are in most cases anecdotal.  This 
limits the understanding of the broad range of criminal actors which transcend criminal 
networks to include community members (ISS and GIATOC 2016).  The main judicial 
investigation from which the evidence and data that underpins the analysis of the 
actors and routes in this chapter is extrapolated is named the FERMO PALESTINESE 
1 case. This was the case against ABIA, a pseudonym, in connection with the Libya 
to Italy boat landings of October 15 and November 3, 2013, tried in the tribunal of 
Agrigento.  These judicial proceedings identify and highlight divergent organizational 
features of the phenomenon of Libya to Italy human trade.  These are extrapolated 
from the statements to the criminal investigators by witnesses and victims, as well as 
transcripts of wiretaps of phone conversations between smugglers.  Other cases used 
to obtain evidence and data include the FERMO PM MUHIDIN; the FERMO PM 
SCAFISCA case and the FERMO PM GLAUCO case.  The identification of 
perpetrators/actors involved in the smuggling process is often controversial.  This 
chapter will advance assessments of the actors - both recognised and overlooked – 
and the analysis of their participation and roles in the smuggling process.  
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This chapter is broken into three parts.  The first part presents a summarised account 
of the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case showing essential details of the case and the 
actors involved as part of emerging themes towards understanding the nature of 
criminality in the Libya to Italy human trade.  The second part analyses the various 
actors in the human trade across the central Mediterranean in the context of human 
trade as an organised criminal activity, individually exploring the diverse actors that 




THE FERMO PALESTINESE 1 CASE 
 
This case arose out of an investigation conducted by the Italian authorities of a 
transnational criminal organization operating between Libya and Italy with the aim of 
enabling illegal immigration into Italian territory and other related offenses.  The 
investigation was launched following the tragic sinking of a migrant boat on 3rd 
October 2013 off the island of Lampedusa in which 366 lives were lost.  The case 
concerns migrant boat landings on 15th October and 3rd November 2013 on 
Lampedusa. The boat that landed on 15th October had on board 211 Syrian citizens 
and the boat that landed on 3rd November had on board 26 Palestinians, two Syrians 
and one Eritrean.  The two boats were rescued by Italian Coast Guard and the 
migrants taken to Reception Centre at Lampedusa. 
 
As the survivors of the 3rd November landing were being taken into the Reception 
Centre there was unrest amongst migrants already in the Centre, many of who had 
landed on 15th October, instigated by the identification of an individual named Abu 
Ibrahim, the leader of the group that was responsible for their transportation from 
Libya to Lampedusa. Upon further investigation, Abu Ibrahim was discovered to hold 
a passport issued by the Palestinian Authority identifying him as Abdalmenem Attour.  
Six Syrian migrants volunteered statements to the police.  In their statements, they 
identified Abdalmenem Attour as the man they had known as Abu Ibrahim, a 
smuggler to whom they had each paid between US$800-2000 for their journey from 
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Libya to Italy.  They alleged that they individually met the defendant in Libya through 
the recommendations of friends and underworld contacts in Libya. 
 
According to their statements, on contacting Abu Ibrahim through the telephone 
numbers given to them, the defendant arranged for their transport to Tripoli and then 
to a farm house, a collection center, at Sabratha located near Tripoli which was kept 
and maintained by the defendant.   
 
The migrants were incarcerated in the farm house to wait for a boat.  They also 
alleged in their separate statements that the house where they were kept was guarded 
by men armed with machine guns that stole their valuables and did not allow them to 
leave the house.  Their statements detailed their movement from the collection centre 
to the place of embarkation and the role played by the defendant and the heavily 
armed men in ensuring that the migrants boarded the boat and complied with the 
cramped sitting arrangement dictated by the crew who took no consideration of the 
particular vulnerability of the migrants some of whom were children and pregnant 
women.  The migrants were once more stripped of belongings including money, 
phones and travelling documents.  
 
The identification of Abu Ibrahim as the leader of the smugglers and pilot of the boat 
was unanimous.  Based on these statements Abu Ibrahim was charged with offences 
including conspiracy to engage in human trade; illegal transportation of migrants from 
Africa to Italy for a fee; and running a criminal organization. 
 
The specific offences were association with other individuals identified to be involved 
in the crime of smuggling of migrants under Article C.P. 416, paras 1, 2, 3 and 6 and 
the possession of weapons in public under Article 4 L. 146/2006. This was 
aggravated by the fact that the crime was committed with the involvement of an 
organized criminal group engaged in criminal activities in more than one state, in 
Libya and Italy.  He was also accused of criminal activities aimed at enabling illegal 
entry into the state of Italy in violation of immigration legislation.  
 
Abu Ibrahim was accused of the incarceration of migrants in a house run by the 
accused under the guard of heavily armed men and the transportation of the migrants 
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by boat across the straits of Sicily to Lampedusa. Witness testimonies also indicate 
that unwilling migrants were forced by the threat of violence to embark the boat. 
Items recovered from the accused person included a mobile phone with the numbers 
allegedly used by the migrants to contact him; bank cards; international passports 
bearing the name of the defendant; ‘carta di sorggiono’; military cards and laissez-
passer issued by the Libyan authorities with images of the accused.  A personal 
organizer with various notes and numbers was also recovered and used as evidence 
against the defendant. 
 
Abu Ibrahim was found guilty at the tribunal in Palermo. Applying the Italian legal 
principle of ‘convergence of multiples’, the similarity of discrete and separate witness 
statements, the tribunal found that the accused had played a major role in overseeing 
the surveillance of migrants at the collection center, participated actively and 
collaborated with others in arranging transportation of the migrants and directed 
operations at the point of embarkation. It was also the decision of the court that the 
accused belonged to and participated in the activities of a criminal organization 
engaged in the smuggling and trafficking of migrants from Libya to Italy.  The 
defendant was accordingly convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and 
fines for each of the counts of the charge against him.  For the cumulative offences, 
the defendant was sentenced to a prison sentence of over twenty years and a fine 
that amounted to €6m.  
 
The findings and decision of the Palermo tribunal in this case is significant for the 
development of jurisprudence on the human trade, as well as providing insights into 
the details of how the trade operates which is valuable both to scholarly research 
and law enforcement methodologies.  While the trial of the defendant was held in 
Palermo, most of the acts that constitute the offences he was charged with took place 
either in North Africa or in international waters.  As in all the cases that arose out of 
the GLAUCO Operation, there is a question of jurisdiction or territoriality.  
Specifically, according to Article 6 of the Criminal Code, for the lawful exercise of 
Italian jurisdiction, it is necessary that the act or omission that constitutes the criminal 
conduct takes place, in whole or in part in the territory of Italy.  Jurisdiction will equally 
be established if the natural result of the conduct occurs in Italian territory.  The court 
correctly assumed jurisdiction in this instance because the natural result of the 
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defendant's conduct, the entry into Italy of irregular migrants, occurred in Italy. This 
innovative application of Article 6, although not entirely new, is compliant with Article 
5 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC). Article 5 UNTOC provides, inter alia 
 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally:  
(a)Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from 
those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity: 
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious 
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of 
a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic 
law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in 
furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal 
group; 
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim 
and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its 
intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in: 
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the 
knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the 
achievement of the above described criminal aim... 
(UNTOC 200, Article 5 sub section (a), i. ii) 
 
Hence, the verdict domesticates UNCTOC into Italian law and makes it applicable in 
all cases involving organized criminal groups wherever they are based or operating 
from.  It means also that Italian courts can now assume jurisdiction over a people 
smuggler operating out of Libya without that smuggler necessarily being found on 
Italian soil.  All the actors in the chain, including the armed men, drivers, recruiters, 
boat owners etc. in Italy for example, are equally affected by this decision. 
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The Nature of Criminality in FERMO PALESTINESE 1 
 
The tribunal also found, based on investigation reports that the defendant belonged to 
and participated in the activities of a criminal organization.  It was the conclusion of 
the court that  
 
there clearly existed a criminal organization which takes “care” of the migrants 
in all the different phases of traffic, taking care of the transport to the place of 
concentration, their stay at the place pending the finding of a boat for the 
crossing; the basic needs, like food and water, guarding the place also with 
armed men... For these “services” in the end, the migrants pay an amount of 
between US$1800-2000 (Judicial reports FERMO PALESTINESE 1) 
 
The tribunal described the defendant's group as ‘a complex organization, and armed, 
systematically dedicated to the design, planning and carrying out clandestine transfer 
of migrants from Libya to Italy, to be made on the payment of a fee for each of the 
persons transported’ (Judicial Report,  FERMO PALESTINESE 1). 
 
The reasoning of the tribunal discloses the elements considered when assessing both 
the membership of an organized criminal group dedicated to the smuggling of migrants 
and the participation in a criminal conspiracy with the same purpose.  
 
In order to be categorized as a criminal group, it is necessary that; (i) there is a bond 
between the members which is of a permanent character or, at least, stable and aimed 
to continue beyond the commission of specific criminal acts; (ii) to have undetermined 
criminal programme, and (iii) there needs to exist a certain level of organization that is 
adequate for pursuing its criminal objectives.  In line with mainstream jurisprudence, 
there is no need for formal agreements.  In line with previous jurisprudence organized 
criminal groups should act upon a well-structured plan dedicated to the smuggling of 
migrants in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit.  In the FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1 case, this involved (i) concentration of migrants in hidden location in 
the Libyan city of departure; (ii) the availability of several and different means of 
transport to carry out the diverse phases of the travel; (iii) engagement of several men 
with specific roles (e.g. recruiters, drivers, ship crews, landlords) abiding by rigorous 
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codes of conduct; (iv) systematic exposure of the life and safety of migrants to serious 
risks given the conditions of the trip; (v) diverse and sophisticated means of 
communication; (vi) attempts to hide evidence and deceive the authorities and (vii) a 
structured methodology regarding payments etc.  
 
The different phases of the criminal activity should be seen as part of a process, a 
single and indivisible criminal reality aimed at precluding the jurisdiction of the country 
of disembarkation.  It is the intrinsic bond between the subject and the organized 
criminal group that prompts the qualitative leap from “involvement in an organized 
criminal group” to “participation in a criminal conspiracy”.  The decision of the tribunal 
enhances the effectiveness of Article 5 UNTOC and makes it easier to prosecute all 
involved in the criminal activity (See GLAUCO Operation Case n. 10341/15 R.N. G.I.P. 
SHERLOC Case Law Database ID ITA013). 
 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the set of actors involved in the irregular 
migration from Libya to Italy and their specialization.  The number involved are 
significant including agents, foot soldiers, organizer, armed men/enforcers and the 
boat owners and captains.  A visual illustration of the network - actors is presented 
below. 
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Figure 5-1.  Network actors drawn from the FERMO Palestinese 1 case. 
 
 
The network of actors in the FERMO Palestinees 1 Case reflects the roles involved in 
the irregular migration from Libya to Italy from the land route to the point of 
embarkation according to specialization.  Figure 5.1 highlights the organiser as the 
central focus of the network and value chain. The local agents or strategic actors which 
include the agents that spread awareness of the existence of the criminal organisation 
and connect interested migrants to the organiser.  They have a direct contact with the 
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organiser.  As their role ends the moment they have connected the migrant with the 
organiser, these actors are passive members of the network who may not be 
permanent.  The value chain includes the foot runners, armed men, enforcers, boats 
owners, captains and agents that take their orders from the organiser.  All these actors 
revert back to the organiser as shown by the arrows in the Figure 5.  These actors are 
vital to the smooth running of the network.   
 
All witness statements in this case acknowledge that the migrants were referred to the 
defendant by local agents in Libya.  They were given the telephone numbers of the 
defendant by his agents who stood to benefit from the referral.  Statements by B
R  and H  H  reveal that the process by which the would-be migrants 
were able to procure the numbers of the named smuggler Abu- Ibrahim in the FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1 case involved asking around. The court held that the statements of 
migrant witnesses proving that they were introduced to the defendant by friends with 
previous experiences, and those referrals leading to the consummation of their trip, is 
an indication that the group possesses the essential qualities of an organized criminal 
group.  These local agents form part of the elaborate network that moves the criminal 
enterprise along. They are strategic actors.  This point will be further elaborated in this 
chapter.  
 
Other than the local agents who spread awareness of the existence of the 
organization and connect intending migrants with the organizer, there are also the 
foot runners.  These run errands for the organizer and are part of the value chain.  
They consist mostly of drivers and other trusted persons who do the biddings of the 
organizer in other to achieve their goal of aiding illegal migration.  They are the ones 
that buy provision for migrants while they are kept at the collection centre.  They are 
also the ones sent to pick and bring migrants to the collection centre. B  R  and 
Gharsedin Hilmi in their statements, report how they and their fellow countrymen 
telephoned Abu-Ibrahim indicating their location and requesting to be picked up and 
taken to the collection centre at Zuwarah where they were to stay until the day of 
embarkation.  These witnesses in the statements detailed that an emissary of Abu-
Ibrahim was sent to pick them up from Zanzur where they realized that the migrants 
were being held hostage by armed men. (Judicial reports, the FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1 case,) 
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Based on the facts of this case, the organizer of the smuggling exercise can be taken 
to be the single most important actor in the organization of people smuggling from 
Africa.  It is his operation and he runs it with the help of his accomplices. In this case, 
being a Palestinian did not impede the defendant's ability to run such an operation 
on Libyan territory with Libyan accomplices.  The organizer makes the important 
decisions. He fixes the fees to be paid by each migrant. He ensures that they are 
safely brought to a collection centre owned or controlled by him.  He ensures their 
safety while they are there. The organizer must also find suitable boats or ship and 
a captain to make the sea crossing.  He ensures the movement of the migrants from 
the safe house to the embarkation point on the beach.  To accomplish all these tasks, 
he must necessarily rely on his foot runners, body guards and other accomplices.  
Abdalmenem Attour, otherwise known as Abu Ibrahim was the organizer in this case.  
The witnesses testified to the fact of Abu Ibrahim being responsible for the 
emissaries sent, collection of monies paid for the journey, and the other members of 
the groups were identified by their demeanour as working for Abu Ibrahim (Judicial 
reports, the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, Statement of B  R . 
 
Armed men are another set of key actors involved in the people smuggling 
enterprise.  They act as both body guards for the organizer and enforcers of the 
wishes of the organizer.  They are always armed with sub-machine guns either at 
the collection centre/safe house or at the embarkation point on the beach.  They do 
the bidding of the organizer for the success of the operation and wellbeing of the 
organization.  Most are Libyan citizens. According to B R , on arrival at the 
farm house, men armed with machine guns and clearly members of the organization, 
were stationed there and prevented some migrants from escaping.  Witnesses also 
identified the same armed men on the beach on the day of departure (Judicial 
reports, the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case).  Such is the importance of these armed 
actors that they are never far from the organizer and see to the enforcement of his 
every command, like the dispossession of the migrants of all valuables as they board 
the ship. They also enforce the seating arrangements on the boat. 
 
Boat owners and captains are another important set of actors in the process 
highlighted by the judicial reports. Piloting often barely seaworthy boats requires 
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some skill.  Some of the discarded or converted fishing boats are often captained by 
off duty fishermen for a fee.  Not being migrants themselves, they often return to 
Libya once their mission is accomplished. Sometimes, some of the migrants with any 
prior experience at sea, are put at the helm of the boats and as compensation, get 
to pay little or nothing for the crossing.  
 
The next section will examine the specialization of the actors in the Libya to Italy 
human trade from Libya to Sicily and it various dimensions. It will effectively elaborate 
on the actors and their categories on which this chapter bases its argument.    
 
Specialisation of the actors  
 
 
In reaction to the high demand for both regular and irregular transportation, those 
involved in the transportation process may operate alone or in networks with multi-
national membership.  The UK government describes organised crime as involving 
‘individuals normally working with others, with the capacity and capability to commit 
serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and 
coordination, and benefits those involved…the motivation is often, but not always, 
financial gain” (HM Government 2011).   
 
To understand the nature of criminality involved in irregular migration from Libya to 
Italy, it is necessary to know who is involved in providing the assortment of services 
which facilitate the human trade.  Based on primary and secondary research the actors 
may include: local gangs/groups; local businesses/entrepreneurs; artisanal operators; 
local residents; intermediaries; locally based opportunists; formerly trafficked and 
smuggled migrants; NGOs and shelter providers; state officials; professional 
smugglers and traffickers in the destination countries. Understanding the intricate web 
of actors in this illicit trade will give a better understanding of how they carry out their 
operations. The following classification is informed by analysis of the judicial 
proceedings that provide the fundamental evidence and data for this study. 
 
Actors’ categories  
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An Institute for security Studies and Global Initiative study concluded that a range of 
actors from diverse organised criminal groups and community members facilitate, 
support and profit from human trade (ISS & GIATOC 2016).  In classifying these 
actors, this research has adopted a categorisation based on the level of involvement 
of the actors in the organisational process to determine their significance in the 
irregular migration process based on analysis of a set of prosecutions undertaken by 
the Italian authorities.  These actors include: local gangs/groups which comprise local 






The UNODC labels these set of actors as persons who live along the smuggling routes 
who have chosen to make money through any available means, often illegal, whilst 
aiding the smuggling of migrants along that route (UNODC 2011).  These local 
residents assist in providing logistical support to the migrants and getting paid for their 
services. For the OECD (2015), local residents are people who find their means of 
livelihood within the key towns of smuggling routes.  This means that it may be difficult 
to counter their smuggling practices due to their knowledge of the terrain. However, 
research findings suggest that these local residents go beyond people who live along 
the towns as suggested by OECD (2015).  In FERMO PALESTINESE 1, the migrants 
were introduced to the organiser by local residents who knew about the smuggler and 
his smuggling operations. In other words, the smuggling organisation in that Libyan 
city was not ‘clandestine’ in the strict sense of the word. B R , a prominent 
witness in the FERMO PALESTINESE case, disclosed in his written statement how 
he learnt about Abu Ibrahim’s smuggling operation, as well as his contact details, 
through chance meetings with locals in Tripoli. 
 
 
Locally based opportunists 
 
According to the UNODC, these sets of actors are ad hoc smugglers who aid 
smuggling along the travel routes.  They take advantage of à la carte migrants who 
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cannot afford ‘the full-packet solution’ or a comprehensive portfolio of smuggling 
services (UNODC 2006). Such comprehensive packages include false 
documentation, accommodation, transportation and any other services that they may 
require in the course of the journey.  INTERPOL (2016) and the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) refer to this category of actors as opportunistic 
low level facilitators who help migrant smuggling networks in managing smuggling 
activities along given routes, while the UK government (2011) refer to them as groups 
driven by profit. Reitano, Adal, and Shaw (2014) on the other hand, identify this 
category of actors as individuals whose services are in most cases limited to 
smuggling operations related to the geography of their own in their territory, notably 
desert crossing or sea crossing.  This research however, refers to this group of people 
as ‘always at hand providers’ who operate along smuggling routes.  They could meet 
the migrants at staging areas where migrants gather while waiting or planning their 
next move.  Such staging areas include desert oases for land journeys and points of 
embarkation for sea journeys.  This set of actors need not be part of any smuggling 
organisation, they may simply function as ad hoc providers and, as their name implies, 
they simply take advantage of the difficulties of the migrants at these locations.  Being 
mostly natives of the transit country, they profit from their local knowledge of transit 
routes. Westcott (2016), gives the example of the Tubu people resident in several 
Sahelian countries, traditional suppliers of personal security, who opportunistically 
extend their services to passing migrants. In the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, those 
that provided information to migrants concerning Abu Ibrahim and his smuggling 
services are considered as locally based opportunists (Judicial Reports FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1, 2013).  However, emphasizing the relevance of these locally based 
opportunists ISAB, currently working for a Palermo-based NGO Addio-Pizzo, states 
that there were departures every day, but he had to wait for a designated driver to 
come from Sabha to transport him to Sabha and onwards to Tripoli (Interview 33). This 
implies that the driver was a locally based opportunist that knew the routes and the 
safe times to travel these routes and made good use of this privilege; which is a clear 
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According to UNODC (2011), local business/entrepreneurs are individuals who use 
their business resources for smuggling migrants within or beyond their home territory.  
This category of actors is identified by EUROPOL (2016a) as persons who make 
substantial profits from people smuggling activities or crimes related to the aiding of 
migrant smuggling. EUROPOL (2016b) describes these actors as freelancers who 
provide their services to multiple networks at a time, and also identifies them as lower-
level contacts of smuggling networks that could also be used as drivers, crew 
members and recruiting agents. Herman (2006) drawing on Salt and Stein, (1997) 
describes local business people as institutionalising the surreptitious transportation of 
irregular migrants often using vehicles otherwise used for other business activity.  
These entrepreneurs could be classified as institutionalised economic metaphors that 
assist migrants in their transportation as smugglers and illegal entrepreneurs.  For 
example, one respondent identified professional transporters who used their personal 
vehicles such as Lorries and 4x4s to transport migrants, supplying the added value of 
local knowledge and corrupt relations with the local authorities.  Facts from the 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 indicate that these local business people are usually from 
the places where they offer their services.  So, extrapolating from the evidence in 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1, many involved in that case were not formal members of 
the smuggling network, but rather local business people providing their services for 
money.  This is evinced in the statement by B R ‘… I recognized, without doubt, 
the person named Abu Ibrahim, one of the leaders of the smuggling organization who, 
equipped with weapons and working with men of Libyan nationality…’ (Judicial 
Reports FERMO PALESTINESE 1, 2013).   
 
A settled Nigerien migrant interviewed in Rome recounts that at the time of his travel, 
he was transported free of charge from his home town of Tawan to Agadez and was 
further escorted to Sabha by a friend whose main business had become transporting 
migrants.  This friend did not consider himself to be part of a smuggling network; he 
simply took advantage of an opportunity that presented itself.   
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This set of actors is identified by the UNODC as local smuggling groups whose 
activities can be described as ‘artisanal’ (UNODC 2006).  Reitano, Adal and Shaw 
(2014) define these actors as people who work in artisanal activities such as nomads, 
fishermen, and immigrants who work in collaboration with corrupt officials and agents 
in the smuggling of migrants across international borders.  They sell their services to 
desiring migrants at the well-known gathering points.  Although their activities are 
perceived to be in the manner of family businesses, there are indications that these 
artisanal operators are often involved in smuggling activities. Speaking on irregular 
migration crimes, an Italian judge revealed that some of the offenders identified and 
apprehended were noted to have been formerly involved in other forms of criminal 
activities such as drug smuggling amongst others (Interview 1).  These operators have  
diverted to people smuggling as it has been identified to be one of the most lucrative 
organised crime activity in the world triggered by the introduction of more rigorous 
immigration policies by the western world (Shelly 2014:2; Ellis 2011-UNODC).  
Although these set of actors have been noted by the UNODC as individuals that sell 
their services to desiring migrants, the incidence of migrants being intercepted, 
kidnapped and held against their will in the desert as recorded in the FERMO PM 
MUHIDIN case (account presented in the next chapter), cannot be said to be selling 
their services as their main aim of kidnapping and distorting the voyage of these 
migrants is to make unjustifiable profit off them with violence and force.  It can therefore 
be argued that the evolution in the strategies of the transnational smuggling groups in 
recent times, has in a way erased the previous perception of actors in this category as 
they no longer conform to the description provided by the UNODC and Reitano, Adal, 
and Shaw (2014).  Their operations have translated from nomadic artisanal activities 





In analysing the significance of organised crime in the smuggling of Africans to Europe, 
the UNODC(2006 18) report identifies market forces as key drivers who engage in 
making optimal use of their investments and capabilities but could be observed to be 
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at the same time collaborating with professional criminals/smugglers.  Micallef (2017) 
argues that the ‘industrialisation’ of the people smuggling trade has been greatly 
influenced by the collapse of law and order in destination counties such as Libya 
creating a conducive environment for the further exploitation of migrants.  Individuals 
are converted into what Micallef (2017) refers to as ‘…vehicles for reverse-
remittance…’ because of the evolving strategies and techniques in the means of 
collection.  This category of criminal actors might be described as professional 
smugglers and traffickers.  
 
An Italian judge who prosecutes irregular migration and anti-Mafia cases referred to 
these market forces as establishments in the semblance of tour operators (Interview 
1).  The opinion of the judge may be premised on evidences from the several irregular 
migration cases he may have tried in the course of his duty as a judicial officer.  Given 
that judicial evidences are perceived as tenable in cases where the verbal or media 
reports are weighed to have either exaggerated or less reported the weightiness of the 
situation, his submission about the initial perception of smuggling organization may be 
regarded as a defensible assessment.  The implication is that professional smugglers 
use the façade of ‘tourism’ – tour operators or travel agents – to mask their smuggling 
activities. This tallies with Liempt’s (2011) study on irregular migration by Kurdish 
women from Iraq that believed that the professional smugglers were indeed seen as 
assisting migration rather than criminals.  Other settled migrants interviewed stated 
that they were put in touch with their smugglers by friends who had used their services 
in the past (interview 33).  Hence, arguably these ‘travel agencies’ may not appear 
clandestine at first sight but underneath that façade of legal business, lies the 
clandestine activity of offering smuggling services.  
 
Another respondent provides insight into the role of family and friends in the 
transportation process. Ellis et al (2011) points out that over half of Nigerian migrants 
receive financial support from their family.  ISAM recounts at the time of his travel, how 
he was introduced to his smugglers by friends connected with individuals involved in 
moving people within Niger, smuggling people from smugglers connected to the 
smugglers by his friends who knew the smugglers.  This is usually the first lap of the 
journey from sub-Saharan Africa.  In fact, he claimed that he did not have to pay for 
his trip because his friends who were involved in the business of transporting intending 
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migrants from his place Tawan in Niger Republic to Agadez, and further down to 
Sabha, along the route, offered him transportation (Interview 35).  This implicates 
families and friends of the migrants, making them actors in the process;  
 
… I went to meet my friend in Agadez; I did not pay for my trip to Agadez 
because my friends drove [he would transport intending migrants]. I stayed a 
bit at Agadez with my friends and my friends escorted me to Sabha; so I did not 
have to pay too.  At Sabha, I had my money to pay for the sea trip to Italy; I 
then met a friend who knew a Ghanaian who is a trafficker- he only knew him 
not as a friend but as per the type job this man – Ghanaian does for a living.  
He gave me the contact of this man so I contacted him to organise the journey 
from Sabha to Tripoli and from Tripoli to Italy. 
 
Although UNODC (2011) states that local groups are primarily identified as those 
involved in the scouting and introduction of migrants to the passeurs who drive the 
immigration process, this research argues that the local groups are not the only ones 
involved in scouting and introduction, emphasising the pivotal role of friends and 
family.  These actors are largely over-looked in the scholarly literature.  This set of 
actors is referred to in this research as overlooked actors.  A further group often over-
looked is the irregular migrants, or former irregular migrants themselves.  Their task 
as ‘fixers’ involves receiving newcomers and arranging lodging in houses or ghettoes 
owned by professional passeurs.  In actual sense, a majority of these ‘fixers’ are simply 
aspiring migrants who get involved in aiding the smuggling process to raise money to 
fund their own journeys.  A number of the settled migrants interviewed confirmed that 
they had to work in a variety of jobs at different stages to make enough money to 
complete the payment for their trip.  Yet, the research discovered that some migrants 
could effectively fund their entire journey from money made assisting those involved 
‘professionally’ in the process.  Money made by participating in the process can also 
be supplemented by criminal activity including stealing from migrants with whom they 
come into contact. Witness accounts from FERMO PALESTINESE 1 evidence that at 
the point of embarkation, the migrants had been robbed of all their possessions.  Facts 
from the cases indicate that the migrants at the time of embarkation were rid of all their 
belongings and these were collected by the Libyan men that assisted the named head 
smuggler, Abu Ibrahim. (Judicial report, FERMO PALESTINESE 1, 2013). 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
136 | P a g e  
 
 
In the Libyan context, a Senegalese migrant settled in Palermo further relates that 
migrants are usually grouped by scouts and fixers by nationality (Interview 36).  This 
ties in with a further category of actors in the process, the wasit, or intermediary. These 
wasits are usually from the same country as the migrant, but have been resident in 
Libya for many years. Wasits may have once been irregular migrants who choose to 
stay in Libya to make money.  The Libyan owners of the migrants’ lodgings invariably 
have an ‘eye’, a wasit who acts as an intermediary between the Libyan and a discrete 
group of migrants from a particular country.  The role of the wasits is explored in the 
FERMO SCAFISCA case (Judicial Report FERMO PM SCAFISCA case, 2013).  
 
A further category of actor is the Chairman.  According to Ellis et al (2011), these are 
semi-official leaders of nationalities often from ECOWAS countries.  They are mostly 
former migrants, but established at a particular location for a long time.  They abound 
both in prominent communities along migrant routes and in destination countries. 
Chairmen in some destination countries are elected and well respected by migrants 
as they are perceived as role models.  They collect money from their fellow 
countrymen referred to by Ellis et al (2011) as ‘droit de ghetto’ for ‘services’ such as 
advising migrants on the choice of passeur, managing contacts with local authorities 
and maintaining contacts with families of the migrants which can have the added 
benefit for the Chairmen of attracting new recruits.  A Ghanaian chairman, now based 
in Palermo argues that his role was to help fellow countrymen, whilst failing to mention 
the financial benefits enjoyed by people in this position (Interview 10).  Indeed, these 
Chairmen often fulfil dual roles as wasits.  It seems that the honorary role of Chairman 
can often serve to mask the less honourable role of wasit. 
 
At the other end of the range of the ‘simple market forces’ category are the professional 
smugglers and traffickers in the destination countries.  These are clandestine actors 
involved in people smuggling networks and transnational criminal organizations.  
EUROPOL (2016a) refers to this set of actors as members of migrant smuggling 
networks involved in the coordination of activities along a specified route, managing 
activities locally by means of individual contacts, while traffickers in the destination 
countries in this context refers to members from the diaspora providing services such 
as arranging the hosting of migrants, providing employment and aiding the onward 
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transport of migrants (EUROPOL 2016a).  The analytical framework by Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Sørensen (2013) refers to the transporters and middlemen in the process 
as ‘ground-level actors’.  This research would include individuals resident in Italy 
involved in orchestrating escapes from the reception centres of Caltagirone, Marsala, 
Comiso, Potenza, Catania, and Mineo Catania; and the movement of migrants within 
Italy (Judicial report, FERMO PM GLAUCO case).  These actors play a pivotal role in 
the process.  They incorporate the services of smaller enterprises informally referred 
to as ‘people pushers’ that aid migrants’ transportation along migration routes, 
circumventing legal barriers in search for work and residence permits, and also legal 
advice on how to navigate the system for asylum seekers.  
 
The size and scale of irregular migration across the central migration from 11,749 in 
2007 to 171,635 in 2017 suggests that the actors involved in this criminal activity are 
becoming more expert and productive.  This study argues that this is partly the result 
of increasing specialisation.  The evidence gathered by those investigating the 
FERMO PALESTINESE case, corroborated by accounts from interviews, provides a 
unique insight into how a multiplicity of scouts and middlemen facilitate the process. 
Witness ‘A’ travelled to Benghazi from Syria and was scouted and directed to the head 
smuggler, Abu Ibrahim, by Palestinian middlemen. (Judicial reports, FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1, pg. 20). Witness ‘B’ was directed to Abu Ibrahim with the help of his 
own countrymen (Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1, pg. 10). Witness ‘C’ 
found about Abu Ibrahim from discussions with locals (Judicial reports, FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1, pg. 8). 
 
Research indicates that there is usually a high price to transport a migrant across 
international borders.  This, however, does not prevent the harsh treatment of migrants 
to ensure compliance.  A coordinator from MNSA Migrant First Welcome Centre 
describes the instance of ‘60 people who were held in a room of 14 metres, without 
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State Officials, NGOs and Shelter Providers 
 
There have been a number of reports in the Italian and international media recently 
alleging varying degrees of involvement in the irregular migration process on the part 
of Italia state officials, NGOs and those working for NGOs and those involved in 
providing accommodation for irregular migration in Italy (La Stampa; Deutsche-Welle; 
Reuters; Law Breaking News; Libya-Herald; Arab-News).  Scherer (2017a) reports 
some Italian lawmakers accusing NGOs of running a ‘taxi service’ for migrants arriving 
by sea.  Casper (2017), however, adopts a humanitarian stance applauding these 
NGOs for saving many lives. Farell (2017) writing in the Spectator implies that some 
Italian NGOs bend international rules, intervening to rescue migrants in distress and 
bring them to Italy even though they are rescued outside Italian territorial waters.  
Scherer (2017b) further reports Carmelo Zuccaro, former chief prosecutor of Catania, 
accusing NGOs of collaborating with smugglers to bring migrants to Italy, although she 
later admitted that she had no evidence to prove this assertion.  
 
In keeping with their claim that migration has become a business, Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Sørensen (2013) question the position of, for example, NGOs and those involved 
in running detention centres since they either directly or indirectly ‘profit’ from the 
process.  In particular, the argument that the mare Nostrum operation encouraged 
more smuggling could logically be extended to the many NGOs from Italy and 
elsewhere involved in rescuing maritime migrants. NGOs interviewed as part of this 
research include Centro Astalli, Casa San Francesco, NMSA, Consulta delle Culture, 
Association Pellegreno della Terra, Santa Chiara and Caritas. Ostensibly, these 
organisations appear to be motivated by humanitarian concerns rather than seeking 
to profit financially, although evidently seeking funding is an intrinsic function of the 
majority of NGOs.  
 
Shelly (2014) argues that given the number of actors in the smuggling process, there 
is always the potential for well-meaning individuals or organisations to unwittingly 
facilitate smuggling, whilst not being explicitly part of any criminal network.  Indeed, 
one respondent, a director of the Centro Astalli, argues that far from being aimed at 
profit making, their activities are ‘…a moral slap to the institutions that cannot help 
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people’ (Interview 4).  This position is critiqued by a government official working for the 
Palermo municipality: 
 
…the problem is that these social operators have no skills at all to 
manage this big situation due to economic problems because very 
often, the cooperative which I am managing, want to spend less money 
if possible…the cooperatives run these reception/welcome centres for 
economic reasons; they always aim at saving money, therefore, 
unskilled and untrained agents are used (Interview 27).  
 
The motive here appears to have moved from saving lives to profit making.  This 
revelation puts a question to mind as to what extent profit is prioritised in the services 
of NGOs.  The FERMO PALESTINESE 1 did not involve any investigation of the role 
of NGOs, but many of the witnesses in that case were held at a reception centre partly 
managed by NGOs.  One respondent, a social worker in the municipality, reports that 
the numbers of minors arriving in Palermo spiked in 2014 overwhelming the existing 
provision of reception centres (Interview 20).  The same respondent was exasperated 
by the pressure brought to bear on social services by the migration crisis: 
 
Palermo is made up of 800,000 citizens but there are only 40 
social workers for both migrants and citizens from the local 
government, the others are paid from private cooperatives, 
NGOs, but it’s the private sector.  Very often the private sector 
wants money from the state.  For Italy, particularly, the nation 
does not have money so they tell the local government, “…you 
have to get money from your citizen…” so in Palermo, people do 
not pay taxes and so Palermo local government has no money 
and they have only 40 social workers…this is where EU burden-
sharing should come in so as to help Italy handle this 
crisis…imagine Austria planning to build a wall! Other EU counties 
have enough social workers – Germany… (Interview 26) 
 
In the same context, although the EU denies allegations by Amnesty International that 
they ‘turn a blind eye’ to the catastrophic immigration crisis, these events are arguably, 
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the consequence of EU policies and the outsourcing of border controls to Libya (Barker 
2014; Sturridge et al 2017; Riemer 2017; Harari 2018; Global Detention Project 2018; 
Amnesty International 2018; Badalič 2018 and European Commission 2019).  Along 
the length of the migrant journeys there is considerable evidence from the scholarly 
literature of state officials, for example the police and coast guard, taking bribes to 
‘turn a blind eye’, the abuse and torture of migrants at migration hotspots by the military 
and police, and the use of government facilities in collusion with smuggling and 
trafficking rings (Kingsley 2015; Flynn 2015, Research and Evidence Facility (REF) 
2017).  Rusev (2013) reports that consular staff are bribed to procure entry visas and 
leave to remain.  One respondent states that he spent CFA10, 000 at eleven control 
posts on his journey (Interview 36). Also relevant is the near absence of rule of law 
characterised by lack of effective enforcement of extant laws in countries like Somalia, 
Libya and some parts of Niger and Mali.  In Nigeria, for instance, it used to be possible 
for an individual to obtain and hold multiple travel passports bearing different names 
and dates of birth but with same photograph.  This would not have been possible 
without the active connivance of men and officers of the department of immigration 
which has the responsibility to issue the passports.  In recent debates on the 
Mediterranean crisis, John Fisher Burns of New York times argued that the 
government of that Libya opened the border for migrants to cross from North Africa, 
suggesting that there was actually a way out of the misery that the crisis in Libya had 
created (BBC Dateline 2017).  The journey across land borders from West Africa to 
Libya stretches across multiple countries whose border agents look the other way 
giving migrants unhindered passage for a fee.   
 
Mafu (2019) believes that the African Union, equally fails to protect African migrants, 
although it is the EU that faces the sharpest criticism.  This research finds that the 
human rights of migrants have been violated under the guise of border protection and 
enforcing immigration policies.  This is borne out by a number of incidents evidenced 
in the judicial proceedings10.  The rival groups and government of Libya for instance, 
did not consider releasing or relocating the migrants nor their fate when air raids were 
decided upon.  As previously mentioned, in a preceding chapter of this work, the 
 
10 Examples include incidents mentioned in the judicial proceedings as evidence and data for this work as well as the media 
reports on migrant’s shelter bombing in Libya and the slave trade reported by the BBC and Amnesty International (Amnesty 
International 2017, BBC 2017, Nebehay 2018 and Wintour 2019) 
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European states are found complicit by several authors and activist as regards the 
crisis and how their policies have encouraged it (Nigram, 1965, Hollis 2012 & 2016, 
Achilli 2016, Sturridge et al 2017, and Molenaar and van Damme   2017, Adler 2018, 
Welander 2018, Guiraudon 2018, and Estevens 2018). Additionally, Italian officials at 
the transit points within Italian territories are also considered culpable in terms of their 
‘look the other way’ attitude which let migrants move to various regionsof Italy without 
being identified or documented (Barker 2014). Consequently, the business of human 
smuggling and trafficking, remains undetectable culminating in a complicated trade.  
On-site roles  
 
On-site roles in this context refer to specific support roles allocated to different persons 
by way of a division of labour.  The roles discussed here are key roles that oil the 
human-trade business as shown in the network-actors diagraph in the preceding 
section of this chapter.  For the purpose of a more succinct breakdown, the analysis 
in this chapter aims to demonstrate how the actors in the process adjust to the trend.  
This research argues that the shift in response to the trends, occurs not only in the 
structural organisation of the criminal groups and networks or in the routes taken, but 
also in the roles undertaken by the actors.  The specialisation of the actors shape the 
routes and the routes in turn shape the specialization.  The roles undertaken by these 
actors follow the notion of the 3Cs - capability, capacity and convenience as argued 




Rusev (2013) refers to transportation as an integral part of the modus operandi of 
smuggling and trafficking of migrants across borders and in most cases is done via 
corrupt means to circumvent border controls and surveillance.  Whether it be termed 
as transportation or movement, the fact remains that this aspect is the most expensive 
and crucial part in the trade (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012, Massari 2015, 
Maungandize 2016, EUROPOL 2016, and Campana 2017).  Consequently, the 
individual responsible for this task is essential to the process of irregular migration.  
The transporter refers to the drivers; those who take care of the transport to the place 
of concentration as well as the boat owners and captains that convey the migrants 
during the onward sea journeys.   The FERMO PALESTINESE case indicates that 
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some clients were picked up from airports, bus stations and locations in the city to be 
taken to the designated place where they waited for their time of embarkation for the 
sea journey.  These members ensure that the would-be migrants are discreetly 
transported to prevent any sort of identification.  This information meshes with that 
provided by a settled migrant IMAB, a pseudonym, interviewed in Italy, of how he was 
transported and concealed as goods to prevent being spotted by the Tuaregs  and the 
authorities during his desert journey from Gad to Sabha and then to Tripoli: 
 
…a special transporter who came from Sabah was then sent to 
transport me to Sabha and thereafter Tripoli. En-route, I was covered 




This account of the modus operandi in tandem with evidence from the judicial 
proceedings (Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1).  The means of 
transportation in the desert is the 4x4 pick-up truck while dinghies and fishing boats 
are procured for the sea journeys.  This means that an individual in possession of a 
resource such as the pick-up truck is well placed to financially profit from transporting 
migrants.  The importance of a transporter cannot be over emphasised. Moreover, 
driving or sailing skills are equally as important as access to a means of transportation  
 
 
Carers and caterers 
 
In the FERMO PALESTINESE case, the migrants were held in a farmhouse near 
Zuwarah or Sabratah.  The migrants are guarded by armed individuals. Ostensibly 
charged with looking after the migrants the carers role is more to ensure compliance, 
making sure they do not abscond or use mobile phones to contact the outside world.  
As such they could be seen more as enforcers as carers. In terms of supplying food 
and drink, this is mainly restricted to the time spent waiting for the sea crossing, as 
migrants can use the eating houses that exist along the way during the land journey. 
In FERMO PALESTINESE the migrants describe being fed, albeit little and not often,                                                                                                                                                                           
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I saw ABIA during our stay in the cottage, at least once a day 
bringing us food. He was armed with a submachine gun and 
accompanied by other Libyan entities, which are also armed. 
I want to say that, the food that ABIA carried was a single 
piece of bread; sometimes, during our stay in this house, we 
tried to go out to buy something to eat but, we were watched 
over by armed men, led by Abu-Ibrahim, who denied us the 
permission…(Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 





The special task of the guards is to prevent escape. They ensure compliance through 
intimidation: 
 
“…we tried to go out to buy something to eat but, we were 
watched over by armed men, led by Abu-Ibrahim, who 
denied us the permission…” (Judicial reports, FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1 case, pg. 6) 
 
“…any of us that tried to oppose such conduct, was 
threatened with weapons pointed to his head…” (Judicial 
reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, pg. 7) 
 
Based on the witness testimonies, the same individual who was identified as the 
controller of the trade was also spotted as part of the guards that restricted their 
movement. He and his cohorts were sighted at several times armed with submachine 
guns. Other evidences provided in  the court room which implied that the person 
identified was  in fact the same person that was responsible for the organisation of the 
irregular trip,  caused the capsizing of the boat and fire out break on deck which in turn 
caused the death of numerous migrants.  Personal effects recovered from the suspect 
were further evidence that he lied about his true identity and intention.  Such items 
included his international passport showing nationality, electronic gadgets and 
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telephone set with which transactions calls were made, bank cards and note pad with 
details of transactions and agenda (Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, 
pg.23).  These are strong indications of criminality laced with deception geared at 
thwarting investigation and apprehension.   
 
Overlooked or Unintended Actors in the Trade.  
 
Freedman (2012) argues that EU policies rather than seeking to limit or stop irregular 
migration have resulted in increased insecurities which have forced migrants to take 
more dangerous routes.  In the context of ‘criminality’, there is the question of whether 
only those directly involved in smuggling and/or trafficking, the organised criminal 
groups, should be seen as facilitating these activities, or whether entities less 
perceptibly involved, such as individual states and inter-governmental organisations 
such as the EU, should also be held responsible for the damaging effects of 
smuggling/trafficking.  
 
To establish where criminality lies, it is important to clarify how this thesis understands 
‘criminality’ and the distinction between structural and individual culpability.  There 
have been debates over establishing a universally accepted definition of the criminal 
elements in the smuggling/trafficking from Africa to Europe via the Mediterranean.  In 
the narrowest sense, a crime is any act or omission which is forbidden by the laws of 
a state and is punishable under the law. Woźniakowska-Fajst (2016: 1) defines crime 
as ‘…a certain identifiable form of conduct that can be defined by law and which is 
recognised as not conforming to the conventional behavioural model of a given 
culture’.  Criminality, in effect, is identified the moment an offence is perceived by the 
legal authorities (Turk 1966).  However, what constitutes a crime differs from country 
to country. Many scholars argue that crime is a complex, indefinable phenomenon that 
is subject to change across cultures; in other words it is socially constructed (Gilinskiy 
2001; Peterson 1972; Hurwitz 1951).  While murder, rape and stealing are 
acknowledged the world over and legislated upon as crimes, the same is not true of 
irregular migration.  As shown in chapters 5 and 6, there are very many actors who 
are involved in the human trade from Africa to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea route 
and they use a variety of methods.  This makes the task of determining the criminality 
involved complex. While impoverished African migrants and their community see no 
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criminality in any step they take to overcome the stiff requirements for legal migration 
to Europe (and in fact will do anything to assist them), their prospective European host 
country considers their attempt to circumvent immigration/visa rules a crime. 
 
There is also contestation over the question of responsibility for irregular migration.  A 
number of authors have written on the complicity of state actors in causing and 
aggravating the humanitarian crisis stemming from migration from Africa to Europe 
(Research and Evidence Facility 2017; Molenaar and van Damme 2017; Hollis 2016, 
Morvarid 2008).  Some have apportioned blame to corrupt African governments that, 
they argue create the economic conditions that force migration (Research and 
Evidence Facility 2017; Molenaar and van Damme   2017).  
 
However, the culpability of the EU and the member states and their level of complicity 
need more consideration.  Could the EU member states and the EU as a supranational 
body have foreseen the migration flows that followed their immigration policies and if 
so, are they not vicariously liable?  If we answer in the affirmative, can such liability be 
criminal via the notion of aiding and abetting a crime (UN Case File, 2007)?  Or, are 
the European states non-complicit simply because they could not have foreseen the 
spike in irregular migration and the attendant humanitarian crisis as natural 
consequences of their policies restricting migration?  This research indicates that EU 
policies have been formulated in such a way as to immorally curtail migration directly 
leading to the illegality involved in both smuggling and trafficking. Governments and 
states have a duty to make laws that promote morality not retard it.  The EU and 
member states’ various and varying responses to the activities of people smugglers 
and the upsurge in irregular migration will be examined against this backdrop vis-a-vis 
the criminality involved.  
 
To understand the level of complicity of the European states in the irregular migration 
imbroglio, it is important to return to the origin states of the immigrants where restrictive 
visa policies of the EU member states in and outside the Schengen Agreement deny 
visas to the majority of applicants who are termed ’economic migrants’ (Hollis 2012; 
Hollis 2016). Hollis also accuses European states of complicity in the destabilisation 
of parts of Africa and the Middle East, leading for instance, to the uprisings of the Arab 
Spring and the collapse of the Libyan government. It is argued that the uprisings in 
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Libya and Syria  were manifestations of the sustained information war waged by the 
West, including the EU, against the governments of both states and supported by 
direct military intervention by the UK and France, as well as the US (Hollis 2012 & 
2016).  More important than this, however, is how the EU and its member states have 
responded to the spike in irregular migration.  Since the Lampedusa tragedy of 2015, 
the EU’s use of FRONTEX and changing policies over the rescue at sea of unsafe 
vessels has come under scrutiny. Prior to 2015, the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency was actively involved in search and rescue operations along European 
coastal borders to rescue migrant boats and hand the migrants over to local European 
authorities for processing for asylum purposes. However, a political decision was 
made following the 2015 tragedy to abandon this approach in favour of a policy of 
containment under which, European states, particularly Italy, have implemented a 
series of measures aimed at closing off the migratory route through the Mediterranean 
with little care for its implication for those trapped within Libya’s lawless borders 
(Amnesty International, 12 December, 2017). Under this policy, European states have 
resourced the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord to ‘intercept boats leaving 
Libya and detain those intercepted in detention centres where they face appalling 
conditions’ (Human Right Watch, 2019). EU policy makers justify this as a political and 
practical necessity to assert control over Europe’s borders as well as a humanitarian 
imperative to prevent dangerous boat migrations organised by smugglers for financial 
gain.  This EU migration cooperation with Libya is, without doubt, contributing to the 
extreme abuse of migrants detained in Libyan detention centres where they face 
inhuman and degrading conditions and the risk of torture, sexual violence, extortion 
and forced labour. Confirming the EU’s knowledge of these conditions, EU migration 
commissioner, Dimitri Avramopoulos in November 2017, stated, ‘we are all conscious 
of the appalling and degrading conditions in which some migrants are held in Libya’.  
Indeed, the EU provides support intended to ameliorate these conditions in detention.  
However, even though that support has had minimal impact on the situation, the EU 
continues to pursue a flawed strategy to empower the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept 
migrants and asylum seekers and take them back to Libya. Immigration detention in 
Libya is against international law not just because the centres mete out cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, but also because such detentions are indefinite and not 
subject to judicial review.  Amnesty International argues therefore that European 
governments have not just been fully aware of these abuses, by actively supporting 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
147 | P a g e  
 
the Libyan authorities in stopping sea crossings and containing people in Libya, they 
are complicit in these abuses. 
 
It would seem therefore that the EU was so focussed on curbing migrant smuggling 
through criminalisation and containment that it neglected its humanitarian and moral 
obligation to coordinate and undertake search and rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean (Baldwin-Edwards et al, 2018). FRONTEX tripled its efforts at securing 
the borders along the Mediterranean routes with less attention on protecting the 
human rights of migrants. It did this by obstructing migrants’ basic rights to seek 
asylum by using force or threat of force to return migrants back across the EU’s 
external borders. Is FRONTEX, and by extension the EU, complicit in the ill-treatment 
of migrants by its officers as suggested by Stephen Kessler, the head of its Advisory 
Forum or is it enough for the European Commission to be ’concerned about reports of 
the treatment of migrants’ without redefining FRONTEX’s rules of engagement 
(FRONTEX: World/Social Issues, August 6, 2019)? The disproportionate allocation of 
funds in EU’s 2017 draft budget between FRONTEX - €283m - and the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) - €153m- is a clear indication of the policy direction of 
the EU (Segura 2016). Furthermore, EU member states are also frequently guilty of 
not applying international asylum law (Council of Europe n.d). 
 
The EU’s partnership with African states is increasingly based on the exchange of 
economic support, supposedly to raise living standards to diminish the need to 
migrate, but arguably also a quid pro quo for enhanced counter-migration 
securitisation policies. Jan Claudius Volkel argues that while the European 
Commission tried to keep the humanitarian aspect of the migration crisis on the 
agenda, the governments of certain member states including Italy, Hungary, Poland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia stressed the need for increased securitisation. In 
December 2018, for example, the Italian government passed a new migration law. In 
particular, the law abolishes humanitarian protection for asylum applicants who do not 
meet refugee status.  Further it withdraws social services from asylum seekers whose 
requests are pending; stipulates that people whose asylum process is being examined 
cannot obtain an identification document required if the asylum seeker needs to sign 
an employment contract; and extends from three to six months the period of time 
Italian authorities can detain new arrivals while their identities and nationalities are 
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being checked.  Yet, it is exactly this focus on securitisation that is leading to the 
paradoxical result that the EU is failing in achieving either more security for itself or 
better safety for the immigrants. 
 
 
Köhler (2017) commends the comprehensive EU crisis management strategy of 
applying short-term humanitarian actions and political, legal and development tools to 
tackle the underlying causes of migration and refugee crisis. However, other scholars 
are less impressed. Adler (2018) in her report on the EU Mediterranean crisis argues 
that the European migration policies are unfit for purpose. Her argument points to the 
fact that the EU policy exhibits a persistent ‘screaming absence’ with relation to a clear 
short-term and long-term plan on the management of irregular migration; 
 
…the bottom line, as Italy knows too well, is that there is a screaming 
absence in EU policy when it comes to a coherent, united and 
functioning plan to deal with irregular migration in the short and medium 
term. 
There is the underfunded and much derided long-term EU strategy for 
Africa - aimed at making life better over there so fewer people are 
tempted to make the risky journey over here. But as millions poured over 
EU borders back in 2015, the action that truly stemmed the flow was 
arguably nothing co-ordinated in Brussels, not even the shaky deal with 
Turkey (Adler 2018:5) 
Rather, the issue of migration is often used by populist politicians in EU member states 
as a policy area intended to win support rather than find solutions to the underlying 
drivers of migration. The parties to which these politicians belong are becoming 
increasingly powerful, governing alone or in coalition in a significant number of EU 
states Adler (2018).   
 
Similarly, Welander (2018), commenting on measures adopted by the European 
Council in June 2018, is concerned about the EU’s ability to meet its obligations 
regarding migration under human rights law. Despite the EU seeking to emphasise 
unanimity in its approach to countering smuggling/trafficking, this ambition is 
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undermined by the disconnect in the discourse adopted by different member states 
(Neisser 2016).   
 
The EU's comprehensive approach on migration seeks to address irregular migration 
from multiple perspectives: cooperation with partner countries; external border 
protection and tools to manage migration inside the EU (Köhler 2017). However it can 
be argued that in practice there is still a clear gap in humanitarian assistance and the 
range of tools at the EU’s disposal is less extensive than they claim (Köhler 2017).  
 
Henley (2018) argues that the EU’s delayed response to the crisis exacerbated the 
both the numbers trying to cross the Mediterranean and the related drownings. 
Potentially, the distance between member states precludes a viable solution to 
irregular migration from Africa to Europe and the concomitant criminality.  The key 
issues identified by Henley (2018), points to the absolute counter-immigration 
strategies employed by Italy’s coalition government since 2018 signalling a definitive 
refusal by Italy to accept the majority of immigrants from Africa to Europe.  This 
unilateral response runs contrary to the spirit of the Dublin Regulation that requires the 
state where a claimant first applies for asylum to handle the claim.  Hungary had 
already signalled an intention to cease applying the Dublin Regulation. Burden sharing 
has also recently become an issue in Germany who initially operated an open border 
policy until it became overwhelmed with migrants.  The overburdened states now 
demand an EU-wide solution, an idea that appears anathema to the other states such 
as Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Spain, and Austria. Guiraudon 
(2018) on the other hand, argues that part of the reason for the crisis is policy inertia 
and drift.  The system in place is not suitable for handling the numbers wanting to enter 
Europe without documentation and the capacity of the smugglers/traffickers to 
transport these numbers (Guiraudon (2018). This situation further empowers the 
smuggling rings in whose hands the fate of vulnerable fleeing migrants now lie.  
 
In the long run, the situation today is that of misplaced priorities Estevens (2018) 
argues that by concentrating on securitisation, the EU ignored its other humanitarian 
commitments, a position that might have short-term gains, but engender long-term 
challenges.  
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FRONTEX has become a different agency to that envisaged when it was established 
in 2004. Liaising with Tunisian naval forces and Libyan coast guards from various 
factions, FRONTEX vessels are now an elaborate part of a security operation often 
required to return vessels to the custody of these navies and coastguards irrespective 
of maritime danger or international humanitarian law. Experience shows that increased 
security on one route invariably prompts the smugglers/traffickers to develop new 
methods and new routes to service demand (Achilli 2016).  The shift from managing 
borders including deterring and pursuing smugglers/traffickers has shifted to securing 
borders and preventing the arrival of migrants. Some of the steps suggested by Achilli 
(2016) include: ‘granting humanitarian visas; creating humanitarian corridors between 
transit countries and Europe; the expansion of European countries’ resettlement 
programmes; and the development of alternative legal routes for refugees – such as 
family reunification, university fellowships and scholarships, training programmes, 
private sponsorships, and labour mobility’ (Achilli 20161:103).  There is a call for an 
overhauling of the EU policy, seeing that it is clearly responsible for the crisis; 
especially the refugee crisis that swept through 2015 (Guiraudon 2018). 
 
Human Rights Watch have suggested the EU’s unwillingness to consider opening 
more legal migration channels and processing centres for refugees and asylum 
seekers portrays the EU as supporting and contributing to the crisis, making it 
responsible for the activities of smugglers and traffickers across the Mediterranean 
(Human Right Watch 2019).   
 
Meanwhile, the conditions for migrants in transit remain perilous. The slave trade in 
Libya as a result of the migrants’ inability to access legal migration channels is 
classified as a crime against humanity (Mafu, 2019).  The EU continues to negotiate 
with Libyan factions including the faction that controls the coast-guard, whilst 
FRONTEX works with them to ‘push-back’ migrants to Libya where they face an 
uncertain future, exploited for their labour or held in dangerous detention camps.  
International maritime law requires those rescued at sea to be returned to a port of 
safety. For good reasons, Libyan ports are not considered ports of safety.  Moreover, 
Libya is still in a state of war. Migrants escaping this war situation are being pushed 
back into a war situation.  The bombing of the detention centre at the beginning of 
2019 (Wintour, 2019), highlights the dangers faced by migrants returned to Libya.  
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The EU, responding to the spike in irregular migration in 2015, has taken steps to 
prevent a similar crisis re-occurring.  In so doing, mutual agreements to forge equitable 
partnerships have been replaced by hard power tactics (Hollis, 2016: 6). It is not to 
belittle the culpability of corrupt governments in the countries of origin; the exploitative 
methods of criminal smugglers and traffickers and the brutality and venality of Libyan 
factions to single out EU policies as key drivers of smuggling and trafficking from Africa 
to Europe. The way in which the EU migration policy has developed, notably its quasi-
abandonment of the laws of the sea concerning rescue and return, as well as its 
relationship with governments and factions are potentially illegal under international 
(and domestic) humanitarian law, maritime law and refugee law.  Likewise, 
securitisation policies have encouraged a, perhaps unexpected, but certainly 
foreseeable expansion of activities by organised smugglers and traffickers. This 
category of overlooked actors may not be visible on the illustrated network as 
presented in Fig. 5.1 but this does not mean they are not complicit.  This category of 
overlooked actors may not be visible on the illustrated network as presented in Fig. 
5.1 but they are comlpicit in one way or the other.  
 
Furthermore, there is very limited material on what roles the religious organisations 
along the migration routes play in the smuggling process; whether they support or fight 
against the phenomnon.  However, UNODC reports revealed that the determination 
and stamina to migrate observed in West African migrants, is strengthened by the 
support and blessings they get from the religious figures of their communities (UNODC 
2011, Ellis et al 2011).  Thus, the migrants rather choose the sufferings along migration 
routes over remaining poor, dying en route, or facing the consequences of bonds 
broken by their failure to comply with the requirement of rituals performed for them.  
However, admist efforts to limit the scourge by some African leaders such as the 
Gambia government’s programme to discourage migration in the Gambia youthwith 
reference to the experiences of previous migrants (Luda di Cortemiglia et al 2018) are 
were also recorded other community inititives with the vision to reduce the desire to 
migrate in young people.  In this vein, faith-based organisations were recorded to have 
organised initiatives towards skills acquisitions with the help of community–based 
organisations.  The reports nonetheless, stated that the religious leader were still 
found wanting in their involvement in the activities and debates relating to human 
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smuggling (Luda di Cortemiglia et al 2018).  In some cases, religious and ethnic 
networks are alleged to have been used along the Sudan and Libyan borders as risk-




Findings from the judicial proceedings examined, mainly FERMO PALESTINESE 1, 
cross-checked with the semi-structured interviews conducted in the field, indicate that 
there are both intentional and unintentional actors facilitating irregular migration on the 
Libya to Italy route.  The chapter endeavoured to categories both these sets of actors. 
In so doing it becomes clear that the multi-tasking actors typical of the fluid and 
unstructured criminal networks of the 2000s have been replaced by a more nuanced 
and differentiated set of actors that play specialised roles. To this end, the chapter 
examines the complicity of actors often overlooked including the EU as a supra-
national body and the role of individual member states. Though not shown on the 
‘actors in the network’ illustration, their actions drive the trade, too often resulting in 
terrible outcomes.  
The research extrapolates from the judicial proceedings a detailed understanding of 
the roles undertaken by individual actors within the networks.  It uses the concept of 
the 3Cs - capability, capacity and convenience – to better understand how these actors 
fit into the transportation process.  It becomes clear that the ‘professional’ smuggler is 
in the minority when it comes to facilitating the movement of irregular migrants both 
along the land routes and across the Mediterranean.  Those involved along the land 
journey are both full-time local entrepreneurs and ‘artisanal’ operators who have 
moved into migrant corralling and/or transporting as a ‘family business’ and others who 
have other ways of making money but become involved when money-making 
opportunities arise.  Whilst not necessarily full-time smugglers, these links, in the 
process, fulfil specific and specialised roles such as recruiters, transporters (lorry 
drivers and boat captains), carers, caterers and guards.  
The way in which these actors treat the migrants that they accommodate, or transport 
can vary depending on their relationship with the smuggling process – intentional or 
unintentional. However, at critical junctures, in particular at the points of embarkation 
in Libya, evidence gathered by this study indicates that the actors involved are 
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becoming less restrained in the use of violence and coercion against migrants. This 
will be explored in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 6  THE MODUS OPERANDI 
 
 
This chapter will critically examine the irregular migration of persons across the 
Mediterranean as a pattern of organised criminal activity, focussing on the modus 
operandi, or the ‘way of operating’, employed by the criminal networks in the 
smuggling of persons. 
 
Based on recorded deaths in the Mediterranean it can be concluded that irregular 
migration from Libya to Italy has become increasingly global (Den Boer, 2006, Monzini 
2007, Koslowski, 2011, Boch and Chimenti, 2011, Cheng, 2013 Doomernik, 2013 and 
The Economist 2016).  Yet, as demonstrated by the findings in this study, migrants 
despite the challenges and threats to their lives continue to make the journey.  
Reflecting on the cause, some scholars argue that this voyage is a phenomenon 
understood in terms of the availability of people smuggling and trafficking services, the 
search for ‘greener pastures’, and escape from socio-political crises (Morehouse and 
Blomfield 2011, King and Debono 2013, Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi 2013, Reitano, 
Adal and Shaw, 2014).  Others see the causes of the phenomenon in terms of criminal 
practice based responding to existing national legislation and immigration policies 
(Provera 2015, Van Liempt 2016, Carrera and Guild 2016).  When it comes to the 
prevailing mode of these irregular operations and the degree to which criminal 
activities are involved, scholars are less clear (UNODC 2011, UNODC 2006).  The 
methods employed by the people smugglers in carrying out their operations are 
sufficiently diverse and complex to evade ready understanding or even prosecution.  
It is likely that, as Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi (2013) say, that the ‘Arab Spring’ 
contributed to the geopolitical changes and the subsequent new migration flows, but 
what is less clear is the degree to which organised crime groups were actively involved 
in exploiting the situation and promoting the migration process which this study refers 
to as the ‘human-trade’. 
 
This chapter addresses the second objective of this research, namely to compare the 
findings of this research with current explanations of the criminal elements in human-
trade.  It explores the modus operandi of the criminal activities involved in the Libya-
Italy migration and examines the diverse strategies utilised by the smugglers.  It 
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examines how smuggling operations are run; strategies adopted to ensure compliance 
from the migrants and at the same time circumventing regulations and defying 
investigation and the different roles and techniques employed.  In supporting the main 
argument of this work which holds that the criminal organisation driving the human 
trade from Libya to have significantly changed, this chapter argues that their recent 
modus operandi are not only ‘specialised’ but also that the means used to recruit, 
corral and transport irregular migrants has become increasingly violent and 
unrestrained.  
 
The analysis is drawn from the examination of judicial proceedings of irregular 
migration cases tried in Italian courts and analyses of interviews with irregular 
migration experts.  These two data sources offer a unique insight into the complexity 
of the phenomenon and together offer substantiation to reduce potential bias from a 
single source.  As noted in the previous chapter, the judicial proceedings examined 
are selected court cases from 2013 that cover different aspects of the phenomenon.  
The evidence presented in the court comes from witnesses statements by victims of 
the people smuggling as well as records of wiretaps of phone conversations between 
the smugglers.  
 
In particular, this chapter employs evidence from: 
 
The FERMO PM MUHIDIN case against Elmi Muhidin Mouhamud. 
 
The FERMO PM SCAFISCA case.  
 
Elsewhere in the chapter reference is made at times to the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 
case and the FERMO PM GLAUCO case.  
 
The two selected cases demonstrate the modus operandi of people traffickers and 
smugglers from Libya to Italy.  The witness statements show how the different criminal 
groups carry out their activities and how the migrants were treated in the desert and 
on the sea journey.  While FERMO PM MUHIDIN details the workings and techniques 
of the criminal groups across the Sahara desert, the FERMO PM SCAFISCA lays bare 
the techniques employed by those responsible for ferrying migrants across the sea 
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into Italy.  Both cases arose from criminal investigations following the migrants’ 
shipwreck of 3/10/2013 off the Italian island of Lampedusa when 366 lost their lives. 
 
 
The FERMO PM MUHIDIN Case 
 
The survivors of the 3 October shipwreck, all of Eritrean origin, were housed at the 
Reception centre (CPA Lampedusa) pending completion of identification and 
processing of asylum applications. On 25/10/2013, there was an attempt by some of 
the survivors to lynch a Somalian citizen at the centre who had also landed 03/10/2013 
but in a different boat from that of the Eritreans.  The Eritreans identified the Somalian, 
Elmi Muhidin Mouhamud, as the leader of a group of armed men who had been 
responsible for their kidnap, torture and extortion while they travelled from Eritrea to 
Libya in an area between Sudan and Libya. 
 
On the intervention of the police, eight of the Eritreans, through interpreters and in the 
presence of a lawyer, provided spontaneous verbal statements detailing the 
circumstances of their kidnap and the violence meted out to them by the suspect, and 
his accomplices. Specifically, their statements claimed that about 130 of the Eritreans 
were accosted in the desert by an armed band led by the suspect. Allegedly, they were 
forcibly taken to and locked up in a large house under the control of Muhidin and the 
band. The families of the migrants were ordered to pay a ransom of $3300 for the 
release of each migrant. They were also tortured, starved and racially abused by their 
kidnappers. The women were also sexually abused and “offered as gifts” to Libyan 
men. 
 
The statements revealed that their detention lasted for a period of two weeks after 
which they were transported to Tripoli and handed over to another criminal gang who 
arranged their trip across the sea into Italy.  The trip only took place after their 
individual families had paid an average sum of $3000 for each of the migrants into a 
bank account designated by their captors.  The migrants were later made to pay 
individually a further fee ranging from $1600-$2000 US dollars to be ferried across the 
sea into Italy.  It was their subsequent trip across the sea that resulted in the shipwreck 
of 3/10/2013.  
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The defendant, Elmi Muhidin Mouhamud in fact denied all the allegations, insisting 
that he was a simple migrant just like the others.  Nevertheless, based on the 
statements given by the migrants, Elmi Muhidin Mouhamud was prosecuted, accused 
of: 
 
(1) Conspiracy and participation in criminal activities of a criminal group under 
Article 4L. 16 n.146 
(2) Kidnapping for ransom under Article 605 Penal Code of Italy 
(3) Trafficking in Persons (Article 601 Penal Code) 
(4) Sexual abuse (Aggravated) Article 609 bis Penal Code and 
(5) Facilitating smuggling under Article 12 L. paragraphs, 1 a, b, &d. 
 
The contentious matters at the trial were the existence or otherwise of a criminal 
organization and whether or not the Italian courts had jurisdiction to try the accused 
person, bearing in mind that the migrants ship was intercepted on international waters. 
Some of the disputed legal questions included: Could the defendant be said to have 
participated in the activities of an organized criminal group? Could he be said to have 
conspired with elements of the group based in Libya and Italy? What is the relationship 





The court found: 
(a) That the defendant was indeed a member of a “highly structured and 
transnational” organized criminal group based in Africa, acting with the purpose of 
obtaining a financial or other material benefits, and dedicated to the smuggling of 
migrants. 
 
11 Guilty knowledge and wilfulness. A fundamental principle of Criminal Law is that a crime consists of both a 
mental and a physical element. Mens rea, a person's awareness of the fact that his or her conduct is criminal, is 
the mental element, and Actus Reus, the act itself, is the physical element. 
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(b) That the defendant directly managed an illegal detention centre in the Sahara 
Desert where, together with his unidentified collaborators, he subjected the migrants 
to violence and the women particularly were sexually abused. 
(c) That the defendant and his group also organized the further transportation of 
the migrants from the Sahara Desert to Tripoli. 
(d) The fact that these acts were done with intent to obtain financial or other 
material benefits; more than five people were smuggled; more than three people were 
involved in the criminal act and the life and safety of the migrants were endangered 
constitute aggravating circumstances.  
It was also the finding of the court that the accused person showed no sign of remorse. 
 
In adjudging the defendant a member of a criminal organization, the court considered 
the indispensability of the accused person to the activities of the organized criminal 
group as a crucial element in determining his level of involvement. The defendant and 
his gang were responsible for supplying a large number of migrants to the Libya based 
group.  He was therefore somewhat indispensable to the activities of the criminal 
group.  From the level of his involvement and indispensability can be inferred criminal 
conspiracy. In respect of the crime of procuring illegal entry, the court reasoned that 
that was the intendment or natural result of the defendant's actions. It ruled that the 
commission of the offence is independent of actually achieving the result intended. It 
is enough that the defendant did the things he was alleged to have done.  In other 
words, the courts look at the actus Reus or conduct which is a constituent element of 




Under Article 6 of Italian Criminal Code, for the lawful exercise of jurisdiction, it is 
necessary that the action or omission that constitutes the offence takes place, wholly 
or in part, in the territory of Italy. Italian courts will equally assume jurisdiction if the 
natural result of the act or conduct occurs in Italian territory.  In this case however, the 
transportation of the migrants from Tripoli to Italy was interrupted on international 
waters by the Search and Rescue operation of Italian authorities. In other words, the 
ship and migrants were intercepted before reaching Italian waters or territory, meaning 
that the natural result of the defendant's acts “ordinarily” did not occur in Italian 
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territory. It was the opinion of the court that this did not preclude Italian courts from 
assuming jurisdiction. The court reasoned that authorities are under national and 
international obligation to attempt to rescue the migrants from a potentially deadly 
situation.  The authorities, in this sense, act under a state of necessity to prevent the 
death of the migrants. The jurisdiction of Italian courts is therefore not precluded on 
account of this intervention.  This finding thus prevented an impunity gap in the 
prosecution of organized crimes and once again gave effect to Article 5 of United 





The defendant was found guilty of criminal conspiracy for the purpose of smuggling 
migrants as well as procuring the illegal entry of migrants into Italy.  He was 
accordingly given a maximum sentence of thirty (30) years imprisonment and ordered 
to pay reparation to the municipality of Lampedusa, Italy. 
 
 
The FERMO SCAFISCA Case 
 
The case of FERMO SCAFISCA was about unmasking the person or persons that 
organized or led the sea crossing of 02/10/2013 which resulted in the shipwreck of 
03/10/2013. At the time, the Lampedusa shipwreck was the worst of its kind and had 
necessitated the launch of Italy's search and rescue operation, otherwise known as 
Mare Nostrum. BENSALAM (alias BENSALAM KHALED) a Tunisian national born on 
12/11/1978 was the sole defendant prosecuted for the shipwreck of 03/10/2013 off 
Lampedusa.  He was, among other things, accused of belonging to and running a 
criminal organization engaged in procuring for profit, the illegal entry into Italy of about 
250 foreign nationals, in violation of existing legislation on immigration. 
 
In their spontaneous statements to the police and Coast Guard, the survivors narrated 
how the boat came to grief and what led to the loss of 366 lives that were on board.  
They went further to state that the boat was captained by two "white men" or subjects 
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of lighter complexion than the Eritreans, complexion typical of the people of Libya and 
Tunisia. 
 
Following a survey of the survivors, the suspect was discovered to fit the above 
description exclusively.  His complexion was lighter than that of every other person 
and he was also the only one of Tunisian origin.  The rest were Eritreans. One other 
detail that led to the suspect away was the wound and bandage on his right arm. The 
injury was observed to be consistent with burns sustained in a fire, thus confirming his 
proximity to the area from where the fire started on the boat. Moreover, when 
interrogated, the suspect confessed that he captained a boat of migrants that landed 
earlier on 11/04/2013, which also recorded a lone Tunisian on board. His confession 
was proof that he had sea-going-experience.  In summary, the witnesses or depositors 
were able to provide a reconstruction of the facts in a fair and consistent manner and 
were all agreed on: 1. The business underlying the tragic journey. 2. The arrangement 
for boarding in Libya. 3.  The presence of only Eritreans or citizens of central Africa 
amongst the travellers. 4.  The conduct of the boat by two Arabs or persons of lighter 
skin complexion than the Eritreans. 5.  The presence of 500 or more travellers on the 
boat. 6.  The voluntary stop of the boat for about one to two hours along the coast of 
Lampedusa while waiting for someone to come along and rescue them. 7.  The why 
and how the fire was started on the boat and the stampede that followed and the 
consequences thereof. 8. Three of the witnesses positively identified the suspect as 
the person who captained the boat while being assisted by a younger fellow of the 
same tribe or nationality who presumably perished in the disaster.  On the basis of this 
identification, the suspect was formally charged and tried in the law court for several 
offences including: 
 
1. Conspiracy, participation in the activities of a criminal organization through the 
facilitation of illegal immigration (Articles 81 C.P; 110 C.P, paragraphs 3 a -e.) 
2. Multiple murders and voluntary shipwreck (Articles Para. 40; 110, 428 Penal 
Code)  
3. Associated offences (Para. 40, 81,110, 575,576n. 1, 61n. 2 C.P.) 
 
 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 




The court believed the evidence of the witnesses regarding the modus operandi of the 
criminal organization responsible for their transportation from Tripoli across the sea to 
Lampedusa.  The witnesses had in their independent and spontaneous statements 
detailed their ordeals at the hands of their minders as they were kept at the collection 
centre and later moved to the embarkation point by the beach.  They were made to 
pay between 1600 and 2000 US dollars as fee for their transportation to Italy.  As soon 
as a ship had been found for their trip across the sea, they were shepherded to the 
beach from where they were put first, on a small boat and ferried to a bigger fishing 
vessel out on the sea for the trip across to Italy. It was at the point of embarkation that 
all their valuables, including clothes, telephones and laptops were forcibly taken away 
from them. Again, armed Libyan men with machine guns were on hand to ensure their 
compliance. 
 
All the witnesses confirmed that the vessel was captained by two Arabs of skin fairer 
in complexion than that of the Eritreans and Ethiopians.  These “white men” were not 
part of the travelling migrants but were the ones manning the boat. While the older of 
the two men was in his mid- thirties, the younger one's age was put as between 22 
and 27 years. Bensalam Khaled, the defendant was identified as the older one and 
captain of the vessel, while the younger one died in the shipwreck.  The court accepted 
the defendant's positive identification by the witnesses and also took into consideration 
the defendant's confession of a previous landing and the presence of burns on his 
body to conclude that he was indeed the captain of the vessel.  It relied on the principle 
of “convergence of multiples” as the statements of the six witnesses were fair and 
consistent with the hypothesis of the investigation. 
 
Having been identified as the “smuggler” who transported the migrants from Tripoli to 
Lampedusa, the defendant's conduct was held by the court to come under Article 12 
of Legislative Decree 286/98 which penalizes people or migrant smugglers.  The court 
noted the different stages of the smuggling operation including recruitment of migrants, 
payment of a fee, lodging at the collection center, dispossession of valuables and 
embarkation as proof of the existence of an organization dedicated to the smuggling 
of migrants into Italy. The defendant was deemed to have been a participant in the 
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activities of a criminal organization and was responsible for the last stage of the 
operation.  This view of the court was further corroborated by the statement of a 
witness (Tekeste Tesfahiwet) who claimed to have seen the accused person 
consulting with the armed Libyans at the place of embarkation. 
 
The witness statements also showed that the vessel was deliberately stopped a short 
distance before Lampedusa as it was the practice of the smugglers. The vessel at that 
point had no engine problem but was stopped deliberately to call for and wait for 
rescue by the authorities.  While waiting, however, due to a lot of movement by the 
expectant passengers, the vessel tilted and began to take in water. In desperation, the 
defendant lit up a flare to attract more attention.  The vessel accidentally caught fire in 
the process. The court held that this amounted to a voluntary shipwreck under Article 
428 C.P. and convicted the defendant accordingly. He was also convicted for the 





Bensalam Khaled was found guilty of conspiracy and participating in the activities of a 
criminal organization dedicated to procuring illegal entry of migrants into Italy.  He was 
also convicted of voluntary shipwreck and multiple murders.  He was sentenced to a 
prison term of eighteen (18) years in Italy. 
 
Together, the two cases paint a picture of opportunistic desert criminal groups, who 
kidnap, torture and extort from the victims/migrants, and who pass the migrants on to 
other criminal groups in Tripoli for the onward journey; and of Libyan gangs who abuse 
the migrants while they house them and then when they transport them across the 
Mediterranean.  These acts were carried out with amoral attitude to human life.  In 
particular, the FERMO MUHIDIN case exposes how the migrants were forced against 
their will to follow the instructions of the criminal group made up of about 50 armed 
men, between Chad and Libya.  According to one key Eritrean trial witness, D
T , the 130 migrants were forced onto vans which conveyed them over 6 days 
to a house on the outskirts of Sebha, Libya.  It would appear that some of the tribal 
militia of the desert, especially Tuaregs and Tebu, have taken advantage of migrants 
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crossing the region and have become involved in the human trade. The use of force 
is a recurring theme in the operations of the people smugglers from Libya to Italy.  The 
desert armed gangs move in large groups which can easily overpower the migrant 
parties.  A witness statement by K M spoke of 50 Somalis and Sudanese 
being kidnaped and forced at gun point en route Libya and thereafter held hostage in 
a house in the village Sebha.  Even at the safe houses awaiting the trip across the 
sea, according to the FERMO PALESTINIAN 1 case, migrants are confined and 
guarded by armed men who restrict their movements.  The statement of M
M in that case spoke of how the migrants were led to a farmhouse near the 
town of Zuwarah where they were held for about 3 days and payments of about one 
thousand six hundred (1,600) dollars were made to Abu-Ibrahim for the direct trip to 
Europe.  
 
According to the witnesses the only food that Abu-Ibrahim brought them during their 
stay was a piece of bread.  He was armed with a submachine gun and accompanied 
by other armed Libyans.  
 
Again, force and arms are used to keep the migrants in check even in the safe houses 
that the desert gangs and those who organize the sea crossings make use of.  This is 
to ensure the payment of ransoms by their families.  As the migrants understandably 
do not travel with cash, it follows that the only way these bandits could profit from their 
kidnap is to demand ransom money from their families.  The case of MUHIDIN 
revealed how the kidnapping groups force the captured migrants to place telephone 
calls to their families and friends requesting that they pay the ransom demanded.  They 
are given bank accounts specially designated by the kidnappers for this purpose.  To 
ensure that the ransom is paid and paid quickly, the kidnappers routinely starve and 
torture the migrants.  They are also put through other forms of dehumanizing 
experiences to hasten efforts by their families to pay the ransom. K  M  and 
D  T  (witnesses in the PM Munhidin case) spoke of redemption fees of about 
$ 3,300 US for each migrant.  Migrants were confined in a room for about 10-14 days 
until the monies requested were confirmed to have been credited by their families to 
the bank accounts the kidnappers provided   
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Force is also used by both desert gangs and the boat operators to dispossess the 
migrants of all valuables, such as telephones, money, clothes and accessories and 
identification documents. D  T  and K M , witnesses in the FERMO 
PM MUHIDIN case, spoke of being deprived of their belongings, detained in a house 
in the village of Sebha, beaten with a rubber and threatened by death until $3,300 US 
dollars was paid by the families of the migrants.  
 
Besides the evidence of force, it has long been believed that these criminal groups 
cannot possibly be thriving without connivance with state actors (see chapter 7 for a 
detailed discussion).  According to a witness statement in the FERMO PM MUHIDIN 
case, migrants were moved from Tripoli to the embarkation point in a military van.  This 
suggests collaboration with state security authorities or rogue elements within 
government military. 
 
A further revelation concerning the modus operandi of the human smugglers from the 
judicial proceedings concerns the sea crossing strategy.  We learn from SCAFISCA 
the method employed by the smugglers to attract rescuers once far out on the sea.  
Since most of the boats are ill suited for the perilous journey across the Mediterranean, 
those who captain the boats use a variety of means to attract rescuers before they 
sink or perish.  As mentioned above in the case of the tragic shipwreck of 3/10/2013 
off the coast of Lampedusa, when the boat was in danger of sinking, the captain sent 
out distress radio signals to attract the attention of the Italian Coast Guards and other 
sea going vessels nearby.  It was also his decision to light up a blanket, sprinkling it 
with diesel, in order to use it as a visual indicator.  It was this unfortunate act that set 
off a chain of reactions that led to the sinking of the boat and the loss of hundreds of 
lives.  Concerning the access of people smugglers to available boat captains, 
BENSALAM KHALED in the FERMO SCAFISCA case was tried as the captain of the 
ship that sank on 03/10/2013.  In the course of interrogation, he confessed to being 
also the captain of a boat that previously arrived 11/04/2013.  It is on record that that 
previous arrival had a lone Tunisian survivor (BENSALAM is a Tunisian).  It means 
therefore that Bensalam Khaled must have found his way out of Italy after that previous 
arrival and returned to Libya to again lead another sea crossing.  He could have done 
this many more times before that of 03/10/2013 and there could be many more like 
him. 
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Criminal strategies and tactics 
 
Research identifies the smuggling of persons as transnationally driven by 
transnational criminal networks in form of ad-hoc operations carried out in border 
towns for profits (Dimitriadi 2016).  Criminal organisations are employing increasingly 
sophisticated methods (Interpol 2015), determined by the jobs/operations to be carried 
out and the profit expected.  The organisation is therefore task-motivated in a form of 
“…set of links that attach and disengage depending on the modus operandi and 
monetary compensation offered” (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012, Dimitriadi 
(2016:66).  There is evidence too that characteristically, adjustments to tactics and 
charges are made according to changing institutional frameworks and protocols or that 
more professional networks and specialised groups emerge to handle the new 
scenarios (UNODC (2010).   
 
Before analysing the evidence from this research concerning the roles and the 
strategies employed by the smuggling groups, it is important to highlight the three key 
elements identified concerning their sophisticated modus operandi. The judicial 
proceedings and the interviews revealed: the use of deception; the demand of inflated 
transportation costs; and use of operational success to advertise and recruit.  It 
became apparent that the actors are inter-related.  Using the FERMO PM MUHIDIN 
and FERMO PM SCAFISCA cases, it is possible to summarise in diagrammatic form 
the links between the actors and the roles they carry out. 
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The diagram above illustrates the diverse actors found in the human trade from Libya 
to Italy.  The arrows indicate the inter-relationship between the actors and flexibility of 
their roles.   
 
 
Key elements of migrant smuggling  
 
The Element of Deception 
 
Research indicates that people smuggling from Libya to Italy often commence with 
would-be migrants being in contact with passeurs who organise migrant movement 
and transportation. Would-be migrants may be recruited or introduced to the passeurs 
by local gangs/groups using either scouts of posing as tour operators (UNODC 2006, 
Reitano, Adal, and Shaw 2014, INTERPOL 2016); of by locally based opportunist, 
local business/entrepreneurs; and in some cases by family members.  The assumed 
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local travel agency or connection men quote prices for the prospective transportation 
of person according to the means and routes and a contract is drawn up.  The findings 
from the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case and the FERMO Scafisca case record 
witness testimonies on how inquiries were made by the migrants in search of 
organisations which organised clandestine travels.  One of the migrants, J P , 
testified about how they contacted the accused (the smuggler) by phone and how they 
handed the demanded payment to the presumed head of the travel organisation 
(Judicial reports, FERMO PM Scafisca, 2013).12  This finding raises questions 
regarding the sincerity of motives.  Did the smuggling groups deliberately hide their 
criminality?  It appears that most times these actors are perceived as sincere business 
persons offering foreign travel avenues.  At this point the migrant may not perceive the 
smuggling agency or even the act of consulting the agent as criminal or illegal.  This 
was the case of the Kurdish women who were observed to have perceived the 
smuggler as providing them immediate needed assistance.  The smuggling agencies 
at this initial stage present themselves as ‘helpers’, ‘genuine business outlets providing 
needed services’ ‘meeting an essential need’.  As an Italian judge who prosecutes 
irregular migration and anti-Mafia cases responded in an interview:   
 
People request for the services of smugglers… they pay 
whatever kind of money they were requested to pay… the 
smuggler is seen as tour operators, that have travel agencies 
where people come to request for their services to travel. Trips 
are organised from Central Africa to the shore of the 
Mediterranean, which is the first part of the journey; from the 
shore of the Mediterranean to Sicily by boat, the second part; 
and from Sicily to final destination, which is the third part 
(Interview 1) 
 
Given that judicial evidences are weighed, his submission may be regarded as a 
defensible assessment.  The smuggling organisations present themselves as tour 
operators as means of masking the criminality involved.  This corroborates the 
observation of Liempt (2011) who suggested that irregular migration was being 
 
12 Testimony of J  P  
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perceived as assisted migration.  In the case of the Kurdish women and others, they 
may well be inclined to believe the legality of the operators since it was safer to embark 
on the perilous journeys than remain in their war-torn country of origin. In Sudan too 
hosting smugglers offer East Africans travel services for not less than one thousand 
Euros per migrant (Deutsche Welle 2015).  Smugglers in places such as the Horn of 
Africa have been referred to as carriers or mukhalis, a word which means 
‘…alternative migration experts who reduce the chance of getting caught’ (Van Liempt 
2011:183).  Smugglers then create an impression of being helpers and agencies who 
aid travellers in ensuring that their desired destination is achieved.  The concept of 
deception in this context is two-sided, applied by both the smuggler and the smuggled, 
aiming to evade border checks and requirements. 
 
Migrants’ testimonies from the FERMO PM SCAFISCA and FERMO PALESTINESE 
cases reflect the deception of the smuggling rings at their first meetings. 
 
(a) J P  stated that he had previously contacted Ermiyas (the smuggler) 
before his arrival from Sudan, and he was received and transported to the 
collection centre by the said Ermiyas and other Libyans (supposedly members 
of the organisation).  On arrival, a prior agreed money was given to Ermaiyas 
for the payment of the trip (Judicial reports, FERMO PM Scafisca, 2013).  
(b) Kiro Ali stated that he arrived in Libya from Syria and started making contacts 
to arrange a trip to Europe as a result of the instability which plagued Libya at 
the time. He was directed by Nasser, a Palestinian, who gave him the number 
of Abu-Ibrahim. His arrangement with Abu-Ibrahim indicated that he needed to 
get to the city of Tripoli by plane by 11.01.2013. On arrival, he found some men 
waiting for him at the airport, which led him to the home of Abu-Ibrahim, where 
he found other Palestinian men - also travellers. On his arrival, he paid the sum 
of two thousand (2,000) dollars for the trip. After which he and the rest of the 
other travellers were moved to another house owned by a Libyan where they 
stayed till the evening of their embarkation; November 2, 2013 (Judicial reports, 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case). 
(c) Gharsedin Hilmi who arrived from Syria was working in a company that dealt in 
air-conditioning equipment. He stated that he knew about the travel 
organisation from his colleague who supplied him with the phone number of the 
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Palestinian who was in charge of the business of organising the journeys. After 
contact was made, he was led along with other travellers, by the Palestinian to 
a cottage in Zuwarah where they stayed for while waiting for their travel. 
(Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case,); 
(d) B  R stated that he and three of his friends had got the number of a 
smuggler known to be responsible for organising clandestine travels, contacted 
him (the smuggler), and explained their need to him. According to the 
testimony, B ’s location was enquired and a car was sent to pick them up 
and conveyed to a cottage where they stayed till the date of their embarkation. 
(Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, 2013). 
 
The reception these four migrants (witnesses) received, such as being conveyed 
(picked up) from their different locations and assembled in the waiting place before the 
embarkation trip, gave no indication of the dehumanising treatment that was to follow.  
The initial show of favouritism was a façade and part of the deception which is 
prevalent at the initial stages of the human trade.  This goes to show the extent the 
networks are willing to go to achieve their aim. 
 
The consistency of the evidence provided by the testimonies of the witnesses is 
considered plausible.  Consider these accounts given to police when questioned in the 
first welcome centres.  They were recorded in the FERMO PALESTINESE case. Box 
6.1 below presents excerpts from 3 testimonies in the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case 
tried in Palermo. 
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These testimonies in Box 1 not only depict the guise of sincere business agencies but 
also the cordial treatment the migrants are made to believe they will be given for the 
services they are about to pay for, as also reflected in the testimonies of witness in the 
FERMO PM SCAFISCA case.  It equally reflects the roles of local informants (scouts), 
business and transporters as members and facilitators of the smuggling process as 
illustrated in the Role/Task Motivated People smuggling Network Model in Fig. 1.  
 
The same deception is illustrated in a journalist report that the sought after ‘King-Pin 
of people smuggling Germany’ had overwhelmed his victims with his deceptive charm 
(Perry and Agius 2015).  The report details that based on the preconceived notion that 
the European immigration procedure would automatically grant children (an 
unaccompanied child) asylum, parents allow their children to be picked up from 
refugee centres such as in Ethiopia when the offer is made by the human smugglers 
to transport them for free to Europe.  Unfortunately, the moment these children are 
taken, the families are billed about 3,600 USD for their journey to the Mediterranean 
and across the Mediterranean.  They are held in one of numerous warehouses until 
 
Box 6.1 
Excerpts from witness testimony – Judicial proceeding of the FERMO 
Palestineese 1 case at the court of Palermo. 
 
I personally telephoned Abu-Ibrahim, explaining our needs and I was asked by 
him where we were in order to send someone with a car to be picked up. The man 
sent by Abu-Ibrahim, led me and the other three of my countrymen, in a cottage 
near Zuwarah, where we stayed for three days... (pg. 8) 
 
 
In conversations with some of my countrymen, I became aware of the opportunity 
to reach Italy… (pg.10) 
 
 
…I contacted Abu-Ibrahim, the latter informed me that, in order to organize my 
departure for Italy, there was the need for me to reach near the city of Tripoli; so 
I boarded a plane on 11.01.2013. Arriving in Tripoli, I found some men waiting 
for me at the airport, who then led me to the home of Abu-Ibrahim, where I found 
other men of Palestinian nationality… (pg. 20) 
6-1.  Testimonies from the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case 
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payment is made (Perry and Agius 2015).  These smugglers/traffickers fail to exhibit 
any sense of morality in the way the fate of the children are handled  
 
Examining the above responses, this study argues that Deception is a key element of 
the modus operandi.  This enables the smuggler to effectively begin the process of the 
smuggling activity, with would-be migrants attracted by the presumptions that they are 
being assisted to achieving their goal of escape to safety.  
 
 
Inflated Transportation Costs 
 
The second key element identified from the roles and task undertaken by the 
organisers, connection men and passeurs is the aspect of inflated transportation costs. 
Testimonies of migrants in the FERMO PM MUHIDIN reveal large sums extorted from 
migrants and migrants’ families after being kidnapped and in the FERMO PM 
SCAFISCA case large sums demanded as payment for organising travel from 
migrants.  The monies extorted was recorded to be as much as 3,300 USD (Judicial 
report, FERMO PM MUHIDIN), while the monies demanded as payment were in the 
neighbourhood of 1,600 USD.  Often, in the case of trafficked migrants such as 
Nigerian girls who are often trafficked for sexual exploitation, payment could be made 
not only by the sending families or local sponsors, but also from abroad.  This is 
because the contemporary smuggling and trafficking network through which these 
actors organise their enterprise, enables them to advertise their ‘wares’ to prospective 
customers abroad in the trafficking – for exploitation - trade.  As an investment to their 
business, they decide to sponsor the transportation of their victims across the borders.  
This additional means of recruitment by the trafficking rings, particularly in the case of 
sex exploitation, was highlighted in a discussion with International Organisation for 
Immigration (IOM) representatives in Palermo.  The IOM representatives detailed 
various instances where they had to deal with sensitive cases, such as with victims 
found to be at the mercy of the investor from abroad who may have decided to take 
off the bill of transporting the victim and thereafter resume another regime of 
exploitation.  The representatives explained that:   
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Sponsors from the destination countries are contacted and they 
make a promise to “to help the girls/victims”.  Most of these girl 
come from a culture that the children are expected to take care of 
their parents instead of the other way round…the payment is the 
same be it minor or adult.  Also the migrants are usually told they 
will board a plane and would finally find out that they would actually 
have to go through the desert and then take the boat… (Interview 
19) 
 
…as for the other girls who could not pay, after being forced to 
suffer violence of various kinds including that of carnal knowledge, 
they were given the opportunity to speak to this Aziz, an Eritrean 
man who lives in Tripoli and that is part of ' criminal organization 
of Ermies Abdelrazak…we embark clandestinely for Europe, this 
man following requests arranged to pay the ransom of girls with no 
money, and the same once arrived in Tripoli in debt …(Judicial 
reports, FERMO PM MUHIDIN case, Pg. 12) 
 
In view of the response and the testimony quoted, transportation costs demanded by 
the smugglers are often beyond what regular migrants from an average background 
can offer.  This inability to meet the demanded fees ushers the migrant into an epoch 
of exploitative experiences by which the smuggler ensures that the migrant either 
works to earn his/her freedom or makes arrangements for more funds to be transferred 
to the smuggler by the means of local banking system known as Awhala.  Journalist 
reports by Perry and Agius (2015) reveal children (mostly unaccompanied children) 
being held in warehouses until their devastated parents are able to pay the inflated 
transportation prices of about 3,600 USD per child.  Though these children are 
voluntarily given to the smugglers, they have been deceived that their transportation 
would be free, and end up as hostages or live-automated teller machines (ATM) for 
the exploitation of their parents.  This situation is in line with the ‘voluntary victims’ of 
Aziz, Monzini, and Pastore (2015) which are reflected in four ways; hostage holding 
of migrants, coercion to get on the unseaworthy boats, arrest by questionable officials, 
and unlawful detention or forced into exploitative labour.  Literature further reveals that 
there is usually a contract between the smuggler and the smuggled which often times 
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entails the smuggled paying the smuggler ridiculously high prices to transport him/her 
across international borders.  The evidence of the inflated prices paid for the 
movement by migrants from Libya to Italy such as €1000 is found in the majority of the 
interviews conducted.  Despite these payments, the would-be migrant still undergoes 
a series of dehumanising treatments which the smuggler perceives will ensure 
complete compliance from the would-be migrant and enable their further exploitation.  
An instance is the evidence reported by the MNSA Migrant First Welcome Centre 
coordinator of ‘…60 people who were held in a room of 14 metres, without water and 
food awaiting their transport…’ (Interview 7, 2015, MNSA Cord. reports).  
 
Meshing their response with the above quote from a witness’ testimony demonstrates 
that this modus operandi of inflated transportation costs as means of taking advantage 
of financially incapable would-be migrants is a lucrative means of investment for 
organisers of crime (see Shelly 2014, OECD 2015, UN 2011).  
 
 
‘Operational Success’ to market and recruit  
 
Another relatively new revived element is the advertisement and recruitment by virtue 
of successful operations.  Findings suggest that formerly trafficked migrants often 
advertise the business to other willing applicants who perceive that the business 
answers their quest.  This same pattern is also replicated for migrants who have 
already arrived in transit countries such as Italy who desire to proceed to other 
European countries.  Migrants are observed to be lured by perceived better lives of 
luxury lived by successful returnees or counterparts yet in the diaspora, as well as 
success stories relayed through social networking.  These success stories and the 
luxury life style displayed by a few successful returnees act as a push factor, building 
in the hearts of desiring migrants, the hope of success.  An implication of this is the 
possibility of the returnee migrants unintendedly facilitating the smuggling practice by 
the hope their stories and life give to desiring migrants, who then request for tutelage 
on how to go about the process.  
 
There is also the possibility of the returnee migrants deliberately luring other migrants 
by these stories, especially when there is gain for them - probably if promised by the 
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smuggler. Siegel and De Blank (2010) trace this modus operandi down in the case of 
the Nigerian women to the 1980s, when the demand for African girls in Europe 
increased.  It is established by filed study findings that majority of West African 
irregular migrants are lured by the perceived success of the attempts of their 
counterparts who in turn send them pictures or tales of their Eldorado lives (Browne 
2015 Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke 2015, and Elliott (2015). Kuschminder, De 
Bresser & Siegel (2015) raise another point, stating that network connections in the 
form of family and friends in destination countries have been observed to play a crucial 
role in determining destination choice for both desiring migrants.  Information passed 
on from former migrants and particularly in destination countries has been observed 
to be more valued and trusted by the desiring migrant.  This is prevalent in the Nigerian 
case of young girls being trafficked for prostitution.  This pull factor is a function of the 
social inequalities emphasized by mass media and social networking and the ideas on 
migration routes and imaginative ideals they offer of Europe (Elliot 2015). It is worthy 
of note that gender influences which networks are approached both in the country of 
origin and at the destination countries. Female migrants often lack access to the 
resources that would enable them to migrate (Ahmad 2008).  Yet those women who 
do migrate are overrepresented and disproportionately abused sexually and in other 
ways. Networks which have female leads and members like the Nigerian trafficking 
rings are attractive to women (Siegel and De Blank 2010).  This is explored in other 
parts of the thesis see interviews 28, 30, 19, 37).  There is equally evidence of 
trafficked women joining the networks involved in their trafficking (Browne 2015; 
Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke 2015; and Elliott 2015).  Further research indicates 
that women in some instances, for example women migrants from the Horn of Africa, 
perceive their smugglers less as criminals and more as facilitators (Liempt 2011).   
 
There is also evidence that this form of advertisement is carried out not only by the 
returnee migrants, but also by desiring migrants’ families in the destination country.  A 
migrant mediator and Interpreter with the Commisione Territoriale per il 
Riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale, Parlemo, stated: 
 
…il ya aussi des familles étrangères vivantes en Europe qui adèrent à 
ce reseau criminel en recommandant leur parent de passer par cette 
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voie maritime pour se soustraire aux barrières existantes contre 
l'immigration clandestine (Interview 8). 
 
…there are also foreign families in Europe who helped this criminal 
network by recommending their parent to go through the sea to avoid the 
existing barriers against illegal immigration  
 
This migrant mediator’s view is based on his experience and various encounters 
working with the Territorial Commission for International Protection and Recognition, 
in Palermo where thousands of arriving migrants are attended to.  The smugglers 
seem to have had assistance in increasing their demand ratings by the roles played 
by families and friends of desiring migrants in advertising the successes, possibilities 
and assurance of hope of travel.  The same arguments are made by Browne (2015); 
Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke (2015), Elliott (2015) and Kuschminder, De Bresser & 
Siegel (2015). 
 
Settled migrants interviewed disclosed that they got connected through their friends 
who had in the past utilised the services of the same smuggling rings.  This indicates 
that former migrants provided unintended assistance to these implied travel agencies 
who may not appear clandestine ab initio given the way they present themselves. 
Respondents claimed: 
 
I was introduced to the smugglers by a friend who had also used 
the smugglers.  An address was given to me on how to locate the 
smugglers…I was treated differently because I was of the same 
ethnicity with the smugglers (Hausa).  The smugglers work as a 
local travel agency…I met with the main boss named Yusuf. 
Because of the cultural bias, I was catered for in the 4 days 1 
stayed in Niger, waiting to be transported (Interview 33). 
 
I left my place Tawan in Niger … I went to meet up my friend in 
Agadez; I did not pay for my trip to Agadez because my friends 
drove [he would transport intending migrants].  I stayed a bit at 
Agadez with my friends and my friends escorted me to Sabaha; so 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
176 | P a g e  
 
I did not have to pay too.  At Sabaha, I had my money to pay for 
the sea trip to Italy; I then met a friend who knew a Ghanaian who 
is a trafficker- he only knew him not as a friend but as per the type 
job this man – Ghanaian does for a living. He gave me the contact 
of this man so I contacted him to organise the journey from Sabha 
to Tripoli and from Tripoli to Italy… (Interview 35) 
 
A striking observation which emerged from research findings is the issue of migrants’ 
continuous contact with smugglers even after arrival.  An interviewee during the field 
study pointed out that the migrants call the connection men at their arrival in Italy.  This 
gives the connection men as well as the smuggling groups the credibility that 
enhances their business which indicates for new clientele that they can deliver 
(Interview 33).  This implies that the fact that no one dies during the crossing and their 
clients arrive safely makes their business successful; getting them more customers 
and referrals.   Another point worthy of note was the level to which the element of 
ethnicity and religion affected how a prospective migrant was treated in the comments 
of Interview 35.  Moreover, examining the increase of Nigerian migrants (especially 
women, see the fig. below; IOM 2016) who have arrived Italy in recent times; the 
statistics show that there seems to be a rejuvenation of this modus operandi.  An 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) representative in Palermo who was in 
charge of the group that were assigned to attending to the Palermo arrivals at the time 
of the data collection (2016) comments: 
 
The traffickers have their groups and have their connections in 
form of a network. For instance, if I (as a trafficker) needs a girl, I 
know who to call that will get the girl for me…so if I am in Nigeria 
for instance (as a young girl), and my dream is to go to Italy, all I 
have to do is contact a friend in Italy and she will contact another 
friend who will contact a madam and arrangements will be made. 
(Interview 37) 
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Figure 6-2.  Arrivals by Nationality (as presented by IOM, 2016) 
 
 
In the graph above, Nigerian arrivals are represented in cobalt blue which clearly 
shows a significant increase. 
 
In the view of the representative as indicated in the above response (interview 37), the 
contact the desiring migrant has in the destination country influences the smuggling 
process of the migrant regardless of whether the migrant has the funds for the trip or 
not.  Regrettably, the other side to this sort of connection is where the migrant makes 
little or no payment towards her transportation.  Then the migrant remains trapped 
continuous exploitation and debt bondage.   
 
The evidence is that stories of migrants, mostly through social networking, indirectly 
assist the smuggler.  This modus operandi of “advertising operational success” has 
not been sufficiently recognised. 
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Task Motivated Roles and Strategies 
 
Indications from data collected reveal that besides cases of kidnap, the connectors 
and agents of the smuggling group/network at the outset appear pleasant but their 
disposition and demeanour assume a different appearance the moment the 
connection has been made and the would-be migrants are at their mercy.  This point 
marks the commencement of the strategies employed by these smugglers of violence.  
Although the respondent in Interview 33 (above), relays how well he was treated at 
the commencement of the trip, at some point of the journey he experienced 
exploitation.  It is evident that regardless of the acquaintance with the network ab initio, 
the goal and expected outcomes of the smuggling group and process takes priority.  
There is an increasing use of violence by smugglers in recent times in the form of 
extortion, torture, firearms, abuse, kidnap, coercion, sexual abuse of female migrants 
all to enforce compliance.  This continuum of most prominent tactics which have been 
extracted from migrant testimonies/accounts and judicial materials are discussed as 
aspects of the modus operandi that reflect the nature of criminality in the process – as 
an organised criminal activity. 
 
 
Emergence of violent tactics 
 
The use of force is a recurring theme in the operations of the people smugglers from 
Libya to Italy. Sanchez (2017) points out violence as part of the risks inherent to 
clandestine journeys. Certainly, smuggling groups operating in the desert and from 
Libya across the sea to Italy use violence and coercion.  The armed gangs in the 
desert are always armed and move in large groups to overpower the migrants.  
Statement made by one of the witnesses, K M , indicates that migrants were 
often waylaid, abducted and forcefully compelled to do the biddings of the smugglers;  
 
… along with 50 other Somalis and Sudanese after stopping me and 
my traveling companions, they forced us, under the threat of 
firearms, to go into some vans and was thereafter conducted 
forcefully in small groups into a house located in the village of Sebha 
where we were being locked up in a large room ... (Judicial reports, 
FERMO PM MUMHIDIN case, Statement of K  M ) 
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At the point of boarding boats for the sea crossing, there is also the use of force. The 
FERMO PM SCAFISCA case reveals that migrants are compelled under the threat of 
force to squeeze unto the boat so as many people as possible can be accommodated 
for the trip. This included pregnant women and children. Force is also used to 
dispossess them of all valuables and identification documents. The migrants are not 
even spared at the safe houses whilst awaiting the trip across the sea. We learn from 
the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, how the migrants are confined to a house near 
Tripoli and guarded by armed men who restrict their movements and generally keep 
order in the place. One of the witnesses, M  M  testified that they were 
not even allowed to go out to buy food but were given a mere piece of bread to last 3 
days. (Judicial report, the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, Statement of M
M ) 
  
Witness statements speak of dehumanising treatment meted on the migrants prior to 
their embarkation, such as being deprived of food and deprived of liberty of movement 
(Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1Pg. 6); also deprived, by the use of threat, 
their luggage and personal belongings (money and travelling documents) (Judicial 
reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1, Pg. 9); subjected to sexual abuse (particularly the 
young women – some virgins and underage) and subjected to torture with beating with 
sharp objects and having poured on them dangerous substances (Judicial reports, 
FERMO PM MUHIDIN case Pg. 14) 
 
Examining the modus-operandi and the evolving tactics employed by these smuggling 
groups, the participants interviewed were asked to share their experiences.  They 
disclosed that violence was one of the strategies and that it had been modified by the 
smugglers to suit the changes brought about by changes in immigration policies and 
restrictive measures employed by the receiving state (destination countries). Interview 
transcripts indicate that in recent years there has been evidence of a change in the 
degree of violence towards migrants.  This research agrees with Shelly (2014), Davila 
(2015) and Sanchez (2017) that violence is used to force migrants to comply with the 
smugglers’ set terms and conditions. Interview transcripts also revealed that beatings 
and torture were meted out to migrants to force them to relinquish all their funds en 
route in the desert. These violent acts are often instigated when migrants refuse to 
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continue with a journey.  In the bid to force them to travel, the smuggling groups turn 
to violence.  In the opinion of Cappello et al (2015:6), the new crime strategies 
employed by smuggler in recent times such as the increased violence strategy, distorts 
in this context, the preconceived distinction between trafficked persons and smuggled 
persons. Consequently, smuggled migrants are converted to victims.  Empirical 
findings further indicate that some migrants, who have ab inito subscribed for the 
services of smugglers, are abandoned in the desert to their fate or even killed to extort 
money.  There are cases of the slashing of the throats of migrants that decided to 
swallow their monies as a means of hiding it from the smugglers and shooting migrants 
who had hidden their monies in their anus (Interview 34).  About 95% of the 
respondents from the field study affirmed the consistent use of violence by the criminal 
groups in ensuring compliance.  A settled migrant in the Ballaro area of Palermo who 
earnestly wanted his experience to be heard, stated: 
 
Once you are taken to the sea, you cannot go back. So in cases 
as such, violence is used in forcing the migrants unto the boat. 
Refusal can lead to the migrant’s death. Even in detention 
centres, migrants are severely tortured…I was once turned 
upside down and tied to a stick and my feet battered with big 
sticks. I was then released and asked to run with the same feet. 
(Interview 34) 
 
The head of Police in Palermo states, based on his encounters during his job, that 
there had been a significant increase in the use of violence, particularly in the case of 
trafficked girls; most especially, the percentage from Nigeria who are usually raped 
and exploited en route even before they arrive in Libya. (Interview 18).  To this end 
Fulvio Vassalo, a professor of international law in Palermo, added that the women are 
greatly violated and abused in Libya even prior to their arrival in Italy (Interview 28).  
According to him, at their arrival, the women are given to the criminal groups to 
continue the prostitution which they had been forced into in Libya [in Libya, there are 
little or no human rights]. Eventually, the women on arrival are enslaved. Research 
findings indicate that they are mostly held within a facility.  However, there are media 
reports on enslaved Nigerian prostitutes that have escaped their bosses (Gillian 2011). 
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The above comments of respondents depict the degree of violence meted on migrants 
en route, particularly poor and vulnerable ones.  Roth (2011) detects a correlation 
between gender and abuse with women more likely to be subjected to physical and 
sexual abuse (Roth 2011; Schrover 2008).  The vulnerability of women is greatly 
exploited by smuggling and trafficking cartel; echoing the notion of victimhood as 
explained by Schrover (2008), women and children are often found easily exploited.  
On many occasions in the criminal cases reviewed for this study, the victimisation of 
women, particularly their sexual exploitation, is relevant. This abuse of women could 
be said to have been used as a form of violence against female migrants by the 
smugglers.  
 
The cruelty of the smugglers raises questions as to why there is still an increase in the 
migrant flows.  Toaldo (2015) identifies the migrants who patronise these smuggling 
networks regardless of the en route experiences as ‘survival migrants’.  
 
Professor Fulvio Vassalo further argues that incidents of violence are more likely in 
the transit countries such as Libya, which is confirmed by settled migrants interviewed 
in Palermo.  Doubts may be cast about stories of violence at sea and it may be that, 
as has been often observed, migrants do not always tell everything concerning their 
ordeals to law enforcement agents based on cultural reasons and in some cases, 
because of the possibility of future clientele.  This observation equates with Hamood’s 
(2006) concerns about the challenges encountered in getting credible information from 
migrants by means of interview.  It may be possible that some of the migrants still 
subscribe to the same group for the transportation of their loved ones after they have 
arrived their destinations (see also Karagueuzian and Verdier-Chouchane 2014).  
There are however exceptions as regards testimonies of witnesses during trials in the 
court of law.  This is because, as Ingulli argues in his analysis about witness credibility 
‘…witnesses are required to testify under oath, or some equivalent solemn affirmation; 
opposing counsel has an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses; and the jury is 
able to observe the witnesses' demeanour on the stand as an aid in determining their 
credibility’ (Ingulli 1986:145).  In this context, the opinion of Novo and Seijo (2010) on 
the concept of Judicial Judgement-Making and Legal Criteria of Testimonial Credibility 
could be accessed to often guide the outcome of the testimonies made.  
Consequently, a witness’s testimony is considered as evidence drawing on the factors 
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aligned in Ingulli’s argument.  An additional fact will include the opinion that the witness 
has first-hand knowledge of the issues in the case and there is often consistency in 
the recounting of incidents or events.  Although it may be argued that some witnesses 
may falsify their testimony for reasons of emotional or personal interest, there are also 
other means of determining the credibility of witnesses such as challenging the 
credibility for bias or employing the psychiatric approach as suggested by Juviler 
(1960). 
 
Using the forensic statement analysis tool (a technique used in analysing the accuracy 
of statements made) in analysing the findings from the selected judicial proceedings 
examined for this study, the authenticity of the witness testimonies contained in the 
proceedings could be assessed as valid considering the consistency in the verbatim 
statement on which also judgements are given (Flemming 2011).  The principle on 
which this method of analysis is based is that people do not lie, and though no records 
of the body language and stress on the part of the witnesses (which is often associated 
with speaking lies) the statement of the witness is considered tenable for the 
judgement of the court regarding the people smuggling and irregular migration crimes 
being tried (McClish 2017).  However, while statement analysis may seem the new 
trend in content analysis, the debate on the validity of the Undeutsch hypothesis and 
Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and other forms of statement analysis, on the 
other hand, remain (Novo and Seijo (2010, Amado, Roma et al 2011, Arce and Fariña 
2015, Amado et al 2016).  
 
It can be deduced from the testimonies that a high degree of violence was meted out 
to the migrants.  The degree and progression of violence described by the testimonies 
above imply that extreme violence is continually used by the smugglers until their 
desired results are achieved.  The criminal use of violence contradicts Jesperson 
(2015) that the recent people smugglings could be termed as less violent than human 
trafficking as passengers are not coerced into travelling and violence not used so as 
not to draw attention to their activities by also providing good conditions for 
passengers, providing basic needs of the migrants such as mattresses and other 
comforts on board, so as to maintain a positive reputation and ensure probable future 
businesses.  This study contradicts Jesperson, as the majority of respondents 
interviewed, and judicial proceedings reveal the increase in the use of violence to 
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ensure compliance and extortion of money.  Evidence reveals that majority of the 
witnesses were coerced, kidnaped in most cases tortured and imprisoned before their 
embarkation and during their voyage. 
 
Violence and negligt of human rights and changes in the vessels used in transporting 
the migrants to avoid being detected by sea patrol has become the primary strategy 
employed by the people smugglers in recent times.  Interviews conducted at the 
Centro Astalli in Palermo - a migrant reception centre - indicate that migrants are being 
forced into boats against their will at the Libyan point of embarkation.  The coordinator 
of the centre spoke of received migrants who told of smugglers who drove them with 
guns to board the boats and at the same time compelling them and their relatives to 
pay more than the agreed fares (interview 4).  This claim was confirmed by interview 
with the people smuggling unit of the Italian Flying Squad (Police).  Equally, while the 
FERMO PM MUHIDINcase proceedings corroborates the assertions on the use of 
violence in abducting migrants into incarceration, the FERMO PALESTINESE 1 
proceedings corroborates the use of violence in compelling the migrants to board and 
change boats against their will; 
   
…afraid because the cottage, composed of many rooms, there 
were many people waiting departure. Also, there were many 
men of the organization, carrying machine guns, watching us 
on sight. For this reason, I tried to get out and go away not 
wanting to continue on the journey to Europe, but I was 
prevented by gunmen… (Judicial reports, FERMO 
PALESTINESE 1, pg. 8) 
 
...we underwent continuous maltreatment, especially during the 
step of transhipment from a smaller boat to the largest; 
specifically, each of us, located on the bigger boat, then used 
for the trip, was forced to take up minimal space, so the 
organizers were able to pick up more people.  The ill-treatment 
which was faced by all passengers, men, women, some 
pregnant, and children, who were taken by force from the small 
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boat and placed in the smallest spaces between the people 
already… (Judicial reports, FERMO PALESTINESE 1, pg. 14) 
 
Given the multiple affirmations regarding this aspect of modus operandi in the Libya 
to Italy human trade, there are therefore strong indications that the use of violence as 
a compelling tool, is a strong element of the modus operandi employed in the 
phenomenon which also depicts the nature of criminality.  Evidence and data show 




 Overcrowding of boats  
 
This strategy consists of taking on board the conveying boats, numbers exceeding 
their capacity.  This strategy which overtime have resulted in hundreds of deaths is 
also violence against the migrants.  Witnesses during trials of irregular migration 
offences in Palermo, Italy stated that they were badly treated during their transfer from 
the smaller boat to the bigger vessels and forced to take up only very minimal space 
to make room for more people to be taken aboard (Judicial reports, Tribunale di 
Palermo, Sentenza contro I. H. Attour Abdalmenem 2014).  The FERMO 
PALESTINESE and FERMO SCAFISCA cases and the Sentenza – Judgement, reveal 
that even pregnant women and children were not exempt from this inhumane 
treatment of ‘squeezing for more’; in fact, the children were forcefully taken and used 
to fill up the small spaces.  The boats were loaded beyond capacity with no concern 
for human life and the risk of overturning or sinking. Literature identifies this tactic as 
common among professional smugglers (UNODC 2015, ETH 2016).  Kohnert (2007) 
regards these tactics as neglect of basic safety precautions, while Horwood (2015) 
points out that majority of the deaths on the high seas since 2011 have been recorded 
as a result overcrowded vessels.  Last and Spijkerboer (2010) note additional risks of 
“unauthorised travel” such as boats running out of fuel or even drifting for weeks, 
exposing passengers to dehydration, starvation, and hypothermia and sun stroke.   
 
Another risk associated with the overcrowding of boats, occurs during the transfer of 
the migrants when intercepted by rescue operations.  Some boats have been reported 
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to have capsized during this process of transfer as a result of the excitement of the 
migrants.  Indications from field study findings suggest that the recurrent sea 
calamities that have characterised the Mediterranean journeys particularly in recent 
times are culminating effects of the criminal modus operandi employed by the 
smugglers.  The aftermath can be seen in the photo below showing migrants seen on 
a capsizing boat before a rescue operation by Italian navy ships "Bettica" and 
"Bergamini" (unseen) off the coast of Libya.  The picture was released by the Italian 




Figure 6-3.  One of the many Mediterranean disasters (Scherer 2016 REUTERS) 
 
The analysis presented above concerning the boat disaster mentioned in the FERMO 
PM SCAFISCA case, was based on the provision in Italian law for the punishment of 
intentional sinking of vessels (art. 428 cp) and negligence (art. 449 cp).  Issues 
discussed as evidence included: a filmed documentation of the activities of the 
firefighters as they endeavoured to arrest the fire on deck; the size of the boat in 
comparison to the number of persons that was conveyed - using un-seaworthy boat 
(a small boat the size of 25 meters) to convey about 500 migrants, without the 
possibility of movement which resulted in the disaster that records only 153 survivors.  
The transcript records:  
 
Q: What were the conditions inside the boat? How were you prepared? 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material 
has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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A: We were more than five hundred people about twenty children aged from 
a few months up to seven years.  We were all crammed, with no possibility 
of any movement (FERMO PM SCAFISCA, Judicial reports pg. 12).  
 
In such overcrowded situation as was described, there is every possibility of serious 
danger, especially in the case of fire.  Again, this is a clear case of the unrestrained 
nature of the modus operandi employed by the human trade networks.  This explains 
the preventive act of making the migrants pick representatives (directed by the 
smugglers) who alone were allowed to move, to ask questions of about what was 
going on during the journey as recorded in proceedings of the FERMO PM SCAFISCA 
case.   
 
 
The ‘stranded scene’ tactic   
 
Another identified tactic in the recent migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean is 
the purposeful staging of a stranded scene with the motive of taking advantage of the 
rescue operation.  The smugglers, in the process of determining to be spotted at sea, 
carry out actions such as the burning of a blanket to attract attention though often 
causing fire on deck and making migrants to move to one side of the boat and 
producing the overturning of the boat.  In the FERMO PM SCAFISCA case, the boat 
stopped close to Lampedusa for about 2 hours, but the witnesses attested that there 
was no known problem with the boat or the engine.  Rather it appeared that the 
smugglers were waiting for the rescue operations to come.  Judicial proceedings 
revealed that the singular act of lighting a blanket resulted in the fire on the deck that 
caused the panic and subsequent overturning and sinking of the boat.  The use of 
unseaworthy boats which could stop at any time on the seas is one of the new tactics 
which the smugglers use.  This new strategy is reflected in the news of migrant ‘ghost 
ships’ on the Mediterranean, for example using old freighters (Coleman 2015). 
UNODC (2011) speaks of mostly fishing vessels taken out of service as unseaworthy 
and unable to complete a single journey (UNODC 2011:29).  Schemm and Becatoros 
(2015) reveal that the vessels used in ferrying hundreds of Syrian families across the 
Mediterranean en route Europe were scrapyard bound cargo ships bought over the 
internet.  In this context, the Italian rescue mission (mare Nostrum) and the European 
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rescue mission (the Triton - in recent times) are taken advantage of.  Coleman (2015) 
reports that in the same manner the cargo ships ‘Blue Sky M’ and ‘Ezadeen’ were 
abandoned on the sea and set at auto pilot towards the Italian Islands.  This tactic 
meshes with the assertions of the witnesses regarding the use of small boats before 
being transferred to bigger ones (Judicial reports, FERMO PM SCAFISCA cases and 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1case).  On the other hand, the Guardian reported a case of 
the arrest by the Italian police of a smuggler who admitted to a new tactics to outsmart 
the naval forces, namely: ‘of putting only a few passengers aboard a small boat in a 
bid to land undetected on Italian shores’ (The Guardian 2015). As yet, there is not 
much evidence to support this new tactic thus, further research is needed.  
 
 
The hostage holding tactic 
 
This is when migrants are detained as hostages over a certain period of time.  In the 
FERMO MUHIDIN case, the migrants interviewed show that they never met or sought 
the help of the armed band to get to Tripoli, but were forced against their will to follow 
the instructions of the criminal group.  The testimony of D  T , one of the 
Eritrean survivors and a key witness in the trial of MUHIDIN, reveals that he and 130 
of his countrymen on their way to Libya by foot, met the smuggler for the first time in 
the desert between Chad and Libya.  The fifty strong militia (the smugglers cum 
abductors), threatened them with firearms, forced them to get onto some vans with 
which they were conveyed to Sabha after 6 days of travel (Judicial reports, FERMO 
MUHIDIN case). 
 
From the statement of the witness, migrants are held in confinement, and while in 
detention, the smugglers are then able to demand inflated fees that were not originally 
agreed and threaten to kill them if they fail to comply.  As the migrants are unable to 
pay, the bandits demand the payment of ransom by their families. In the MUHIDIN 
case, kidnapping groups forced the captured migrants to place telephone calls to their 
families and friends requesting that they pay the ransom.  Based on the account in the 
FERMO PM MUHIDIN case, the main purpose of the abduction and detention was to 
exploit the migrants’ belongings and funds. One of the witnesses in the FERMO 
MUHIDIN case stated that he and the fellow travellers/migrants were severely beaten 
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with batons and were deprived of all their belongings and held in a confined space.  
He added that the other part of the room was occupied by sixty abducted Somalians.  
In incarceration, he and his mates were compelled to call their families to pay a ransom 
of $ 3,300 USD in exchange for their lives.  (Judicial reports, FERMO PM MUHIDIN 
case Pg. 11).  Another witness K M , stated that he and his mates were 
confined for about 14 days, being subjected to all forms of torture and depravation; 
beaten with sticks, electrocuted, sexually abused to the point of death all in the bid to 
compel them to pay what they demanded (Judicial reports, FERMO PM MUHIDIN 
case Pg. 11). 
 
…once they hit me with a stick on the knee and for 6 days I could not walk. 
one day in particular,  after having water was thrown on me and flooded the 
floor, electrical wires were on the water causing us to undergo an electric shock 
that lasted till the lights were turned off…I remember in particular that the only 
one who was not touched was a child of about four years and that my 
kidnappers were using women as objects, in fact every day took some girl in 
my …sexually abused her Once one of these girls did not return …she was a 
friend of mine and was called Youhana…After my father did pay the ransom 
and I was delivered along with 13 other of my compatriots…put in a van we 
were    taken to Tripoli. (Judicial reports, FERMO PM Muhidin case Pg. 9) 
 
This strategy transcends both the people smuggling and trafficking rings.  Field study 
conducted in Sicily and Rome showed that this strategy is also used for trafficking 
victims controlled by sex exploitation trafficking rings.  A Caritas representative 
interviewed gave a very good encapsulation in her account of the ordeal Nigerian girls 
trafficked for the business of prostitution mostly go through during their voyage; 
The time of travel from Africa to Libya could be 2 or more weeks 
and from Libya to Italy, the same. The time of voyage depends 
on the trafficking rings and the means taken. At Libya they are 
put in prison and there after put in a prostitution house where 
they have to work day and night.  They do not see the faces of 
their customers because they wear masks. 
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These girls have to continue to work to pay for their remaining 
journey.  The girls however do not get paid directly for their toil, 
but at arrival in Italy, they are told they paid about 80,000 euros 
to get them there and the girls are thus indebted and have to pay 
up before they are free. Unfortunately, they never finish this 
payment their debts just keep increasing. 
(Interview 22) 
 
The statements and testimonies presented relate that the migrants were held against 
their will and tortured.  Kidnap and continuous hostage holding is one modus 
operandi that enables the smugglers to make more money.  According to the 
testimony of the witnesses, they were only released to continue on their journey or 
further transported only when the inflated price the smugglers demanded had been 
paid.  This strategy is relatively new as there are little or no scholarly publications 
detailing this aspect of the waiting time prior to embarkation.  The account by UNODC 
(2011:26) simply details how migrants are held in safe house and some maltreated 
during the waiting period to maintain order and secrecy.  The analysis presented in 
this report is void of extortion for which the migrants in the FERMO Muhindin case, 
FERMO PALESTINESE and FERMO SCAFISCA case were detained. While Spena 
(2016) describes this tactic as commodifying of human beings, Cara (2015) 
compares the tactic of intimidation of victims as a Mafioso behaviour.  This could 
mean that the criminal networks (which will be discussed in the next chapter), exhibit 
attributes of a hierarchical structure in their organisation (Malk 2016, Tahir 2016, 
IGAD 2016, Human Right Watch, 2016). 
 
Research has shown that there is usually a contract between the smuggler and the 
smuggled which entails the smuggled paying the smuggler a high price to transport 
him/her across international borders.  The evidence of the inflated prices paid for the 
movement by migrants from Libya to Italy such as €1000 or more, depending on the 
route and means, is recurrent through majority of the interviews conducted and data 
collected.  The reports are validated by witness’ statements in the judicial 
proceedings: 
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The Somalian along with his men robbed and forced us to call 
our families to pay a ransom of $ 3,300 US threatening to kill 
us, I did not have a phone so before I could call my dad, I had 
been severely beaten with a rubber water pipe, they gave me 
their phone and made me instruct my family by phone to pay 
$ 3300 to a contact M, located Israel… (Judicial reports, 
FERMO PM MUHIDIN case Pg. 9) 
 
In the majority of the cases these payments are never completely paid up in the 
source country and are expected to be paid up at arrival at the destination country; 
this lands them into debt bondage (Davidson 2013).  In the course of the field study 
conducted for this research, the author met with the President of the Pelegrino de la 
Terra an NGO in Palermo, founded by a Nigerian in 1996, engaged in assisting, and 
taking away from slavery trafficked migrants forced into prostitution and all forms of 
sexual exploitation, and providing them with better alternatives.  This respondent 
confirmed that some smuggled migrants or their families take a loan to pay the bill 
and clear the debt imposed on them by the expenses claimed by the smuggler 
(Interview 23)13.  A typical example is the picture of Chinese migration that involves 
a patch work of loans from family and friends to finance the journey as the smuggler 
will most times demand full payment proposed as the cost of the service he is 
rendering (Davidson 2013).  Given that the migrants may not still be able to pay all 
the debt, the family remains indebted to the smuggler and the migrant vulnerable to 
forced labour as well as those who organised their movement (Davidson 2013).  
Consequently, the migrant at this point is forced into a contract with the smuggler 
with a blurred difference between being trafficked and smuggled, thereby resulting in 
a situation where a migrant that has been smuggled across international borders 
ends up being coerced into labour exploitation (Kyle & Koslowski, 2011, Davidson, 
2013).  This implies that the smuggled migrant at this stage is translated from a client 
to a victim of trafficking blurring the line between the two phenomena.   
 
Research shows that at this point, their enslavement begins; these victims are found 
in the sex industry, massage parlours, domestic servitude and agricultural work 
 
13 Interview with the Head of Peligrin della Terra in Palermo, Italy. 
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(UNODC, 2013).  Finnegan (2008) in his report on the predicaments of most of the 
victims of trafficking from Chisinau, Moldova shows that most people pay actually to 
be smuggled but the criminal network which they patronise ends up trafficking them 
(Finnegan 2008).  These victims, even when they reach their destinations end up in 
cycles of violence, exploitation and abuse (Bhabha 2005).  If assessed in this 
manner, it could be argued that the migrants who have been translated into victims 
may be absolved of the crime of irregular migration and not be criminalised based on 
the gruesome experiences which they have encountered in the smuggling process.  
 
In Tamura’s (2010) opinion, the treatment of the smuggled migrant during transit or 
at arrival depends on how much he is able to afford for the whole process as well as 
the mode of payment.  However, the experiences detailed in the statement and 
testimonies of migrants and witnesses contained in the judicial proceedings 
examined for this chapter – the FERMO PM MUHIDIN and FERMO PM SCAFISCA 
cases, contradict this assertion.  The proceedings present detailed verbatim 
testimonies of the travails of migrants (before, during and after their journey) who on 
their own accord subscribed for the services of the smugglers and were in no way 
coerced to contact the smugglers.  For the migrants escaping any form of political or 
social crises, they may have been driven by the quest for safety, but the decision to 
employ the services of a smuggling organisation would be entirely theirs. In the same 
vein, given that most migrants end up becoming victims at some point of the 
smuggling process by means of debt bondage, coercion and exploitation, the 
UNODC’s (2013) assumption of the routine which indicates that the business 
transaction between the smuggled and the smugglers ends upon arrival in the 
destination country is contested particularly in cases where the migrant has no legal 
gratification for remaining in the immediate country of arrival. This study suggests 
that given the criminal intentions of the smugglers which weighs heavily on profit 
making, the financial capacity of the migrants in recent times makes no difference to 
the sort of treatment the migrants receive during the period of voyage or even on 
arrival.  A majority of migrants are still being coerced into further exploitation with the 
threat of revealing their illegal status [this is most rampant with migrants exploited for 
labour and sex]. 
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The Unaccompanied-voyage tactic 
The unaccompanied voyage is where the smuggler decides not to travel with the 
migrants but rather send them off on their own with whatever they perceive they may 
need for the journey; for example, a compass, torch light and gallon of petrol for the 
motor.  Because rescue ships have in recent times become faster in their response to 
distress call, smugglers may risk being apprehended, hence they perceive that staying 
back, and sending the fleet of dinghies and fishing vessels unaccompanied is less 
risky. The danger of this strategy, however, is that the unseaworthy boats used, barely 
survive the short trip the migrants have to do before they are rescued.  A settled 
migrant interviewed in Palermo recounted how the migrants had to navigate the boats 
in which they came:  
 
…the sea journey from Libya to Lampedusa took 2 days. The 
boat was surprisingly steered by a volunteer migrant as we 
were left just with the boat with no one to navigate [this is 
because the smugglers have stopped travelling with the 
migrants]. The smugglers only showed us our travel boat and 
sent us off on our own… (Interview 33) 
 
 
In the same vein, the opinion of an IOM representative interviewed in Palermo 
confirms this use of unaccompanied voyages in the Libya-to-Italy human trade. In her 
opinion,  
 
…the smuggling business in Libya is now a low cost business 
with the influx of cheap rubber boats from China…all they need 
to provide to the migrants is a compass, a mobile phone to call 
the Italian rescue team and just as much petrol to take them off 
the coast of Libya. (Interview 37) 
 
This strategy is relatively new and major development in the human trade business.  
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From the FERMO PM MUHIDIN and FERMO PM SCAFISCA cases, it is apparent 
that both the desert bandits and those who organize the sea crossings make use of 
safe houses or collection centers to confine the migrants pending the payment of the 
ransoms or the finding of a suitable boat for the sea crossings.  Again, force and arms 
are used to keep the migrants in check even in these houses.  Another consistent 
method employed by the people smugglers in the Mediterranean is dispossession of 
the migrants of all valuables, often accomplished with the use of threat or force.  A 
witness in FERMO PM MUNHIDIN case stated; 
 
…the Somalian along with his men robbed and forced us to call our 
families to pay a ransom of $ 3,300 US threatening to kill us, I was 
devoid of phone and before I call my dad have been severely beaten 
with a rubber...(Judicial report, FERMO PM MUHIDIN case). 
 
In the FERMO PM MUHIDIN case, another  witness K  M , reported of 
his ordeal after their abduction to a house located in the village of Sabha, where they 
were locked up in large rooms and deprived of their belongings, and their cell phones 
were used in calling their family members to demand for their ransom. 
 
Field findings corroborate this tactic which has in recent times led to the discussion 
about migrants’ transformation from “voluntary clients” into victims.  The deprivation 
of liberty was identified by Aziz, Monzini, and Pastore (2015. Pg. 42), in their research 
on the changing dynamics of border crossings and validates the responses of 
respondents and witnesses to this modus operandi. The table below presents a 
comparison of the experiences of the migrants concerning deprivation of liberty 
employed by the smugglers as indicated in the literature and from the primary sources, 
both interviews and judicial proceedings.  While this tactic is identified to a high degree 
in the testimonies of migrants presented in the judicial proceeding (X), the responses 
from interview participants (Y) did not reflect some of these experiences.  This is owing 
to the fact that unsettled smuggled migrants could not be contacted due to ethical 
restrictions. From the table, it can be seen that two points (12 and 13) are identified 
as not being listed in the experiences identified in the literature which indicates the 
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evolution of the modus operandi of the migrant smugglers aimed principally at 
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Table 6-1.  A comparison of the experiences of the migrants concerning depravation of liberty 
employed by the smugglers as indicated in the literature and from the primary sources 
 
 Experiences identified 
in the literature 
Analogous 
experiences 
identified in the 
judicial reports 
Validation of the 
Analogous experiences 
identified in the literature 
and judicial reports by 
interview respondents 
1 Forced to get into the 
boats 
X Y 
2 forced to change boats 
during the navigation 
X  
3 initially negotiated 
conditions change 
during the trip 
X Y 
4 consent loses its 
validity 
X  
5 migrants are treated 
like goods on board 
X Y 
6 locked in the hold of the 
ship 
X  
7 food and water are 
often distributed in 
insufficient quantities 
X  
8 poor hygiene and lack 
of space in safe 
houses, 
X  
9 Crossings are 
performed in 
dangerous weather  
X Y 
10 migrants are often 
deliberately 
endangered to attract 
rescue operations 
X Y 
11 abandonment of the 
boat or ship at sea 
without crew 
X Y(self-navigation) 
Additional experiences identified from findings 
12 Hostage holding X Y 
13 Depravation of liberty X Y 
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Other aspects of the modus operandi 
 
A compendium of actions and activities carried out by the smugglers reveals the level 
of criminality of the offenders and members of irregular migration.  These are 
discussed based on evidence provided in the judicial proceedings selected for 
analysis in this study. 
 
Method of organisation of trips  
 
The evidence of the activities of the connection men, organisers and passeurs reveals 
that the Libya to Italy trips are organised in stages.  It commences with would be 
migrants making contacts with the connection men through phone calls or as in recent 
times, WhatsApp or even Facebook.  These migrants are sometimes also being 
referred and connected by scouts that work for the smuggling organisations that pose 
as travel agencies or tour operators (see Interview 1, page 4).  As with a settled 
migrant interviewed (Interview 33), he was informed of the possibility of travel by 
friends who had in the past used the services of the recommended smuggler.  
Similarly, the judicial proceedings contain evidence of would-be migrants contacting 
the smugglers via phone calls (Judicial reports, The FERMO PALESTINESE 1 Case, 
pages 6-21).  This information is validated by records of wire taps of calls made 
between the smugglers as regards the arrangements of travel and the payments to 
be made; discussions cover what gains are to be made and the arrangement of how 
monies are to be paid as well as the desired final destination of the migrant (see Box 













Conversation 15.11.2013, starting at 11:47, prog nr.380, 393,285,690,899 to SAL.M, from 
TES: 
        
“TES calls from Australia and informs SAL.M that he sent money to SAMUEL to help 
a relative named HENOK GEREZGIHER, but did not get any news, because SAMUEL 
would not answer the phone. TES, informs that the boy is 15 years and is a survivor of the 
sinking, was transferred from Lampedusa to Sicily and needed the said money right away. 
 
SAL.M reassures TES that he would go personally to talk to SAMUEL. 
TES informs that the number of the guy is: 00393339996008…” 
 
 Figure 6-4. Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 6-2.  Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 
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All names used in the transcripts are pseudonyms.  The migrants are further detained 
either to enable more extortion while the transportation means is organised or 
exploited during this waiting period.  There is evidence to suggest that at this stage of 
the journey, the consent of the migrants do not count as they remain at the mercy of 
the transportation organisers.  The criminality at this stage is related to the extortion 
and illicit means of money transfer that sustains the business.  
 
 
Assistance given to migrants to escape from reception centres 
 
Studies have established that the criminal associations in the recent past have 
ventured into organising escape from reception centres in concealed locations while 
they wait for onward travel (Massey and Colucello 2007).  Judicial proceedings record 
cases tried on offences such as the organising of escape from reception centres, so 
as to enable the migrants to procure illegal entry into the territory of another State to 










Conversation of 11.06.2013, 12:41 hours, prog nr. 1480 393 291 927 862 on the user used by 
WOLDU WEL between Samuel and Daniel: 
 
       "Samuel speaks by phone WOLDU with Daniel. Daniel tells Samuel to report to WOLDU to 
be able to send money to Ibrahim. Subsequently, he requests that the three girls (guests of the 
same in Canicattì) can find accommodation in Agrigento only for one night, and then leave the 
next morning for Rome. 
        Samuel asks: "They already have the money?” 
        Daniel: "no, must arrive. How much do you get paid?” 
        Samuel replied: "100 Euros, i.e. 50 and 50 for the journey for me." 
Figure 6-5. Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1  6.5.   6-3.  Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 
 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
















Examining the conversation in Box 6.4, there is strong evidence that the transportation 
was illicit and contravens laws that govern hosting centres as well as laws of the state.  
It also indicates criminality. This is suggested because the tone of the conversation in 
Box 6.4, implies that an escape from one of the reception centres in Caltagirone was 
being organised.  The client seems to have been well informed prior to arrival on who 
to call and what to request for or even informed at the reception centres by 
strategically positioned moles.  The contact made in this excerpt is a means of 
enabling an arrangement to organise an escape for the man who was requesting help 
from TES.  The judicial proceedings from FERMO Glauco 1 imply that this assistance 
was received and could have been gotten from any means possible both from the 
criminal network and from ordinary citizens, for example offering use of their mobile 
phones, as indicated in the excerpt in Box 6.2.  It is however possible that help form 
regular people or citizens may be driven by empathy, but the aid rendered by 
members of the criminal network is tactics of their modus operandi.  
 
 
Payment methods used and gains 
 
The findings suggest that the journey across the desert through the central 
Mediterranean is costly in the sense that large sums of money are demanded of the 
Box 6.4. 
Conversation of 10.14.2013, 17:47 hours, prog nr. 100, 393 291 927 862 with TES and a 
young man looking for help to escape from the reception center: 
 
                  TES talks to MAED (Eritrean). 
                  The man tells TES that he was at Caltagirone and had gotten his number from a man 
TEM. The same tells him that he was with some Italian and that the number he was calling was 
theirs. 
                  TES replied that will prompt MAEDIN immediately and tells him to ask him. " 
 
Conversation of 10.14.2013, 18:22 hours, prog nr.110, 393,291,927,862 in use on the user TES 
between predicted and a young man: 
                 TES talks to MAED; He communicates these to be at the entrance of Caltagirone, in a 
building where they are housed; 
                  TES, that he is in Agrigento and know the location of Caltagirone. 
                  MAED says that a man (without specifying who) told him that he would help him. 
                  TES asks if it was hard to get out of there (the center) 
                   MAEDIN said it was not difficult. 
                   TES then the movement will be the next morning with the car of another person. 
                   TES is recommended not to go out before it could be difficult to meet. " 
 
Figure 6-6. Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1  6.6.  6-4.  Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 
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migrants.  To support this submission, some of the respondents recount the sums 
money they had to pay for the journey which happens at several posts during the 
journey: 
 
The trafficker demanded of me 1, 200 dollars, I accepted 
because I had the money. I paid him and the journey started… 
(Interview 35) 
 
I paid about 150 -300euros to get to Libya, apart from the one 
I paid at the different post 10,000cfa. There were about 11 
post before we got to Libya… 
(Interview 36) 
 
The payment issue is complicated because several of the migrants had already paid 
for the trip before they travelled.  A Syrian migrant once confessed to the police that 
he had to deposit a certain required sum of money to an agent – [a guarantee office] 
in the form of a guarantee prior to the travel. At this stage, any migrant who pays, is 
given a pin-code.  On arrival the migrant is to call and give the pin code to the smuggler 
who organises his crossing.  The smuggler is to use the pin code to claim his money 
from the agency.  Although judicial proceedings examined in this work report large 
sums of money paid by the migrants for the journeys, they cannot be confirmed for 
they are not documented or recorded in any credible source.  
 
Payment methods employed by the smuggling rings include hand-to-hand, Awhala, 
Western Union Transfer.  Findings indicate that about 90% percent of the transactions 
are done by the Awhala system because even the police and law enforcement 
agencies find it hard to track the payments.  A law enforcement officer of the Squadra 
Mobile of Palermo, Sicily interviewed explained that Awhala payment method could 
be transacted from anywhere by anyone.  For instance, someone in Nigeria can make 
a payment in Israel for a migrant leaving Nigeria. And the money could have been 
made to a shop owner who could disguise the money flowing through his account as 
solely from his business; hence, this means of payment has developed into a means 
of money laundering.  It is a disturbing fact that although phone tapings can detect 
that a transaction was made, the detail of the transaction cannot be known given the 
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anonymous nature of this mode of payment.  This further fuel the criminality in this 
business as laying hold of solid facts such as financial transactions - where there is 
no witness - for which offenders could be prosecuted remains insurmountable. 
 
As the most commonly used modes of payment in recent times such as the hand-to-
hand, western Union, Money Gramm and the Awhala system do not clearly show the 
proper details of transaction made, these methods of payments have consequently 
been taken advantage of. Although the majority of respondents attested to the 
challenge of detection of these payment means, an Italian prosecutor’s assessment 
of the problem was: 
 
…the most used is the Awhala because it is the most difficult to 
track…is basically impossible to track; we construct the Awhala only 
through interceptions, but if they don’t talk about it you cannot track 
it because we don’t have any direct exchange of money. So this 
system defies investigation…yes you can track Western Union 
transaction but the money disappears the moment it is done, so 
evidence may be  revealed of the transaction, but you do not find the 
money. It is not like a bank account; they receive the money and take 
it away. Majority of documents they present for this sort of 
transaction, are usually fake. (Interview 17) 
 
 
Measures taken to evade police checks  
 
The use of falsified documents and falsified modes of qualification, such as fake 
marriages or marriage of convenience, are also ways by which migrants, aided by 
smugglers, attempt to evade police checks en route and at borders. 
 
Findings from field study indicate that for migrants who decide to use regular routes 
such as by air – going through border controls - in getting to Europe from their country 
of origin, the act of falsification of a document starts with an invitation letter which is 
offered to the officials so as to procure a visa or allowed passage.  A migrant centre 
mediator in pointing out this issue of deception, pointed out the practice of families 
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recommending their relatives/families to the smuggling criminal network to enable 
them travel across the Mediterranean, avoiding existing barriers or outwitting set 
restrictive measures (Interview 8).  The idea was that reference was given by families 
not only for travel across legal borders but also to enable contact with smugglers and 
easy assisted passages.  Hence not all irregular migrants who come from Libya to 
Italy have to come by sea as generally assumed.  This point was strongly argued by 
a migrant centre coordinator in explaining the different categories of migrants they 
received and catered for: 
…80% of the migrants that arrive in Italy arrive with regular 
documents, only 11% percent of them arrive with the boat. But 
the media force the news… ah yeah, but in Italy statistics there 
is a statistician book made by Caritas that show that 
11%percent only arrive by the boat and a lot of people arrive 
with the aeroplane… (Interview 4) 
 
Scholars hold that this initiative of using falsified documents is driven by the 
immigration policies and legal restrictive border hurdles of various developed states 
(Kolslowski, 2011, Bhabha 2005, Dwyer, 2011) as well as the restricted available 
immigration opportunities which in turn makes them vulnerable to diverse forms of 
exploitation (Dwyer 2011, Davidson 2013, Beate 2009 Koslowski 2011).  Media 
reports on UK’s clamp down on the abuse of student visas suggests that the student 
visa system for the UK for instance, was being abused by the use of fake documents 
in acquiring them (see Paton 2014).  This is an instance of not merely evading police 
check but a means of circumventing immigration authorities.  A typical example is the 
Sadiq (2010) analogy of now you see them…now you don’t, in explaining the use of 
falsified documents in circumventing immigration authorities.  Consequently, the fact 
that documents are what identify migrants makes it difficult to know when even 
smugglers are posing as migrants and when victims of trafficking are smuggled across 
borders. 
 
A researcher interviewed in the field contributed that ‘…the legal migration channels 
are not proportionate to the need of the economic system or the demand to migrate’ 
(Interview 2).  She emphasised the importance of understanding that the business of 
smuggling should be analysed by considering the economic system which 
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necessitates these migrants having to move.  Her perception is that the economic 
causes that drive these migrants to migrate will provide a better understanding on how 
to manage the phenomenon.  This argument throws light on the concept of smugglers 
across the Mediterranean preying on the demand for cheap labour being that some 
criminal groups have also been observed to generate the demand for their services.  
Although this researcher emphasises the need to analyse the phenomenon 
considering the economic system, it is important to note that in recent times and other 
factors such as politics and social and psychological issues propel migration. 
 
In the majority of cases, difficulties in visa procurement remain the major reason why 
migrants resort to the services of smugglers despite the dreadful nature of the route 
chosen.  A respondent from field study stated that:  
 
…compte tenu de la difficulté pour l'obtention du visa et des 
politiques de la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine, ils font 
recours à des voies illégales et prennent donc la voie de la mer 
mediteranée  
(Interview 8) 
 …given the difficulty visa procurement and the fight against 
illegal immigration, they resort to illegal channels and therefore 
take towards the Mediterranean Sea (Interview 8; translated by 
author) 
 
The participant offers the reason of inaccessibility to visa as an impetus for the use of 
falsified documents.  Evidence of the use of falsified passports which results from the 
use of same passport for different travellers is detailed in the judicial proceedings 
FERMO PM GLAUCO.  Intercepted telephone calls reveal arrangements to resell 
passports previously used to another traveller in a different location. Names on the 
passport are taken on by each new client and the passports are returned after the 
client‘s arrival at destination (Judicial reports, FERMO PM GLAUCO, pg. 77).  The 
successes of these transactions call to question the nature and means of verification 
by the border controls.  The long period in which these transactions were conducted 
without detection according the tracking reeks of jeopardy on the side of responsible 
authorities who let incidents of such magnitude slip pass them (Sadiq 2011).  
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Increasingly false marriages or marriage of convenience have become another mode 
of falsified document or falsified personality by which irregular migrants have 
attempted to evade the authorities (EUROPOL 2009, UNODC 2010, EUROPOL 2013, 
and EUROPOL-INTERPOL 2016).  Judicial proceedings present evidence of a phone 
conversation 18.01.2014 to organise marriage of convenience as a modus operandi 
employed by the smuggler to enable unauthorized migrants (Judicial reports FERMO 
PM GLAUCO case).  The women who subscribed to this service were to be married 
from Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Sudan and were to be brought to Italy on grounds of 
family reunifications.  The inclusion of this approach reflects the diverse dimensions 
to the falsification of document as a measure to evade police or instituted authorities 
by smugglers.  
 
This issue of recommendation and show of efficiency based on previous successes 
by the smugglers was evidenced in a conversation between two key organisers John 
Mahray Ermies and Ghermay Ermias intercepted by the police through wiretapping 
recorded in the FERMO GLAUCO 1 case.  The content of their conversation reveals 
the technique of destroying any technology used with the aim of evading detection by 
the police such as throwing away used phones in the sea so as to remain anonymous.  
Clearly, were it not for the wiretapping the phone would never have been traced to the 












Besides the use of falsified documents, disruptive behaviour to distract police from 
checks also amount to means of evading police checks. Judicial proceedings 
Box 6.5. 
Conversation 31.10.2013 13:52:55 hours prog 245: conversations between JHN and ERMs in 
Tigrinya 
ERMs added,  
"I understand that to destroy the phone is not good. However, a call from the MEZREA (place of 
incarceration or farmhouse where the migrants are usually collected prior to their embarkation) to 
the city may reveal our anonymity to the police. All that has happened is the will of God. At 02 
o'clock at night (he speaks of the sinking of the 03 October this) they called me and told me that they 
were already come ready to throw the satellite phone in the sea and it was all ok. 
 6-5. Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 
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evidence this tactic of smugglers which was obtained by wiretaps about an 
arrangement to meet perhaps a new would-be migrant to collect money, as presented 










Notice the behaviour of NUREDIN in the box above, it is suggestive that though not 
at a police check point he was able to divert the attention of the police from him as he 
was probably not in a right position and could have be questioned by the patrolling 
police if found idle. This all amounts to measures taken to evade poilice checks.  
 
Based on analysis made in the foregoing sections of this works it can be deduced that 
the actors in the irregular migration fromLibya to Italy are both diverse yet there exists 
a confluence of roles at different stages according to the operation at hand. The next 




The evolving roles of the actors and the modus operandi  
 
Monzini, and Pastore (2015) have identified the different roles carried out by the actors 
in the business of migrant smuggling.  The findings present a clear identification of 
the mix actors that carry out these roles.  This presentation reflected the flexibility and 
the complex nature of these actors which in turn influences a complex continuum of 
strategies, nurturing the criminality in the practice.  The table below elucidates specific 




Conversation of 01.19.2014, 11:30 am, prog nr.236, 393,898,524,836 between ABK between predicted and 
ATWN: 
            SHE discusses with ATWN: 
            ATWN tells SHE that he realized that the police were nearby. 
             
            NUREDIN says he pretended to talk on the phone to avoid arousing suspicion. 
(Judicial reports FERMO PM GLAUCO, pg. 65) 
Figure 6-7.  Excerpts drawn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1  6.8.  6-6.  Excerpts d awn from Judicial reports, FERMO GLAUCO 1 
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Table 6-2.  Table showing comparison of the different actor roles classification and 
specialisation 
A comparison of the different actor roles classification in 2002 as 
Presented by Monzini, and Pastore (2015) and specialisations in recent 




of  2002 
Task identified Observation/identification 
from recent findings 
skilled 
intermediaries 
Collect clients from 
countries of origin 




Maintain connections with 




Locally based opportunists ; 
Tuareg (desert nomads) 
persons in 
charge of the 
management of 
migrants 
Manages the migrants 
during waiting time, 
embarkation and 
accommodation 
Carers; caterers; guards;  
Chairmen; 
Wasits (intermediaries per 
nationality) 
intermediaries in 
charge of finding 
the boats 
Providing means of 
transportation in form of 







experts for the 
maritime 
passage 
In charge of loading and 





transporters  Passeurs; recruited 
migrants; Tuareg (desert 
nomads   
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The over-arching argument advanced by this thesis is that the nature of the criminality 
involved in the human trade between Libya and Italy has significantly changed and 
that the criminal networks involved are now, for the most part, specialised, scattered, 
unrestrained and structured. Extrapolating from the judicial proceedings, notably the 
FERMO PM MUHIDIN case, cross-checked against the evidence and data gathered 
from the semi-structured interviews, this chapter specifically analyses the way in which 
actors at particular junctures of the migrant journey operate, their modus operandi, 
has evolved, becoming increasingly exploitative, coercive and violent.  
 
The evolution of the modus operandi employed by the criminal networks involved in 
the transportation of irregular migrants is the most dramatic and disturbing change to 
the nature of the criminality involved in the human trade which is assessed by this 
study as highly unrestrained. Some of these unrestrained strategies range from 
violence to forced confinements, stranded scenes on the sea, unaccompanied 
voyages, hostage holding tactics both on land and sea, and to methods of evading 
checks by the authorities.  
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On Wednesday the 13th of April, 2016, there was a disembarkation of about 980 
migrants who had just arrived from Libya to the port of Palermo, Sicily, Italy. The author 
of this thesis witnessed this disembarkation, which included 138 minors, two babies 
and many pregnant women.  This was just one arrival that day with more scheduled 
to arrive. Such arrivals are constant and growing.  This, is in part, due to the recent 
political upheavals in north and central Africa and the acclaimed ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. 
These upheavals have displaced large numbers of citizens in the affected countries 
and swelled the refugee population.  Consequently, this situation has in turn led to an 
extraordinary increase in the number of those refugees seeking to migrate to Europe.  
Since European countries have restricted the numbers they are prepared to accept, 
there has been created a criminal market.  Criminal organisations operating out of 
Africa have created a burgeoning enterprise out of the misery of migrants.   
 
An 823% increase in the flow of migrants into Italy was recorded in the first four months 
of 2014 over the same period of 2013.  There were 25,650  arrivals into Sicily, Puglia 
and Calabria in 660 landings making it the highest number of arrivals in the preceding 
five years except for the months of the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 (FRONTEX 2017).  It is 
estimated that an average of four hundred thousand irregular migrants enter Europe 
through this route annually.  On the other hand, 2016 has since been declared as the 
deadliest year for refugees crossing to Europe via central Mediterranean. In the first 
eight months of 2016, two hundred and eighty-one thousand, seven hundred and forty 
(281,740) migrants successfully crossed the Mediterranean into Europe while a total 
of four thousand, one hundred and seventy six (4,176) have died or gone missing for 
the same period.   
 
 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the link between the evolution of these irregular 
migration flows by sea and the structure of the criminal networks.  The analysis draws 
on both interviews and the judicial proceedings such as the ‘FERMO PM GLAUCO’ 
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cases14, to establish the nature of that link.  The argument here is that despite the fact 
that the networks in this human trade may reveal multi-various attributes in detail, they 
remain scattered, which is one thing they have in common.   Using the FERMO 
GLAUCO cases this chapter examines the structure of the transnational criminal 
groups and networks involved in the organised crime of irregular maritime crossing in 
the last 7 years with the aim of analysing the characteristics that demonstrates their 
differences in detail.  In the light of the existing known models for organised crime 
(Arsovka 2014), it examines the organisational structure of their operations and the 
distinctive features of the networks in terms of their capabilities.  The chapter offers a 
clearer understanding of what enables transnational criminal organisations operating 
in and out of Africa to adjust their structure and network to the evolving migration 
trends.    
 
 
The evidence from judicial proceedings 
 
 
The ‘FERMO PM GLAUCO 1’ Case  
 
This is one of the four cases that arose out of the investigation carried out by the Italian 
police and courts following the events of October 3, 2013 off the coast of Lampedusa, 
Italy.  At about 07.15 a.m. the Italian coast guard was alerted to a shipwreck involving 
migrants near the south coast of the island of Lampedusa, in an area called 
‘Tabaccara’.  The Flying Squad of Agrigento who also attended the scene of the wreck 
took statements from survivors who reported that the boat had 500 migrants on board.  
Almost all of them were Eritreans, who had sailed from Misurata in Libya the previous 
night.  During the journey 366 people lost their lives. 
 
The complex and comprehensive investigation into the activities of the people 
smugglers involved came to be known as the GLAUCO OPERATION.  It involved 
extensive interviews with survivors, surveillance and telephone tapping of persons of 
interest.  The investigation unmasked a complex web of criminal conspiracy involving 
 
14 Provisions of Decree of Detention P.M, (FERMO PM GLAUCO 1) Art. 384 Code of Civil Procedure, Prosecutor’s office, 
Court of Palermo, District Anti-Mafia, 2013; and Decree of FERMO Disposed by P.M. (FERMO PM GLAUCO 2) - art. 384 
p. p.p. Prosecutor’s office at the Court of Palermo District Anti-Mafia Directorate N. 1874/2015 
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a transnational network of criminal groups traversing the Sahara Desert across the 
Mediterranean into Italy, Western Europe and the Nordic countries.  It also revealed 
the cooperation of several suspects in organising, procuring and enabling the illegal 
entry, transit and or stay of migrants in Italy for profitable purposes. 
 
The investigation led to nine persons being prosecuted in the court of Palermo.  They 
were accused of crimes committed in more than one state, participating in an 
organised criminal group; conspiracy to commit serious crime, participation in criminal 
activities of an organised criminal group; organising, directing, aiding, abetting, 
facilitating or counselling the commission of a crime involving an organised  criminal 
group and smuggling of migrants (this includes enabling illegal entry, procuring a 
fraudulent travel or identity  document; enabling illegal stay violating existing legislation 
on immigration; the possession of arms; organising the transport of migrants within the 
Italian territory – receiving the migrants or orchestrating escapes from reception 
centres in order to procure illegal entry into another state.   
 
The accused were: Wold, Tesfahiweit, [specifically accused on four counts]; 
Weldemicael, Samuel [on three counts]; Sales, Mohammed [on three counts]; 
Afwerke, Yared; Mells,  Matywos [on four counts]; Abdadt, Shamshedin [on two 
counts];  Atta, Wehabrebi Nuredin [on three counts]; Mahray, John; and Ghermay, 
Ermies.  These suspects were alleged to have endangered the lives and safety of the 
migrants in the process of carrying out their enterprise, including acts of dehumanising 
treatment towards the migrants and extortion for profit.  These persons were identified 
as connected and members of particular people smuggling group both on a temporal 
and permanent basis so as to enable them to succeed in their smuggling escapades.  
Their techniques and the strategies are analysed in chapter six of this work. 
 
The facts (as gleaned by the judicial and police investigators from statements of 
survivors of the shipwreck, surveillance and telephone tapping) demonstrate how the 
criminal organisation was led, the roles of the members, their violence and extortion 
in handling the migrants, their transportation methods, and their police avoidance 
techniques for onward travel through Europe. 
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Ghermay Ermies of Ethiopia, Mouhamud Elmi Muhidin of Somalia and Mahray John 
of Eritrea were the leaders of the organised criminal group engaged in the smuggling 
of migrants from Libya to Italy.  Most migrants were contacted by Ghermay Ermies or 
themselves contacted Ghermay for the latter to procure their entry into Italy illegally by 
sea.  Ghermay Ermies was based in Tripoli, Libya.  Mahray John was based in Sudan 
and was a major recruiter and organiser of migrants from Eritrea, Sudan and 
neighbouring countries.  It was part of his duties to organise caravans of migrants from 
central Africa to the coast of the Maghreb and liaise with Elmi Muhidin and his group 
for their passage through the Sahara onwards to Ghermay Ermies in Tripoli.  He was 
paid for his services in advance. 
 
Mouhamud Elmi Muhidin who was the subject of a separate criminal proceeding 
(FERMO PM MUHIDIN) was identified on 25/10/2023 as the leader of an armed group 
responsible for the kidnap or abduction of about 130 migrants, mostly of Eritrean 
origin, in the Sahara Desert in July 2013.  These migrants who were travelling from 
their home countries to Libya (for the purpose of immigrating to Italy), were taken under 
the threat of force by Elmi Muhidin and his gang.   
 
The migrants were locked up in a farmhouse in Sheba under the control of Muhidin.  
During their detention, they were violently assaulted until their families paid a 3300 US 
dollars ransom per migrant, as demanded by the gang.  Such payments were made 
by way of electronic money transfers through banks or Western Union/ Money gram 
in the name or codes supplied by Muhidin and his associates.  Other payments were 
made by the families of migrants to representatives of the abductors both in Eritrea 
and other parts of the world.  They were tortured, their women raped and some of 
them killed while they waited for their families to come up with the ransom money.   
 
The migrants were later, through various means, transported to Tripoli where they 
were handed over to Ghermay Ermies.  Ghermay Ermies, in turn, put them in a house 
(collection centre) where they were later joined by no less than 600 other migrants.  
They were each dispossessed of personal belongings and made to pay a fee of 1600 
euros for the trip across the Mediterranean into Italy.  Again, the payments were made 
by relations of the migrants from various parts of the world in the manner specified by 
Ghermay Ermies.   
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While at the house, the migrants were not allowed to go outside for any reason 
whatsoever.  They were fed sparingly on a diet that consisted of just bread and water 
for the duration of their stay.  Some of the women amongst them were also sexually 
abused and prostituted for money.  The migrants were kept at the collection centre for 
upwards of one month as Ghermay Ermies and his associates made arrangements 
for the trip across the sea into Italy.  First, they had to find the appropriate ship and a 
captain and also reach understandings with the police and maritime security 
operatives to ensure that their illicit enterprise was unhindered.  The migrants were 
later transported to the embarkation point at the beach where they were ferried by 
small boats out into the sea and then put on a larger boat for the sea journey across 
the Mediterranean.  Even at this stage, migrants were dispossessed of all personal 
money and effects and were so tightly arranged in the boat that none could move or 
stretch out during the trip.  Those who protested at the inhuman conditions on the boat 
were severely beaten.   
 
According to the survivors of the disastrous shipwreck of October 3, 2013, the boat en 
route had started to take in water.  Scared and apprehensive, one of the smugglers 
(the Captain), in order to attract the attention of some commercial ships or other nearby 
boats, had set fire to a blanket, sprinkling it with diesel in order to use it as a visual 
indicator.  Such conduct caused a fire on the deck.  The ensuing fire frightened the 
migrants who, en masse, moved towards the other area of the boat, away from the 
fire.  This caused imbalance and the subsequent capsizing of the boat.  
 
Following these facts, 366 people including women and children, lost their lives in one 
of the deadliest events on Italian waters outside of war times.  The events of the ill-
fated trip gave rise to the extensive criminal investigation otherwise called the 
GLAUCO OPERATION.  Through telephone intercepts, it was discovered that the 
cooperation between Ghermay Ermies and Mahray John preceded the boat trip of 
03/10/2013 and continued even after the shipwreck.  Intelligence so gathered revealed 
that of the 500 migrants on board the wrecked ship on 03/10/2013, 109 were sent to 
Tripoli by Mahray John and 68 of them died in the shipwreck. 
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The investigation revealed that while Mahray John, Elmi Muhidin and Ghermay Ermies 
were principal actors of the criminal organisation in Africa, the first seven defendants 
formed a critical part of the organisation and operated from inside Italy.  This latter 
group was responsible for helping migrants quartered at the Reception centres to 
avoid giving their thumbprints to the police, escape from the centres, travel across 
central and Northern Italy and ultimately move on to other destination countries in 
Europe and beyond.  This group were especially adept at providing logistics to enable 
the migrants to travel and to establish in any city or country of their choice in Europe 
without detection.  They provided temporary lodgings, clothing, transportation and 
travel and immigration advice to the migrants for a fee, such fees always paid in 
advance.  They provided fake or altered passports and other travel and identity 
documents to enable the migrants to reach their respective destinations while avoiding 
detection and arrest.  They procured for the migrants, marriages of convenience or 
sham marriages with European citizens as a short cut to obtaining resident permit and 
European nationality. Their remit also included physically transporting the migrants 
from one point to another via bus routes, private cars and hired vans.  Using all human 
and material resources necessary, the suspects, working together, pursued and 
achieved a common criminal purpose of effecting illegal entry and establishment of 
migrants into Italy and beyond for profit. 
 
 
The legal findings of the case were as follows. At the hearing conducted to determine 
precautionary detention, the public prosecutor ruled for detention of all available 
suspects pending full trial.  In reaching this decision, the public prosecutor, following 
laid down determinants of a criminal group, concluded that the suspects belonged to 
a criminal organisation, were part of a criminal conspiracy and, participated in the 
activities of a criminal group.  The public prosecutor also assigned jurisdiction to Italian 
courts applying the principle of autore mediato.15  Specifically, for the lawful exercise 
of the Italian jurisdiction, it is necessary that the action and omission that constitutes 
the criminal conduct takes place, wholly or in part of the territory of Italy (Article 6, 
Criminal Code).  The jurisdiction will equally be established if the natural result of the 
conduct occurs in Italian territory.  In respect of criminal conspiracy, the jurisdiction of 
the state will extend to all co-perpetrators (even if abroad) as long as any act of 
 
15 ‘Autore mediato’, doctrine of the so called ‘mediated’ or ‘indirect’ perpetrator, Article 54 of the Italian Criminal Code 
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participation in the common plan occurs in Italy.  The prosecutor also highlighted the 
difference between smuggling of migrants and trafficking in people notwithstanding 
that the two are often interlinked. 
 
The above details reveal some key features concerning the nature of this criminal 
organisation.  There was clearly interdependence between the groups in Sudan, 
the Sahel region, Tripoli and Italy.  Even in Italy, there was coordination between the 
various cells in Agrigento, Rome, Milan and other cities.  During the planning and 
execution of their illegal activities and even during their rest periods, contacts between 
the principal actors were intense, constant and frequent.  This extensive network of 
the criminal organisation was built and sustained by an array of communication 
channels, including telephone, Skype, Tango, Viber, WhatsApp and many others.  
They also made use of satellite phones for communication in places where cell phones 
and Internet do not function. As a result, there was always a constant flow of 
information between members of the organisation regarding conditions on the sea, 
stages of migrants’ journey and the manner of assistance required by each.  Free flow 
of information between the various members of the group ensured a stable structure 
for the group’s criminal activities. The criminal activities of the criminal group was 
further helped and the network strengthened by the system of payments adopted by 
it.  The use of instant money transfer channels like Western Union, MoneyGram and 
Italian Poste Pay, ensured that members of the group received instant payment for 
services agreed to be rendered at all stages and in all places.  The further practice of 
families of migrants handing over cash money to representatives of the group 
anywhere in the world further enhanced the structure and network of the group. 
 
Of all the four cases that emanated from the investigation into the shipwreck of 2nd and 
3rd October 2013, this case is more representative of the workings of the modern day 
criminal groups engaged in smuggling and trafficking migrants from Libya to Italy 
through the Mediterranean.  Other than the FERMO PM GLAUCO I and II cases, 
arising out of the investigation that followed the 03/10/2013 shipwreck, there were 3 
other relevant cases where organized criminal groups engaged in people smuggling 
were investigated by the Italian authorities in Sicily.   
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(1) FERMO PALESTINESE 1, where Abdalmenem Ih Attour, a Lebanese was, among 
others, charged with illegal transportation of migrants from Africa to Italy, particularly 
from Libya to Lampedusa for a fee.16  He was also charged with providing safe houses 
for the migrants in Libya with armed guards and inhuman treatment of the migrants.   
 
(2) FERMO PM MUHIDIN in which Elmi Muhidin Mouhamud, a Somalian national, was 
identified as the leader of the kidnapping gang operating in the deserts.17  He was 
specifically charged with offenses relating to trafficking in persons, kidnappings and 
smuggling of migrants for a fee or ransom.   
 
(3) FERMO PM SCAFISCA which had Bensalam (alias Bensalam Khalid) of Tunisian 
origin, as defendant.18 He was identified as one of the two smugglers that organised 
and piloted the ill-fated boat crossing of October 3, 2013.  Investigations conducted 
showed full participation in these criminal activities by all the nine suspects with 
different roles as well as their ability to be fully operational, regardless of the ongoing 
investigations on other apprehended members of the association and network of 
actors.  The techniques and strategies observed to have been employed by these 
actors in their operations, have been analysed in the chapter six of this work 
While the other cases examined in this study dealt with the aspects of the modus 
operandi and the actors of the phenomenon, this case shines light on how the diverse 
groups have responded to the spike in demands for crossings by migrants and the 
various approaches employed by European authorities to stem the tide.  It gives a 
detailed presentation of activities of the actors in their networks revealing their 
connections and their inter-relations revealed through wiretappings carried out by the 
Italian flying squad during several investigations.  Information contained in these 
proceedings are deemed credible following the assertions of Colwell, Hiscock, and 
Memon (2002) who in their analysis endorse the veracity of eyewitness reports such 
as contained in the proceedings, in investigations, in which also the criminal justice 
 
16 Examined in chapter five of this work as regards the aspect of actors involved in the Libya to Italy irregular maritime 
migration phenomenon 
17 Examine in chapter 6 as regards the aspect of the Modus operandi employed by actors in the Libya to Italy 
irregular maritime migration phenomenon 
18 Also examined in the sixth chapter of this work as regards the aspect of the Modus operandi of the actors 
involved in the Libya to Italy irregular maritime migration phenomenon 
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system expresses a high level of confidence.  Although this may not tally with the 
opinion of Aziz, Pastore and Monzini (2015) regarding the authenticity of the structural 
organisation proposed by this study, the indications from these proceeding are 




The FERMO PM GLAUCO II Case 
 
The complex investigations by the office of the Public Prosecutor into the activities 
of the organized criminal group did not stop with the detention and prosecution of 
the nine suspects.  The investigations continued, leading to the issuance of yet 
another order for precautionary detention of twenty four suspects, mainly of Eritrean 
nationality, on 10/04/2015.   GLAUCO 11 is, therefore, a follow up on the work 
developed and the findings reached in the Glauco operations.  It involved 24 
suspects, 22 residing in Italy, one Eritrean, Ghermay Erimais and an Ethiopian, 
Mered Medhaine Yehdego.    
 
The facts and circumstances in this second case are similar to that of GLAUCO 1, 
such that even Ghermay Ermias, a principal suspect in the first proceeding, is also 
a defendant in this second case.  As in the earlier proceedings, the declarations of 
migrants, phone tapings and surveillance operations were central to the 
investigation.  The investigation found that the organized criminal group identified in 
the GLAUCO OPERATION remained fully operative at a transnational level, with 
cells in many different places.  Responsibilities were shared among members and 
cells, with some responsible for the illegal entry of migrants into Italy, while others 
were concerned with their transit to final destinations in the European Union. 
 
According to the proceedings, the smuggling of migrants is organized in different 
stages.  Firstly, migrants are collected and assembled in Libya where they are 
received by Ghermay Ermias and his associates.  Usually, they are kept in Zuwarah 
(Libya), in houses under the control of Ghermay Ermias, until the day of their 
departure for Europe via the sea.  Again, their journey to Libya from their respective 
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home countries is fraught with violence and abuse, including kidnapping, of which 
Ghermay Ermias and his partners were aware and accomplices.  Every service 
rendered to the migrants is paid for in advance and those who are not able to pay 
are forced to work in lieu.  From Ghermay Ermias' houses in Zuwarah, the migrants 
embark on the most precarious stage of the journey.  They are crammed into 
unstable boats and launched into the Mediterranean in the direction of Italy.  
Conscious of operation Mare Nostrum, the smugglers abandon these boats in 
international waters after they have sent a request for help to the authorities.  The 
migrants are subsequently, in most cases, rescued by the coast guards. 
 
Once migrants are on Italian soil, they are again ‘‘recruited’’ by members of the 
organized criminal group operating in Italy, with the promise of facilitating their 
further movements, and providing other logistical support, such as accommodation 
and clothing.  All services are provided only after pre-payment has been made.   
 
The modus operandi of the organized criminal group, therefore, consists of: (1) 
Introduce migrants illegally into Italy; (2) Once in Italy, migrants are forbidden from 
participating in the standard identification procedures, including photographs and 
finger printing; (3) Before the conclusion of identification and reception procedures, 
migrants are assisted by members of the criminal group, in moving away from the 
Reception centers towards northern Italy, and from there to northern Europe.  
Avoiding identification procedures at the Reception centers is in a bid to preclude 
the application of European and national laws on immigration.  According to 
European Union law, the administrative procedure aimed at obtaining a resident 
permit and or refugee status, shall be finalized where it is initiated.  If the migrants 
are photo identified at the Reception centers in Italy, the mentioned administrative 
procedure is triggered.  This means that migrants who wish to settle in any other 
European country can no longer do so, on account of having already initiated the 
asylum procedure in Italy.  Only Italy is obligated to consider their asylum or 
residence requests.  On escape from the Reception centers, and in their bid to get 
to their destination countries, migrants, assisted by members of the organized 
criminal group, are moved from one place to another by public bus transport, as a 
way of evading passport controls and possible detection by the authorities.  
Investigation also revealed not only prepayment for each service provided, it also 
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revealed in greater detail the methods of payment used.  Members of the criminal 
organization receive payments through different systems, legal and illegal.  They 
can receive payments directly in cash; through the ‘‘Ahwala’’ banking system based 
on trust; through financial services providers that allow quick and smooth movement 
of cash, such as Western Union, MoneyGram, and, in Italy, Poste-Pay. 
 
Other services provided for migrants by the criminal group in Italy include, the 
procurement of false documents to enable migrants travel within Europe undetected, 
and the arrangement of sham marriages as a means of procuring and or enabling 
illegal entry, transit and stay. 
 
Evidence gathered showed that members of the organized criminal group had 
precise yet varied roles, either as a migrant receiver and or collector, driver, Ahwala 
etc. with the contribution of all suspects being essential to the smuggling of migrants 
and other related offences by the group.  Ghermay Ermias, Mered Medhanie 
Yehdego (in North Africa) and Ghermay Asghedom (in Italy) were, at this stage, 
identified as main leaders of the organized criminal group. The investigation 
concluded that the group remained operative and was responsible for smuggling tens 
of thousands of migrants across the sea into Italy and the rest of Europe. 
 
The legal findings of the case were as follows. In view of the findings of the 
investigation, the public prosecutor determined that all the suspects were members 
of a transnational organized criminal group dedicated to the smuggling of migrants 
for financial and material benefit.  The group operated mainly in Central Africa, the 
Maghreb countries, Italy and northern Europe.  All suspects conspired in the 
smuggling of migrants and in procuring and or enabling the illegal entry, transit and 
stay of migrants in Italy and from there to other places in Europe.  Precautionary 
detention of the suspects was determined because of the risk of escape; risk of 
tampering with evidence and risk of the suspects repeating the offences if not 
restrained.  The order of precautionary detention was also issued against suspects 
whose whereabouts was unknown at that time, even as their investigation was 
continuing. 
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The judicial reports enable some of the key questions to be answered such as: can 
the rapid increase in the number of migrant crossings be linked solely to the desire to 
travel by the migrants?   If so, to what extent have the evolving strategies and 
techniques employed by the criminal smuggling groups assisted this phenomenon?  
The answer, according to Monzini, Aziz and Pastore (2015) is that the high demand 
for crossings in the recent past can be attributed to the heterogeneous criminal 
networks, which avail themselves of the desperate situation of the migrants, expanding 
the markets in popular transit hubs, such as Libya and Zuwara.   
 
The escalation in the crossing figures in the recent past points to two sustaining 
factors; first, the high demand in crossings, and secondly, the ability of the 
transnational criminal groups in adjusting to the trend in terms of their structure and 
network, which is the focus of this chapter.  What stands out clearly in the judicial 
proceeding is the use by the criminal networks of social networking sites and other 
electronic forms of verbal and financial communication. Here we are referring to 
Applications like Skype, Imo, and WhatsApp which have end to end encryption (for 
security purposes) as against the use of telephone conversations which are easily 
amenable to wire tapings by the authorities. Most of the evidence used to convict the 
1st to 7th defendants in the FERMO PM GLAUCO1 case on the count of belonging to 
a criminal organisation was obtained through wiretapping of their telephone 
communications. It was observed in the transcript of the wire taps that the suspects 
preferred discussing details of strategy via WhatsApp and Skype. This infers that the 
complexity and the evolution of the crossings in the Mediterranean are inversely 
conditioned by the techniques and structural formation of the criminal groups. 
 
Based on the judicial reports above, the remainder of this chapter will trace the 
development of criminal networks as part of the overall evolution of the irregular 
migration flow in the central Mediterranean. 
 
 
The formation of the Criminal Networks  
 
Networks have been identified as a common feature in the study of social 
organisations (Williams 2001), and applied to organised crime (Potter 1993).  The 
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traditional understanding of organised crime identified their structure as either 
hierarchical or pyramidal.  It now appears that these criminal organisations have 
significantly evolved.  The Europol Risk Assessment of 2013 identified an estimate of 
3600 OCGs actively functional in the EU, with about 40% of them running a network 
type structure (Europol SOCTA 2013).  The 2016 Europol report records Europol being 
purview to information regarding over 10,000 suspected members of smuggling 
networks in 2015 alone (Europol 2016).  Bârsan and Cardiş (2014) explain that the 
observed replacement of traditional hierarchy of the groups which acted based on 
geographical criteria, by free networks which worked together with the sole aim of 
exploiting new opportunities on the free market, necessitated the definition of 
organised crime group on an international level, which the United Nations have 
provided.  They add that there has been an expansion of international commerce 
which can be seen in the mode in which the activities of organised crime organizations 
throughout the country have expanded and diversified. This scholarly observation 
could be visualised in the recent irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy in which 
some of the smugglers have been identified as former drug smuggling offenders who 
have diversified into the business of smuggling of persons because of the profits which 
smugglers now make from migrants and because of the unprecedented surge. 
Considering the statistics of SOCTA 2013 and EUROPOL 2016, these observations 
and assertions appear tenable.  This aligns with the response of an officer of the Italian 
Flying Squad in Palermo who deals directly with irregular migration cases particularly 
on the issue of the evolution of criminal groups and networks (Interview 11)19.  He 
revealed that structurally, the criminal groups identified with people smuggling could 
also be grouped as the Mafia based on its hierarchical model as presented by Arsovka 
(2014).  This modelling of criminal groups has been extensively discussed in the third 
chapter of this study.  Other revelations by the officer exposed the fact that based on 
this categorisation and understanding, human smugglers apprehended by the people 
smuggling unit of the Italian police, are prosecuted in the same way members of the 
Mafia are prosecuted.   
 
Regardless of the scholarly assertions regarding the perceived structure of criminal 
organisations, evidence and data reveals significant evidence of the evolution of 
 
19 The officer did not wish to be identified; he rather remains anonymous for security reasons. 
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criminal organisations/networks. Bârsan and Cardiş (2014) argue that there are no 
unique models of a transnational crime organisation based on its multi forms, codes, 
experience, areas, and tactics. Their arguments are premised on the fact that  
 
…the fight against organized crime is quite complex and requires 
international cooperation; crime organizations are sophisticated, 
easily adjustable and are in permanent expansion of their alliances 
and agreements in order to obtain broader access to ‘know-how’, 
new technologies of ensuring better protection from state’s 
authorities, reducing risks and opening new channels of illegal 
activities (Bârsan and Cardiş, 2014:160)  
 
This submission could be argued as the reason for the evolution of criminal groups as 
well as the increase in the business of people smuggling and trafficking (Bloch and 
Chimienti, 2013, The Migration Observatory, 2014, Vogel, Triandafyllidou. and Düvell, 
2011. See also Campbell, 2013).  It is therefore possible to trace and lace the 
challenges and complexities of the phenomenon in recent times with the traits 
asserted by Bârsan and Cardiş, 2014.  In essence, the different sides to the network 
of the human trade between Libya and Italy points to one thing; a multi-various 
networks with distinctive characteristics that make them indomitable which this study 
examines in this chapter.   
 
Although criminal organisations have in the recent past been observed to operate 
through fluid networks, shifting from the traditional hierarchies (Williams 2001), 
indications from data collected for this research suggest that the evolution in the 
structure of criminal networks has become a continuum at the same time scattered. 
One notable feature of the criminal organisations involved in the smuggling of persons 
from Libya to Italy is the fact that they are more than ever transnational and ‘boundary 
spanners’ (Williams, 2001).  William’s noted the capacity of criminal networks to flow 
around physical barriers and at the same time across legal/geographical boundaries 
as an advantage.  This ability goes some way to explaining how their operations 
survive against prosecutions and clampdowns.  The FERMO PM GLAUCO case 
revealed the existence of a criminal network of smuggling groups, active both in Italy 
and the African continent.  The research concludes that the Libya to Italy human trade 
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is organised and steered by transnational networks consisting of various operational 
components as ‘‘collective sets’’, and not as a ‘‘compartmentalized structure’’ within a 
formation.  The structure is one of a number of groups interconnected, with the ability 
to mutually interact with a common goal of orchestrating and carrying out criminal 
operations/projects. This could be compared to the collective network concept (Kurtz 
2009), only that in this case, the common goal which is the financial gain and 
acclaimed authority in successfully smuggling migrant through international borders 
remain the common bond that links the groups.  The focus and interest of the groups 
momentarily transcend their traditional structures with their common goal in mind.       
 
Membership of a criminal organisation is established when the role and method of the 
acts performed are such as highlight the existence of a bond/agreement to commit a 
crime.  This can occur when the role cannot be entrusted to people outside the 
organisation or when the person involved uses the resources and system of the 
organisation as a permanent member of the organisation.  Membership is not 
established simply because   the organisation may occasionally place responsibilities 
on the person.  In this regard, boat owners or lessors, Italian nationals who are 
occasionally recruited to drive migrants across European borders and others who, in 
a single instance, take part in fake marriages for a fee, though identified as actors in 
this study, are not classified as belonging to a criminal organisation.   
 
In the FERMO GLAUCO case and using the afore-mentioned criteria, it is obvious that 
all the defendants belonged to a criminal organisation.  The case is demonstrative of 
the existence of a bond between the ‘‘cell’’ in the Italian territory and those operating 
from abroad (Libya, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia) which together have allowed members 
of the cell to interact with the migrants, facilitate their travel arrangements to Sicily and 
thereafter, to northern Italy and other parts of Europe. Although an attempt was made 
by the public prosecutor in the FERMO GLAUCO case to allude to a permanent and 
existing criminal organisation operating out of Africa and Italy to facilitate the 
smuggling and resettling of irregular migrants into and in Italy, opinions differ as to 
whether there is indeed a permanent criminal organisation so structured.  For instance, 
Salt (2000) points out that the symbiosis observed between the trafficker/smuggler 
and the migrant complicates issues.  He argues that the trafficking and smuggling 
organisations consists of a flexible structure of many loosely interconnected and 
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competitive networks in which the smuggling and trafficking market is continuously 
pooled and re-shared, as against working with a single core.   The OECD (2015) 
report, on the other hand, analyses that the smuggling organisations adopt adaptive 
strategies in the face of policy changes, by either changing prices or reverting back to 
their poly-criminality mode or adopting intense smuggling tactics to make more money.  
To this end, Monzini, Aziz, and Pastore (2015) suggest that these smuggling 
organisations are structured in the form of flexible coalitions which are managed by 
means of ad hoc contractual agreements, continuous interactions with other local and 
transnational networks.  They assert that even judicial proceedings have not been able 
to arrive at proven organizational structure, where particular roles are specifically 
shared out, whereas this study disproves that claim by extrapolating from proceedings 
examined key evidence to demonstrate the organizational structure of OCGs in the 
human trade.  However, in the opinion of the EUROPOL (2016), it perceives that 
cooperation among smuggling networks would be according to the immediate need, 
thereby making it more occasional but a regular occurrence.  It exposes that the 
competition among them is managed by means of larger criminal networks attempting 
a sort of hostile takeover of smaller opportunistic networks.  As varied as these 
opinions may be, this research adopts the perceptions of the 2016 EUROPOL report 
on Migrant smuggling, which suggests that the evolution and structure of smuggling 
organisations tend to take up all identified features and many more, in order to meet 
immediate need.  This transcends merely being flexible.  
 
In truth, the increase in migrants' demand for crossings of the Mediterranean resulted 
in more smugglers entering the now lucrative ‘‘business’’. With this came more 
specialisation and ‘‘professionalism’’.  There arose, therefore, the need for better 
organisation with a view to avoiding detection and arrest and making more profits.  The 
findings in the case under review suggest that the criminal networks involved have 
since evolved and become dense, complex and transnational.  They are linked in 
some cases and parallel in others, not involving a protracted criminal bond and not 
based on permanent membership but having a well-planned objective of profit.  We 
see from the case under review, criminal networks orchestrating the transport of the 
migrants from their countries of origin across the Sahara Desert and the coast of Libya 
into Tripoli.  In Tripoli another network of criminal groups warehouses the migrants 
pending suitable arrangements for a boat or dinghy to take the journey across the 
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Mediterranean.  Even as the migrants travel from Sub-Saharan Africa across the 
desert to Libya and from Sudan to Libya, there exists other armed groups who kidnap 
and keep the migrants against their will and ultimately extort huge sums of money from 
their relatives before they are released or handed over to the Tripoli based people 
smuggling networks (judicial reports, the FERMO MUHIDIN Case).  These informal 
and overlapping networks emerge, morph and fade by the week.  This feature is 
observed uniformly in the conversations recorded via phone tapings between the 
suspects/actors obtained by the anti-trafficking and smuggling police squad.  Below is 
an excerpt of the analysis of the conversation between the smugglers (both 
professional smuggler and a relative as an actor) on behalf of a prospective client, 
who was the younger brother of the caller. It is an example of the interconnectivity of 















Examining the above excerpt in relation to previous conversations wiretapped  on this 
thread as contained in the proceeding,20 the caller had earlier contacted a different 
smuggler who appeared to have swindled him and had not carried out the agreed plan 
of smuggling the minor abroad, after receiving the money paid for the service (The 
FERMO PM GLAUCO case, pp. 52-55).  This implies that though a smuggler may 
appear to belong to the same association because of shared nationality, they 
 
20 The wiretapped conversations are attached as an appendix in the finished draft of this work.  
Box 7.1. 
 
Conversation 15.11.2013, starting at 11:47, prog nr.380, 393,285,690,899 to SAL.M, from TES: 
        
‘TES calls from Australia and informs SAL.M that he sent money to SAMUEL to help a 
relative named HENOK GEREZGIHER, but did not get any news, because SAMUEL would not 
answer the phone. TES, informs that the boy is 15 years and is a survivor of the sinking, was 
transferred from Lampedusa to Sicily and needed the said money right away. 
 
SAL.M reassures TES that he would go personally to talk to SAMUEL. 
TES informs that the number of the guy is: 00393339996008…’ 
 7-1.  Excerpts from The FERMO PM GLAUCO case 
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nevertheless, in most cases, have their private operations which they run without 
collaborating with other members of their organisation, as their own prerogative.   
 
Scholars in the network field, such as Powell (1990), explain that in networks, 
transactions are carried out by the network of individuals who are ‘…engaged in 
reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions’ (Powell 1990, p.303).  The 
complexity as indicated by Powell in networks such as these is that ‘…they involve 
neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy’ 
(Powell 1990, p.303).  In the same vein, this manner of interconnectivity in the form of 
a network, is identified by Campana (2016) in his illumination of criminal networks as 
a mode of exchange, as against the renowned twin pillars of market and hierarchies 
championed by Williamson (1973, 2005).  However, the complexity in the network of 
the criminal groups in the Libya to Italy irregular migration is problematic based on the 
diverse features and characteristics of their trade, especially hierarchy. These are 
further analysed in the succeeding part of this work. 
 
The networks in the Libya to Italy human trade, regardless of their unique 
organisational structure, were observed to exhibit the ability of coming together to 
commit more crimes, without imposing necessarily a hierarchical structure.  The focus 
of their actions secures their unification; this unification for the most part is temporal. 
Figure 12 below presents a representation of the network and linking of the smuggled 
migrant with the different actors analysed in chapter five of this study, and how they 
are further connected to other actors in the course of the journey from their diverse 
countries or place of origin, through the transit points, towns or cities, to their desired 
destination or location. 
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The Integrated Criminal Smuggling Network Model (ICSNM) 
 
Figure 7-1.  Integrated Criminal Smuggling Network Model (ICSNM) indicating the connection between 





The diagram above is a mix model which describes the type of network of criminal 
organisations driving the Africa-to-Europe voyage, which this study refers to as the 
Integrated Criminal Smuggling Network Model (ICSNM).21  In their respective entities, 
 
21 The findings from the case file, validates the indications from findings gathered during filed study in Italy (Palermo, 
Castelvetrano, and Rome). Examining the interview transcripts, indications are that the structure of these criminal networks 
is dense complex, and transnational. The findings suggest that these networks are linked in some cases, and parallel in other 
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these groups are of their own unique structures yet converge to form sub groups as 
the need arises and are non-permanently linked to the other groups for the purpose of 
any trade.  For an example, the subset of the Nigerian/Ghanaian gangs are made up 
of multi-various groups who comport themselves to converge solely because of the 
human trade.  They also have their own heads in their various sub groups; this 
surprisingly, does not in any way hinder their collaboration.  Although the case 
examined in this chapter – the FERMO PM GLAUCO case – illuminates mainly the 
activities of criminal groups in the Horn of Africa, this analytical diagram is based on 
data regarding smuggling networks of Sub-Saharan and North African origin but may 
also be applied to other regions with minor modifications.  The diagram above shows 
a criminal network with roots in migrants' countries of origin, such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa, North Africa, including East Africa, which begins with business men (Unknown 
Bosses), Contractors (contacts) and family members of the migrants who may decide 
to indulge in the business of illegal migration in the form of either trafficking of human 
beings for profit or people smuggling for profit (Interview 30).  With the Nigerian 
connection as an example, village heads and individuals desperate for quick money 
or better economic alternatives are contacted and linked with smuggling rings 
disguised as local travel agencies, philanthropic kinsmen, connection men, and other 
local criminals.  An independent respondent, who preferred to remain anonymous 
when asked of how she got connected to the smugglers, recounted that the lady who 
trafficked her and her friends, came in the guise of being a help to their family’s 
helpless condition and was adored by all as good fortune to the family (Interview 39).  
At this level the connection link is horizontal.  Desiring migrants, and pimps by these 
connections are connected with middlemen/Passeurs of smuggling rings, operating in 
their different formations.  These independent smuggling rings, in the process of the 
voyage, meet with the desert crew which consist of the Tuareg, Tebu, Bokoharam and 
possibly other unnamed criminal groups who exploit the desert smuggling route.  This 
“desert crew” as this study tags them, sets up road blocks in order to exploit migrants, 
as well as unknown criminal groups that go through the desert, demanding large 
payments per person, most often sums not less than 10,000 Cfa.  A respondent in 
Palermo, with extensive knowledge of the route stated that; 
 
cases, not involving a protracted criminal bond and not based on participation or permanent membership but having a well-
planned objective of profit. Evidences from the field, based on respondents’ opinion shows that these criminal networks 
operate in form of cells within major Italian territories such as Agrigento and Rome - consisting for instance of Eritrean 
complementary to that operating in the African territory. 
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…every week, at least 30 vehicles (Toyota Pick- up) leave through the 
desert. During the journey, there are posts where they have to pay each 
person 10,000cfa [these posts are usually occupied by men from North 
of Chad and Libya – generally known as the Tuareg], armed rebels. 




At arrival in the most prominent transit countries for sub-Saharan and east African 
migrants, Libya, the migrants get connected to other criminal groups.  In the majority 
of cases, the criminal groups consist of members of different nationalities, but are 
mainly from Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt as well as Libya.  
Indications from field study conducted for this study suggest that, though the different 
groups may have vertical or horizontal structures of regional hierarchies, the 
connection at this level is horizontal with two main bosses.  The criminal groups at this 
level form alliances with one another across the Mediterranean.  An example of such 
links is the Somalian, Sudanese, Eritrean and Nigerian communities’ link with Italian 
criminal groups to form a formidable Europe based smuggling chain.  Although not 
clearly outlined in the diagram, the smuggling groups may maintain whatever models 
of organisation suits their existence, be it hierarchical or alien conspiracy or any other 
structure as independent smuggling rings. Excerpts of conversations between 
smugglers contained in the FERMO GLAUCO 1 proceedings reveal that the actors 
connive on many occasions with the aim of organising a smuggling assignment.  This 
aligns to a considerable extent with the expositions of William (2001) regarding the 
ability of criminal groups and networks to congregate and disband where they deem 
necessary, towards achieving a common goal. Thus, these smuggling groups form 
these alliances only as a means to succeed at the points of embarkation.   
 
It is possible however to assess the opinion of the court in this case (FERMO PM 
GLAUCO) regarding alliances across the Mediterranean as somewhat tenuous. This 
is because although in this case, the available evidence points to a clear link between 
the smuggling ring in Sudan/Eritrea/Syria through Libya and Agrigento in Italy, there 
yet remains a debate as to whether this is always the case. Conversely, drawing from 
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the responses of interviewees and the literature, there are clear indications that there 
exist networks in sub-Sahara Africa who only organise and move migrants from their 
countries of origin into the desert and consider their mandate expired at that point 
(Interview 1, 17, 18, and 28, Aziz, Pastore and Monzini 2015, UNODC 2010).  These 
sorts of networks have no responsibility or connection for any further steps the 
migrants take from there.  Also, some Tripoli based operators simply make 
arrangements for a boat, cram the migrants into it and leave them to the mercy of the 
sea and European coast guards.  They are not concerned about what happens to the 
migrants in Italy, whether or not they survive the perilous journey across the sea.  As 
argued by a confessed people smuggler, ‘anyone here who has no money can sell 
their apartment, buy a boat, and organise a smuggling trip’ (Kinsley 2015). Such a 
person certainly has nothing to do with the migrants if and when they get into Italy.  It 
is the contention of this study that the cell of receptors that exist in Agrigento arose in 
response to a need by the migrants.  They formed and operated in some cases 
independently of the Tripoli gang.  It however, has not been suggested that they 
shared their profits with or were in any other way answerable to the Tripoli network.  A 
parallel could be drawn here of the observed human trade network operating from 
Libya to Italy and the drug smuggling networks that import illicit drugs from Africa and 
South America into Europe, using Spain as a hub (The Economist 2016, UNODC 
2011, UNODC 2007).  The joint Europol-Interpol report of 2016 also adds that 
exploited migrants are at some stages of their journey used as drug mules for 
smuggling drugs.  These migrants have no choice regarding their involvement in drug 
smuggling; hence cannot refute the status.  While some networks get the drugs into 
Spain with the intention of disposing it to any willing and ready buyer, others have a 
transnational reach, capable of moving the consignment further around Europe, even 
as far as Scandinavia.  These later networks have a network of agents spread across 




The structure of the groups in the network 
 
The findings of published studies indicate that the human trade is organised by fluid 
networks as well as complex networks (Siegfried 2015, Massey and Coluccello 2007, 
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Reitano et al. 2014).  However, the findings of this research indicate that, although 
there is lack of permanence as regards criminal organisation, when smugglers and 
traffickers work together, they adopt horizontal and vertical structures.  This study 
regards this sort of network as ‘scattered and structured’ rather than fluid.  ‘Scattered’ 
in the context of this study refers to the ability of the criminal group being able to move 
off in different directions as a result of geopolitical factors or restrictive anti-smuggling 
measures, albeit with flexible return-to-status-quo abilities. In their assumed locations, 
these networks exhibit in an amoeboid form the multi-various characteristics that 
enable them thrive; so it is possible to have a group mutate from a traditional 
hierarchical or pyramid structure to whatever structure best suits the regions and the 
sociological factors it presents. In other words, having both impermanence and yet a 
clear structure when they are constituted, suggests that the organised criminal groups 
involved in the human trade operate in scattered networks employing a complex 
modus operandi.  Consequently, the networks are structured organisations, where 
members come and go, and can be readily replaced, whilst at the same time remaining 
clandestine.  The question of the evolution of organised criminal groups in recent times 
is reflected in some characteristic traits identified by this research, which will be 
discussed in this chapter.  To this extent the issue of hierarchy is contested.  Findings 
from field research and primary data analysed indicate that, regardless of the 
supposition that organised criminal groups in recent times operate through fluid 
networks (Williams 2001), and the formations appear definable, albeit the concept of 
criminal hierarchy still exists.  Although they may feature certain characteristics, such 
as specialisation and strict division of tasks, which this study refers to as a ‘task-
motivation’ trait of these criminal groups, at the same time, findings suggest that this 
feature enables the criminal groups to make their activities hard to identify.  The 
EUROPOL (2013) report on organised criminal groups authenticates this finding as a 
technique of adopting flexible hierarchy by the organised crime groups as a means of 
avoiding recognised organisational structures enabling them to obscure their activities.  
EUROPOL (2013), equally reveals that criminal groups are evolving and have in 
recent times adopted the concept of shared leadership, usurping the product of 
‘complimentary skills’ and ‘leadership collaboration’.  This research suggests that this 
may explain the reason for more coalitions in place of competitions despite emergence 
and evolution of smuggling groups in the face of the market demand of smuggling 
services.   
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In the line of criminal networks, a notable change that this research has observed, is 
the structure and behaviour of organised criminal groups; particularly groups involved 
in the Libya to Italy human trade, and their use of  multi-national membership.  When 
organised criminal groups were discussed in the Europol 2013 risk assessment, there 
was an indication of membership based essentially on shared national, ethnic, 
language, familial and kinship ties.  However, the analysis presented spoke of only 
single nationality criminal groups or even dual-nationality groups and not multi-national 
membership groups.   Although the UNODC attempted to provide a profiling of 
smugglers based on a regional categorisation, no research has noted multi-national 
membership. In his analysis on the social organisation of Chinese people smuggling, 
Ko-Lin Chin (2011), contrary to assumptions and arguments by scholars like Meyers 
(1994), Zhang Gayford (1996) and Hood (1997), found that membership of people 
smuggling groups were not solely dominated by the Chinese but also non-Chinese in 
various transit countries just as in any other legitimate international trade.  To this end, 
it is possible to share in the argument of Bilger et al. (2006:86) Webb and Burrows 
(2009:8) that the perceived good reputation of the smugglers, which is birthed by the 
trust the majority of the migrants have in them, complicates the possibility of gaining a 
comprehensive insight on the actual profile of the smuggler.  This research also 
suggests that the identified amoeboid nature of the criminal groups and the scattered 
structure of the networks also contribute to this complexity, and on the other hand, 
exposing the increasing trait of multi-membership both in the core groups.   
 
When Monzini, Pastore and Sciortino (2004) examined the organisation of the people 
smuggling business to and through Italy, in a project promoted and supported by the 
European Science Foundation and Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche respectively, 
they identified the problem of inadequate data for an in-depth analysis of the 
organisational structure of the human trade to and through Italy.  The analysis 
presented spoke of the need for sources that would enable an effective reconstruction 
of the organisation of the services provided by the smuggling groups, and the internal 
system of relationships and strategies employed by the groups.  It is this need that this 
research has endeavoured to meet through its examination of key judicial 
proceedings, corroborated by targeted semi-structured interviews with relevant 
respondents. Aziz, Monzini and Pastore (2015) more recently have argued that there 
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is little solid and systematic evidence of organisational structures. However evidence 
and data from field research conducted for this study indicate a probable 
organisational structure, particularly for the criminal groups operating between Africa 
and Southern Europe, on the central Mediterranean route.  The FERMO PM GLAUCO 
evidences connections that transcend international boundaries involving professional 
smugglers conducting their business in both Africa and Europe; in Eritrea, Australia 
and Italy.  This case had seven defendants of Eritrea nationality, one from Sudan and 
one national from Ethiopia. While all the Eritreans resided in different parts of Italy, the 
Sudanese lived in Sudan while the Ethiopian lived in and operated from Libya.  All the 
defendants, whilst residing in three different countries were able to work together to 
achieve a common goal confirming the observations of Chin (2011) regarding the 
global nature of the business.  This implies that the structural organisation of criminal 
groups in recent times, in their organised nature, transcends, to a large extent, 
cultural/national boundaries. These are changes necessitated by the phenomenal rise 
in the number of migrants wanting to cross the Mediterranean into Europe.  The key 
point here is that networks that were assumed to be peopled by members of the same 
ethnicity with a common language have expanded to include people from multiple 
ethnic backgrounds (UNODC 2011, Chin 2011).  The activities of individual networks 
have now become transnational in certain cases,  
 
…a request for ‘intervention’ made to SALIH Mohammed and Samuel 
WELDEMICAEL by a person resident in Australia, which asked the two 
suspects to help his brother, illegal in Italy, to go to Rome.  The 
conversation between the two does not only show the complications of 
a proposed operation of the group but also the fact of how the same 
suspects are well known for their activities in support of the migration 
phenomenon even outside the country... (Judicial Report- FERMO PM 
GLAUCO) 
 
The above excerpt from the judicial proceedings exemplifies the intricacies of the 
smuggling groups involved in the Libya to Italy human trade, emphasising the 
transnational nature of their relationships and the services they provide.  Details of 
the conversation referred to in the report are provided in the appendix.  The evidence 
indicates that the criminal networks involved in the Libya to Italy human trade exhibit 
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an amoeboid nature – the ability to adjust to suit whatever condition - which confirms 
Phil William’s characterisation of criminal networks’ core; which is characterised by a 
dense connection among individuals/members and peripheries; which though less 
dense with a more loose relationship nature, is highly significant in network patterns 
as facilitators of cooperation (Williams 2001:72, 73).22   
 
Aziz, Monzi and Pastore (2015) argue that the structure of the smuggling groups 
allows for flexible coalitions which can be managed through ad hoc contractual 
agreements and repeated interactions among different local and transnational 
networks, which could in turn facilitate easy geographical shifts to respond to counter-
trafficking and smuggling operations. However, judicial proceedings examined for this 
study reveal that the structures remain and are reinstated by means of recruitment 
when members are apprehended and detained.  Thus, the business continues without 
obstruction.  
 
In the same vein, field research indicates that the different actors examined in Chapter 
5, belong to groups that exhibit the characteristics of criminal networks proposed by 
Williams (2001).  Certain distinctive differences, and significant similarities, were 
identified in the analysis of the different actors at different stages of the Libya to Italy 
journey, briefly discussed in Chapter six and represented in Table 6.2 in the same 
chapter.  The next section examines this amoeboid feature of these criminal groups 
briefly mentioned to identify their flexible and overlapping capabilities. 
 
 
The nature and the network of the human trade criminality  
 
This study argues that the structures assumed by the actors of the human trade in 
forms of groups and networks are effects of the characteristics which they exhibit 
which in turn reflects their nature.  In the preceding section, it is argued that the criminal 
networks and groups in the Libya-Italy human trade exhibits an amoeboid trait in their 
organisational structure which to a reasonable extent aligns with the expositions of 
 
22 Amoeboid - Amoeba comes from a Greek word meaning ‘to change.’ The amoeba moves by continually changing its 
body shape, forming extensions called pseudopods (false feet) into which its body then flows. The pseudopods also are used 
to surround and capture food—mainly bacteria, algae, and other protozoa—from the surrounding water. It is used here to 
signify the mode of metamorphosing of the criminal groups of the Libya to Italy human trade. 
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Williams (2001) in his analysis of networks and criminal networks.  It could also be 
implied that this feature is the reason for the concept of poly-criminality of the networks 
highlighted by the Joint Europol-Interpol report of 2016 on migrant smuggling (Europol 
2016).   
 
When questioned on the nature of the criminal groups involved in this human trade, a 
number of the professionals encountered on the field had diverse understandings of 
the criminal groups; some assessed them as scattered, highly enterprise driven, highly 
complex, opportunistic in nature, diverse and formidable (Interview 28, 17, 18, 3, 4 
and 11)23.  Whatever nature they may assume, one fact resonates; they are scattered.  
Thus, they exhibit different characters as a means of adjusting to whatever condition 
their operations constitute.  As a result of the fact that members of the network i.e. the 
actors are specialised in their operations, they are efficient in covering up any 
loophole.  Judicial proceeding corroborated by interviews conducted reveal that 
apprehended members of the groups/network are quickly replaced while the 
apprehended ones remain lip sealed.  
 
The formation of criminal groups according to their nationalities that have their own 
leadership without having to pay royalty to external leaders yet being able to work with 
other criminal groups to execute a plan, and then disband when it is accomplished, 
evidences an independent criminal group structure.  The study finds that this 
independent group structure is aimed at remaining clandestine and incognito (Squadra 
Mobile).  Another reason for this structure is to allow for versatility, enabling groups to 
engage in multiple business activities.  This versatility, in turn, enables increased 
capacity building and more profits.  
 
This study suggests that determining the nature of criminality on the central 
Mediterranean route is based on an understanding of the structure of criminal 
networks.  The structure of these criminal networks is analysed through the lens of the 
organised criminal group typology analysed in Chapter 3 and 4.  They include the 
hierarchical/alien conspiracy; the patron-client relationship model; the illegal 
 
23 Interview 28 – Interview with a Professor of International Law; interview 17- Interview with an Anti-smuggling and 
irregular migration prosecutor/judge at the Ministero della Giustizia (Palermo); Interview 18 – head of Police (Palermo); 
Interview 3- Interview with academia from CISS Palermo; Interview 4 – interview with the Coordinator of Centro Astalli, 
Palermo. 
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enterprise model; and the network model (Arsovka, 2014, Davis 2012, Zhang and Chin 
2002, Cressey, 1969).  The networks operating out of Libya, however, employ 
divergent structures, exhibiting complex characteristics. For instance, findings from 
interviews show that while the Eritrean groups have a horizontal structure, the Nigerian 
groups have a vertical structure.  Further, the Nigerian groups have strong hierarchies, 
layered bosses, and operate as confraternities; these bonds are formed right from the 
formative years of the protagonists (Interview 28).  The complexities of the structures 
are reflected in their intersections at certain points, and their ability to work together to 
achieve planned goals.  In effect, these groups have different formations in terms of 
nationalities reflecting both regional and clustered hierarchies24.  They have the ability 
of coming together to commit more crimes, without necessarily adopting a hierarchical 
structure.  As argued by one of the respondents,  
 
…the criminal groups based on the origin such as Eritrean and Syrian 
and the others are different/separate, they only seek for other 
connections when they arrive in the EU from their bases, there are 
no connections – they simply operate within their communities (when 
they need extra connection to fulfil an aim and their help can only 
come from another group such as getting to the north of Europe, from 
another region/nationality they explore it. (Interview 28) 
 
Based on this analysis, it can be deduced that formation of criminal groups to perform 
designated operations transcends the original structures per nationality and structural 
codes (See Von Lampe, 2011).  Arguably, the interconnectivity between criminal 
groups and the strong regime of hierarchical leadership is prevalent in the criminal 
network steering the irregular migration from Libya to Italy.  Further indications from 
findings suggest that African networks are infused into the Italian criminal groups; for 
instance, the Nigerian group have been observed to have joined forces with the Italian 
group and they have complete control of the territory, particularly in the drug and sex 
trade and smuggling (Interview 28). The structure of these criminal networks appears 
complicated and unique because a situation where the Eritrean group, for instance, 
features a horizontal structure while the Nigerian group features a vertical structure 
 
24 See Le (2012) 
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reflects features of both economic models and hybrid models of organised criminal 
groups. One common trait among the various networks, however, is the gender and 
age of members. The average age for the seven out of nine defendants whose ages 
were ascertained in FERMO PM GLAUCO was 28 years. They were all males and 
cannot be said to be engaged in any form of occupation as their smuggling remains 
the only documentation of their activities. Europol reports that the average age for 
people arrested for people smuggling and trafficking in 2015 was 32 years (Europol 
2015).  In other words, these networks are composed mainly of male youths.  The 
Nigerian human trafficking networks remain an exception here as women (Madams) 
are at the helm of affairs especially in relation to human trafficking for the sex trade in 
Europe. 
 
Conversely, regardless of the fact that these groups come together to make up the 
Libya to Italy network, findings indicate that there are no actual intersections of these 
groups: they are all separate, depicting the scattered trait argued by this study. Though 
the groups feign the semblance of independence, research findings indicate that each 
region has a main boss such as the regions controlled by Erymais and Medhaine who 
are allegedly the main kingpins of criminal people smuggling networks (Interview 18) 
in the Libya to Italy routes.  However, it is unlike the drug cartels where turfs are carved 
and each boss fights to control his turf and does not allow any new operator.  The 
Libya to Italy human trade remains a free entry enterprise but recognises the 
dominance of certain actors in certain regions either due to their successes or 
longevity in the trade. 
 
Although Aziz, Monzini and Pastore (2015) argue that even judicial proceedings have 
not been able to identify organisational structures in the smuggling business, the 
analysis of the judicial proceedings selected for this study corroborated with field study 
carried out, suggest otherwise.  To this end, a conceivable model for explaining the 
distribution and formation characteristics of the network of criminal organisations in 
the ‘human trade’ from Libya to Italy is designed and presented below.  This model 
reflects the characteristic feature of collective sets which is made up of multi groups 
who are interconnected and mutually interact with the ultimate goal of carrying out 
designated smuggling and trafficking operations.  The arrows in the diagram are 
representations of the interconnectivity of the criminal groups/organisation which 
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indicate how the groups interrelate to enable them carry out tasks and operations.  
Based on this design, it is arguable that for the criminal groups in the networks, the 
focus transcends their autonomy but rather the business and how to make their profits.  
Consequently, the ideals of convening and disbandment following a cause or task is 
here demonstrated (William 2001).  Groups therefore form what this research refers 
to as ‘collective sets’ to enable them effectively meet the market which is made up of 
actors of different origins 
 




Figure 7-2.  The distribution and formation characteristics of the criminal networks. 
 
 
Examining the foothold of these non-native criminal groups in the various desired 
destination countries, indications from the interviews are that the criminal groups in 
Italy have direct connections with other criminal groups in Libya.  They act as support 
in Italy for people who arrive from Libya on the boats, and organise further trips from 
Sicily to Northern Italy and other parts of Europe because a majority of migrants do 
not want to stay in Italy.  Together with countries in the Balkan region, they tend to 
serve as transit countries for migrants. Preferred destination countries for the migrants 
include Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the 
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Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.  This is evident from the 
testimony of witnesses during trial and evidence from the wiretapping of defendants' 
telephones during investigation in the FERMO PM GLAUCO case.  It is thought that 
the criminal groups operating in Italy to help newly arrived migrants continue their 
journey to other parts of Europe are made up mainly of migrants who followed the 
same route in the past.  Their involvement is more opportunistic and grew out of an 
observed need from their own experiences. For these categories of migrants who 
desire to move on to other countries, Italy is simply perceived as a transit country.  The 
interconnectivity between the criminal groups and the migrants is intensified by the 
cordial relationships and communications these criminal groups maintain with the 
migrants before and after their arrival; and even in the reception centres with the aim 
of increasing their clientele. 
 
 
Respondents’ views vs Comparative view from literature on the nature of 
criminality in the study area 
 
This research explores all the varied opinions in determining the nature of criminality 
in the Africa Europe human trade via the Mediterranean.  Having considered the 
nature and the network of the human trade criminality, this study proceeds to analyse 
the responses provided by the interview respondents regarding their opinion on the 
nature of criminality in the Libya to Italy human trade.  Their opinion is considered 
based on the fact that these respondents have been carefully selected according to 
their relevance to the study.  In this vein, the opinion and positions from interview 
transcript are explored.  From the interview transcript of this study, there were 
divergent opinions of criminal organisation involved in the smuggling of migrants from 
Libya to Italy.  When asked about their understanding of criminal organisations, 
respondents were split in their views.  Some of the respondents explained that while 
the structure and characteristics of the groups and individuals appear complex, they 
are nevertheless higly organised and flexible.  The nature of flexibility of these groups 
was explained by the way they were able to respond to changes in restrictive 
immigration measures set out by the EU (especially the coastal States), the change in 
the level of violence employed by the smugglers, as well as the motive behind their 
venture.   Another key feature observed from the responses was the level of 
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connection of the groups within themselves and with some authorities. Some 
respondents claimed that the resilience of these groups was as a result of their links 
with their counterparts in countries of embarkation and destination and that the 
collaboration of the smuggling groups enables them not to be easily intercepted and 
identified.  The respondents further explained that although the rate of irregular 
migration in the Africa-to-Europe route – particularly via the Mediterranean – has 
increased in the recent past, the political situations which may be referred to as drivers 
of these events. as also noted by Browne (2015), do not necessarily always create 
these criminal groups.  The criminal groups are rather observed to flow with the money 
source which is thought to be the demand for smuggling services stirred by the would-
be migrants’ need and desire to survive.   Difficulty in understanding these criminal 
groups is analysed based on its concept of illicitness and the dangers they are 
associated with, which seem to dispel further probing and successful investigations.  
For instance, one of the respondents (an Italian state prosecutor) reported two major 
investigations Glauco 1 and Glauco 2 that were successfully conducted; including 
some arrests made, but stated that the kingpins of these groups remain ‘at large’.  
Similarly, for instance, the Italian Flying Squad representative interviewed indicated 
that though warrants for arrests have been granted, the unit yet face the challenge of 
proofs for the potential arrests.  He claimed that they can only rely on the cooperation 
of the migrants to identify these offenders which appear unachievable as the migrants 
remain hesitant in this regard. 
 
Other views and debate based on findings from interview transcript present 
respondents' view of the nature of transnational criminal networks reflecting an array 
of perspectives of the Libya to Italy criminal networks.  These particular views are 
based on their expertise in the field, experiences and personal encounters.  These 
views analyse the transnational organised criminal groups that originate from the West 
African, Sub-Saharan region but are presented in comparison with the East African 
originated transnational criminal networks identified and analysed in the FERMO PM 
GLAUCO case.  This enables an understanding of the nature of criminal networks in 
the Sub- Saharan section of the irregular migration from Africa with the knowledge that 
regardless of their region these criminal groups pool migrants at the same point of 
embarkation (in most cases Libya) as the East African groups testified in the FERMO 
PM GLAUCO case.   
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Based on the interview transcripts, a migrant mediator’s opinion of the criminal 
groups/organisations involved in the most recent irregular migration particularly across 
the central Mediterranean is that they are scattered in their networks with a complex 
modus operandi (Interview 30).  There are indications that these groups are 
transnational networks that act on the weakness of the structures in the society (with 
connections/representatives).  These groups also have connections with the people in 
both Libya and Italy who inform them either via phone calls or text messages of when 
it is safe to transport migrants; “…listen this time is not good for travel…” or “…this 
time is not favourable …” (Interview 30).  Findings indicate that these groups have 
different bosses, reflecting the concept of shared leadership where each boss has a 
responsibility which corroborates the analysis of risk assessment made by EUROPOL 
(2013).  Typical examples of such type of leaders are the Nigerian madams on local 
levels with certain roles such as recruiting girls.  These categories of leaders are able 
to operate and carry out their business because they have good repute before the king 
or the local village heads from where their clients or the trafficked girls are recruited.  
The interviewed migrant mediator’s perception of the criminal groups in this trade is 
echoed by a settled migrant interviewed during the field study for this paper in Italy in 
2016 (Interview 33).   Indications from this interview are the concept of groups in 
groups and in some occasion inter-related groups where the members and their 
leaders are acquainted, working as agents that know themselves.  This concept 
agrees with the context of two professional smugglers who were contacted by a 
transboundary client to organise the irregular transportation of an illegal relative within 
regions in Italy contained in the FERMO PM GLAUCO case proceeding being 
examined in this chapter.   Cases in the Judicial proceedings examined in this study, 
reveal the inflated fees charged by the smugglers for their services, which has been 
analysed under the diverse aspects of modus operandi employed as the concept of 
“inflated transportation cost” in the sixth chapter of this study; a witness interrogated 
during one of the documented trials stated “…I paid to the latter the sum of two 
thousand (2,000) dollars, compensation for the payment of my trip” (Judicial reports, 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case, pg. 20). Consequently, the monthly earnings of the 
members empower them to live enticing and extravagant lifestyles and ultimately 
enables them recruit their members.  Return on investment is huge.  With a 74,000 
pounds investment on a boat and an average profit of 24,000 pounds per trip, a 
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smuggler can make up to half a million pounds per week if he organises twenty trips 
a week (The Guardian 2016). 
 
Additionally, the views of an academic interviewed reveal the concept of multi-
membership in the groups driving the process, highlighting the diverse features 
analysed in the preceding part of this chapter in which the formation and structure of 
the groups as a result of the features they display present them as amoeboid in nature.  
An instance of the Nigerian group joining forces with the Italian group which grants 
them complete control of the territory, particularly in the drug and sex trade and 
smuggling, further highlights the implication of a multifaceted and interconnected 
group in the network (Interview 28).  Weighing the views of the respondents, the 
scattered network characteristics as suggested by this study, is affirmed by all as the 
most notable characteristics of groups and networks.  To this end, an Italian judge in 
charge of Irregular migration and Mafia cases presenting the Medhaine and Erymias’ 
network as an example, describes the intensity of the scattered nature of the criminal 
groups as little groups under each network that are accountable to that network, 
having different agents that desiring migrants approach for their services; ‘… they are 
scattered but still have one boss - each group have little outlets…’ (Interview 18).  He 
asserts in further discussions that he perceives that the smuggling networks though 
different, are observed to be returning to the hierarchical structure, but are more 
deadly and dangerous than the Mafia.  The judge’s observation is matched with the 
assertions of the Head of the Police (Squadra Mobile in Palermo), a prosecutor of 
irregular migration cases, who analyses the nature of the criminal groups as ‘…very 
structured organisation where you can identify the leader and the persons that support 
the leader’ (Interview 17).  Further indications from interview transcript reveals the 
features of good logistics because they have availability of weapons and men, persons 
and places to compound, especially in Libya, as features that convey their structured 
nature. In clearer terms the prosecutor informed that; 
 
‘…the criminal groups operating in Africa…they have a horizontal 
connection with the people operating in Sicily -Italy…because with the 
people operating in Sicily they are at the same level because they are 
in charge of a different part of the route…the people in Libya are in 
charge of the route concerning the travel from central Africa to Libya, 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
241 | P a g e  
 
and from Libya to Sicily…(two steps)…the people in Sicily are then in 
charge of the last step which is from Sicily to other parts of Europe’  
(Interview 17).  
 
In line with this assessment of a criminal group taken together with academic 
interviews, there crystalises a more vertical structure in the connection of cults such 
as the Nigerian groups where women have distinctive roles particularly in criminal 
networks devoted to sexual exploitation of women (Interview 29).  The academic 
contends that the horizontal formation of the Nigerian group is a ploy to hide the true 
identity of the leader thereby obstructing detection and prosecution.   Bârsan and 
Cardiş (2014) however differ on this. They explain that the observed replacement of 
traditional hierarchy of the groups was based on geographical criteria by free networks 
which worked together with the sole aim of exploiting new opportunities on the free 
market.  This was observed to have necessitated the definition of organised crime 
group on an international level which the United Nations has provided.  They add that 
there has been an expansion of international commerce which can be seen in the 
mode in which the activities of organised crime organizations throughout the country 
have expanded and diversified.  This development could be visualised in the recent 
irregular migration by sea from Libya to Italy in which some of the smugglers have 
been identified as former drug smuggling offenders who have diversified into the 
business of smuggling of persons because of the profits due to the unprecedented 
surge.  This observation is validated by the response from an officer of the Italian 
Flying Squad who is directly in charge of handling irregular migration cases on the 
issue of the evolution of criminal groups and networks (Interview 11).  The interview 
with the officer revealed that structurally, the criminal groups identified to be involved 
in this business of people smuggling could also be grouped as the Mafia, based on its 
hierarchical model as presented by Arsovka (2014).  The modelling of criminal groups 
as analysed by Arsovka (2014) has for the purpose of this study, been extensively 
discussed in the third chapter of this study. Based on this categorisation and 
understanding of these criminal groups grouped as in the category of the Mafia, human 
smugglers apprehended by the people smuggling unit of the Italian police, as informed 
by the officer, are prosecuted in the same way members of the Mafia are prosecuted. 
Going back to the concept of organised crime groups and crime organisation, Bârsan 
and Cardiş (2014) argue that there are no unique models of a transnational crime 
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organisation based on its multi forms, codes, experience, areas, and tactics.  Their 
arguments are premised on the fact that  
 
…the fight against organized crime is quite complex and requires 
international cooperation, crime organizations are flexible, 
sophisticated, easily adjustable and are in permanent expansion of 
their alliances and agreements in order to obtain border access to 
“know how”, new technologies of ensuring better protection from 
state’s authorities, reducing risks and opening new channels of 
illegal activities (Bârsan and Cardiş, 2014:160)  
 
This submission which is in tandem with the opinions of such scholars as Vogel, 
Triandafyllidou and Düvell, (2011), Bloch and Chimienti (2013), and Campbell, (2013), 
could be adduced as the reason for the evolution of criminal groups as well as the 
increase in the business of people smuggling and trafficking which has beleaguered 
not only Africa and Europe but also become an international concern (See also The 
Migration Observatory, 2014).  The flexible, sophisticated, easily adjustable and 
continually-in-permanent-expansion-of-their-alliances features of the present-day 
criminal organisations could account for the inability to completely defeat them.  
Therefore this study suggests that analysing the criminal networks that organise the 
Libya to Italy Mediterranean voyage as a single network which exhibits all the forms 
and characteristics of the different paradigms of organised crime may enable a better 
understanding of the nature of criminality involved in the trade, hence the development 
of the Integrated Criminal Network Model rather than merely refer to it as ‘complex’. 
 
Furthermore, the basis of the scattered nature of the criminal groups as identified by 
this study can be deduced from the assertions and comments of a government official 
who is a medical practitioner in Palermo who has attended to several newly arrived 
migrants in Palermo.  She points out the diverse origins/borderlands of the members 
of the smuggling groups with an example of an Afghan migrant travelling from Greece 
and Turkey, and the travel is organised by different groups; same as the migrants that 
go from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya highlighting the probable differences expected 
(Interview 32).  This observation is supported by the response of a settled migrant in 
Palermo who drew attention to the fact that the differences in this context can also be 
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based on the lingual variety and the different nationalities that carry on this business 
– the Iraqis, Arabs, and Africa – Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and West Africa (Interview 
25).  It is debatable that they may all have contact such as in Italy where there exist 
groups in the south, central and the north, but remain dispersed.  It is however 
important to note that as unimaginable as it may seem that Turkish, Grecian and 
Libya/African criminal groups can form a network, the stories and the time of the 
journeys is different and difficult depending on where the point of embarkation is.  This 
is inferred in the light of the understanding that for the Libya to Italy route, the network 
is strong and possible but with the Turkish route it is rather difficult. BBC (2015) reports 
of the problematic nature of the eastern Mediterranean route (which is via Turkey) as 
a result of the efforts put in by the Turkish government in addressing the issue of 
countless migrants arriving in Turkey for their onward journey to the nearest Italian 
Island.  To this extent, the effect of the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement is 
not ruled out (EU- State Watch 2016). Indications are that these observed difficulties 
have, based on events in the recent past, bolstered the pre-eminence of the criminal 
groups, thus the evolution of their strategies and techniques.    
 
The Non-Governmental organisation interviewed on the other hand, opined as a 
contribution to the opinion of the academia, that the criminal groups avoid being linked 
as a means of making themselves independent so that they remain indomitable 
(Interview 23).  This argument is presented based on the fact that cultist groups (like 
the black axe group originating from Nigeria) who are also involved in drug and 
prostitution carry out their own criminal activities with no form of remittances to any 
particular head.  Hence they have adopted the Independent Criminal Group Structure 
so as to defy investigation.  Summarising the diverse   views of respondents 
concerning criminal groups, a table is presented below, indicating the category of 
respondents and their perception of the phenomena. 
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Table 7-1.  Categorisation of the respondent’s view of the criminal network organising the 
Libya to Italy irregular migration based on their experience (source: the Author) 
 
  





Opinion 1 Opinion 2 
A migrant Scattered in groupings and 
variegated and yet acquainted; 
huge earnings of existing 
members, lure others. 
(Interview 33) 
  
Difference based on  language differences and nationalities 
(the Iraqis, Arabs, and Africa – Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
West Africa); interconnected but dispersed; existing groups in 





Scattered networks but having one 
boss (e.g. the networks of 
Medhaine and Erymias are 
different); small groups 
accountable to a/per network; 
diversity of agents; networks 
observed to be returning to the 
hierarchical structure, but are more 




Structured organisation with a visible  leader, (second in 
command),  good logistics; availability of weapons and human 
resource and locations (especially in Libya); the African group  
have a horizontal connection with the people operating in 
Sicily but roles are conducted in division of labour for the 
stages of the journey from Africa to  Sicily                                                                                                                                                                                                            
(Interview 17) 
 
An academic 1 
 
Variegated criminal groups; 
collaboration between the Nigerian 
group and Italian groups, having 
complete control of the territory, 
particularly in the drug and sex 
trade and smuggling. 
(Interview 28) 
 
…the structure of the Nigerian groups is of a vertical 
formation…they are not horizontal as some argue so no one 
understands who is the big one and its more difficult to get to 
them; however appears more vertical, and connected with the 
cults; women have distinctive roles in the Nigerian criminal 







Variegated criminal groups from 
different borderlands; travels and 
groups are organised/formed per 
nationalities (it is counter-intuitive 
that Turkish, Greek and 
Libyan/African criminals can form a 
network); the stories, time and 







Variegated groups of criminal 
networks; they operate 
independently so that they remain 
strong; there is no form of 
remittance to a particular head; 
they have adopted the 
independent criminal group 
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Examining the claims and assertions highlighted from the respondent’s quotes, it is 
clear that each respondent presents his claim based on a first-hand knowledge and 
experience perspective, which provides an array of features of the criminal 
groups/networks in the Libya to Italy irregular migration. In essence, the migrant who 
has encountered different criminal groups en route his journey to Europe would 
express his opinion of the scattered nature of the networks based on occurrences and 
his dealing with the group he contracted to organise his transportation, while the 
migrant mediator on his part would only relay the opportunist transnational nature 
opinion of the network he would have gathered during his contact with particular 
migrants.  It is therefore important to note that, given that a majority of migrants will 
not tell exactly what their experiences were, there is little doubt that all the information 
provided by a migrant who voluntarily offers his testimony may be worthy of note.  
Moreover, the assertions of the academia of the diversely linked formidable nature of 
the networks can be assessed to be based on examination as in the manner of this 
study; reliant upon primary data, while the claims of law enforcement agents and 
prosecutors of these networks having a scattered but deadly hierarchical structure, 
can be opinions based on investigations conducted and cases prosecuted.  
Conversely, while the claims of the government official may not be factual because 
their opinions of an internationally complex network are based on information provided 
by migrants that they have dealt with, being mindful that the migrants may have fear 
of the reaction of the authority and as such might withhold certain details, the claims 
of the non-governmental social worker of an Independent Criminal Group Structure 
may be more realistic because of the level of confidence the migrants may have in 
social workers. 
 
A number of descriptive key words explaining criminal networks/smuggling 
organization in the study area were noted from the interview transcripts and is further 
analysed in chapter eight, echoing the intricate nature of these smuggling groups.  The 
problem associated with identifying the offenders and the distinction between the 
offenders and the victims yet pose a major barrier in understanding the trend as well 
as determining the nature of criminality involved.  
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The question of ‘the Connection of irregular people smuggling groups with the 
Mafia’ 
 
One of the themes from the interview transcript was the structure of the criminal 
organisations which questioned the involvement of the Mafia in the irregular migration 
from Libya to Italy.  Consequently, in the discourse of people smuggling and trafficking 
networks, the debate on the link between the Mafia and the criminal groups that 
organise the Africa to Italy and Italy to other European countries movements is yet 
ongoing.  
 
For the sake of background knowledge, the five major Mafia organizations existing in 
Italy include; Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia), revered as the world’s most popular criminal 
organisation and also the oldest manifestation of the Sicilian Mafia; Camorra or 
Campanian Mafia, known for their extreme violence and their lavish lifestyle; 
'Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia, categorised among the most threatening organised 
criminal group not only in Italy or Europe, but also in other continents; Basilischi 
(Basilicatan Mafia); Sacra Corona Unita (Apulian Mafia), exhibiting its heterogeneous 
structural characteristic which enable them carry out diverse strategic criminal 
activities; Mala del Brenta, Banda della Magliana (Europol 2013b -Italian Organised 
crime) and the newest escalation, Mafia Capitale, is referred to as a drafting of  Roman 
upper class members into an organised criminal network, operating a systematic Mafia 
model (De Bonis 2015).  In general terms, the Mafia are known for their bonds that 
supersede the law of their communities, love for respect, the love for power, 
particularly economic power thus, they are defined by their conduct of exercising 
absolute power over their territories (Europol 2013b).   
 
This explains why it remains questionable that African criminal groups such as the 
afore mentioned identified human traffickers and smugglers resident in Italian 
territories are able to flourish without the possible involvement of Italian criminal 
organisations such as the Mafia.  The suggestion of the involvement of the Mafia 
created a controversy among the respondents who participated in the field study 
conducted for this work.  This is implied because, while respondents from the criminal 
justice system claimed that there were no evidence to prove the involvement of the 
Mafia and as such could not be said to be involved, over 10 of the 40 respondents 
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interviewed held to their position as regards their assurance of the involvement of the 
Mafia.  Respondent 22, a representative of CARITAS in Palermo, asserted the 
existence of a connection between the Nigeria criminal groups and the Italian criminal 
groups given the rate of prostitution in Sicily. Perhaps respondent 22’s opinion may be 
based on his experience of many years working with trafficked migrants. She believes 
that “…they [other criminal groups/organisations] cannot function without the authority 
of the Mafia (Interview 22).  Other respondents held similar position while some 
respondents from anti-Mafia organisations conform to a limited degree, with the 
defence of the possibility of the Mafia knowing simply about the transportation but not 
clearly involved with its management.  This stance was equally contradicted by a 
representative from Santa Chiara Palermo, who argued that the fact that no one 
admits to the truth about the involvement of the Mafia may not dismiss their 
contribution;  
 
I can also confirm that the smuggling rings have contacts with 
the Italian also, because there is no business or criminal 
organisation that can function on Italian territories without the 
authorisation of the Mafia. This is something that everyone is 
quiet about. No one wants to voice it that that the Italian criminal 
groups are also connected. 
(Interview 20) 
 
Although criminal justice agents interviewed did not agree to the involvement of the 
Mafia since they claimed not to have sufficient evidence to prove, a number of 
respondents strongly agreed that there may be a link between the duos. Their 
responses on this question are stated thus; 
 
…there is a connection between the Nigerian criminal groups 
and the Italian criminal groups. Surely, the rate of prostitution in 
Sicily shows that there is an agreement with the Italian Mafia. 
Surely, the prostitutes cannot function without the authority of the 
Mafia.  
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(Interview 30)25  
 
I can also confirm that the smuggling rings have contacts with 
the Italians also, because there is no business or criminal 
organisation that can function in Italian territories without the 
authorisation of the Mafia. This is something that everyone is 
quiet about. No one wants to voice it out that the Italian criminal 
groups are also connected.  
(Interview 20)26  
 
As regards transportation, the Sicilian Mafia may be informed 
about the transportation and prostitution but there is no direct 
management by the Sicilian Mafia. They may have permitted it 
but are not directly involved in it.  
(Interview 25)27 
 
There is the case of several Italians profiting from the migrant 
flows like making profit with the hosting of the centres…the Mafia 
are really involved in this hosting.  A good example is the town 
of Mineo, where there is sited the biggest shelter or Reception 
centre in Sicily.  There was a big case of the Mafia being involved 
in  Mineo, where they were hosting was smaller than the required 
number of migrants like the 4000 migrants…inside, everything 
was going on and they had not only criminal groups for 




Based on these responses from interview transcript, the involvement of the Mafia may 
be debatable as concluded by the criminal justice system, with the assumption that 
 
25 A government official from the Commisione Territoriale per il Riconoscimento della Protezione 
Internazionale - Territorial commission for the International Protection and Recognition Palermo, Sicily. 
26 Interview with Fr. Vincenzo Volpe from Santa Chiara, Palermo 
27 Interview with a representative from Addio-Pizzo, Palermo, Sicily, Italy. 
28 Interview with a researcher from CISS - Cooperazione Internazionale Sud Sud, Palermo, Sicily, Italy. 
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there has not yet been enough evidence to prove the involvement of the Italian Mafia 
in the criminal network being discussed in this study.  Based on this claim, even though 
there may be other criminal organisations in Italy who may be involved with the African 
groups in certain ways in this human trade, the role of the Italian Mafia remains a 
puzzle and thus deserves further investigation. Nevertheless, an Italian medium 
reported the involvement of Italian mobsters in human trafficking cases (Day 2013).  
The report spoke of members of Mafia organisations working with crime syndicates in 
Egypt who charged and extorted huge sums from several would-be-migrants for the 
perilous trip from Libya to Italy which in most cases were not even successful and the 
migrants endured the worst conditions.  Evidences such as ‘…a chilling wiretap made 
in 2011 [which] overheard one Sicilian Mafia boss telling the Egyptian traffickers: ‘If 
they find you, throw them [the migrants] all into the sea’, makes it doubtful that the 
Mafia will not be involved in illegal activities in their territory, particularly on the Italian 
southern coast.  This opinion was also shared by a Mafia expert and author Corrado 
de Rosa (day 2013). 
 
 
Despite the debate on evidence of the involvement of the Mafia in the human trade, 
indications from data collected suggest that the Mafia have been observed to provide 
aids to these migrants, thereby commercialising the circumstance as a way of 
laundering money (Interview 12)29.  This opinion is corroborated by a publication by 
Perry and Agius (2015) on the response of prosecutors in Rome on the debate of why 
the Sicilian Mafia are permitting organised criminal groups to make millions off their 
turf.  The response of the prosecutors revealed main attraction of the Mafia to the 
business of people smuggling and trafficking.  Hence, although the Mafia were alleged 
not to be the main smugglers, they were indicted to have cashed in on the construction 
and management of the reception centres.  In this context, the migrants were merely 
piggy banks to mint and launder money.  Also, other reports, including Ford (2017), 
alleged of how the Mafia are not only commercialising the plight of the migrants but 
also integrating these vulnerable migrants into Mafia-related enterprises in Sicily (Day 
2013, Tondo 2016, Ford 2017a and Ford 2017b).30  In actual sense, a person found 
 
29 Interview with the Head of Casa San Francesco (a migrant reception centre and home) Palermo, Sicily, Italy, 
May 25, 2015. 
30 Although it is believed that the Costa Nostra typically does not deal directly in prostitution and drug dealing, it can be argued 
that the Mafia has found a convenient loophole to these moral codes by exploiting migrants, especially Nigerians. Clearly, the 
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guilty of aiding and abetting a crime cannot be absolved of the said crime, hence it can 
be argued that the Mafia are as guilty as the smugglers. Correspondingly, a 
respondent referred to the case of Mineo in validating an observed practice of several 
Italians as a fact, profiting from the migrant flows in the form of making profit with the 
hosting of the centres, laying strong emphasis on its capacity and its reputation 
(Interview 29).31 
 
Europol 2013b informs that the Mafia are in the custom of regulating the impact of their 
criminality on productive activities that go on in the territories they control, so that even 
though they exert power and are seen as parasites nourished by the productive part 
of their societies, they would not stifle their source of sustenance.  This implies that 
there is the possibility of the Mafia having full knowledge of the occurrence of human 
trade activities in their territories and as such may not be absolved of irregular 
migration crimes committed in Italy and beyond.  This is argued on the premise that 
the Mafia have pre-eminence in their communities and in many ways, at the same time 
benefit from the activities of the smuggling and trafficking groups that operate in and 
outside Italy.  A number of press publications relay the involvement of the Mafia in 
their capacities.  Laccino 2015, reports that the Mafia have been seen as a sort of 
employment agency that offer ‘lousy’ salaries and inhuman accommodations to 
arriving migrants as well as organised further journeys to other parts of Europe.  This 
claim corresponds with the offences of the nine suspects accused in the examined 
FERMO PM GLAUCO case file, who were accused of organising break-outs from 
reception centres and further irregular journeys to other parts of Europe.  Wiretapping 
of conversations between Mafia in Rome reveal the long-time dealings and connection 
between the Sicilian Mafia- the Cosa Nostra, and trafficking groups in Italy and illegal 
immigration bosses in counties such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Pakistan and Turkey 
(Laccino 2015). 
 
It is worthy of note that small criminal groups such as the groups emerging from 
diverse African regions which in majority of cases are opportunistic in nature, availing 
themselves of the vulnerability of the migrants and the incident in the political systems 
 
existence of these vulnerable migrants has enabled the Cosa Nostra to involve themselves in activities that their inflexible 
codes of honour would normally forbid. 
31 Interview with a Representative of CISS, in Palermo, 2016 
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as well as the rescue operations on the Mediterranean, apparently link and align 
themselves to stronger and bigger criminal groups in the countries of origin such as 
the Mafia.  This is implied because, according to indications from interview transcript, 
no alien criminal organisation or group can operate in Italian territories without the 
consent and acquiescence of the territorial powers, the Mafia in this context. 
Considering the possibility of arrived migrants’ accessibility to low paid jobs on farms 
and brothels and accessibility to forged documents and the drug trades, it becomes 
questionable to absolve the Mafia of any involvement.  This assertion is confirmed by 
Gillan (2011) who details the sorts of jobs that are available to newly arrived migrants; 
which includes sex trade and drug trade.  This equally confirms the observations of 
the President of Addio-Pizzo interviewed in Palermo during field study, who affirmed 
that majority of the African migrants who live in Ballaro region of Palermo get involved 
in doing the dirty business for the Mafia groups such as drug trafficking. She however 
pointed out that the migrants, who carry out these dirty jobs, do so possibly as a means 
of survival (Interview 26).   
 
Though the Mafia may deny involvements in smuggling of migrants, their affiliations 
and alleged muscling of migrants/refugees into the construction and management of 
reception centres in which these migrants are also forced to live, in no way absolves 
them of playing the part of actors in the human trade (Perry and Agius 2015).  Gillian 
(2011) claims that sex trade is tolerated by the Mafia in the Castelveltrano region 
because of the economic advantage, thus the Nigerians in the region pay the Mafia 
and are allowed to transact their businesses.  An immigration migrant mediator in 
Palermo, and representatives of Centro Astalli and Santa Chiara interviewed in 
Palermo in 2016, attest to the fact that the migrants get involved with petty crimes in 
drug trafficking as a means of survival given their inability to get proper papers and 
jobs (Interview 4 and 20).  These migrants, particularly those in the Ballaro area, an 
acclaimed Mafia territory, are reported to pay some level of allegiance to the Mafia in 
charge of the territory to allow them carry out their business ventures (Interview 23).32  
In this context the involvement of the Mafia, though not direct cannot also be denied.  
 
 
32 Interview with Head of Peligrin della Terra, in Palermo Sicily, Italy 
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The questions remain as to how they (Mafia) operate without being physically 
identified? This trait may be credited to the secretive nature of organised criminal 
groups of which the Mafia belongs.  The Cosa Nostra and the ’Ndrangeta are known 
to be one of the oldest Mafia groups in Italy that are involved in profitable ventures 
ranging from illicit to licit.  To this extent, other publications reveal the possibility of the 
Cosa Nostra exploiting the human trade in recent times, particularly in relation to the 
incident of vanishing minors (Caprio 2011, Day 2013, and Towsend 2016).  The 
freedom with which the suspects in the FERMO PM GLAUCO case and other 
unidentified suspects operate in this trade could be traced to Towsend (2016) 
assertion that the Mafia apparently have agreements with the smuggling groups as 
the Nigeria bosses have with the women in their trafficking business thus giving the 
African groups the freedom to operate without caution as in the case of Cara di Mineo 
which is now referred to an ‘open hub for smugglers.  Accordingly, the Mafia who is 
known for their display of solidarity, their rule of absolute silence sworn at admission 
to the Mafia clan (Omertà), cannot be overlooked and outplayed when involving 
businesses in the territories they control (Seindal 1998).  In other words, their speciality 
of promoting and selling private protection and the created impression of the Mafia 
being a secret, illegal organisation could be argued to have played out in their dealings 
with the criminal groups which have emerged and situated in their territories, 
regardless of the claim of the criminal justice system (Gambetta 1993, Morselli et al 
2010). 
 
…it shows the existence of a dense and complex network that 
operates in constant liaison with the mutual understanding to 
cooperate in the implementation of a project and criminal speculation 
and profit-making unit organic aimed at final journey towards the 
coveted goal which is Europe; the result of the full operation of a 
criminal group having available a stable structure and having well-
planned objectives. 
(Judicial report, Tribunale di Palermo, Sentenza contro I. H. Attour 
Abdalmenem, 2 April 2014.) 
 
Based on the above quote, although the collaboration of the Mafia is contested by the 
criminal justice system, the existence of the criminal groups in the manner that the 
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judicial proceeding  refer to, can only be as a result of endorsements by the local 
territorial powers in the form of the Mafia.  
 
The Mafia in the literature has been portrayed based on the dynamics of family ties, 
political power and respect of territory, governed by cultural codes and norms which 
prohibit their exploitation of certain crimes such as prostitution.  This may seem to 
have deterred them from the most profitable illicit trade, the human trade (Bechi and 
Turvani 1993, Finckenauer 2007, and Paoli 2010).  Although emphasis has been laid 
on the hierarchical structure of the Mafia and the generally assumed ultimate business 
of private protection (see Gambetta 1993), the EUROPOL’s (2013) threat assessment 
on the Italian organised crime includes people smuggling/trafficking in the list of 
criminal activities undertaken by the Mafia. Based on Williams’s (2001) illumination of 
the possibility of networks in which key participants are hierarchical organisations, the 
Mafia may not be absolved of involvement in the criminal enterprise of the human 
trade.  Judging by respondents’ views, there is a considerable reluctance to voice out 
convictions on the involvement of the Mafia; hence there may be little truth in the 
assertion by some that the Mafia is unaware and not a participant in the human trade 
from Africa to Italy, and from Italy to other parts of Europe.  Notwithstanding the 
apparent fear and understandable reluctance on the part of many to publicly link the 
Mafia to the growing human trade across the Mediterranean, this research finds Mafia 
fingerprints all over the phenomenon. 
 
Analysis in this chapter has been able to convey that despite the factors that enable the 
linkages and connections, the negative effect of the trade outweighs the positive. While 
it is debatable that positively, the maritime escapades have granted several African 
fleeing migrants the privilege to a better life and new opportunities, this positivism is 
quickly erased by the negativity of the death toll and perilous experiences in the course 
of the journey. 
 
 
The Distinctive Characteristics of the Criminal Network of the Libya to Italy 
Human trade And Its Effect on the Changes and Trends 
 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
254 | P a g e  
 
While the world recognises some universal traits or characteristics of organised crime 
groups and fight same with this knowledge, the criminal organisations controlling people 
smuggling and trafficking from Africa and fuelling irregular migrations in Europe tend to 
have their own unique characteristics which have ensured their survival to date.  These 
unique traits have ensured that they adapt easily to new and more challenging law 
enforcement regimes and in the process contributed to the increase in the number of 
irregular migrants entering Europe between 2010 and 2015.  Such unique 
characteristics as the flexible horizontal structure, their ability to corrupt and 
compromise law enforcement and state authorities, the huge profit accruing to them 
and their sophistication and adaptability among others have served the criminal 
organisations very well till now.  This section based on the analysis in chapters five and 
six, examines the unique characteristics of the criminal networks in the human trade 
form Libya to Italy and demonstrates how these characteristics have informed changes 
in migration within the timescale of 2010 to 2017 which is one of the contributions to 
knowledge of this study.  These characteristics of the organised criminal groups are 
predicated by the personalities of the actors, the modus operandi and strategies 
employed by these actors and the structure of the groups and their network.  All the 
characteristics may not be extensively discussed but the most significant ones will be 
addressed in this section. 
 
 
Observed unique characteristics involved in the way of this irregular migration 
based on judicial reports and field study  
 
Notwithstanding the changes in the ways in which the smugglers operate, some 
structural features have remained constant, overlapping with emerging characteristics.  
For instance, the criminal organisations involved in the Libya to Italy Mediterranean 
Voyage adopt the characteristics of a patron /client structure with a scattered nature, 
to reach more clients, whilst operating an illegal enterprise structure, taking advantage 
of push factors33 that drive immigration, as well as the business of people smuggling 
which has become one of the most lucrative organised crime activities. However, 
though some of the criminal organisations such as the Nigerian groups may be 
hierarchically structured, they depict a diverse yet linked nature, linking with other 
 
33 Opportunistic transnational nature  
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groups in the transit countries such as Libya and Italy (Interview 28), making them an 
internationally complex criminal network.  Another characteristic exhibited is the 
independent group structure/nature which involves criminal networks having their own 
leadership without paying loyalties to any particular person while being able work with 
other criminal groups to achieve a planned aim and subsequently disband.  In some 
cases, they are inconceivable and incognito so as to defy tracking, clamp downs and 
investigation. They are profit oriented and driven by demand.  A few other 
characteristics are further analysed in detail.  
 
 
Sophistication and Adaptability  
 
It has also been noted that people smugglers and traffickers from Africa tend to be 
well informed, sophisticated and proactive.  This sophistication has made them more 
mobile and adaptable. Consequently, as one route becomes increasingly dangerous 
or unprofitable, these networks are the first to take note, investigate and often change 
to an alternative route.  This is most evident among the smuggling and trafficking 
networks from West Africa. Between 2010 and 2014, there was a -3 percent change 
in the number of people being smuggled from the West Africa region through the Mali-
Morocco-Spain route. This shift was as a result of preventive and repressive measures 
being implemented within that period by the Moroccan authorities.  The criminal 
networks switched instead to the Mali-Niger-Libya-Italy route which was considered 
more conducive as at that time (Annual Risk Analysis 2015. Frontex.2015, pg.16). This 
switch is also noticeable between air and land borders in Africa.  As more document 
frauds are detected at the air borders, less are recorded at the land borders showing 
the flexibility of the criminal networks in their operations.  Even this flexibility and 
mobility is not restricted to routes but involves also countries of origin and destination. 
Judicial proceedings of the FERMO PM GLAUCO case reveal the extensive use of 
phone and other communication applications such as Skype, Viber and Tango by the 
suspects accused of irregular migration crimes in the Italian territories in producing 
fake visa, passports and tickets; also contracting fake marriages for intending migrants 
who are ready to pay any prescribed fees.  Recorded wiretappings of phone 
conversations collected by the flying squad,  indicates that this means of 
communication enables the smugglers and clients to evasively organise their 
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operations whether they be part of the groups or mere private opportunist that are in 
the business of availing themselves of every opportunity to exploit vulnerable desiring  
migrants.  A significant case of supporting and organising illegal migration to Italy 
recorded by the FERMO PM GLAUCO case is the case of an application made by one 
of the suspects for family unification, in which a marriage of convenience was 
contracted with a woman in Ethiopia who was until the time of this transaction, 
unknown to the smuggler (Judicial report, FERMO PM GLAUCO case).  A similar 
contract is made between an official resident in the Province of Agrigento in Italy in a 
marriage of convenience with a woman in Saudi Arabia on the grounds of family 





















This excerpt reveals the nature of sophistication and adaptability in the business of 
smuggling agents such as the suspects in the FERMO PM GLAUCO case.  A 
continuation of the conversations in the line of this business of falsification revealed 
Box 7.2. 
Conversation of 18.01.2014, 10:14 hours, prog nr. 144 393 898 524 836 on the user used to ABKADT 
SHAMSHEDIN between predicted and a man unnamed: 
 
            "The other party [the unnamed man] says there is a woman known to him, who is located in 
Saudi Arabia and SHEMSEDIN asks if he can go to Saudi Arabia to marry this woman in order to 
bring her into Italy on the grounds of family reunification. The man notifies him that it is difficult to 
get into Saudi Arabia with the document of political refugee. 
 
 SHEMSEDIN says he can travel to Saudi Arabia on the pretext of pilgrimage. The party 
says he has to re-contact the woman in question and let SHEMSEDIN know. The caller asks how one 
gets divorced because he wants to do it. 
            SHEMSEDIN says that divorce is not necessary but if he's going to marry equally again. The 
caller says that he was married in Sudan and has sought advice from the people (does not say who) 
and they asked him to help him with some money, also adds that the same is also married in Ethiopia 
and asks if She knows someone who can help.  
 
SHEMSEDIN says to go to Agrigento as that place nobody knows him, adding that he has 
done in this business before. SHEMSEDIN says that after getting married (presumably Rome), getting 
married the second time went to Agrigento and was helped in this case by NUREDIN. SHEMSEDIN 
tells the other person to ask NUREDIN as the latter will tell you how long it takes to do the whole 
thing, adding that, however, he would have to take up residence in Agrigento, reminding him to 
contact NUREDIN because he will take care of everything. " 
 
(Judicial report, FERMO PM GLAUCO Case, pg 81-82) 
 7-2. Excerpts from Judicial report, the FERMO PM GLAUCO Case  
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the adaptability of the actors/smugglers in relocating or travelling to any location the 
business demands in order to complete a particular deal.    
 
In a similar manner, smugglers from Nigeria often acquire travel passports from any 
other West African country and their clients travel with such passports as citizens of 
that other country. So do Ghanaians. Migrants from Nigeria also sometimes travel from 
airports of other West African countries considered less constrictive and less risky for 
their illicit business (European Commission 2015).  In reality; the evidence of this 
sophistication is not limited to travel through the land borders of the Central 
Mediterranean.  Criminal organisations operating out of Nigeria are able to identify 
scheduled international events (exhibitions, trade fairs, seminars and conferences) in 
Europe, register their clients for these events, pay the required participation fees, 
secure hotel bookings and other necessary things and use this evidence to support a 
visa application for their clients thereby obtaining authentic documents based on 
inaccurate or misleading information.  A Ghanaian migrant in Palermo - Italy in a 
conversation, stated that she had come into Italy with a tourist visa and has since 
remained in Italy with her husband, leaving their children with her parents in Ghana, 
in West Africa.  In a case like this, she may have her passport destroyed and turn 
around to seek for asylum; she may only be able to travel back when she would have 
been granted a stay in Italy on the grounds of asylum. Findings indicate that smugglers 
are very proactive and react immediately to the nuances of European countries 
embassy staff. When it was noticed some years ago that the embassies of the 
Schengen countries of the European union were better disposed to granting travel 
visas to West African couples (as opposed to individuals embarking on a vacation), a 
practice arose among the people smugglers where a frequent male or female traveller 
is paired with a first time visitor of the opposite sex and both apply as a couple.  The 
first time visitor was usually the paying client and the practice enjoyed a certain degree 
of success. (European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs 2015).  European 
diplomats are not immune to the corrupting influences of the African human 
smuggler/trafficker.  Some have since been sucked into the vortex of corruption and 
been recruited as willing accomplices. A classic example of this collusion is that of a 
Senegalese couple as reported by The Guardian (Ní Chonghaile (2015).  In this case, 
an African woman married a European diplomat who was responsible for the issuance 
of visas at the embassy of his country. It turns out that the woman was a people 
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smuggler and was selling visas for between 5000 to 6000 British pounds sterling which 
the diplomat husband issued. The proceeds was laundered through the woman's three 
accounts in her bank. One of the accounts was with power of attorney to her husband.  
The proceeds were later applied for the purchase of real estate in Dakar, Senegal's 
capital city. In the words of Gianpaolo Muccemi, co-author of eBook “Confessions of 
a People Smuggler” who spent two years travelling with smugglers across the world, 
“…they are clever. Think of a smuggler as someone who never sleeps and spends 24 
hours a day thinking about how to break into Europe.  They read newspapers, study 
European laws, study what FRONTEX is doing...” (BBC 2015). To this extent the 
volumes of telephone wiretapping by the Italian flying squad recorded in the EFRMO 
PM GLAUCO case proceeding, reveals the ingenuity and creativity of these smugglers 
in their bid to both make profit and assert themselves ahead of anti-people smuggling 





Between 2010 and 2015, there has been a lot of development in the communication 
sector in most parts of Africa.  Telephone and internet services are now available to 
even the most remote of communities.  Improvement in communication has widened 
the jurisdictional spread of the smuggling networks.  It has therefore become possible 
for an actor in a particular network to so easily move from one jurisdiction to the other 
while still maintaining regular contact with his network.  From Lagos to Agadez and to 
Tripoli and on to Europe, the smuggler/trafficker and the client/victim remain in touch 
with the departure point.  Most importantly however is the expanded role of the 
diaspora population since 2009/2010.  Aided by social media made possible by 
improvement in communication, the diasporic population has become very central as 
migrant smuggling often develops along ethnic and linguistic lines. (GIATOC 2016).  
Incidences of smugglers contacting migrants and transacting the procuring deals via 
Facebook and WhatsApp sprawl the media as it was in the case of the Cargo Ship, 
Ezadeen in which 450 migrants were found abandoned on the Sea and was towed to 
Italy (Hooper 2015, Dearden 2015, Coleman, 2015, and CBS News 2105).  The report 
had it that the said ship was to be the second ship left on course to crash into Italian 
shores.  Technology in recent time has not only assisted the smuggling groups in their 
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procurement and recruitments but has also been employed by migrants who in their 
show off via WhatsApp and Facebook have unintendedly supported and enhanced the 
business of the smuggling groups. The Europol report of 2016 wrote that smugglers 
are increasingly relying on social media to report and advertise their services; 
presenting attractive, mouth-watering offer those desperate desiring migrants may not 
be able to resist as well as recruit aspiring smugglers (Europol 2016).  Their adverts 
are supported with evidence of their successes.  This point was analysed as the 
concept of operational success motivated advert as an emerging strategy employed 
by the smuggler in the sixth chapter of this work.  Interview with IOM representatives 
in Palermo and a representative of CARITAS in Rome, further illuminated how 
trafficked girls have in turn lured their friends into the hands of the trafficking Madams 
by the use of technology in showcasing assumed enviable achievements (Interview 
with Caritas, Interview with IOM).  Effectively, the maximizing of ICT by the criminal 
networks in promoting their business can be said to exhibit their global 
dominance/control (jurisdiction) capability especially in regions where their exploits are 
revered such as regions where the belief that migrating to developed regions such as 
Europe will enhance living conditions.  This point is supported by Toaldo (2015) who 
noted the prominence of west African counties particularly Nigeria, in the statistics of 
migrant flows which could be attributed to the emergence of deeper smuggling 
networks,  cheaper travelling packages, the continuous Boko Haram crisis, and the 
evergreen tradition of “travelling to Europe to make it big” syndrome.  The scope of 
dominance of the criminal networks in the Libya to Italy human trade, therefore exhibits 
their characteristics of multi-jurisdictional spread which overtime enables them to 
decide where to pitch their tent and from whence to advance.  
 
Following the diverse characteristics of criminal networks that have been observed 
and discussed in this chapter, it is worthy of note is that a number of key words were 
identified as recurrent terms used by respondents in the categorisation and definition 
of organised criminal organisation and networks involved in the Libya to Italy people 
smuggling.  For the ease of understanding, they are categorised according to the 
respondents whose perceptions are based on their profession and experience in the 
field of irregular migration   - human trafficking and smuggling.  These key words are 
observed to reflect both characteristics identified in literature on criminal organisation 
and also indication from field study transcripts.  This indicates a conflation in the views 
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on the phenomenon which may have informed the descriptive categorisation of the 
people smuggling and trafficking of person across the Mediterranean as 
incomprehensively ‘complex’.  
 
 




The table above demonstrates that there are certain similar definitions and 
categorisations that were echoed by more than one category of respondents such as 
the aspect of ‘increased violence which was pointed out by both respondents from the 
academia, criminal justice system and the non-governmental organisation.  The 
opinion of the respondents reflects also their knowledge of the criminal organisation 
Key words used in defining and 
categorising criminal 
Networks/Organisations involved in the 
Africa-to-Europe people smuggling 
Category of respondents 
Professionalism Academia (Respondent 2) 
Organized and flexible group of 
individuals 
Academia (Respondent 3) 
Cooperative/Cohesive Criminal justice system (Respondents 1 & 11)  
Academia (Respondent 2)  
Highly connected  and Interconnected 
grand groups 
Academia (Respondent 3) 
NGOs  
Academia  
Criminal justice system 
Increased violence Academia (Respondent 2) 
NGOs (Respondent 4) 
Criminal justice system (Respondent 11) 
Change in motive and goal Academia (Respondent 2) 
Evolved / metamorphosed / Developed Criminal justice system (Respondent 11) 
Governmental institutions (Respondent 8) 
Anti-Mafia associations (Respondent 9) 
Complex Criminal justice system (Respondent 11)  
NGOs (Respondents 6 & 7) 
Academia  
Profit and Demand oriented Governmental institutions (Respondent 10) 
Criminal justice system (Respondent 11) 
Multi-levelled/variegated/ Mixed  
hierarchy 
Academia  
Structured and hierarchical Criminal justice system 
Horizontal cooperation  Academia  
Scattered Government officials 
Unknown Academia  
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originating and dominant in the sub-Saharan Africa and north Africa being compared 
with the criminal organisation originating from East Africa which this study analysed in 
the fifth, sixth and seventh chapter.  
Based on these different perspectives observed in the table above, it can be deduced 
that although the activities of smuggling networks are evident in diverse regions, the 
perception of the populace directly affected and in contact with them differ.  
 
 
Authority, Corruption and Compromise 
 
Another unique and notable characteristic of organised criminal organisations 
operating in Africa for the smuggling and trafficking of migrants to Europe is the ease 
of corrupting or compromising authorities and law enforcement agencies.  Although 
collusion with authorities is a general trait of criminal organisations worldwide, this trait 
is more pronounced and with a higher rate of success in Africa.  This is not surprising 
if the across-the-board poverty and deprivation in the continent is taken into 
consideration.  A settled migrant in Palermo, recounting the intricacies of his voyage 
to the EU – Italy through the desert routes and finally via the sea route, stated that 
“…every week, at least 30 vehicles (Toyota Pick- up) would leave through the desert. 
During the journey, there are post where we had to pay each person 10,000 CFA…and 
once they have left Agadez, the migrants are normally told to let go of their passport, 
as they may not need them anymore, more so that it may not be possible to identify 
them to know what county they are from” (Interview36)34.  From interview transcript 
and scholarly articles, the city of Agadez in Niger republic, which has long been long 
considered a smuggling city, is a case in point (Interview ISAB).  The economy of the 
city is built around smuggling and it has been so for ages. Everybody, including city 
and security personnel live off smuggling.  This fact is not lost on migrant smugglers 
and traffickers who have since taken advantage of the historical interplay between the 
city and the underworld. According to a report by the Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organised Crime (GIATOC), a Geneva based lobby, at least half of all 
West African migrants who reach Lampedusa in Italy first pass through Agadez.  The 
ethnic Toube gang who dominate the trade charge migrants between $200 and $300 
 
34 Interview with Senegalese migrant in Palermo, who did not wish to be identified, hence he is referred to as an 
independent respondent.  
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for passage into Libya or ask them to carry drugs in lieu of payment (The Economist, 
2014). Interview transcript corroborates this fact of inflated fees collected from 
travelling migrants in order to permit further passage where a respondent re-counted: 
“….I paid about 150 - 300euros to get to Libya, apart from the one I paid at the different 
post which was 10,000 Cfa” (Interview Resp. Senegal).  The truth of a possible 
compromise with the ruling authorities, which allows and encourages the emergence 
of more people smuggling merchants is rather glaring regardless of the several 
promises by the government of Niger to stamp out large scale people smuggling 
through its borders in the past.  It is suggested that the negative impact of such action 
on the local economy is a stumbling block.  The Economist quotes a diplomat in Niger, 
“Dismantling the networks of intermediaries, drivers, guides, migrant safe homes, and 
clandestine migration consultants would place the regional economy of Agadez under 
significant stress”.  What the diplomat did not feel able to say however is the role official 
corruption plays in the whole conundrum.  In other words, the unique environment in 
which they operate has united to sustain their operations and prolong their existence 
and profitability notwithstanding the fightback from European authorities especially 
FRONTEX beginning from 2011 after the demise of Muamma Gadafi and the uprisings 
in Mali and Niger republics.  Even at safe houses and embarkation points in Libya, it 
can only be corruption that prevents the authorities from detecting and stopping the 
smugglers and their clients in their tracks.  Where smugglers and traffickers are 
intercepted and arrested, there is no evidence to suggest that they are duly 
prosecuted.  Most suspects end up escaping the rap as a result of judicial corruption 
made possible by the proceeds of the illicit business.  Put simply, these criminal 
organisations or networks are highly connected to the powers that be within their 
zone of operation. Witness testimonies from the judicial proceedings of the FERMO 
PM SCAFISCA case, made statements that could be termed as indicting the Libyan 
authority as regards the migrants being transported from the Libyan shores: 
 
I contacted an intermediary named Ermiyas, probably Ethiopian 
nationality, to which I gave $ 4,800. Later, accompanied on a car by 
other Libyan entities, in the like of Ermiyas, we were taken to a 
collection centre available to the Libyan organization devoted to this 
type of travel. In this centre, where we were collected in about 500, 
we were about two weeks. Then we were then taken up on a military 
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truck, equipped with a closed box body and, in groups of about 100-
120 people, they took us on a beach, after a journey that lasted about 
an hour and a half. I do not know what city it was. 
(Judicial report, FERMO PM SCAFISCA Case, pg. 8)  
 
Examining this quote, the information about a military truck connotes some level of 
compromise and corruption which boosts the enterprise and survival of the smuggling 
groups in Libya.  Access to state properties such as a military truck implies that there 
may either be a mole in the corridors of power or some level of cooperation with the 
organised criminal groups on the side of the territorial authority.  Regrettably, issues 
as this are not veraciously spoken about so as not to discredit the ruling power.  The 
Guardian newspaper of London quotes Abu Uday (probably a pseudonym), one of 
Egypt's most active people smuggler who earned a net income of 1.5million British 
pounds sterling in 2014 from smuggling an estimated 10,000 migrants to Italy; in his 
words; “If I want to smuggle 300 migrants, the authorities will arrest 50 and let 250 go, 
to show the Italians they are doing some work.  Maybe they take $12,800 per 
operation” (Ní Chonghaile 2015).  As it stands, therefore, migrant smuggling remains 
a “low-risk, high-reward” business.  This ensures that irregular migration to Europe 




Flexible structure characteristic 
 
Flexibility here refers more to the ability of the actors in the network to adapt to trends 
vis-a-vis their roles and task.  Organised crime such as the human trade from Libya to 
Italy through disastrous means such as the recurrent perilous journeys across the 
central Mediterranean is ipso facto being organised through the concept of networks.  
As William (2001) revealed, these networks are fast, evolving exhibiting traits of 
universality yet imperceptible, ubiquitous and invisible, everywhere and nowhere’ 
(Williams, 2001: 64).  Most of the groups involved in the transnational 
smuggling/trafficking of migrants from Libya to Italy have no hierarchical structure but 
operate rather as loosely connected people and in small networks.  The suspects in 
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FERMO PM GLAUCO35 case were accused of crimes committed abroad such as 
Libya, Eritrea, Sudan, Israel and other regions in Africa as well as in EU countries such 
as Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Australia and Canada.  
They are at the same time accused of crimes committed in the different regions of Italy 
such as Lampedusa, Rome, Mineo, Agrigento, Caltagirone and other locations.  
Crimes committed by the accused according to the proceeding include: Criminal 
association transnational crime; Crime of aiding and abetting illegal immigration;  The 
crime of trafficking in person/ illegal transfer of migrants; Kidnapping and coercion; 
Extortion/exploitation; Torture/abuse/maltreatment of migrants, Sexual abuse of 
female migrants; and Crime of Negligence.  An indication from this case is that there 
is no ownership or chain of command in the structure of the networks. Each person or 
network is only answerable to his or its need for financial profit. In a smuggling network 
for instance, the person who recruits the potential migrants has little or no nexus to the 
person or group that procures necessary fake documents nor does the latter have any 
control over the person who sees to it that relevant state officials are bribed and 
compromised for easy passage across the borders.  The amorphous nature of these 
networks ensures that they are not easily discernible yet ubiquitous and able to 
operate at any given time.  They have therefore been aptly described as “complex 
criminal networks that do not recognise borders and which can be likened to 
multinational corporations” (BBC 2015).  This implies that although the Europol report 
of 2016 explicitly explains that members of smuggling networks have been observed 
to work autonomously in some cases, with a few low-level contacts, it is clearly 
dependant on the degree of risk involved (Europol 2016); the point remains that the 
versatility of the networks is largely applied when they deem it necessary.  To buttress 
this point, the FERMO PM GLAUCO case examined reveals incident of the suspects 
privately conducting their own operations yet still part of a group.  They also do not 
divulge important details that will reveal their connections to the authorities.  In 
Palermo the head of the Squadra Mobile interviewed for this study, revealed that they 
had only one successful cooperation from an arrested smuggler since the years of 
their investigation of irregular migration case (Interview 18, Palermo, 2016).  However, 
the actors and groups continue with their operations regardless possibly because of 
 
35 Judicial proceeding of the case against nine suspects on irregular migration crimes committed within Italy and 
abroad. This case is one of the four selected case files on irregular migration crimes used as case study evidence 
in this study.  
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their structure or a probable kinship-tie or agreement they may have which may be 
similar to the Mafia Omertà.  To this extent, the death, imprisonment or voluntary 
withdrawal of an actor does not therefore pose any serious threat to the survival or 
success of the network as such actor can so easily be replaced.  Except in few 
situations, the structure of migrant smuggling networks differs remarkably from that of 
other typical criminal organisations where people “are tied and committed to the group, 
cannot leave and are often bound by oath”.  Findings of this study indicate that the 
loose structure which has been adopted by actors in this phenomenon is beneficial to 
the smuggling operations in more ways than one. In this light, scholars believe that by 
working in networks, the criminal groups are equipped with “flexibility to adapt new 
routes and methods in response to policies and measures dedicated to controlling 
European borders” (Aiazzi, Iaria, and Monzini 2016).  Other scholars writing of the 
Study of Smuggling of Migrants on the other hand, opine that a network is better 
understood in the context of “…individuals who provide their specific services to 
whoever requests these services”, further explaining it as being “…confined to people 
who come together for specific task/operation and dissolve, [who] can meet again but, 
the same people, may at times perform different roles or bring new people to perform 
their tasks” (Aksel, et al 2016).  In essence, the actors identified in the fifth chapter of 
this work such as locally based opportunists for instance, may not be registered as 
members of a particular group, but can be referred to as part of the irregular migration 
network being that the services they provide which include: falsified documents, 
transportation, accommodation, bribery of border officials, and advice/tips to migrants 
en route, are essential for the successful movement of operations steered by 
professional smugglers (UNODC 2006, HM Government 2011, and INTERPOL 2016). 
Consequently, the choice to operate in networks no matter their prior structural 
organisation, gives them leverage against the combative measures put in place to 
manage the phenomenon.  Indications from interview transcript reveal that in some 
cases, some actors have diverted from a particular role to another to suit the demand 
at the time; a friend who falls in the category of local scout or a private business man 
reverts to being a transporter of desiring migrants as the opportunity present itself 
(Interview with ISAB) or in the case of the guards converting to transporters in the 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case36 on the Lampedusa landing of 15/10/13 and 
 
36 Judicial proceeding on the Case against Abdalmenem IH Attour on the landing of 15/10/13 and 11/3/2013, 
defended by the lawyer's office. Gaetano Mongiovì of the tribunal of Agrigento. 
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11/3/2013.  This flexible structure therefore makes smuggling networks more resistant 
towards law enforcement than closed and hierarchical organisations would be.  




Changes in terms of the organisational and behavioural features of the criminal 
groups and their networks; how does it informs the migration process?  
 
This section examines the evident changes in terms of the organisational and 
behavioural features of the criminal groups and their networks.  It questions how these 
changes inform the migration process, evaluating whether it encourages it or 
discourages the phenomenon.  These changes include changes within the timeline of 
this study which is from 2010 till present date.  Findings from field study reveal that the 
organisational structure and behavioural feature of the criminal groups in their network, 
to a large extent, encourages its evolution and complexity. Some of the evident 
changes are examined in this section, particularly those indicated in the interview 
transcript based on respondents’ experiences - both victims of smuggling practices 
and professionals - in matters relating to people-smuggling practices.  The observed 
changes reflect the evolution in the phenomenon that the accounts in the judicial 
proceedings failed to clearly elucidate. Based on indications from field study, some 
areas recorded significant changes; these are discussed here; 
 
 
Trends in the Modus operandi  
 
 
One trend that has brought about significant changes in the Libya to Italy human trade 
is the structure and the modus operandi of the people smuggling groups. Fr. Vincezo 
from Santa Chiara in Palermo Italy pointed out the fact that in the last 5 to 10 years, 
the arrival of migrants could be assessed as more structured and organised.  This was 
also echoed by an Immigration judge in Palermo and Soura Valeria of CARITAS in 
Rome who asserted that the mode of operation of the people smugglers in terms of 
organisational structure and even violence could have been, to a large extent, 
attributed to the increase in the number of arrivals (Interview 22).  Fr. Vincezo noted 
that 15 years prior to that, the arrivals were just large and not organised as it has been 
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observed in the recent past (Interview 20).  Considering the means by which the 
degree of organisations of these groups in recent times could be achieved, the 
evolution of information technology cannot be overlooked.  This is observed in the 
widespread access to internet with various apps such as WhatsApp and Facebook 
and sophisticated phones.  This line of thought also reflects ISMIS perception of the 
roles of technology in the trade as against what was obtainable in the years before 
2010 (Interview with ISMIS). Migrants can now call from their boats as well as make 
connections through the internet.  Fr. Vincezo added that often times, the migrants 
would arrive with just ‘Sim’ cards tucked away from the smugglers and traffickers 
which will later be useful for them in connecting with their relatives that are already in 
the desired destination countries as well as referrals they could have been given prior 
to their embarkation (Interview 20).  
 
An interesting fact pointed out by ISMIS is that the trade can no longer be termed as 
clandestine.  This could be based on the fact that getting smuggling services is not in 
any way difficult as the degree of secrecy in the perpetrators and their locations (in 
some cases) appear no more a secret.  This agrees with migrants testimonies in the 
FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case where they recounted of how they simply got details 
of the smuggler off friends whilst discussin on the streets, work place, and even in 
cafes.  Notably, the smuggling groups have increased in numbers and members to 
suit the surging demands to travel as observed by a representative from CISS in 
Palermo (Interview 29).  This can also be related to the fact that the business is clearly 
more lucrative and less risky for the smugglers than has ever been. Members are 
taken on to the smuggling groups and ad-hoc members willing to make quick money 
at the instance of existing operations.  People smugglers are observed to now apply 
the tactics of unaccompanied-voyage as discussed in the sixth chapter of this work. 
Media reports point out that these smugglers simply invest in cheap dinghies that are 
unable to transport the migrant to their destinations because they believe the 
European rescue mission would intercept the boats and bring them to safety (Farrell 
2017).  They even offer seasonal discounts for bad weather days (Weise  2015) While 
they evade the authorities, they are at the same time making more profit while also 
overcrowding the boats which has led to the gamut of sea disasters recorder between 
2013 and recent times.  The Head of Police in Palermo explained that because the 
rescue ship do not repatriate the migrants, but rather bring them down to Italy, the 
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smugglers simply need to assure the migrants a limited trip duration during which  they 
would be rescused and assuredly taken to Italy (Interview 18).  Another emerging 
modus operandi observed is the concept of women trafficking women, referred to by 
Professor Fulvio – a professor of International Law in Palermo – as feminisation of the 
trade (Interview 28).  Although this was observed in the Siegel and De Blank (2010)’s 
work as regards the role of women in human trafficking networks, the scale of the 
practice is re-echoed by respondents following its increase in recent times.   According 
to Prof. Fulvio, the practice is quite evident in the Nigerian case, where once trafficked 
women who have now become their own bosses, traffic other women.  A migrant 
mediator in Palermo, based on his experience with migrants, also mentioned the 
instance of the Nigerian girl who was once trafficked but has evolved to the one who 
today pays for others to be trafficked (Interview 30).  In the past it was the men who 
would organise the transportation of the women to the destination country, but the 
reverse appears to be the case in recent times. 
 
 
Trends in Routes  
 
As the modus operandi and the structure of the criminal groups are changing, analysis 
and reports show that the routes as well are changing.  Though the detections by the 
FRONTEX 2016 Risk analysis report indicated that there was a reduction in illegal-
border crossings in the central Mediterranean route in 2015, which is the focus of this 
research, the Eastern Mediterranean routes appeared to be the get-way routes for 
mostly desperate Syrians who sought all means to get to European shores.  The 
Economist recorded that about a million crossed the Mediterranean in the year 2015 
which has astronomically grown from the formerly largest flows in the year 2011; from 
64,000 to 150,000, with a land flow of about 270,000, from Agadez towards Libya (The 
Economist 2016).  Sharing the statistics of flows in the Mediterranean, the Head of 
Police in Palermo, added that the sudden opening of the Libya routes through the 
Mediterranean, has made every point a thorough-fare despites the measure put in 
place (Interview 18).37 These tit-bits of statistics indicate the fluctuations in the flows 
in the routes in reaction to the trends and occurrences that triggered the shifts.  An 
Italian Judge, Calogero Ferrar, interviewed in Palermo, Italy added that the changes 
 
37 Interview with Head of Police - Squadra Mobile, Palermo. 
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in routes and the reduction in the flow in 2015 in the Mediterranean route and increase 
in the Balkan route was no coincidence but as a result of the number of arrests that  
were carried out in Italy.  However, despite the arrests, the knowledge that there are 
rescues in the Mediterranean, now makes the travels quicker than before.  Interim 
changes have been set in the pipeline as regards ways to limit the hundreds of 
thousands that would continue to take the perilous sea journeys.  A professor of 
International Immigration Law interview in Palermo – Prof. Fulvio Vassalo expressed 
hope in the project with the European Commission to control and close the border 
between Libya (south) and Niger (north) which has become the main route from sub-
Saharan Africa to Libya and to Europe, while the police in Zuwara have awakened to 
fighting the increasing take-off from their region; especially in Misuarata (Interview 28).  
Media reports by May 2017 reported that in the light of closing the said borders, growth 
and development programmes in local communities, as well as technical and financial 
support were yet being sought from Libyan authorities in fighting illegal migration at 
the borders around Niger (EURACTV 2017).  The ideas in theory appear good but the 
implementation as other ideas of the commission remains a challenge (McIntyre 
2017).  The professor further pointed out that criminal groups/networks that have taken 
advantage of the take-off points in Zuwara and are becoming stronger and 
domineering, hence police in the major hubs are becoming aware of the realities of 
the situation and have therefore taken up the task of guarding the see so as to reduce 
the activities of criminal networks on the sea (Interview 28). 
 
Most striking in the discourse id the issue of Bangladeshis and Kurds routing through 
Libya. It would have been assumed that take-off in North Africa would include only 
Africans but revelations from data collected reveals that the mixed migration category 
and demographic is getting more complex as the phenomenon evolves.  In sum, the 
increase in the routes is owed to the increase in memberships of smuggling networks 
which in turn is owed to the returns and transnational versatile nature of the structure 
of the criminal networks involved in the evolving human trade.  The link between the 
structure and the drivers – which include both human resources, socio-political, 
economical and geographical issues- continues to spawn in a complex nature.   
 
Trends in Violence 
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Europol risk assessment of 2013 identified violence as one prominent characteristic 
associated with OCGs (SCOTA 2013).  Most notably, the increasing use of violence 
is one strategy that was recurrent in the comment of the respondents during field study 
for this research. Violence in agreement with the SCOTA report is now used as an 
integral part of the strategies of the criminal network involved in the present-day 
human trade. The SCOTA report of 2013 clearly attests to the fact that in illegal 
migration, violence is used in intimidating migrants upon arrival (SCOTA 2013). The 
effect of violence on the human trade transcends the concept of violence as a push 
factor as in the opinion of Toaldo (2015), where he notes violence as enforcing 
compulsive migration in region such as Libya and South Sudan. Comparatively, 
findings from data collected reveal another dimension to the use of violence 
particularly in the smuggling of persons from North Libya to Italy. It was observed that 
the use of violence has now been shifted from being used against rival gangs and 
intimidating members towards being used as an enhancement tool for their smuggling 
business.  Migrants were reported to be forced at gun point to embark upon 
unseaworthy boats by the smugglers who have devised the use of cheap unseaworthy 
boats as a means of making more profits, neglecting the consequences of the quality 
of the vessel used or the consequences of overcrowding such unseaworthy vessels.  
While comments from respondents such as the director of Centro Astalli in Palermo, 
Scilly, who relays horrid  stories of migrants being forced unto boats at gunpoint 
(Interview 4), the analysed FERMO PM MUHIDIN case speaks of migrants abducted, 
enslaved, exploited in diverse ways and there after forced unto unseaworthy boats 
(Judicial reportsFERMO PM Muhindin). Additionally, increasing the danger involved in 
the business is the alleged involvement of the Mafia with the criminal groups involved 
in the human trade in Italian territories in particular. Respondents echoed the fact that 
the triumph of the criminal groups are enabled by their affiliation with Italian Mafias in 
the diverse regions where the trade is accepted and thriving as a result of the 
endorsement of the territorial Mafia. (Interview 22).38 Considering the increase in 
irregular migration flow in the Mediterranean and calamities that have been associated 
with it particularly in the recent past, it suffices to say that increase in the use of 
violence is one change that has been boosted by the characteristic of flexibility and 
multi-jurisdictional spread of the criminal networks.  
 
38 Interview with Suora Valeria from Caritas Rome and Palermo, Sicily. 
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Trends in Investigation 
 
Investigating the crime of irregular migration particularly across the Mediterranean has 
over the years become a complex and difficult task often laced with several 
challenges. The FRONTEX identified the problem of the unending complexity 
wherefore it stated that;  
 
The job is never finished however. The networks of human 
smugglers and traffickers stay abreast of FRONTEX operations; as 
soon as a route is identified and closed down by an EPN or 
FRONTEX sea operation, the facilitators will adjust either the route 
or their modus operandi to stay ahead of the detection net’. 
(FRONTEX 2017) 
 
While the statement informs that continuous efforts are being put in place by the 
authorities, the challenges that continue to erupt as a result of the characteristic of the 
criminal networks exhibited by their strategies posed a continuous hindrance to a 
complete clampdown of the phenomenon. The FERMO GLAUCO case revealed that 
criminal organisation involved in the smuggling and trafficking of persons into Italy and 
from Italy to other European countries, continued to forge in their activities despite 
investigations being carried out on arrested members. Most striking is the fact that not 
only are their activities observed to go unimpeded, recruitment of new members to 
effectively replace the detained members continue (Judicial reports FERMO GLAUCO 
case). Considering the characteristics of loose coupling of criminal networks along the 
model of Charles Perrow, discussed by William (2001) as regards their robustness 
and resilience, the criminal networks in the Libya to Italy human trade could be said to 
have advanced beyond simply evading knock-on or cascading effects.39 Rather than 
rely on the strategy of redundancy in the network to carry on activities formerly carried 
out by arrested members, they engage in more recruitments in the face of 
investigations. Considering the legitimacy of this realisation, it is plausible that 
corruption has a great role to play. Despite the challenges observed, investigation into 
 
39 This is a situation where a loosely coupled network is equipped and limits knock-on and cascading 
possibilities to one part of the network so as not to undermine the network in a whole; at the same time 
preserving diversity in response, determining which parts of the network should respond in what manner and 
location. 
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Libya to Italy people smuggling and trafficking crimes in recent times evidently has 
recorded, amidst the challenges, greater successes than before as identified from 
interview transcripts. While the president of Peligrin dellaTerra in Palermo expressed 
the perceived difficulty of apprehending culprits due to the fact that the migrants travels 
mean the migrants having to go through different towns and criminal groups, which 
could be attributed to the new structure of the criminal groups. The Head of police of 
Palermo informed of remarkable successes made by the force in recent times 
(Interview 23).40 He pointed out that the investigations carried out so far has revealed 
to a good measure, how to reduce the flow probably with the establishment of a 
‘CARITAS’ sort of organisation in the Libyan points of embarkation (Interview 18). He 
added that  ten years prior to then, there were no rescue missions such as the triton 
or mare nostrum because the coastal countries which have become points of 
embarkation such as the Libya, had agreement with EU to restrict  migration across 
the Mediterranean, which came to a dissolution after the overthrow and death of 
Gadhafi. However, as a result of the investigations that have been going on for about 
three years now, the police have been able to arrest over 100 offenders. These sorts 
of results are relatively new as arrests were not always very possible due to the secret 
way these trips were organised. More considerable as a change would be the fact that 
one of the defendants arrested in GLAUCO 1 accepted to cooperate with the Palermo 
criminal justice system. It is considered a change as he is the first person in history 
recorded as accepting to cooperate, hence they accorded him the same protection 
provided for witnesses against the Mafia.   These successes notwithstanding, the state 
prosecutor for irregular migration crimes, opined that investigations could have been 
much easier if the Flying Squad perhaps had jurisdiction to investigate in the African 
regions from where embarkation takes place or even co-operation between the police 
in places such as Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sicily (Interview 17). 
 
 
Trends in Economics and profits 
 
The debate on whether the human trade in recent times could be assessed as being 
more enterprise driven is a question that is worth considering given the profit margin 
 
40 Interview with the Head of Peligrin della Terra, the first Anti-trafficking non-governmental organisation in 
Palermo.  
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associated with the business of human trade. Thachuk (2007:198) in his work, 
Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, 
assessed people smuggling as the fastest growing form of organised crime which is 
estimated to generate a profit of approximately 6 billion dollars or more annually. In 
accordance with this assertion, the ILO in 2005 estimated the value of illicit human 
trafficking at 32 billion dollars globally (ILO 2008). Graduating to 2016, the human 
trafficking industry according to Molloy (2016), is estimated to generate about 150 
billion dollars annually. Current statistics by Human Right First (2017) state that the 
ILO estimates the human trafficking business to earn about 150 billion dollars yearly 
with 99 billion dollars being made from commercial sexual exploitation alone. In all the 
report presented on the profits made from illicit human trade, it is most striking to note 
that about 6.75 billion dollars have been recorded as profits generated for criminals 
along the two major smuggling routes North/East/West Libya to Italy, and also from 
South America to North America (UNODC 2017). Given the statistics presented and 
following the evolution in the organisational structure of criminal networks in recent 
times, it can be argued that the human trade has become a more enterprise driven 
affair. It is therefore impossible to perceive human smuggers in particular as mere 
“assisted migration” agents but as opportunistic businessmen/entrepreneurs who 
have resorted to maximizing the drivers of irregular migration to their advantage. 
Following this statistic, indications from interview transcript strongly suggest that the 
modus operandi and the organisational structure of the networks involved and the 
outcome thereof is poised to multiply these numbers (Interview 23, Interview 25). 
Some other respondents alleged that the business seems to thrive owing to the 
advantages it yields to the receiving countries such as Italy as there is a struggle and 
competition to host migrant centres when there are arrivals (Interview 22). According 
to the state judge for irregular migration cases, more criminal groups and more 
members are joining the smuggling networks; probably because of the profit they 
make which is providing a big market. This strongly suggests that the offer of migration 
to Europe is and will continue to create the demand for smuggling services.  Therefore, 
focus should be on decreasing the demand by creating conditions to stunt the growth 
of the criminal groups by making more arrests which will in turn reduce the number of 
criminals available to provide the offer to migrate.  
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Socio-political issues  
 
 
The Arab-spring among other socio-political issues has been assessed as a factor that 
has intensified the degree of irregular migration over the years (from the 2010) till 
present time.  While some scholars such as Uchehara (2015) opine that the movement 
from Libya to Italy is embarked upon with the hope for a better life, others such as 
Kohnert (2007) have argued that the movement, in majority of the cases, are due to 
external forces which according to John Fisher Burns of New York Times (2017), are 
assumed fancy lifestyle that the Europeans enjoy seen by these migrant with 
expansion of ICT. While Flahaux and De Haas (2016) debunk such claims as being 
based on stereotypes, Monzini, Pastore and Sciortino (2004 on the other hand pointed 
out that the presence of underground-border economy had a significant part to play in 
the growth of illegal migration flows. Following this debate, research data collected for 
this research has shown that the recent growth of irregular migration has evolved from 
people seeking economic alternatives to people escaping political, religious crises and 
epidemic. To this end, a number of scholars such as Rezouni, (Lt.C), (2010) Browne 
(2015), Kuschminder Bresser and Siegel (2015) have also diverted the blame for 
irregular migration to social-political crisis.  This research particularly agrees with the 
opinion of Kuschminder, Bresser and Siegel (2015) on the fact that specific drivers of 
irregular migration appear to have been overlooked and under- researched. Schmid 
(2011) endeavours to identify these push factors such as demographic push factors, 
ecological push factors, political push factors, economic push factors, and Attendant 
circumstances increasing the migration potential. Based on the different pointers 
shown by the debate on the effect of social-political issues as drivers of irregular 
migration, this research attempts to draw a parallel between these drivers of irregular 
migration and the organisational structure of criminal networks involved in this human 
trade. The Criminal Network Nature Bubble (CNNB) developed by this research 
(chapter 7), reveals flexible and overlapping features of the structures of the criminal 
groups/networks which enable them to adjust their modus operandi and the modalities 
by which irregular migration in recent times is organised. Based on the CNNNB, the 
feature of being diversely linked, formidable nature, opportunistic transnational nature 
and scattered nature of the emerging groups enable them to wade through the 
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changes affecting the phenomenon and thrive against all odds. Interview transcript on 
the other hand reveal that while some respondents from the populace are of the 
opinion that the situation is simply a politically orchestrated affair (Interview 35), others 
based on their professional experience opine that in early times of the emergence of 
this phenomenon, releasing and opening the borders was what President Gadhafi 
used in threatening the Italian government and other EU states to make them grant 
him his several requests. However following the death of Ghadafi, the borders are now 
being manned by local gangs such as the Tuareg and other smuggling dons who may 
have possible connection with terrorist groups such as the ISIS and Boko-haram 
(Interview 17, 18, 28).41 The debate notwithstanding, it is evident that the criminal 
groups which have emerged in recent times in their diverse formations, have simply 




Tends in Numbers and arrivals  
 
The increase in the numbers of arrivals in recent times according to BBC Dateline 
London reads a number of 94,000 according to the UN report of 30th of July 2017, 
indicating a 70% increase from the numbers recorded from 2015.  A reporter for 
Prospect magazine interviewed on the same programme stated that about 11,000 
migrants were recorded to be arriving in 5 days From Africa (mainly West Africa), with 
about 300,000 migrants still waiting in Libya.  The tables below show the statistics of 
arrivals as at 2013 and what the records in the early part of 2017 was, which clearly 
indicates the increase considering the records in recent times.  
 
Table 7-3.  Statistics on arrivals based on judicial proceedings. 
Statistics Of Major Landing In Italy Based On Reports Provided By 
Judicial Proceeding 
Country  Syria Eritrea Somalia Egypt Nigeria 
Number of 
arrivals  
10,851 9213 3254 2618 2458 
Report indicates that majority of landings took place in Sicily (Lampedusa and 
other Pelagie Islands). A recorded estimate of about 14,102 migrants have 
 
41 There is a suspected accord with the Isis and boko haram in the smuggler such as the Kufre. 
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landed while 20,862 migrants have arrived in the rest of Sicily (source: Italian 








Although this research does not engage in calculation of the intensity of African 
migration based on the size of populations or based on births in the originating and 
destination countries as suggested by Flahaux and De Haas (2016), the assessment 
of the flow by this research is hinged on the statistics provided by the IOM. The second 
part of 2017 according to IOM reports records arrivals to Europe of about 118,684 
migrants, with about 116,692 arriving by sea and about 2,405 recorded as 
dead/missing on the Mediterranean.  Based on indications from interview transcript it 
can be deduced that the issue of numbers especially from 2011, are clearly no longer 
a case of propaganda but reality (Interview 32).42  Other changes which were noted to 
have emerged in 2014 included the arrival of unusual but new nationalities in Italy such 
as from the Gambia and landings which were purposefully directed to Palermo 
(Interview 25, 26).  IOM representatives encountered on the field confirmed that the 
sharp increase in the statistics of mixed migration flow is a significant change 
(Interview 19, 37).  These changes are assessed by this research as most primarily 
the effect of the adopted organizational structure of the transnational networks 
involved in the trade as analysed in the 7th chapter of this work and also the modus 
operandi employed such as the over crowing of boats, violence, various other forms 
of exploitation with coerces the migrants in their favour.  
 
42 Interview with a Medical Practitioner handling smuggled migrant cases and torture victims in Palermo, Sicily, 
Italy.  
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Trends in Mixed Push and pull factors 
 
A mix of many factors have in the recent past, driven the movement of persons most 
especially from Africa to Italy which are identified as changes influenced by the 
characteristics of the criminal networks that organised the human trade along this 
route.  A number of these factors include the permitted porous borders of Africa states 
especially West Africa (ECOWAS), porous coastal borders between Africa and 
southern European States which makes way for the sea routes that appear to defy 
tracking.  Another factor as regards transportation and cost is the upgraded, simplified 
though sophisticated payment modes such as the Awahla payment system which 
could be assessed as the active response of smuggling networks to restrictive state 
measures.  Aziz, Monzini and Pastore (2015) consider evolving complexities of the 
smuggling networks and the human trade as a reaction to the state response. For 
every change and stricter measure set up the smuggling networks appear to promptly 
adjust to a solution.  Therefore, with the increase in transportation cost and awareness 
in the danger and profits of people smuggling, the Awahla payment method was 
introduced. The state prosecutor for smuggling and irregular migration crimes in 
Palermo in an interview during field study for this research explained the impossibility 
in tracking the Awahla method; hence the Awahla is constructed only through 
interceptions and can only be tracked if the perpetrators talk about it as there is no 
direct exchange of money. Mohammed El-Qorchi identifies it as one of Informal Funds 
Transfer system under different names in diverse regions whose anonymity and 
minimal documentation appear to have been abused in funding illegal activities (El-
Qorchi 2002). It is evident from the history of the Awahla transfer system that the 
motive was for legitimate business and not criminal activities. This method is not only 
a means of collecting unmistakable payment from the families of the migrant as 
informed by Aziz, Monzini and Pastore (2015), but also as a means of defying 
investigation employed by the networks. Although D.K (2015 – The Economist) 
explained the changing forms of the Awahla money transfer-scheme in 2015, 
respondents from field study in 2016, assert that the anonymity is still in existence and 
the people who transact this business are adamant in not revealing their sources or 
where the money is headed making the tracking more complex.  
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Another change worthy of note is the feminisation of the trade.  This is considered as 
a push and pull factor because the successes and the trust the young women, 
especially women from Nigeria have in their benefactors can be said to be responsible 
for encouraging new arrivals into the rings.  Indications from interview transcripts 
suggest that the case is rampant among migrants from Nigeria.  The Nigerian girl who 
was once trafficked after being emancipated from her boss, pays for others to be 
trafficked.  Before, it was the men who would organise their transport to places such 
as Italy but now, it is the women that traffic other women (Interview 28, 30, 19, 37).  
So, it’s a new business for women; they are now bosses of their own.  
 
So, it’s a new business for women. They are now bosses of their own. However, the 
stigmatization women face in the end is a downside to this development.  It can be 
argued that gender also influences how migration is perceived by outsiders, with the 
assumption that women are vulnerable victims and are forced to migrate and be 
trafficked (Schrover 2008).  In contrast, male migrants tend to be seen as wilful 
circumventing national immigration laws for economic reasons (Schrover 2008).  
According to Schrover, protective measures put in place regarding women are driven 
by narratives of victimhood.  This notion of victimhood may influence the decision of 
some female migrants to find a living in sex work, although this decision can have 
long-term disadvantages with former sex workers often struggling to reintegrate into 
their communities, faced with the stigma of their migration choice should they return 
(O’Neil et al 2016).  In other words, the using the notion vulnerability to their advantage 
equally has its disadvantage.   
 
Nonetheless, examining the mixed migration arrivals to Italy, a respondent pointed out 
that majority of the migrants who had initially intended to remain in Libya are forced to 
migrate to Italy as it is increasingly dangerous for them to remain in Libya (Interview 
32).  Another respondent stated that some were driven in their search for human right 
interventions which they perceived as lacking in their countries of origin and is a pull 
factor while another respondent considered the fact of Italy becoming and being 
calculated as a possible transit point for migration to other EU state as a plausible 
reason for the flow to Italy (Interview 33, 21).  A medical practitioner who is in charge 
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of handling smuggling migrants cases and tortured victims in Palermo expressed her 
encounter with diverse migrants; one of which she stated; 
 
…I meet a lot of persons, and generally the Eritrean and Syrian people 
want to go to the north immediately. For the last two years, I have never 
had a Syrian patient because for them the first thing they want to do is 




Based on this response, it can be deduced that the search for political asylum appears 
to be a significant pull factor especially for migrants fleeing political crisis. In sum, 
mixed migration into Italy are made up of a majority of persons who simply want to get 
to the first European shore from whence they may migrate to other EU states with the 
aid of willing smuggling groups/networks as against the perception that migrants to 





This chapter presents findings that reflect the nature of criminal networks involved in 
people smuggling between 2007 and 2016 based on analysis of judicial proceedings 
FERMO PM GLAUCO1 and 2, triangulated with evidence and data gathered from 
interviews conducted in the field.  The analysis from the previous chapters focused on 
categorising the actors involved in the organisation of irregular transportation across 
the central Mediterranean and the roles of these actors.  Having identified the different 
categories of actors and the strategies they  employ in carrying out their roles, this study 
has moved on to analyse the structure of the network of these actors to evaluate the 
research findings against existing models and paradigms of criminality.  The analysis of 
these two elements led to the development of an integrated criminal network model 
which reflects a putative structure for the criminal network organising the Libya to Italy 
human trade.  This study suggests that analysing the criminal networks that organise 
the Libya to Italy Mediterranean voyage as a single network which exhibits all the forms 
and characteristics of the different paradigms of organised crime may enable a better 
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understanding of the nature of criminality involved in the trade, hence the development 
of the Integrated Criminal Network Model rather than merely refer to it as ‘complex’.  
The criminal organisation involved as drawn from existing literature typifies the 
syndicate type of organised crime but in a more complex way featuring all the 
characteristics of business and criminal networks (see William 2001).  The analysis and 
investigation in this chapter has focused on elucidating the impact and implication of 
this trade in relation to the formation and organisation of the networks involved.  This 
chapter concludes that the organisational structure of the people smuggling network 
operating from Libya to Italy via the Mediterranean, defies a mere assessment of flexible 
or fluid network as asserted and argued by existing literature.  It rather portrays adaptive 
professionalised and sophisticated collective sets with unique division of labour which 
takes on an amoeboid feature in order to continually be ahead of restrictive measures 
undertaken by the authorities.  They metamorphose and get more sophisticated, flowing 
with the global technological and social development in recent times.  In analysing the 
intricacies involved, data from empirical research and interviews all point to the fact that 
identifying the persons conducting the smuggling of migrants could remain impossible.  
This is because the migrants, having formed a symbiosis with the smugglers, do not 
have enough confidence in the protection which the authorities offer should they expose 
the identity of the person with whom the contract of moving them across the borders 
were entered.  This may have contributed to the 18 months investigation of the Italian 
immigration police being futile and could have been said to have yielded no results 
aside from the recent arrests and convictions of 2016 reported in this work.  The 
migrants have been observed to resort to silence, instigated by the fear of abuse which 
they have over time endured during the migration process.  Nonetheless the models 
developed and presented in this chapter have endeavoured to break down these 
barriers and complexities towards a better understanding of the structure, formation and 
characteristics of the Libya to Italy criminal organisation networks. This work suggests 
that the flexible, sophisticated, easily adjustable and continually-in-permanent-
expansion-of-their-alliances features of the present-day criminal organisations are 
reasons for the inability to completely defeat them.  Additionally, the question regarding 
the involvement of the Mafia remain yet a debate.  However, this research holds on to 
evidences collected during interviews in Sicily and Rome, asserting the involvement of 
the Mafia, whether direct or indirect.  These assertions are tenable because no criminal 
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group/activity operates in Mafia territories without the consent of the Mafia of the 
territory.   
 
Furthermore, analysis of the observed characteristics of criminal networks based on the 
different interactive processes in chapters five and six, helped to demonstrate how the 
unique characteristics of the criminal networks in the Libya to Italy human trade 
influences the changes observed to be associated with the phenomenon in recent 
times.  The research strongly suggests that the capabilities and characteristics of the 
criminal networks has over the years played significant roles in the changes observed 
as well as adjusted to changes which have not been orchestrated by the evolution of 
these networks.  Therefore, the criminal networks have been observed to maximise its 
adopted characteristics in matching up with unfolding events in recent times.  For 
instance, analyses done reveal that changes in the modus operandi of the network and 
routes accessed is owed to the observed flexibility, sophistication and adaptability of 
their organizational structures.  Findings indicate that the tactics are continually 
changed, migrants are exploited and abused, deceived and tortured before, during and 
at the end of the travel.  Criminal group continue to mutate to suit every change and 
restrictive measures set by immigration authorities; only that the migrants have to pay 
dearly for it.  On the other hand, analysis shows that their authority, corruption and 
compromise attribute based on their ability of having a multijurisdictional spread has to 
a large extent impeded investigation and in turn intensifies economic profit.  
Documentary evidence show that corruption in the Libyan territory which is the number 
one point of embarkation for the maritime journeys, make it impossible to crackdown on 
the syndicate despite the fact that the actors are claimed to be well known by the 
authorities.  This over the years has been observed to influence not only arrivals but 
also other under researched push and pull factors. In sum, the characteristics and 
changing nature of the networks involved in the human trade from Libya to Italy can be 
assessed as continually complicating irregular migration issues and studies, hence 
consistent research and revision of known perception is imperative in the pursuit of a 
clampdown on the phenomenon.  
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Chapter 8  CONCLUSION 
 
At the time of writing, the human trade between Libya and Italy whereby tens of 
thousands of people seeking an escape from war or extreme poverty, are transported in 
dangerous and often deadly circumstances for profit by criminal smugglers and 
traffickers remains in place.  However, the findings of the research for this thesis indicate 
that the nature of the criminality involved in this trade has changed over the past ten 
years as the numbers of irregular migrants transported has increased markedly.   
 
The key finding is that criminal organisations involved in the human trade have changed 
from being fluid and unstructured networks to specialised, scattered, unrestrained and 
structured networks.  Evidence and data from field research conducted for this study 
indicate a probable organisational structure, particularly for the criminal groups operating 
between Africa and Southern Europe, on the central Mediterranean route.   
 
With the view of establishing the distinction between people smuggling and human 
trafficking, this study started with examining the models of transnational organised 
criminal groups and networks (TCOG/Ns) and considered their distinctive features.  It 
therefore affirms that there is firstly a conflation of people smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings, established as a highly profitable, flourishing business and in the recent 
past being driven by TCOG/Ns.  Considering the nascent nature of this phenomenon, 
the enabling factors, and the level of involvement of the TCOG/Ns, reveals that it is de 
facto driven by a collaboration of criminal organisation and networks as informed by the 
network theories of William (2001).  It is the nature of these criminal networks as well as 
their significant roles that this study has examined.  
 
In examining the actual process of the focus on Libya-to-Italy-human-trade, a number of 
factors and elements arise.  They include the actors who this study have categorised into 
groups according to the concept of the 3 Cs – Capability, Capacity, and Convenience.  This 
concept emphasized the notion of specialisation which is a sub-argument of the study.  
This study suggests that the increase and diversification of these actors could also be owed 
to the aftermath of the changes and trends which came as a result of the anti-immigration 
push-back policies implemented by relevant authorities, as well as recurrent socio-political 
upheavals.  To this end, the Arab Spring has also had a significant influence on migration 
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trends; a catalyst to both breakdown of law and order and irregular migration in majority of 
the countries of origin of the migrants.  These changes have in many ways been observed 
to also influence the routes and points of disembarkations.  It is safe to say that these 
changes influence the modus operandi that these actors employ in the pursuit of their 
purpose.  These modus operandi such as extreme violence, hostage holding, overcrowding 
of boats, unaccompanied-voyage, stranded scene concept, deprivation of liberty and 
capacity of choice are noted as strategies that these human smugglers (with a band of 
opportunistic entrepreneurs and businessmen) devised in outwitting the authorities and 
evading apprehension.  Devious means of obtaining money either as payment (the Awhala 
system) or extortion is included in this list of strategies.  This study considers the extent to 
which these smugglers would go in ensuring that they command obeisance and control, as 
indicating an unrestrained characteristic of the networks by identified amoral acts which 
have been effectively examined in this study.  It is indicative that the nature of criminality 
in this phenomenon at the stage is related to the extortion and illicit means of money 
transfer that sustains the business.  Following the reports from media, government and 
non-governmental bodies, it is debatable that these strategies to a large extent, has 
significantly influenced the trends in the events associated with the phenomenon.  
However, it is important to separate the criminality involved in the phenomenon from the 
bias and excuse/defence for which the practice is being undertaken.  In essence, the 
analysis of the persons, their modus operandi and the structure of the networks in this 
study, was poised at establishing the nature of the crime committed regardless of the 
justification that the action may have been taken as an alternative.  One major truth 
deduced from the analysis of the phenomenon is that every sector and dramatis personae 
identified in the review and analysis of the phenomenon seemed to benefit in one way or 
the other. Unfortunately but realistically, some of these benefactors are more of victims 
than beneficiaries in the long run.  For instance, a number of unintended actors were 
identified in the analysis in chapter 5 who may not have known the impact of their 
actions/activities i.e. some reception centres and shelters.  The argument about actual 
actors and unintended actors linked the European states as complicit of smuggling crimes 
based on the consequence of their policies and actions which gave room for human right 
violations with regards to the migrants in the light of the humanitarian crisis both on land 
and on the Mediterranean.  In the long run, both the immediate society and the migrants 
suffer.  Moreover, the evolution observed in the modus operandi of the migrant smugglers 
in recent times is re-aimed principally at increasing the profit of the trade.  The strategies 
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and changes in techniques according to socio-political and geographical at different stages 
are unique and significantly, unrestrained.   
 
Analysis in this study reveals unique structural organisation of criminal groups and 
networks as offshoots of pre-existing models of organised crime groups such as the 
hierarchical, client/patron, alien conspiracy and enterprise models.  Indication from 
triangulated evidence and data from judicial proceedings and interview transcripts, 
reveal that these criminal groups exhibit the ability to restructure themselves as the 
needs appear according to the network theories of Williams 2001.  In essence, they 
converge and disband, driven by the task, goal and expected outcomes.  These 
groups form what this study refers to as “collective sets” according to nationality and 
region (i.e. the “Nigeria/Ghana collabo” or the “Ethiopia/Eritrea collabo”), and inter-
relate within and without the collective sets.  They independently spring up at divergent 
locations – scattered – in their mutations, but interestingly are linked by one common 
goal which is the human trade.  Consequently, regardless of the indigenous structure 
of each of the groups, they are able to form part of the network governed solely by the 
purpose of association; people smuggling, each exhibiting distinguishing features as 
required by their task.  These attributes are what informs the analysis of these 
structures as scattered but yet structured.  
 
While the EUROPOL (2016:9) would opine based on analysis that the operations of 
smuggling networks are organised according to a ‘crime-as-service’ business model, 
this research suggests that the level of specialisation in their operations demonstrates 
that they have evolved from solely the crime-as-service model to an ‘amoeboid-
crime-as-service’ business and enforcement model.  This implies that their ability 
to change and adjust to ad-hoc structural arrangement without a definite, consistent, 
indicative structure within a period conveys a sense of amoeboid feature and 
capabilities.  Analysis in this work reveals that the networks at different times and 
occasions structure themselves into scattered groups, diversely linked and formidable 
networks, opportunist transnational networks, independent criminal groups, or even 
internally complex networks as the case may be.  This is devised with the aim of 
remaining undetectable but thriving.  This observation gave birth to unique models 
developed to accentuate these revelations; the Integrated Criminal network model 
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which depicts the overall connection of these groups in the network and another model 
that depicts the distribution and formation characteristics of the criminal networks. 
 
Conversely, this study suggests that distinctive characteristics observed based on the 
structural organisation of the groups in the networks influence the degree of flow on 
the central Mediterranean and resultant trends.  These characteristic traits exhibited 
by these criminal groups following their formations and organisations, enable their 
devised modus operandi which in turn is also poised at adjusting to the change in 
regimes and restrictive push back measure/policies.  The characteristics inform their 
capabilities and influence the model and structure of the groups in the network 
accordingly.  Examples include the changes in the routes and modus operandi as a 
result of the flexibility and adaptability characteristic of the organisational structure of 
the networks, while their multijurisdictional spread characteristic and ability, to a large 
extent, can be said to have impeded investigation.  This implies that if a criminal group 
emerges or shifts location or even reform operation does not mean that the previous 
group had been overridden but rather the existing criminal group has simply adapted 
to the trend.  These groups in turn can also influence the trend such as the emergence 
of more criminal groups as a result of methods and profits made, changes in routes 
as a reaction to push back policies which in turn creates a new market for the 
smuggling opportunities.  In essence the routes shape specialisation and vice-versa. 
 
 
Finally, having considered the evidence available and the existing debate, it is safe to 
say that the organisational structure of the people smuggling network operating from 
Libya to Italy  via the Mediterranean, defies a mere assessment of an 
unstructured/fluid network as is asserted and argued by existing literature.  The nature 
of criminality in the Libya to Africa human trade is portrayed in the adoptive 
professionalised, and sophisticated collective sets formed by transnational criminal 
groups with unique division of labour which takes on an amoeboid feature in order to 
continually be ahead of restrictive measures carried by authorities; hence the 
hypothesis of a specialised, unrestrained, and scattered but structured network.    
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Contribution to knowledge  
 
This research has been able to revise and reconstruct model(s) that mimic/portray the 
organisation and processes of the human trade by sea from Libya to Italy.  It presents 
conceivable models for explaining the distribution and formation characteristics of the 
network of criminal organisations in the ‘human trade’ from Libya to Italy contradicting 
arguments of Aziz, Monzini and Pastore (2015) which claimed that even judicial 
proceedings have not been able to identify organisational structures in the smuggling 
business.  It has also tried to interpret the evidence of the means and methods in a 
post ‘Arab Spring’ environment to the present day.  It has illuminated the 
understanding of the structure of criminal organisations involved in the irregular 
migration from North Africa to against the backdrop of established paradigms of 
organised crime and criminal networks.  
 
The distinguishing element in the research conducted was the combination of methods 
used in analysing the empirical data as well as the secondary data gathered for 
evidence and illustration.  Significant tools used for analysis include the behavioural 
statement analysis and scientific content analysis.  By the virtue of this feature, this 
research suggests that its use in the study of the criminal organisation of the human 
trade is a contribution to knowledge. 
 
It is therefore possible to state that my contributions to knowledge in this work are in 
two parts.  The first part deals with the models created in bringing to light the nature 
and role of transnational criminal networks in the process of irregular migration from 
Libya to Italy.  Against the existing debate of the human trade from Libya to Italy being 
steered by a fluid/unstructured network, this research has been able to develop 
models that suggest a definite shift with regards to the model of the network involved 
in this phenomenon.  These models demonstrate that the  criminal groups and 
networks in this particular irregular migration, exhibit a mix of traditional models of 
organised crime and at the same time, exhibiting additional significant features which 
enable them thrive and  able to contravene immigration regulatory  measures.  That is 
the integrated criminal network model in which the criminal groups, regardless of their 
pre-existing forms merge to form a strong formidable network but still maintain their 
original structures.  This is highly the case as these mergers are mainly non-
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permanent but transient in most cases and are aimed at achieving the purpose at 
hand; creating an integrated criminal network.  
 
The second is the model that demonstrates the distribution and formation 
characteristics of the criminal networks highlighting the significant attributes that 
enable the possible existence of an integrated criminal network.  For instance, the 
groups that merge to form a network or even an individual that laces himself into a 
people smuggling or trafficking ring along the sub-Saharan African route based on 
what this work refers to as the specialisation concept of the 3Cs – convenience, 
capacity and capability, may end up creating a network in the form of an Independent 
Criminal Group structure.  The individual or gangs and groups in this structure would 
consist of actors who fall into the category of what my research identified as 
opportunistic business men; who take advantage of the opportunities created by either 
the fact that smuggling routes are along their region or they have resources which 
smuggling activities along these routes may need to thrive\succeed.  This shift in their 
form and organisation portrayed by the models enables their ability to accommodate 
the increasing demand of for irregular migration created by socio-political and 
economic conditions.   
 
Another part of the contribution to knowledge is the methodology used, which has not 
been used by anyone in the way that I have.  For ethical reasons, I was not allowed to 
contact the criminals or the victims of irregular migration; however, by virtue of my 
contact with prominent prosecutors among other professionals in Italy during my filed 
study, I had unique access to very important judicial files of irregular migration cases 
which had not yet been release to the public domain.  These files contained verbatim 
testimonies of victims and records of wire taps of the conversations of the offenders, 
which provided me with first-hand information on the activities and organisations of the 
criminal networks in the Libya to Italy irregular migration in the forms of human 
trafficking and smuggling.  These files, I have by the means of Statement Analysis, 
analysed in form of evidence for illustration, corroborating it with interviews conducted 
and existing literature in addressing the important aspects of the irregular migration 
process which examined the ‘’who’’ – the actors;   ‘’how they do what they do’’ – modus 
operandi; and ‘’how they are organised and able to do what they do’’ – their 
organisational structure.  The statement and behavioural analysis is known to be used 
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for forensic investigation; a tool which enables witness testimonies to be assesses as 
credible by the criminal justice system.   This tool has never been used in analysing 
human trade debates except in this study.  This study has used this tool as a means 
of extrapolating the actual events and intricacies of the networks in all veracity.  The 
deductions therefore defy any bias.  The viability and credibility in using judicial 
proceedings have been extensively justified in the methodological notes in the second 
chapter of this work. 
 
 
Derivatives, /strong suggestions  
 
Following the title of this research, it can be concluded that transnational criminal 
networks by virtue of their disposition in form of structure models developed by this 
research, which in turn influences the modus operandi and the sort of actors that are 
consorted into the smuggling business, has revolutionised the irregular migration of 
persons across the Mediterranean in a significant way.  The formation of specialised, 
unrestrained, scattered and structured networks which in its existence combines all 
the pre-existing models of criminal organisation – from hierarchical models, economic 
enterprise, to network models and also integrated models, has provided an unforeseen 
formidable force of intra-transnational smuggling network formations.  It therefore 
requires both long term and wholesome strategies that nuances every emerging 
feature of this yet evolving formidable intra-transnational development.   
 
 
Recommendations and areas of possible future researches in this area 
 
It is important to reiterate that this research is not conclusive as the phenomenon of 
irregular migration is rather a broad and topical issue, hence new occurrence and 
observation would require continuous research and analysis.  Research areas include; 
the dearth of legal migration channels as a catalyst to the increase in maritime 
crossings; the issue of the identification of migrants, and the psychological impact of 
the Mediterranean crossing on the minors and the resultant futuristic effect. 
 
The findings in this study have a number of practical implications. The criminal 
networks are sufficiently flexible to counter law enforcement and criminal justice 
strategies. The continuation of assisted irregular migration and humn trafficking means 
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more capsizes and drownings. The details of this study should form the basis of further 
research into the way in which criminality, in its widest sense, operates in the human 
trade with a view to minimising its functioning and negative outcomes.   
The framework and the illustrated criminal network structures if applied to the evolving 
criminal networks in the land and maritime human trade will enable a more feasible 
approach in dealing with human smuggling and trafficking networks.     
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Field Study Interview Questions  
 
Title: A re-examination of the nature of criminal networks in the irregular migration from 
Libya to Italy via the Mediterranean. 
I am a PhD student of Coventry University, UK.  
My research examines irregular migration from Libya to Italy via the 
Mediterranean.  
It focuses on the evolution of criminal networks within the timeline 2007 to the present. 
It also examines how the smugglers are reacting to the recent irregular migration, 
examining the mode of criminality involved, in the light of the African (and  the Middle 
East) crises and uprisings in the last 5 years.  
Based on my preliminary research, certain points require clarification, hence this 
second field trip.  
This additional research focuses on:  
• Actors engaged in the human trade. 
• The structure of the criminal networks involved in this human trade.   
• And the modus operandi employed by these networks. 
The methodology proposed for this 2nd field study is face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews with relevant experts in the field. 
This field work is recognised by my PhD supervisors 
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Focus areas based on 
Findings 
Questions 
Actors  Research has identified the 
following probable actors in this 
process; 
  (Gammeltoft-Hansen  and 
Sørensen 2013)  
i. Transnational companies  
ii. Travel agencies 
iii. “People pushers”, smaller 
enterprises aiding migrant 
transportation 
iv. Human trafficking rings 
and smuggling networks  
v. NGO and humanitarian 
organisations that offer 
shelter and transportation 
for migrants. 
vi. push factors as actors; 
 
What is your reaction to the fact that 
human traffickers have been 
identified as resident in Italian 
territories; have been orchestrating 
escapes from reception centres 
(Caltagirone, Marsala, Comiso, 
Sicily, Potenza, Catania, Mineo 
Catania); and are involved in 
transportation within Italian 
territories? 
 
Can it be said that there are criminal 
gangs in the Italian territories 
transporting migrants to other EU 
countries? 
 
It has been said that “…there is a 
link between drivers of irregular 
migration and actors of irregular 
migration. The actors make use of 
the drivers to prey on the 





Based on my research the 
structure of these criminal 
networks is dense complex, and 
transnational.  
 
 Networks are linked in 
some cases, and parallel 
in other cases 
Should organised criminal groups 
involved in human trafficking be 
seen as scattered networks (i.e. 
having a complex modus operandi)? 
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 Networks do not involve a 
protracted criminal bond 
 Membership of networks is 
based on participation (i.e. 
is not permanent 
membership)  
 Networks have a well-
planned objective of profit  
 A cell of a criminal network 
operates within Italian 
territory (Agrigento and 
Rome) - consisting of 
Eritrean complementary to 
that operating in the 
African territory 
 Networks involve a coming 
together to commit more 
crimes, without imposing  
necessarily a hierarchical 
structure 
 
What structure have these criminal 
organisations adopted? Are they 
returning to a highly structured 
organisation? (conceivably 
horizontal) Or could it be where 
members are occasionally available 
and can be replaced at any time?  
 
What is the relationship and 
communication of the criminal 






Research has shown the 
emergence and increase of the 
use of violence by smugglers e.g. 
the use of torture, firearms, 
abuse, kidnap, coercion, sexual 









In the last year, is there evidence of 
a change in violence or other 
practices by the smugglers towards 
migrants? 
 
Are the new tactics related to 
changes taking place in the 
organisational structure, modus 
operandi and smuggling routes of 
the networks? 
 
How is it that these criminal 
activities can continue when 
Lebia Barineme Fakae 
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Payment methods employed: 
hand-to-hand, Awhala, Western 
Union Transfer; 
investigations are underway to find 
members of the network? 
 
Do the methods of payment used by 




  Could it be that the offer of migration 
to Europe is creating the demand for 
smuggling services? 
 
What unique observable changes 
have you observed in the practice of 
people smuggling over the past 5 
years; could it be said to have 
become more enterprise-driven? 
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FIELD STUDY INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS  
 
 
List of Respondents 
Respondents Sector Proxy name 
Ministero della Giustizia 
(Palermo) State Judge 
for irregular migration 
cases  
Criminal justice system Interview 1 
Rep 1 
CISS representatives  
Palermo 
Academia Interview 2 
Rep 2 
CISS representatives  
Palermo 
Academia Interview 3 











Coordinator of CRESM 
(Centro di Ricerche 
Economiche e Sociali 







MSNA, (A migrant 
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Migrant mediator and 











Vice President of the 
Consulta dele Culture, 




Officer of the Italian 
Flying Squad (the 
people smuggling and 
trafficking unit), 
Palermo, Sicily 
Criminal justice Interview 11 
Head representative of  
Casa San Francesco (a 
migrant reception 





Nina Border-line (e-mail 
correspondence) 
Academia  Interview 13 
Nigerian Ambassador to 
Italy, Rome (phone and 
e-mail interview) 
Government institution  Interview 14 
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Judge of the Ministero 
della Giustizia 
(Palermo) (Anti-
smuggling and irregular 
migration 
prosecutor/judge) 
Criminal justice system Interview 17 
Head of Police - 
Squadra Mobile, 
Palermo. 
Criminal justice system Interview 18 
International 
organisation for 
















Suora from  























Anti-Mafia organisation  Interview 26 
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Anti-Mafia organisation  Interview 27 
Professor of 
International 
Immigration Law – 
Professor in Palermo 




Academia Interview 29 
Migrant Mediator1 
From the immigration 
commission 
Government officials  Interview 30 
Migrant Mediator 2 
From the immigration 
commission  
Government officials  Interview 31 
Medical Practitioner 
handling smuggled 
migrant cases and 
torture victims. 
Government officials  Interview 32 
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JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SELECTED  
 
Five judicial proceedings and a judgement case file were selected according to their 
appropriateness to the focus of the study.  FERMO PALESTINESE 1 case against 
Abdalmenem IH Attour, “FERMO PM MUHIDIN” case against Elmi Muhidin 
Mouhamud, born in Beledweyn Somalia, “FERMO PM SCAFISCA case” regarding the 
shipwreck of 03/10/2013, the “FERMO PM GLAUCO” Case against nine (9) suspects 
and FERMO GLAUCO II against 24 suspects. They were duly translated from Italian 
to English for the ease of analysis. However, for the sake of preservation of a 
document such as judicial proceeding of a case of a nature as that of the Libya to Italy 
human trade, only one of the case files (FERMO PALESTINESE 1) is attached in this 
appendix for reference purposes. *  
 
*Previously atthached case file removed at the time of final submission for privacy 
reasons. 
